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2002 DIGILAW 984 (PNJ)

Ram Ludhaya v. Sat Pal Kataria

2002-09-25

JASBIR SINGH

body2002
Judgment Jasbir Singh, J. 1. This Criminal Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioner against an order dated 24.5.2000 passed by Executive Magistrate, Ist Class, Patiala. 2. Arguments addressed by counsel for petitioner and a reading of paper book indicate that petitioner Ram Lubhaya moved an application to the SHO concerned and also to Executive Magistrate, on the basis of which proceedings were initiated under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In his application, it was stated by the petitioner that he had been in possession of house No. 903-904, Street No. 15, Tripuri Town, Patiala. It was further stated that initially, this property belonged to one Kamal Nain, who died on 27.7.1990 and on the basis of WILL in his favour, petitioner had become owner of the property, in dispute. 3. It was again averred that even the Civil Court has ordered that a `succession certificate be issued in his favour on the basis of that WILL, vide its order dated 26.2.1998 and thereafter succession certificate was, infact, issued to him. He further stated that on 12.8.1999, he was dispossessed by members of one alleged trust and those people have also taken all his belongings in their possession. It was prayed that they be asked to vacate the property in dispute and his articles be got recovered and during the pendency of that application, proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. be enforced. 4. After this application, the matter was taken up by SHO Police Station, Civil Lines, Patiala who submitted his report before the Court below on 29.9.1999 wherein, it was specifically stated that property, in dispute, was in possession of trust known as "Bhagat Ram Kanwal Nain Memorial Trust", whose president is Sat Pal Kataria. It was further reported that the petitioner was running the Yoga Classes temporarily in that property and he used to live in that property without payment of rent and members of the trust, after passing a resolution on 12.8.1999, had dispossessed him from the property, in dispute, because they felt that he was going to grab that property, by forging a WILL. 5. During pendency of proceedings, reply was filed on behalf of Trust by its President Sat Pal Kataria wherein, it was specifically admitted that the petitioner had been in possession of the property in dispute and was running Yoga Classes therein without payment of rent on temporary basis. 5. During pendency of proceedings, reply was filed on behalf of Trust by its President Sat Pal Kataria wherein, it was specifically admitted that the petitioner had been in possession of the property in dispute and was running Yoga Classes therein without payment of rent on temporary basis. It was further admitted in reply that by passing a resolution on 12.8.1999, petitioner was dispossessed from the property in dispute. Court, after taking note of divergent stand of the parties, asked Superintendent of Police to investigate and report, his report was received on 11.1.2000. In that report also, it was stated that, at that time, alleged trust was in possession of the property, in dispute, and the petitioner, alongwith his family, was residing at a different place. It was further stated that there was no apprehension of breach of peace on the spot. By relying upon that report and also by taking note of pending litigation regarding succession certificate between the parties, Court below ordered that, proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. be dropped. 6. As is apparent from the record, and is virtually admitted by both the parties, that before 12.8.1999, petitioner had been in possession of the property, in dispute. He was residing there and was running Yoga classes in that property. It is also admitted on record that alleged trust passed one resolution on 12.8.1999 and thereafter, he was dispossessed from the property, in dispute. Petitioner them moved an application on 13.9.1999 i.e. within one month from the date of his dispossession from the property, in dispute. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioner was in possession within two months next from the date on which report was submitted by the Police Officer to the Court below on 13.9.1999. By referring to the provisions of sub-section (4) of the Section 145 of Cr.P.C., counsel for petitioner has contended that court below has committed an error of jurisdiction by not putting him in possession once, it is proved that he had forcibly been dispossessed. Section 145 Cr.P.C. reads as under :- "145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace. Section 145 Cr.P.C. reads as under :- "145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace. - (1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respect claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) For the purpose of this Section, the expression "land or water" includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by this Code for the service of summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. (4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute : Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub- section (1), he may treat the party to dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) shall be final. (6) (a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. (b) The order made under this sub-section shall be served and published in the manner laid down in sub-section (3)......" 7. Counsel has also relied upon a judgment of Honble Supreme Court in Parkash Chand Sachdeva v. The State and another, 1994(3) RCR(Crl.) 217 (SC) : AIR 1994 Supreme Court 1436. Relevant portion of that judgment in para No. 3 reads as under :- "3. True, a suit or remedy in civil Court for possession or injunction normally prevents a person from invoking jurisdiction of the criminal Court as observed by this Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 472, particularly when possession is being examined by the civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. The normal rule is as stated by the Court in Puris case. But that was a suit based on title. And that could be decided by civil Court only. That ratio cannot apply where there is no dispute about title. When claim or title are not in dispute and the parties on their own showing are co-owners and there is no partition one cannot be permitted to act forcibly and unlawfully and ask the other to act in accordance with law. That ratio cannot apply where there is no dispute about title. When claim or title are not in dispute and the parties on their own showing are co-owners and there is no partition one cannot be permitted to act forcibly and unlawfully and ask the other to act in accordance with law. Where the dispute is not on the right to possession but on the question of possession the Magistrate is empowered to take cognisance under Section 145, Cr.P.C. Neither the High Court nor the Sub-Divisional Magistrate cared to ascertain if the respondent had any claim to lawfully prevent the appellant from entering into his own house. The proceedings under Section 107 are for public peace and tranquility whereas under Section 145 relates to disputes regarding possession between parties concerning any land or water or boundaries thereof. Therefore, dropping of proceedings under Section 107 could not furnish foundation for dropping the proceedings under Section 145. Nor the law laid down Puris case could result in rejecting the application filed under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C. There being no dispute of title between the appellant and respondent the only claim to be decided was if the appellant had been forcibly or wrongly dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the information was received by the Magistrate and the High Court instead of deciding this crucial aspect, failed to exercise its jurisdiction as the appellant had sought the remedy in civil suit without applying the mind if that decision was in any way helpful for dropping the proceedings. In law, therefore, the order passed by two Courts below cannot be maintained." 8. The dispute in this case is squarely covered by the ratio of above mentioned judgment passed by their Lordships of Honble Supreme Court. In this case, possession of the petitioner is admitted. His dispossession by the respondent is also admitted. He was dispossessed on 12.8.1999 and he moved an application to the police on 13.9.1999, which was received on that very date by the Courts below. Under these circumstances, it was necessary for the Court below to take recourse to the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. but the Court declined and dropped proceedings on very flimsy grounds. Once, petitioner has been dispossessed forcibly, apprehension of breach of peace there, is natural and it cannot be presumed otherwise, simply on the basis of report made by police official. Once, petitioner has been dispossessed forcibly, apprehension of breach of peace there, is natural and it cannot be presumed otherwise, simply on the basis of report made by police official. In view of reasoning given above, order passed by Executive Magistrate Ist Class, Patiala, dated 24.5.2000, is set aside. Case is remitted back to the successor court with the direction to take appropriate proceedings, as per provisions of Section 145 of Cr.P.C. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, court below will issue notice to both the parties and it will be highly appreciated if the matter is disposed of within three months, thereafter.