A. K. S1kri ( 1 ) THE objections filed by the respondent to the award were heard on 9/10/2001 and by an order dictated on that date, the objections were dismissed. After dictating the order, question regarding payment of interest on the amount awarded by the arbitrator was raised and both the parties sought time to address arguments on that aspect. Accordingly the matter was adjourned for this purpose to 19th October, 2001 and 29/10/2001 and the judgment is pronounced on that aspect by this order. However, the order dated 9/10/2001 is also reproduced to make it a consolidated judgment. ( 2 ) DELHI Electric Supply Undertaking, predecessor of DVB when it was an undertaking of municipal Corporation of Delhi, had awarded the contract regarding the works of fabrication, supply and erection of towers including foundations and stringing of conductors etc. complete for 220 KV line around Delhi. Certain disputes and differences arose between the parties. The petitioner herein requested for appointment of arbitrator and reference of the disputes/ claims to its arbitrator for adjudication inasmuch as contract between the parties contains an arbitration clause. As per this arbitration clause, General Manager (E) was the persona designata to appoint the arbitrator. On request being made to him by the petitioner, the general Manager (E) appointed Sh. K. L. Vij as the sole arbitrator vide letter dated 7/05/1977. The sole arbitrator entered upon reference and after adjudicating the claims made and published his award dated 26/05/1980 whereby the DESU was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 8 lacs to the petitioner in full satisfaction of their claims. ( 3 ) AFTER the award was filed in this court and notice of making and publishing this award by the arbitrator was sent to the parties, the DESU filed IA No. 2903/80 under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which contains objections to the aforesaid award. The petitioner filed replied thereto and DESU also filed rejoinder. Thereafter following issues were framed on 20/12/1982 and the matter was listed for arguments. 1. Whether the objections contained in IA No. 2903/80 have been filed by a duly authorised person? OP Objection. 2. Whether the objections are barred by time? OPR 3. Whether there was no valid contract between the parties including the clause containing the arbitration agreement? If so, to what effect? OP Objector. 4. 1. Whether the objections contained in IA No. 2903/80 have been filed by a duly authorised person? OP Objection. 2. Whether the objections are barred by time? OPR 3. Whether there was no valid contract between the parties including the clause containing the arbitration agreement? If so, to what effect? OP Objector. 4. Whether the objectors are estopped in law and/or by their conduct from disputing the validity of the contract including the arbitration clause? OPR. 5. Whether the claim before the arbitrator of any part of it is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement? OP Objector. 6. Whether the arbitrator has misconducted himself of the proceedings? OP objector. 7. Relief. ( 4 ) IT has taken almost twenty years since then and it would be appropriate to mention in summarised form the factors which contributed to the delay. 1. On 31/07/1989 the court passed an ex-parte decree and made the award rule of the court. 2 On 27/11/1991 this court dismissed objection s IA No. 6188/89 for setting aside the decree. 3. On 4/02/1994 the Division bench accepted the objector s FAO (OS) No. 94 of 1992 on terms and set aside the ex-parte decree. 4. On 15/04/1999 this court again made an ex-parte decree and made the award a rule of the court. 5. On 2/08/2000 this court accepted the Objector s IA No. 11401/99 on terms and set aside the ex-parte decree. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER the matter was listed for arguments. I heard the parties at length ( 6 ) IT may be stated at the outset that the impugned award is a non-speaking award. It is an admitted case of the parties that the arbitrator was not bound by any agreement to pass a speaking award. The primary objection raised by the DESU is that the contract entered into between the parties regarding the work of fabrication etc. which was executed by the petitioner itself was an invalid contract as it did not comply with the conditions mentioned in sections 202 and 203 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act ( for short act ). The submission was that Section 202 of this Act contains the procedure for making the contract as per which each contract on behalf of the Corporation has to be by the Commissioner. The submission was that Section 202 of this Act contains the procedure for making the contract as per which each contract on behalf of the Corporation has to be by the Commissioner. As per Section 203 (2) no contract which is not made in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the bye-laws made thereunder shall be binding on the Corporation. It was submitted that in the instant case the contract was signed by the Executive Engineer but had no authority to do so, and therefore, the contract not having been made in accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the contract was not valid and the arbitration clause contained in the said contract could not be put into action and consequently entire proceedings before the arbitrator were without jurisdiction. It was also pointed that as per bye-laws relating to execution of the contracts titled the Execution of Contract Bye-Laws 1958 the reference to commissioner has to be treated as reference to Commissioner and Standing Committee, general Manger (E) has to be treated as reference to General Manager (E) and Delhi electric Supply committee and therefore, it was the General Manager (E) who was the only person competent to enter into contract. ( 7 ) IT may be stated at the outset that no such plea was taken before the arbitrator in the first instance. In fact after the award of the contract to the petitioner, the contract was duly executed by the petitioner. Further as already pointed out above, on the request made by the petitioner, the General Manager (E) who is the person competent to bind the arbitrator as per the arbitration clause contained in the contract, in fact appointed Sh. K. L. Vij as the arbitrator. The arbitration proceeded after his appointment and the matter was adjudicated upon, on merits. No such objection was taken before the arbitrator. However, faintly and half- heartedly on the last date of proceedings before the arbitrator, the learned counsel for DESU pointed out that in view of a judgment of this court, the contract in the instant case may not be a valid contract. In the absence of any pleadings before the arbitrator and specific issue raised before him, learned arbitrator was not expected to go into this question. In the absence of any pleadings before the arbitrator and specific issue raised before him, learned arbitrator was not expected to go into this question. If the DESU was serious about this objection, the appropriate application along with necessary particulars should have been filed before the arbitrator. ( 8 ) BE as it may, it being a legal question, I heard the argument of both the parties on this issue and find no merits in this argument of the DESU either. ( 9 ) NO doubt Section 202 readwith bye-laws stipulate that General Manager (E) is the competent person to enter into the contract on behalf of the DESU, it may mentioned that as per Section 504 (1) the reference to Commissioner is to be treated as reference to General manager. Both the parties agreed to this inasmuch as even the counsel for DESU relied upon the aforesaid bye-laws pointing out this position. Under Section 391 of the MCD Act, the Commissioner (here reference would be to General Manager (E) has the power and is authorised to delegate any of his powers or duties conferred upon him under the Act. By the instrument of delegation No. 8044/0-2 dated 28/01/1964 he has delegated the power of signing the contract relating to works to the Executive Engineers. This resolution reads as under: "in exercise of the powers conferred on me by Section 491 readwith sub-Section (1) (a) (i) of Section 504 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, I hereby authorise all the Executive Engineers to sign contracts relating to the works being carried out under them in the Engineering Section under the Chief Engineer. ( 10 ) IT may further be noticed that in the instant case the Delhi Electric Supply Committee had specifically passed a Resolution No. 642 dated 2/04/1969 authorising General manager (E) to enter into contract as the subject matter of this case, with the petitioner. This resolution may also be reproduced which reads as under: "resolved that G. M. (E) is authorised to enter into contract with M/s S. E. A. (INDIA) limited in respect of Design, Fabrication and Erection of 220kv Line Ring Around delhi as communicated vide Letter No. XEN/civil/730 dated 28/3/69. " ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid resolutions and delegation of power, the Executive Engineer was specifically empowered to sign the contract in question on behalf of the DESU. " ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid resolutions and delegation of power, the Executive Engineer was specifically empowered to sign the contract in question on behalf of the DESU. This objection has therefore no merit and is accordingly rejected. Issue No. 3 is decided in favour of the petitioner and against the DESU/objector. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to give findings on Issues No. 1, 2 and 4 which relate to the maintainability of the objections as these objections are rejected on merits. No arguments were addressed on Issues No. 5 and 6 at the time of arguments by the DESU/objector. Even otherwise, I do not find any merits in the same. These issues are also decided against the DESU/objector. ( 12 ) IA No. 2903/80 is accordingly dismissed. ( 13 ) NOW, I advert to the question of grant of interest. ( 14 ) THE learned arbitrator has not awarded any interest to the petitioner in the impugned award. The petitioner, however, lays claim on interest from the date of award till payment of the amount. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, where the learned arbitrator has refused to grant any interest, the petitioner can be given interest from the date of award, as upto the date of award, the interest stands disallowed. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner relied heavily upon the two judgments of the constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in support of his contention that interest can be allowed. These judgments are : 1. Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa Vs. G. C. Roy reported in AIR 1992 SC 732 . 2. Executive Engineer, Dhenkenal Minor Irrigation Division, Orissa Vs. N. C. Budharaj reported in AIR 2001 SC 626 . ( 16 ) IT was argued, on the basis of the aforesaid two judgments, that a person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation thereof. It may be called interest, compensation or damages or by any name. The basic consideration is as valid for the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator entering upon the reference. It may be called interest, compensation or damages or by any name. The basic consideration is as valid for the period the dispute is pending before the arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the arbitrator entering upon the reference. Thus the court held that the arbitrator had inherent power and thus inferred power to grant interest for the period prior to entering upon reference, to grant pendentelite interest as well as future interest till the payment is made or the award made rule of the court and decree is passed. The court also took into consideration the principles of Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure in arriving at the aforesaid conclusion. It was to do complete justice. Learned counsel argued that court s adjective and remedial powers under Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot be less than that of the arbitrator and that principle applies, a fortiori, to the power of the court. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 1989 SC 973 to contend that interest from the date of the award could be granted by the court. In para 14 thereof the court said: "so far as interest for the period from the date of award (19. 7. 1985) till the date of the decree is concerned, the question was not specifically considered in Abhaduta jena case (supra) but special leave had been refused against the order in so far as it allowed interest for this period. We think interest should be allowed for this period, on the principle that the court can, once proceedings under Ss. 15 to 17 are initiated, grant interest pending the litigation before, i. e. from the date of the award to the date of the decree. " ( 17 ) TO the same effect is the judgment of this court in the case of Union of India Vs. Swadeshi Karyalaya reported in AIR 1991 Delhi 53. The learned counsel REFERRED TO para 11 of this judgment reading as under: "then the question arises about the payment of interest. " ( 17 ) TO the same effect is the judgment of this court in the case of Union of India Vs. Swadeshi Karyalaya reported in AIR 1991 Delhi 53. The learned counsel REFERRED TO para 11 of this judgment reading as under: "then the question arises about the payment of interest. Under Section 29 of the Act where the award is for payment of money the court may in the decree order interest from the date of the decree at such rate as the court deems reasonable. There is authority for the proposition that this section impliedly bars the jurisdiction of the courts to award interest pendente lite, i. e. for the period the proceedings for making the award rule of court are pending meaning thereby that Section 34 of the Code of civil Procedure is inapplicable in such proceedings. I do not think this is a correct proposition. The Interest Act, 1978 which empowers the court (the term also includes a Tribunal and an arbitrator) to allow interest in certain circumstances for the period upto the date of the proceedings by virtue of Section 5 leaves the pro sions of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure unaffected. This Section 5 is as under "section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure to apply- Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. " THIS, therefore, fortifies the argument that the power of the court to grant interest pendente lite remains untouched and Section 39 of the Act is no bar. "the court went on to say: ". . IT takes years and more years to make award rule of court. Injustice will be caused to the claimant if he is not allowed interest. " ( 18 ) ON the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent argued that when the interest upto the date of award is granted by the arbitrator, the court had the jurisdiction to grant the interest from the date of award till the date of decree or for that matter, from the date of decree till the date of payment. But where no pre-reference or pendente lite interest was granted by the arbitrator, the court had no jurisdiction to grant the interest during the pendency of the present petition i. e. from the date of award and in support of this submission, reliance was placed on the following judgments: 1. M/s Jagdish Rai and Brothers Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1999 SC 1258 . 2. Visakapatnam Municipal Corporation Vs. K. Satyanarayana and Co. reported in 1995 2 SCC 385 . 3. Arjandas Naraindas Adnani Ms. Narsingdas Naraindas Adnani reported in AIR 1997 Bom 20 . 4. S. N. Srikantia and Co. Vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in AIR 1967 Bombay 5 Union of India Vs. Jain Associates and Anr. reported in (1994) 4 SCC 665 . ( 19 ) I have given my anxious consideration to these submissions. The Constitutional Bench judgments of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner and referred TO above, deal with the interest for different periods, namely, pre-reference pendente lite i. e. during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings and future interest i. e. from the date of award till the date of decree. The proposition laid down in these cases is that such a power exists with the arbitrator. There is no quarrel with this proposition now as the law stands settled by the aforesaid judgments. It is also undisputed that the court has power to grant the interest from the date of decree till payment. Where the arbitrator has granted the interest upto the date of award, the court can grant the interest from the date of award till the date of decree as well. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, power to grant interest is different from exercising that power and granting the interest. In the instant case, the arbitrator has not granted any interest. In such a situation whether court can grant interest from the date of award is the question to be decided in the instant case. The Constitutional Bench judgments do not address this situation. In the instant case, the arbitrator has not granted any interest. In such a situation whether court can grant interest from the date of award is the question to be decided in the instant case. The Constitutional Bench judgments do not address this situation. However, in in the case of Gujarat Water Supply (supra) and in the case of Union of India (supra), it has been held that interest from the date of award till the date of decree can be allowed on the principle that the court can, once proceedings under Sections 15 to 17 are initiated, grant interest pending the litigation before it i. e. from the date of award to the date of decree. The view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of Arjandas Naraindas Acfnani (supra) and in the case of S. N. Srikantia and Co. (supra) holding that interest can be granted by the court only from the date of decree and not from the date of award, may not be a correct view in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court and in any case, I am inclined to follow the view taker by the this Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Swadeshi Karyalaya reported in AIR 1991 delhi 53. Therefore, power of the court grant the interest from the date of award stands established. However, these were the cases where the interest upto the award was granted by the arbitrator. In the present case the arbitrator has not granted any interest to the petitioner. It is the respondent who has filed objections against the award. The petitioner has not taken any steps to claim the interest from the date of award. In the absence of any such claim, it would not be appropriate to grant pendente lite interest from the date of the award. The two Supreme Court judgments cited by the respondent, namely, M/s Jagdish Rai and brothers Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1999 SC 1258 and Visakapatnam Municipal corporation Vs. K. Satyanarayana and Co. reported in (1995) 2 SCC 385 deal with this aspect directly. The two Supreme Court judgments cited by the respondent, namely, M/s Jagdish Rai and brothers Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1999 SC 1258 and Visakapatnam Municipal corporation Vs. K. Satyanarayana and Co. reported in (1995) 2 SCC 385 deal with this aspect directly. The case of Visakapatnam Municipal Corporation (supra) is proximate as that was also a case where the claim of interest was rejected by the arbitrator and the claimant instead of filing any objection to the award under Section 30, sought a decree in terms of award albeit with interest from the date of reference. It was held that court had no jurisdiction to grant pendente lite interest in the absence of any objections to the award. Although that was a case where the pendente lite interest i. e. when the proceedings were pending before the arbitrator was demanded which was declined by the arbitrator and in the present case the petitioner is not claiming the interest for that period but from the date of award. Fact remains that in the present case also the petitioner has not claimed any interest even from the date of the award. Exactly in such a situation, the Supreme Court held in the case of M/s Jagdish Rai and Brothers (supra) that by not raising claim of interest before the court making the award rule of the court, the claimant was disentitled to interest for the period starting from accrual of cause of action till the date of decree. The court held that in such a situation interest could be granted under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure only from the date of decree. Para 3 of that judgment reads as under: " The claim for interest not having been made before the court in which proceedings for making the award the rule of the court were pending would certainly disentitle the appellant for making such a claim during first three stages of pre-arbitration and post-arbitration that is between award and filing of application inasmuch as several considerations will have to be examined before award of interest and at what rate. Therefore, when the award had not been challenged for not granting interest, the award could not be upset to that extent. The view taken by the High Court appears to be correct to that extent. However, that is not the end of the matter. Therefore, when the award had not been challenged for not granting interest, the award could not be upset to that extent. The view taken by the High Court appears to be correct to that extent. However, that is not the end of the matter. The High court ought to have further examined whether the appellant was entitled to any interest after the decree was made in terms of the award. The Courts have taken the view that award of interest under Section 34 CPC is a matter of procedure and ought to be granted in all cases when there is a decree for money unless there are strong reasons to decline the same. In the present case the appellant had made a claim for interest before the arbitrator but the same had been denied and no reasons are forthcoming thereof. Whatever that may be, at any rate after the Sub-Judge made an award the rule of the court the decree ought to contain a provision for making payment of interest. If such payment had not been made, appropriate correction of the decree could be ordered to be made when an application had been made before the High Court. " ( 21 ) IN the present case, the learned arbitrator has not awarded any interest. The petitioner has not challenged the award of the learned arbitrator and claimed any interest. Instead it has sought a decree in terms of the award. Thus following the ratio of the cases in M/s jagdish Rai and Bros. (Supra) and Vishakhapattnam Municipal Corporation (Supra) the court can grant interest only from the date of decree and not the pendentelite interest, when it is not demanded by the petitioner. It may be mentioned that in Jagdish Rai and Bros. (supra) the Supreme Court mentioned that there are four stages of grant of interest namely, 1) from the stage of accrual of cause of action till filing of the arbitration proceedings, (2) during pendency of the proceedings before the arbitrator, (3) future interest arising between date of award and date of the decree, and (4) interest arising from date of decree till realisation of the award. ( 22 ) IN the present case the arbitrator has declined to award the interest in so far as first two stages are concerned. The petitioner has also accepted this position and has not challenged the same. ( 22 ) IN the present case the arbitrator has declined to award the interest in so far as first two stages are concerned. The petitioner has also accepted this position and has not challenged the same. In so far as the third stage is concerned, the petitioner has not made any claim. In such circumstances the court can grant the interest only at the fourth stage, namely , from the date of decree. This power of the court to grant interest from the date of decree is not in doubt. The aforesaid ratio in Jagdish Rai and Bros. (Supra) has been affirmed in a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T. P. George Vs. State of Kerala And Anr. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 758 . ( 23 ) THE respondent had deposited a sum of Rs. 8 lacs on 11th June, Rs. 1 lac on 10th august and Rs. 6 lacs on 10/03/1994. This amount was kept in Fixed Deposits in the name of the Registrar. Interest which has accrued on these Fixed Deposits shall belong to the respondent. As mentioned above, a sum of Rs. 16 lacs has been withdrawn by the petitioner. The respondent shall be entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 8 lacs from the petitioner as the amount payable to the petitioner was only Rs. 8 lacs. The respondent shall also be entitled to withdraw the balance amount from this court lying in the aforesaid account. ( 24 ) BEFORE parting, it may be mentioned that proceedings have remained pending in this court for almost twenty years as objections to the award were filed in the year 1980. The substantial period was taken as the objections were dismissed in default and the award was made rule of the court and thereafter, the respondent filed application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree and for restoring the objections. This application was allowed and the matter proceeded afresh again on merits. It may be mentioned that during the pendency of the present proceedings, the respondent was directed to deposit the amount of Rs. 15 lacs on an application made by the petitioner. This amount was ordered to be kept in fixed deposit. Certain interest also accrued thereon. The petitioner was allowed to withdraw a sum of Rs. 16 lacs on 5/12/2000. It may be mentioned that during the pendency of the present proceedings, the respondent was directed to deposit the amount of Rs. 15 lacs on an application made by the petitioner. This amount was ordered to be kept in fixed deposit. Certain interest also accrued thereon. The petitioner was allowed to withdraw a sum of Rs. 16 lacs on 5/12/2000. Thus although the amount awarded by the arbitrator under the impugned award was only a sum of Rs. 8 lacs, DESU was directed to deposit Rs. 15 lacs by the court. This must be on the assumption that in case the petitioner succeeds, he could be entitled to interest on this amount. This aspect would further be clear from the fact that this court allowed the petitioner to withdraw a sum of Rs. 16 lacs during the pendency of the proceedings. I would have therefore allowed interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of award till 5/12/2000 when the petitioner withdrew rs. 16 lacs on equitable grounds. However, as there is no jurisdiction to grant interest for this period, I decline to pass any order. In so far as interest from the date of decree is concerned, it would not be necessary to pass an order as the petitioner has already received the amount before passing of the decree. ( 25 ) SUIT stands disposed of.