JUDGMENT : Tapen Sen, J.—This Letters Patent Appeal directed against the judgment and order dated 4.8.1997 passed by a learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 1362 of 1994 (R). dismissing the Writ Application and upholding the Award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Dhanbad dated 21.1.1994 in Reference No. 76/93. 2. The Government of India, Ministry of Labour referred the following dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication :-- "Whether the Management of Angrapathra Colliery in Area No. IV of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited is justified in not regularising the workman detailed in annexure enclosed in the job/posts given against each with corresponding wage rates and other benefits as per N.C.W.A. III & IV? If not, to what relief the workmen are entitled." 3. The total number of concerned workman, as per the annexure was 17 and they were stated to have been doing the work of Fitter, Head Mistry and Tyndals. The claim of the workman was that all the concerned workmen were performing their respective duties since 1978 in the Angrapathra Colliery regularly and on permanent nature of jobs. They said that they had become members of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and contributions were regularly being deducted from their wages. They also claimed that they have been engaged in connection with operation of Coal Mining Industry in the under ground mines covered under the Mines Act and they were required to attend break down and emergency duties apart from daily routine jobs. They filed a joint petition on 4.8.1989 and approached the Management requesting that they should be declared as departmental workers but the management did not pay and heed and this ultimately gave rise to a demand and conciliation proceedings which ended in failure giving rise to the reference. The concerned workmen were demanding regularisation of their jobs and treatment as permanent employees of Angrapathra Colliery and also for payment of wages as provided in the National Coal Wage Agreement No. III & IV stated above along with other allowances and consequential benefits. 4. Before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, the Management refuted the claims of the concerned workmen and stated that no workman was even appointed by them and no letter of appointment had also been issued. The stand of the Management was that one Mahendra Yadav, whose name also appears at Sl. 4. Before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, the Management refuted the claims of the concerned workmen and stated that no workman was even appointed by them and no letter of appointment had also been issued. The stand of the Management was that one Mahendra Yadav, whose name also appears at Sl. No. 2 of the list of the workmen, was awarded some contract job of transporting materials from one place to another and he was paid the amount as per orders and bills submitted by him. He was not a regular contractor but was entrusted with the contract job as and when required. The Management further stated that Shri Yadav had engaged his own workers and he himself used to supervise their work. 5. At paragraph 8 of the Award, the learned Tribunal held that admittedly the concerned workmen had not been issued any appointment letter nor identity card nor pay slips and thus came to a conclusion that the matter was set at rest to the effect that the concerned workmen were not the employees of the company although they claim to have been working since 1978. At paragraph 9 of the Award, the learned Tribunal observed that it was the consistent case of the Management that Mahendra Yadav had been engaging his own men who accomplished the miscellaneous job of engineering which had been entrusted to him and that although Mahendra Yadav had not been examined to say that the concerned workmen had been working under him, the Tribunal, relying on two Payment Registers which bore the names of concerned workmen and upon noticing the signature of Mahendra Yadav was to be found in every place on those registers, came to a conclusion that the payments were made as per Section 29 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and such payment was made in the presence of the representative of the Management. Consequently, the Tribunal came to a conclusion that these payment registers proved that the concerned workmen had been working under Mahendra Yadav, the contractor and also came to a conclusion, that all the workmen were working impliedly as contract labour. Consequently, the Tribunal came to a conclusion that these payment registers proved that the concerned workmen had been working under Mahendra Yadav, the contractor and also came to a conclusion, that all the workmen were working impliedly as contract labour. Having held in the manner stated above, the Tribunal entered into evidence to find out the periods during which these concerned workmen had been working and the relevant paragraphs in which the Tribunal considered this aspect are paragraph 12 to paragraph 18 of the Award. 6. On the basis of the aforesaid findings and although he held that the concerned workmen were not employees of the workman, the Tribunal came to a conclusion that they were impliedly contract workmen and, therefore, also came to a conclusion that these workmen have been doing permanent nature of job for years together as contract labour in a system that amounted to a camouflage to deprive these workmen of their rightful claims. Consequently, he directed regularization of these workmen as Category-I Mazdoor under the Management of Angarpathra Colliery of M/s. B.C.C.L. 7. Being aggrieved, the Management filed CWJC No. 1362/94 (R) and a learned Single Judge, delivering a well reasoned Judgment came to a finding at paragraph 10 that though the concerned workmen were doing the work as contract labourers, but that was only an eye wash to deprive them of their rightful claim and thus directed the Management to regularize the services. The appellants repeatedly took the plea that there was no relationship of employer and employee and employee, as admittedly, no appointment letters had been issued and, therefore, the Tribunal came to an erroneous conclusion that the workmen were engaged by Mahendra Yadav. The appellants also took the plea that as per the provisions of Section 10, a prohibition notification was required to be issued prohibiting contract labourers and admittedly in the instant case there was no such notification and, therefore, the Management cannot be compelled to regularize the services of such worker. 8. The learned Single Judge, however, rejected the aforesaid contention at paragraph 17 on a different consideration. The learned Single Judge stated as follows :--"At this juncture, the argument of Mr. Mehta cannot be lost sight of. His argument is that there is no notification u/s 10 of the Act to prohibit contract labour as far as this establishment is concerned. The learned Single Judge, however, rejected the aforesaid contention at paragraph 17 on a different consideration. The learned Single Judge stated as follows :--"At this juncture, the argument of Mr. Mehta cannot be lost sight of. His argument is that there is no notification u/s 10 of the Act to prohibit contract labour as far as this establishment is concerned. Thus it may be argued that ratio of Air India Statutory Corporation's case (supra) may not be applicable in as much as this decision deals with the status of the contract labours after abolition of contract labour. But, in my view, the aforesaid decision supports the principle that such workmen have right to live by continuing in employment permanently." 9. Learned Single Judge therefore held that the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 did not apply in the instant case. Another reason why the learned Single Judge came to the aforementioned conclusion was that there was not an iota of evidence to suggest that the provisions of the Act applied to the establishment. The learned Single Judge stated that the Act applied to an establishment in which twenty (20) or more contract labourers were engaged/employed and where the contractor himself employed such number of workers or more than that. He took into consideration the fact that the management had failed to establish that even at the relevant time twenty (20) or more contract labourers were employed by the contractor. The learned Single Judge also took into consideration that on the other hand in the written statement the Management had admitted that the name of Mahendra Yadav appeared at Sl. No. 2 of the list of workmen and he was awarded the contract but transportation of materials from one place to another. They had also stated that Mahendra Yadav was not a regular Contractor and he used to carry out contract work as and them required and it was not the case of management at any point of time that Mahendra Yadav had engaged twenty (20) or more workers at any point of time. On the basis of the aforementioned reasonings, the learned Single Judge came to a conclusion that the provisions of the aforementioned Act did not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. On the basis of the aforementioned reasonings, the learned Single Judge came to a conclusion that the provisions of the aforementioned Act did not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Having so held, the learned Single Judge examined the case on the assumption as to whether the workmen working since decades were entitled to be regularized when work was perennial in nature. In answering the aforesaid issue, the learned Single Judge relying upon the judgment of Hussainbhai v. The Alath Factory Tezhila Union and others, reported in AIR 1978 SC 140 quoted paragraph 5 of the judgment and which I being quoted here also : "The true test may, with brevity, be indicated once again. Where a worker or group of workers labours to produce goods or services and these goods or services are for the business of another, that other is, in fact, the employer. He has economic control over the workers' sustenance skill and continued employment. If he, for any reason, chokes off, the workers is, virtually laid off. The presence of intermediate contractors with whom alone the workers have immediate or direct relationship excontract is of no consequence when, on lifting the veil or looking at the conspectus of factors governing employment, we discern the naked truth, though draped in different perfect paper arrangement, that the real employer is the management, not the immediate contractor. Myriad devices, half-hidden in 'fold after fold of legal form depending on the degree of concealment needed, the type of industry, the local conditions and the like, may be resorted to when labour legislation casts welfare obligations on thereal employer, based on Articles 38, 39, 42, 43 and 43-A of the Constitution. The Court must be statute to avoid the mischief and achieve the purpose of the law and not be mislead by the maya of legal appearances." 10. The learned Single Judge did also take into consideration paragraph 59 of the Judgment of Air India Statutory Corporation, (supra), but that was really redundant in as much as learned Single Judge had already held that the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 was not applicable. The learned Single Judge did also take into consideration paragraph 59 of the Judgment of Air India Statutory Corporation, (supra), but that was really redundant in as much as learned Single Judge had already held that the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 was not applicable. However, taking into consideration, the other Judgment quoted above and after having noted that Mahendra Yadav, the contractor, employed the concerned workmen for doing perennial nature of jobs for the management and the workmen being highly experienced and skilled, held that the contractor engaged was in reality an agency of the management and his contracts were only a veil between the Management and the contract labourers and, therefore, came to a conclusion that the workmen were in fact employees of the management. Having so held, the learned Single Judge refused to interfere and upheld the Award passed by the Tribunal. 11. Now, on perusal of the Judgment of the learned Single Judge, it is apparent that although he came to a conclusion that the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 did not apply in the facts of this case, yet, the Judgment proceeded on the assumption that the contract was an eye wash or a camouflage and also came to a conclusion that the concerned workmen were impliedly working as a contract labourers. 12. In view of the reasonings aforesaid and also taking into consideration of the Judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others etc. etc. Vs. National Union Water Front Workers and Others etc. etc., (2001) 7 SCC 1 , which has overruled prospectively the Judgment of Air India Statutory Corporations case, it is held that by mere engagement of contract labour, it cannot be ipso facto contended that a relationship of master and servant existed between the principal employer and the concerned employees. The Supreme Court has held that where a workman is hired in or in connection with the work of an establishment by the principal employer through a contractor, he merely acts as an agent so there will be master- and-servant relationship between the principal employer and the workman. But where a workmen is hired in or in connection with the work of an establishment by a contractor, a question might arise as to whether the contractor is a mere camouflage. But where a workmen is hired in or in connection with the work of an establishment by a contractor, a question might arise as to whether the contractor is a mere camouflage. If the answer is in the affirmative, the workman will be in fact an employee of the principal employer; but if the answer is in the negative, the workman will be a contract labour. In the instant case, the findings of the Tribunal as has already been recorded above, is to be find between paragraphs 12 to 18 of the Award. 13. Thus, from what has been stated above, it is apparent that the Tribunal found very specifically at paragraph 16 that the entire system was a camouflage and that the concerned workmen have been doing their jobs regularly on permanent nature of job for years together suggesting that they were really workmen of the employer company and not of the contractor. Although, payments were made by the contractor but the Tribunal, therefore, correctly found that it was a camouflage to deprive the concerned workmen of their bona fide and rightful claims which accrued in their favour by doing permanent nature of jobs for years together. The Tribunal also looked into the attendance registers for the years 1988-1992 and also the payment registers for the years 1988-1989. These registers showed that the workman had been doing sufficient number of days in a month and though not 240 days in a calendar year but the same definitely exceeded 190 days. The Tribunal also found that the concerned workmen had also been going underground to accomplish their jobs. The Tribunal also found that Mahendra Yadav had been getting the most important works done by his workmen i.e. the concerned workmen regularly. 14. The learned Single Judge came to a conclusion that it was clear that the provisions of the Act did not apply in the present case and if that be the position he, consequently, framed a question as to whether the workmen working since decades would be entitled to be regularized or not specially when the work was perennial in nature. While answering the aforementioned question and relying upon the case of Hussainbhai v. The Alath Factory Tez-hilali Union and Ors. AIR 1978 SC 140, stated above correctly therefore, came to a conclusion that he did not find any reason to interfere with the award passed by the Tribunal. While answering the aforementioned question and relying upon the case of Hussainbhai v. The Alath Factory Tez-hilali Union and Ors. AIR 1978 SC 140, stated above correctly therefore, came to a conclusion that he did not find any reason to interfere with the award passed by the Tribunal. This Court also finds that the learned Tribunal on perusal of evidences on record and as has already been stated above, came to a conclusion that Mahendra Yadav employed the concerned workmen for doing perennial nature of job for the management and that these workmen were highly experienced and skilled in their work and they executed works which were extremely important for the management. The finding of the learned Tribunal and also of the learned Single Judge, therefore, that the contractor engaged, was in reality, an Agency of the management and it was only a camouflage, is a finding which appears to be correct in this case. 15. The Single Judge was also right in not interfering with the award of the Tribunal and upholding the same and we, exercising jurisdiction under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, approve the Judgment of the learned Single Judge. It is not in dispute that sitting under Article 226 and exercising powers of judicial review, the High Court would not interfere with findings of fact except in cases of mala fide or perversity. The High Court should not also embark upon reappreciating evidences or substituting itself as the original authority. 16. For the aforementioned proposition reference may be made to the case decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor Vs. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. and Another, (1984) 3 SCC 5 . The Supreme Court has held at paragraph 4 that u/s 11(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in matters relating to awarding of relief according to the circumstances of the case. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not enjoy such power though as a superior court it is vested with the right of superintendence. The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinize the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well expected limitations and, therefore, it can in an appropriate case quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and direction, if any. The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinize the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well expected limitations and, therefore, it can in an appropriate case quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and direction, if any. The Supreme Court has also held that the High Court is not entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute an award in place of the one made by the Tribunal. 17. In yet another Judgment, in the case of Calcutta Port Shramik Union Vs. Calcutta River Transport Association and Others, AIR 1988 SC 2168 the Supreme Court at paragraph 10 of the said Judgment has held that :-- "The object of enacting the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and of making provision therein to refer disputes to tribunals for settlement is to bring about industrial peace. Whenever a reference is made by a Government to an industrial tribunal it has to be presumed ordinarily that there is a genuine industrial dispute between the parties which requires to be resolved by adjudication. In all such cases an attempt should be made by Courts exercising powers of judicial review to sustain as far as possible the awards made by industrial tribunals instead of picking holes here and there in the awards on trivial points and ultimates frustrating the entire adjudication process before the tribunals by striking down awards on hyper-technical grounds. Unfortunately the orders of the Single Judge and of the Division Bench have resulted in such frustration and have made the award fruitless on an untenable basis." 18. We do not find any perversity or illegality in either the award or the Judgment of the learned Single Judge. Moreover, findings of fact recorded by a fact finding authority duly constituted for that purpose (the learned Tribunal in the instant case) ordinarily should be considered to have become final and should not be disturbed so long as they are based on some materials which are relevant for the purpose or even on a ground that there could be another view possible. For the aforementioned proposition, one may refer to the Judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Indian Overseas Bank Vs. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union and Another, (2000) 4 SCC 245 . For the aforementioned proposition, one may refer to the Judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Indian Overseas Bank Vs. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union and Another, (2000) 4 SCC 245 . In the instant case also, we are convinced that the learned Tribunal had overwhelming materials which constituted ample and sufficient basis for recording its findings and we are also convinced that the manner of consideration undertaken, both by the Tribunal as also by the learned Single Judge and their objectivity of approach adopted and the reasonableness of findings recorded were unexceptional. In the aforementioned Judgment of the Supreme Court referred to (supra), has also been held that the standards and nature of test to be applied for finding out the existence of master and servant relationship cannot be confined to or concertized into fixed formulate) for universal application, invariably in all class or category of cases. Though, some common standards can be devised, the mere availability of any one or more or their absence in a given case cannot by itself be held to be decisive of the whole issue since it may depend upon each two case and the peculiar devise adopted by the employer to get his needs fulfilled without rendering him liable. That being the position, in order to safeguard the welfare of the workman, the veil may have pierced to get at the realities. 19. Both, the learned Tribunal as also the Award, therefore, correctly came to a conclusion that the system was a camouflage and that in reality the contractor engaged was really a veil between the management and the concerned workmen. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court, therefore, finds that there is no infirmity with the order of the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, this LPA is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.