JUDGMENT 1. 1. This is a unique case where the petitioner has treated the public exchequer as a bounty and stack his claim to share the same. 2. Petitioner, who is doctor, got sanctioned thirty-two days leave; went to Middle East and came back after more than 111/2 years. He claimed to continue as a Government servant and filed an application for voluntary retirement; approached the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal (for short, "the Tribunal") for seeking redressal for retiral benefits on the ground of deemed acceptance of his application for voluntary retirement. The Tribunal, having no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal as there was no impugned order rejecting his application for voluntary retirement or denying him the retiral benefits, passed an order in his favour. Subsequently, the State Government, treating the petitioner to be still in public service, initiated disciplinary proceeding against him for remaining absent after coming back from abroad, though there was no order of joining his duties and proceeded ex-parte against him as the petitioner did not consider it proper to join the inquiry treating himself to be a retired employee of the State and the State terminated his service. This shows a complete apathy also on the part of the Tribunal and the State as how they have acted without any sense of responsibility and what was the occasion for the State to treat the petitioner in service if he remained absent without leave for more than 111/2 years as absence for such a long period could give rise to presumption of voluntarily abandonment of service, terminating the bonds of privity of service, bringing an end to the relationship of "master" and servant" 3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner was appointed as a Civil Assistant Surgeon through the Rajasthan Public Service Commission on regular basis, vide order dated 14.3.69. He stood confirmed vide order dated 1.7.71. Vide order dated 3.4.79, he was sanctioned leave for three months only. Subsequently, vide order dated 12.4.79, he also applied for leave for 32 days, i.e. from 29.4.79 to 31.5.79 on account of personal work. Subsequently, he also applied for leave from 1.6.80 to 31.12.81 but his application was not even processed/considered and no order was passed. thereon. Vide order dated 3.4.79, he was sanctioned leave for three months only. Subsequently, vide order dated 12.4.79, he also applied for leave for 32 days, i.e. from 29.4.79 to 31.5.79 on account of personal work. Subsequently, he also applied for leave from 1.6.80 to 31.12.81 but his application was not even processed/considered and no order was passed. thereon. Petitioner came back after eleven years and seven months on 1.1.91 and though there is no order on record but he claimed that he was put under Order of Awaiting Posting on 3.9.91, a legal notice was served upon the respondents that petitioner should be given posting. There is nothing on record to show as what happened, but it appears that petitioner had filed some application for voluntary retirement and as no order was passed thereon, he approached the Tribunal by filing Appeal No. 205/94, which was decided on 23.12.95, directing that his absence from 1.6.79 to 21.6.2 be treated as extraordinary leave and other reliefs were also granted. As the order was not complied with contempt application was file before the Tribunal, wherein, an order of grant of pension was made and it was further observed that in case the order is not complied with, the contempt matter would be referred to the High Court, as is evident from the order dated 7.3.2000. Neither the petitioner nor the representative of the State pointed out to the Tribunal that disciplinary proceedings were pending against the petitioner as per the charge-sheet dated 12.10.95 for remaining wilful absent without leave from 12.7.92, Inspite of all the orders, the disciplinary proceedings continued and in pursuance of the same, the impugned order dated 7.4.2000 has been passed terminating the services of the petitioner and subsequently withdrawing other benefits vide order dated 31. 2001. Hence this petition. 4. I have heard Mr. Lodha at length and perused the record. 5. Admittedly, petitioner remained absent without getting the leave sanctioned for more than 11/ years. 2001. Hence this petition. 4. I have heard Mr. Lodha at length and perused the record. 5. Admittedly, petitioner remained absent without getting the leave sanctioned for more than 11/ years. In such an eventuality, even under rule 86 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (sic Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 ?), if an employee remains absent for more than thirty days, his services are liable to be terminated after holding disciplinary proceedings, However, it is also settled law that as a Government servant cannot be termed as a slave, he has a right to abandon the service any time voluntarily by submitting his resignation and alternatively, not joining the duty and remaining absent for long. Absence from duty in the beginning may be a misconduct but when absence is for a very long period, it may amount to voluntarily abandonment of service and in that eventuality, the bonds of service come to an end automatically without requiring any order to be passed by the employer. 6. In M/s. Jeewan Lal (1929) Ltd., Calcutta Vs. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1567 , the Apex Court held as under : ".....if an employee continues to be absent from duty without obtaining leave and in an unauthorised manner for such a long period of time that an inference may reasonably be drawn from such absence that by his absence he has abandoned service, then such long unauthorised absence may legitimately be held to cast a break in continuity of service... We would like to make it clear that..... there would be the class of cases where long unauthorised absence may reasonably give rise to an inference that such service is intended to be abandoned by the employee." 7. Similarly, in Shahoodul Haque Vs. the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar & Anr., AIR 19741SC 1896 , the Apex Court observed as under': "The undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post or duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient ground for his absence, is so glaring that giving him further opportunity to dis-prove what he practically admits, could service no useful purpose. It could not benefit him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him. it would prolong his agony. It could not benefit him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him. it would prolong his agony. On the view we have adopted on the facts of this case, it is not necessary to consider the further question whether any notice for termination of service was necessary or duly given on the assumption that he was not punished. We do not think that there is any question involved in this case which could justify an interference by us......" 8. For the purpose of termination, there has to be positive action on the part of the employer while abandonment of service is a consequence of unilateral action of the employee and the employer has no role in it. 9. In the State of Haryana Vs. Om Prakash & Anr., (1998) 8 SCC 733 , the Hon'ble Apex Court explained the distinction between 'retrenchment' and "abandonment from service, observing as under : "Retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) means termination by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, it contemplates an act on the part of the employer which puts an end to service to fall within the definition of the expression 'retrenchment' in Section 2 (oo) of the Act. There was nothing of the sort in the instant case. It was the workman who ceased to report for duty...... therefore, this is a case in which the employer has done nothing whatsoever to put an end to his employment and hence, the case does not fall within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. Therefore, the case does not attract Section 2 (oo), nor does it satisfy the requirement of Section 25-F." 10. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Vijay Singh Charan Vs. Management, Shri Swetamber Nakoda Parshwnath Tirth Mewa Nagar & Anr., 1999 (1) RLW 314. In Syndicate Bank Vs. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association & Anr., AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2198 ; and Aligarh Muslim University & ors. Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2783 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that if a person is absent beyond the prescribed period for which leave of any kind can be granted, he should be treated to have resigned and ceased to be in service. Vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2783 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that if a person is absent beyond the prescribed period for which leave of any kind can be granted, he should be treated to have resigned and ceased to be in service. In such a case, there is no need to hold an enquiry or to give any notice as it would amount to useless formalities. 11. In such an eventuality, as petitioner remained absent for more than 11 years, the State had a right to remove his name from the register of its employees, treating it to be a case of voluntarily abandonment of service. 12. When the petitioner returned from abroad after 111/2 years' absence, the State Government committed a mistake in treating him to be in service. Though it did not give him any posting but he again remained absent w.e.f. 12.7.92 and vide order dated 12.10.95, an inquiry was initiated against him. The charge sheet was served upon him; he was given an opportunity to file reply but petitioner had chosen not to file any reply. The Disciplinary Authority informed the petitioner by substituted service, i.e. publication in local news-paper "Dainik Nav-Jyoti" regarding pendency of the inquiry against the petitioner. The inquiry was conducted ex-parte and after completing the same, the inquiry report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority served the petitioner with enquiry report and asked him to make a representation, if any, against the inquiry report. As petitioner did not join, again the Disciplinary Authority took care to serve him by substituted service, i.e. by publication in the local news-paper on 15,4.99. Inspite of that, no representation was received from him and even he refused to accept the registered letter in respect of the same. As all the relevant notices had been served upon the petitioner only by publication in the local news-paper and petitioner did not join the inquiry, ultimately the Disciplinary Authority came to the conclusion that he was guilty of remaining absent from duty w.e.f. 12.7.92 till the date of passing the impugned order and for that, petitioner was removed from service vide impugned order dated 7.4.2001 and subsequently consequential order dated 31.7.2001 was passed. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. Virendra Lodha, learned counsel for petitioner, has fairly submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, petitioner could have been treated to have abandoned the service, but the Mate Government has not treated him as such and once the State has treated him to be in service and he had submitted an application for voluntary retirement which was deemed to have been accepted though there was no formal order passed and once the Tribunal passed the order, the State Government had no power to proceed with the inquiry. Though at the initial stage when the Tribunal dealt with the case, the inquiry was not pending but when the Tribunal dealt with the case on 13.7.99, the inquiry was pending. Again the Tribunal passed the order on 7.3.2000 and on that date, the inquiry was pending but the Tribunal was never informed of any of these disciplinary proceedings pending against the petitioner. The order passed earlier by the State Government in pursuance of the Tribunal's order had been recalled vide order dated 31.7.2001 by the State Government granting no relief to him whatsoever. 14. Mr. Lodha could not point out any order on record as against which order the appeal had been filed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal can entertain an appeal provided there is an impugned order rejecting the application of a Government servant for the relief claimed by him and in absence of any such order of rejection of his application, the appeal is not maintainable. 15. The Tribunal can entertain an appeal provided there is an impugned order rejecting the application of a Government servant for the relief claimed by him and in absence of any such order of rejection of his application, the appeal is not maintainable. 15. The Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 (for short, "the Act, 1976") defines the "service matters" in Section 2 (f) which reads as under : " 'Service matter' means any one or more than one of the following matters relating to a Government servant : (i) Seniority; (ii) Promotion; (iii) Confirmation; (iv) Fixation of pay; (v) an order denying or vary in pay, allowances, pension and other service conditions to the disadvantage of the Government Servant otherwise than as a penalty; (vi) Cases of revision while officiating in a higher service, grade or post to lower service, grade or post otherwise than a penalty; (vii) Withholding the pension or denying the maximum pension otherwise pension otherwise than as penalty; (viii) Any other matter notified by the Government." (Emphasis added), Section 9 reads as under:- "Limitation for Appeals:-No appeal shall lie to the Tribunal after the expiry of sixty days from the date of order of the authority. (Emphasis added). 16. Section 10 of the Act, 1976 excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Court with respect to any matter arising under or provided for by the Act. 17. The controversy of maintaining an appeal without an impugned order being in existence, arose before this Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Jodh Singh, 1980 RLW 245 , and it has been held therein that such an appeal can be maintained. However, doubting the correctness of the said judgment, the matter was referred to a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Revision No. 196/1985, Jora Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan , vide order dated 4.9.89. The bench examined the issue at length and after considering the cumulative effect of provisions of the Act, 1976, held as under "A perusal of Section 2 (f), Section 4 and Section 9 would make it clear that an appeal lies before the Tribunal within sixty days from the date of passing of the order relating to service matter affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity. The Tribunal is constituted as an appellate forum for appeals against the orders passed against the Government servant relating to matters provided in Section 2 (f), If there is no order passed, then the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would not be attracted. It is only against any adverse order that an appeal can be filed within a period of sixty days..... So far as the present case is concerned, admittedly no order adverse to the plaintiff was passed by the Government relating to any service matter as contemplated under Section 2 (f) of the Act and so there can be no question of availing the remedy of appeal before the Tribunal. The Courts below did not examine the matter in this light and simply proceeded to consider that the matter being a service matter, as such jurisdiction of civil court is barred. It is true that matters are service matters but in respect of which no adverse order has been passed against the plaintiff so the remedy of appeal would not be available to the plaintiff as such so far as the present suit is concerned, in our opinion, it is triable by the Civil Court and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred." 18. The Division bench made it clear that for maintaining an appeal before the Tribunal, an impugned order must be, in fact, in existence and in absence of such an order, an appeal is not maintainable. Thus, existence of impugned order was held to be a condition precedent for filing an appeal before the Tribunal. 19. The said Division Bench judgment gets further fortified by the other relevant provisions of the Act, 1976. Clause (v) of Section 2 (f) provides that the service matters include an order denying or varying the pay, allowances, pension and other service conditions, that means that there has to be an order in existence for filing the appeal against. Section 4 of the Act reads as under:- "4. Duties of the Tribunal-: The Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal shall hear an appeal against the order passed by an officer or authority on any service matter or matters affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity. Section 4 of the Act reads as under:- "4. Duties of the Tribunal-: The Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal shall hear an appeal against the order passed by an officer or authority on any service matter or matters affecting a Government servant in his personal capacity. (2) The Tribunal shall have power to confirm, vary or reverse the order against which the appeal is preferred or to remand the matter for fresh decision in accordance with the directions given by it." 20. Thus, the provisions make it abundantly clear that a Government servant can maintain an appeal if he is aggrieved by an order passed by the Competent Authority under the Act or Rule as and the Tribunal a competent to confirm, vary or reverse the said order and in an appropriate case, the matter can also be remanded for re-determination before the Authority which had passed the order, impugned before the Tribunal. 21. In absence of an order, if petitioner was aggrieved of non-consideration of his application for voluntary retirement, he could have approached the High Court for issuing a mandamus to consider that application, but the Tribunal lacks competence to issue such a direction what to talk of deciding such a matter. Therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal remained an order passed by it without jurisdiction and, thus, nullity. 22. Moreno, how an application can be filed for voluntary retirement by an employee who, even after coming from abroad after more than 111/2 years' absence remained absent for more than two years; whether in such circumstances there could, by deeming fiction enshrined in Rule 244(1)(b) of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 his application for voluntary retirement would be deemed to have been accepted as the same provide for submitting an application for voluntary retirement by an employee who is working on duty It would be travesty of justice to accept the contention that a person, who is absent from duty for years together, may send an application for voluntary retirement and if no order is passed on that application, his application would be deemed to have been accepted. It may give rise further to very complicated situation that an employee, who chooses not to cooperate with disciplinary proceedings and the Disciplinary Authority proceeds against him ex-parte, while remaining absent from duty, may submit an application for voluntary retirement and may submit that by deeming fiction, his application deemed to have been accepted, 23. Thus, in such facts and circumstances, his case for voluntary retirement cannot be accepted in absence of any order passed by the Competent Authority. 24. So far as the inquiry is concerned, admittedly, inspite of service by substituted mode, i.e. publication in the local news-paper, the petitioner did not join the inquiry. No irregularity has been pointed out by Mr. Lodha in holding the ex-parte inquiry. Petitioner had been afforded all opportunities to join but he did not join. He did not even make any representation against the inquiry report. The Disciplinary Authority considered the inquiry report and passed the order imposing the punishment of termination of his service. The termination, in such circumstances, cannot be held to be an excessive punishment or disproportionate to the delinquency committed by the petitioner. 25. In a case like instant, the Court can review only the "decision making procedure" and not the "decision" of the authority. The Court, not being a Court of Appeal, is not competent to substitute its own view on factual aspects of the case. The Court can review to correct errors of law or fundamental procedural requirements which may lead to manifest injustice and can interfere with the impugned order in "exceptional circumstances"'. (Vide Union of India Vs. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1185 ; State of Bank of India Vs. Samarendra Kishore Endow, (1994) 2 SCC 537 ; State of Punjab Vs. Surjit Singh, (1996) 8 SCC 350 ; State of U.P. Vs. Ashok Kumar Singh, AIR 1996 Supreme Court 736 ; State of U.P. Vs. Nand Kishore Shukla & Anr., AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1561 ; Transport Commissioner, Madras Vs. Thiru ARK Moorthy, (1995) 1 SCC 332 ; Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Bhola Nath Singh & ors., AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1908 ; State of Punjab Vs. Bakshish Singh, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2696 ; Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 739 ; Union of India Vs. Lt. Gen. Thiru ARK Moorthy, (1995) 1 SCC 332 ; Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank Vs. Bhola Nath Singh & ors., AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1908 ; State of Punjab Vs. Bakshish Singh, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2696 ; Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1999) 7 SCC 739 ; Union of India Vs. Lt. Gen. R.S. Kadyan & ors., AIR 2000 Supreme Court 2513 ; Food Corporation of India Vs. A. Prahalada Rao & Anx., AIR 2001 Supreme Court 51 ; Kumaon Mandal. Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. Girja Shankar Pant & ors., AIR 2001 Supreme Court 24 ; N.R. Nair Vs. Union of India & ors., AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2337 ; and Union of India Vs. Ashutosh Kumar Srivastava, (2002) 1 SCC 188 ). 26. In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Subramaniam, AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1232 , the Apex Court held that as the High Court has power of judicial review of the administrative action on complaint relating to service conditions of the employee, it is within the exclusive domain of the disciplinary authority to consider the evidence on record and to record findings whether the charge stood proved or not. It is equally settled law that technical rules of evidence have no application in the disciplinary proceedings and the authority is to consider the material on record. In judicial review, the Court "has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches, is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or the Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, the Court or the Tribunal is devoid of power to re-appreciate the evidence and would come to its own conclusion on the proved charges. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has, in its judicial review, is to consider whether the conclusion is based on the evidence on record that support the finding, or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence." 27. In the General Court Martial & ors. Vs. Col. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has, in its judicial review, is to consider whether the conclusion is based on the evidence on record that support the finding, or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence." 27. In the General Court Martial & ors. Vs. Col. Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal, AIR 1998 Supreme Court 983 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court, in its limited power of exercise of djudicial review, may interfere by a reciating the evidence only if there is an omission on the part of the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority to consider the relevant evidence. Similarly, in Rajendra Kumar Kindra Vs. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , the Court observed as under:-- "It is equally well settled that where a quasi-judicial Tribunal or arbitrator records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are either his ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stans vitiated... Viewed either angle, the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer.... are wholly perverse and hence unsustainable. The High Court, in our opinion, was dearly in error in declining to examine the contention that the findings were perverse on the short, specious and wholly untenable ground that the matter depends on appraisal of evidence. Between appraisal of evidence and total lack of evidence there is an appreciable difference which could never be lost sioht of and the High Court ought not to have short-circuited the writ petition ' 28. Even the issue of interference on quantum of punishment has also been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments and it was held that if the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it would be arbitrary and thus would violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, being illegal, it cannot be enforced. (Vide Bhagat Ram V/s State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 Supreme Court 454 ; S.K. Giri Vs. Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs & Ors., 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 519 ; Union of India Vs. Giriraj Sharma, AIR 1994 Supreme Court 215 ; Bishan Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 10 SCC 461 ; Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 611 ; and B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs & Ors., 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 519 ; Union of India Vs. Giriraj Sharma, AIR 1994 Supreme Court 215 ; Bishan Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 10 SCC 461 ; Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India & Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 611 ; and B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996 Supreme Court 484) . 29. In Ranjeet Thakur (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on the aspect, which is otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. In the present case, the punishment is so stringently disproportionate as to call for and justify interference. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judicial review." 30. The said judgment has been approved and followed by the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. G. Ganayutham, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 3387 , and after examining elaborately the concept of reasonableness, rationality and proportionality, the same view has been reiterated. 31. In B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), after examining various earlier decisions of the Supreme Court, the Court observed that in exercise of the powers of judicial review, the Court cannot "normally" substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by an Authority "shocks the conscience" of the Court, it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the litigation, itself "impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof'". While examining the issue of proportionality, court can also consider the circumstances under which the misconduct was 'committed. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced him to do so, though he had no intention to do so. (Vide Giriraj Sharma (supra). The Court may further examine the effect, if order is set aside or substituted by some other minor penalty. 32. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced him to do so, though he had no intention to do so. (Vide Giriraj Sharma (supra). The Court may further examine the effect, if order is set aside or substituted by some other minor penalty. 32. In State of U.P. Vs. Nand Kishore Shukla (supra). the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Court is not an appellate authority and, therefore, the Court will be loath to interfere with that part of the order. In the Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. B. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2447 , The Court held that in case of accepting the illegal gratification and refraining from prosecution against the offender, the dismissal of service is warranted. Similarly, in the case of Municipal Committee, Bahadurgarh Vs. Krishnan Behari, AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1249 , the Apex Court has held that once an employee is found guilty of embezzlement, the minimum punishment is dismissal and Court should not interfere in such cases. 33. In G. Ganayutham (supra), the Apex Court has considered the entire law on the subject and compared the Indian law with English, Australian and Canadian Laws and held that in case the court comes to the conclusion that the punishment awarded is disproportionate or the Disciplinary Authority was irrational in imposing the punishment, the punishment cannot be quashed as even then the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration and it is only in very rare cases that the Court might- to shorten the litigation- think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the Competent Authority. In Aniltej Singh Dhaliwal supra); and U.P.S.R.T.C. & ors. Vs. A.K. Parul, (1998) 9 SCC 416 , the Apex Court has taken the same view. 34. In Council of Civil Services Union Versus Minister for Civil Service, 1984 (3) All E.R. 935, it was held that anything disproportionate should be discarded. It was further observed that judicial review is permissible only on limited grounds, namely, illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety and proportionality. The concept of irrationality has been explained as a decision which is so outrageous in its deviation of logic or accepted moral stand that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided would have arrived at. The concept of irrationality has been explained as a decision which is so outrageous in its deviation of logic or accepted moral stand that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided would have arrived at. Procedural impropriety has been explained as failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who would be affected by the decision. The requirement of procedural propriety depends upon the subject matter of the decision, the executive functions of the decision-maker and the particular circumstances in which the decision came to be made. 35. Similar view has been reiterated in Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 677 . In Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 625 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if the finding of fact is based on appreciation of evidence, the Writ Court should not normally interfere with those findings unless the findings are shown to be wholly perverse or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the Court as the High Court cannot sit as appellate forum for the factual finding recorded during the disciplinary proceedings for the reason that it exercises a very limited power of judicial review and in exercise of such power, the High Court should not substitute its own conclusion with regard to the guilt or delinquency, for that of the departmental authority. The Court further observed as under: "Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or Departmental Authority is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty." (emphasis added). 36. Same view has been reiterated in Rajat Baran Roy & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1661 ; Style (Dress Land) Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1999) 7 SCC 89 ; Union of India Vs. Hinunat Singh Chahar, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1980 ; Registered Society Vs. Union of India, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2979 ; High Court of judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 416 ; Consumer Education & Research Society Vs. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1999) 7 SCC 89 ; Union of India Vs. Hinunat Singh Chahar, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 1980 ; Registered Society Vs. Union of India, AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2979 ; High Court of judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 416 ; Consumer Education & Research Society Vs. Union of India, AIR 2000 Supreme Court 975 ; and U.P.R.S.R.T. Corporation Vs. Madan Lal Gupta, (2000) 9 SCC 521 . 37. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in District Judge, Bahraich & Anr. Vs. Munijar Prasad, JT 2001 (8) SC 643 ; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Ashutosh Kumar Srivastava , (supra); and Haryana Financial Corporation & ors. Vs. Jagdamba Oil & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 496 . 38. Thus, in view of the above, the case does not fall within the ambit of the cases where this Court can have a judicial review of the impugned order passed by the respondents. 39. Even otherwise, interfering with the impugned orders of termination of service and withdrawal of benefit granted earlier, would amount to reviving the wrong orders, which is neither desireable nor warranted. The Court should not set-aside an order which revives an illegal and bad order. (Vide) Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1966 Supreme Court 828 ; Maharaja Chintamani Saranath Shahdeo Vs. State of Bihar & Oors., (1999) 8 SCC 16 ; and Mallikarjuna Muddnagal Nagappa & ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & ors., (2000) 7 SCC 238 ). 40. The Courts are not under an obligation to interfere in such matter for the reason that Common Law doctrine of public policy can be enforced wherever an action affects or offends public interest or where harmful result of permitting the injury to the public at large is evident. 41. In State of Haryana Vs. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2129 , the Hon'ble Apex Court dealt with a similar case and held that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/32 or even under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court and the High Courts should not grant relief based on illegal action of the public authorities. The Courts are under an obligation to rectify the wrongs and not to perpetuate illegal orders passed by the authority, if any, as it would legitimise the wrong action ranting the relief. The Courts are under an obligation to rectify the wrongs and not to perpetuate illegal orders passed by the authority, if any, as it would legitimise the wrong action ranting the relief. The public accountability requires that the Courts should issue direction to proceed against the erring Statutory Authority rather than granting relief to an employee who has illegally been made some favour. 42. In C.P. Chengalvaraiya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, AIR 1994 Supreme Court 853 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "....the Courts are meant to impart justice.... process of the Court is being abused......... unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely." 43. In Noorduddin Vs. Dr. K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242 , the Apex Court observed as under: ...... the judicial process should never become an instrument of oppression or abuse or a means in the process of the court to subvert justice. 44. In Ramniklal N. Bhutta Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1236 , it was observed as under: "The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point........ the interest of justice and public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same...... The Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226..... indeed any of their discretionary powers. (Emphasis added)" 45. In Jai Kumar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 5 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "Justice is supreme and justice ought to be beneficial for society so that the society is placed in a better situation. Law Courts exist for the society and ought to rise up to the occasion to do the needful in the matter and as such ought to act in a manner so as to subserve the basic requirement of the society." 46. Therefore, it is not desirable to interfere with the impugned orders for the reason that petitioner would get the benefits of illegal/wrong orders without rendering any service to the State. 47. Therefore, it is not desirable to interfere with the impugned orders for the reason that petitioner would get the benefits of illegal/wrong orders without rendering any service to the State. 47. In view of the above, I reach the following inescapable conclusions:- (i) Petitioner proceeded on leave for a particular period and remained absent from the duty, without getting the leave sanctioned, for more than 111/2 years; (ii) His absence from duty for such a long period, i.e. more than 111/2 years was enough to give irrebutable presumption that he had voluntarily abandoned the service of the State and in such an eventuality, the bond of privity of service came to an end automatically; (iii) Even if he was allowed to join the service in 1991, he wilfully remained absent from duty without any cause since 1992 for several years; (iv) In the facts and circumstances of the case, a person who remains absent from duty for years together, could not submit an application for voluntary retirement and assert that by deeming fiction, his application stood accepted and he was entitled for the retiral benefits; (v) The orders passed by the "Tribunal" were nullity for want of jurisdiction as no order had ever been passed by the Statutory Authority rejecting his application for retiral benefits on the basis of deemed retirement; (vi) Admittedly, the inquiry against the petitioner had been held in accordance with law and complying with the principles of natural justice and as petitioner, for the reasons best known to him, did not participate in the inc(uiry, the same does not warrant any interference by this Court in a limited jurisdiction of judicial review; (vii) The impugned orders do not require any interference as it would revive the wrong and illegal orders; (viii) It would be travesty of justice to grant any relief to a person who remained absent from 1979 till 2001 i.e. for more than two decades; and (ix) The substantial justice/equity does not warrant any relief to the petitioner. Petitioner's own conduct disentitles him any relief whatsoever. The petition is accordingly dismissed without notice to the other side. Petion dismissed. *******