JUDGMENT Who had been cultivating the property by his own physical exertion and after his death in 1972, his wife. The first respondent herein and his son the 2nd respondent are continuing in possession. The lease deed dated 7.7.1993 can only be a nominal one. Since the respondents have never surrendered possession of the suit property this lease deed cannot be a valid document and in any event, cannot bind the respondents. It is a collusive document brought about by the plaintiff and the public trust. The appellants are not in possession of the suit property on cultivating the property. The allegation made regarding interference with the possession is purely imaginary. It is only the respondents who are cultivating sugarcane and are supplying to the Pugualur sugar factory. The suit has to be dismissed. 2. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the suit was barred by res judicata and also disbelieved Ex.A-1 the order of the Record of Tenancy Tahsildar and Ex.A-2 the lease deed, gave a finding that Ex.A-1 proceedings were collusive in nature and dismissed the suit. Against that on appeal was filed. The appellate Court found that the suit is not barred by res judicata since the earlier suit was filed on the basis of a sub-lease agreement executed by the Ist respondent herein and this suit is filed on the basis of Ex.A-1. As regards the orders of the Tahsildar, the appellate Judge has neither given a finding whether Ex.A-1 order was brought about by collusion nor that it was obtained behind the back of the respondents. However the appellate Court also dismissed the appeal. 3. Notice of motion was ordered in this appeal when the matter came up. 4. Mr.T.Muruga Manickam, learned counsel for the appellants would point out to Ex.A-1 the order dated 31.7.1992 where the Tahsildar has recorded that the suit property has been let on lease in the plaintiff. He would also submit that Ex.A-2 is the lease deed executed by the trust in favour of the plaintiff. The learned counsel would submit that there is no justification for the appellate Court to dismiss the suit when the plaintiff has filed all the documents in his possession to show that he is a cultivating tenant of the suit property. 5. The learned counsel would submit that there is no justification for the appellate Court to dismiss the suit when the plaintiff has filed all the documents in his possession to show that he is a cultivating tenant of the suit property. 5. The learned counsel for the respondents Mr.P.Valliyappan on the other hand, would submit that if the appellants’ suit were to be decreed, it would give rise to conflicting judgments since in the earlier suit, the finding is that the respondents are in possession. He would submit that the order of the Record of Tenancy Tahsildar does not mention that notice has been sent to the defendants who are the respondents herein. He would also submit that when both the Courts have given concurrent finding regarding the possession of the appellants, this Court ought not to interfere in second appeal and for this purpose, the following judgments were relied on; (i) Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1991)2 M.L.J. (S.C.) 105: A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 2213, in which the Supreme Court had held that in a case where from a given set of circumstances, two interferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal and adopting any other approach is not permissible and that the mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence or meaning of entire and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. (ii) Thimmauiah v. Ningamma, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3529, in which the Supreme Court held that the High Court is not entitled to reassess evidence and arrive at a different conclusion. (iii) Dnyanoba Shaurad Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 864, in which it was held that whether a finding of fact reached by the Courts below is against the weight of evidence or not is a question which will remain in the realm of appreciation of evidence and does not project any question of law, much less, any substantial, question of law. (iv) Mohan Lal v. Nihal Singh, (2001)8 S.C.C. 584 , in which the Supreme Court held that concurrent finding of Courts below regarding the possession of suit land cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the absence of any substantial question of law involved therein. 6. (iv) Mohan Lal v. Nihal Singh, (2001)8 S.C.C. 584 , in which the Supreme Court held that concurrent finding of Courts below regarding the possession of suit land cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the absence of any substantial question of law involved therein. 6. The substantial questions of law raised by the appellant in this case are: “(1) When the landlord has admitted the appellant’s possession of the suit property in the capacity as tenants by execution of the lease deed Ex.A-2 whether third parties can object to such as admission? (2) When the adangal has been held to be the best piece of evidence to prove possession of a property, whether the Courts below committed an error in law by ignoring the adangal produced as Ex.A-5 and holding that the plaintiffs have not produced any document to prove possession? (3) When the respondents herein are parties to the proceedings under Ex.A-1 in which the appellants have been recorded as tenants and have not challenged that order, whether they are estopped from questioning the possession of the appellants thereafter in the capacity as cultivating tenants?” 7. The case of the appellants rests on Ex.A-1 which is the order of the Record of Tenancy Tahsildar. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that they had no notice of the said proceedings. But the order would show that their names are shown as parties. However the appellate Court has come to the conclusion, that there is no mention that notice has been sent to the respondents. The respondents’ name have been mentioned in the order and in the original, it was indicated that the copy would be sent to the parties. The respondents have not challenged this order, nor have they taken any steps to debate the name of the plaintiff as a tenant. Assuming that they had no notice of these proceedings, at least after the suit has been filed, they might have taken steps, but the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that there are no instructions to the effect that this order has been challenged. The earlier suit O.S. No.956 of 1988 was filed on the ground that after Veerakandarn’s death. His wife the Ist respondent herein had taken the assistance of the plaintiff to cultivate the suit property and that he had been cultivating with his own physical exertion. The earlier suit O.S. No.956 of 1988 was filed on the ground that after Veerakandarn’s death. His wife the Ist respondent herein had taken the assistance of the plaintiff to cultivate the suit property and that he had been cultivating with his own physical exertion. The plaintiff had claimed that he was in possession as a tenant pursuant to an agreement of sub-lease. The judgment in O.S. No.956 of 1988 shows that the learned judge had not delivered the sub-lease agreement and come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not in possession as a tenant. The appellate res judicata because the earlier suit was based on the plaintiff’s right as a sub-tenant. In this, the plaintiff claims to be a cultivating tenant directly under the public trust, Under Ex.A-1, the plaintiff has also been recorded as a final. The observations of the appellate Judge in this regard do not show clearly whether notice was indeed served on the respondents or not. Apart from stating that in Ex.A-1 there is no mention that notice has been went to the defendants, there is no finding that the respondents were not aware of the proceedings or that they were put on notice of Ex.A-1. Because in the same breath, the appellate judge also says that the defendants’ name have been mentioned under the order and there is also a recital that a copy would be communicated to both the parties and that admittedly, the defendant has not filed any appeal against that order. From this, it is not possible to come to any conclusion as to whether the respondents had notice of Ex.A-1 or not. 8. Both the parties admit that Veerakandar was in possession till his death which is in 1972. The appellants claimed to have been inducted in possession of the suit property thereafter in pursuance oaf a sub-lease agreement. The sub-lease agreement was disbelieved by the Court in the earlier suit. The plaintiff had also filed Ex.A-3 to A-8 before the trial Court to show his possession and Ex.A-9 to A-13. There is no discussion regarding the same. In addition, it is also found that the respondents had filed Ex.B-3 which is an application filed by the trust to evict the 2nd respondent herein for arrears of rent. The trial Court has accepted the oral submission made across the bar that subsequent to Ex.B-3 the rental arrears were paid. There is no discussion regarding the same. In addition, it is also found that the respondents had filed Ex.B-3 which is an application filed by the trust to evict the 2nd respondent herein for arrears of rent. The trial Court has accepted the oral submission made across the bar that subsequent to Ex.B-3 the rental arrears were paid. The trail Court’s judgment does not show any documentary evidence filed in this regard. The trial Court’s finding regarding possession is that the plaintiff has not proved beyond doubt that he is in possession and Veerandar’s right would have only devolved on the respondents and it is difficult to believe that the appellant who had claimed rights as a sub-tenant should now assort his right as under Exs.A-1 and A-2. The appellate Court also on the question of possession merely says: "It is needless to say that the defendant had been in possession of the property after the death of Veera Kandara. 9. Above all, the question regarding the legality of Ex.A-1 is definitely vital for deciding this appeal. The decision in S.Balasubramaniam v. Shamsu Thalreez and others, (1985)2 M.L.J. 168 , which was referred to before the appellate Court will definitely come to the aid of the appellants. In that decision, it was held that the Civil Court cannot sit in judgment over an order passed by an authority constituted under an Act of legislature unless it is vitiated by fraud, collusion etc. The appellate Court has not given any reason for rejecting Ex.A-1. In the aforesaid decision it was held thus: The jurisdiction of the authority under the Act is ample enough to determine the controversy relating to the factum of demise, the subject-matter of demise, the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant and the propriety, factual and legal, of the demise and such other jurisdictional issues. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondents do not preclude the interference by the High Court if a substantial question of law arises. In view of the decision of the division bench, it is clear that the appellate Court ought to have given a finding either that Ex.A-1 was collusive or that it was obtained behind the back of the respondents, when the order has also not been challenged, it cannot be merely ignored. In view of the decision of the division bench, it is clear that the appellate Court ought to have given a finding either that Ex.A-1 was collusive or that it was obtained behind the back of the respondents, when the order has also not been challenged, it cannot be merely ignored. The judgment of the appellate Court is therefore set aside and the matter is remanded in the learned Additional District Judge, Karur for deciding the entire matter afresh. No costs. C.M.P. No.998 of 2001 is closed.