I.A. Ansari, J.— When a Government Corporation, which has not formally adopted disciplinary rules, regulations, executive instructions, etc., initiates a disciplinary proceeding against one of its managerial staff' under a set of rules applicable to Government employees of the State, whether resort to such rules is permissible in law and if the disciplinary authority does not, while taking action under such set of rules, follow the procedural safeguards laid down in such rules, appoints an enquiry officer, who examines witnesses behind the back of the delinquent, one of such witnesses being even from outside the list of witnesses furnished to the delinquent, without assigning any reason therefore, and when the disciplinary authority, without furnishing enquiry report of the such an enquiry and without caring to find out from, or listen to, the delinquent as to how the enquiry was really conducted, imposes a penalty not prescribed under the rules, so resorted to, can findings of such an enquiry and/or the penalty imposed £e allowed by a writ Court to stand good on record are some disquietening features of the present writ petition. 2. In the above backdrop, let me consider the case of the petitioner, which, briefly stated, runs as follows:- The petitioner, who holds a post-graduate degree in Arts and a diploma in Printing Technology, entered into the service of Assam State Text Book Production and Publication Corporation Limited, (hereinafter referred to as "the said Corporation") as Production Officer by order, dated 9.8.73 (Anenxure-I to the writ petition) issued by respondent No. 2, namely, Managing Director of the said Corporation. The service of the petitioner was regularised by order, dated 18.4.79, issued by respondent No. 2. The post of Production Officer was subsequently redesignated as Manager (Production). Being a Govt. Corporation, the said Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the State Government. It serves public interest is vitally connected with the welfare activities of the State Government. This Corporation is, therefore, a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Though the petitioner rendered satisfactory service for more than 14 years i.e. from 1973 to 1987, he was placed under suspension with effect from 28.8.87 vide resolution No. 5 (Anenxure-V to the writ petition) adopted at the Board meeting of the/said Corporation. In course of time, this suspension order was revoked, vide order, dated 26.11.91 (Annexure-VII to the writ petition) issued by respondent No. 2. In course of time, this suspension order was revoked, vide order, dated 26.11.91 (Annexure-VII to the writ petition) issued by respondent No. 2. By letter, dated 10.5.94 (Annexure-XI to the writ petition) issued by respondent No. 2, the petitioner was asked to show-cause under Regulation 47 of the Employees' Service Regulations, 1988 of the Assam State Text Book Production and Publication Corporation limited (hereinafter referred to as "Regulations 1988") read with Rule 9 of the Assam Services (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules 1964") as to why any of the penalties prescribed under Regulation 46 of the Regulations 1988 read with Rule 7 of the Rules 1964 should not be inflicted on him on the basis of the charges framed against him and the statements of allegations appended thereto. By his letter, dated 22.5.87 (Annexure-XLA to the writ petition) the petitioner made a request for allowing him to inspect the documents on the basis of which the charges had been framed against him. This request of the petitioner was not adequately acceded to and with the limitation so imposed the petitioner submitted his reply, dated 19.5.94 (Annexure-XII to the writ petition) refuting the charges levelled against him. The said Corporation appointed an Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry by order, dated 10.3.96 (Annexure-III to the writ petition). The said Corporation also appointed one Presiding Officer by a letter, dated 28.3.95 (Annexure-IIIA to the writ petition), but the petitioner was not given any defence assistance causing thereby serious prejudice to the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer recorded the statement of the petitioner on 20.4.95 and, thereafter, other witnesses, namely witness Nos. 2 to 5 cited in the list of witnesses and also one unlisted witness, namely, Professor Kalaleswar Sharma were examined by the Enquiry Officer, but all these witnesses were examined behind the back of the petitioner denying, thus, to the petitioner opportunity of cross-examining the said witnesses and causing thereby serious prejudice to the petitioner. No enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner and he was, thus, denied the opportunity of having his say against the findings of the Enquiry. Officer. Even then the respondent, particularly, the respondent No. 2 accepted the enquiry report and imposed penalty on the petitioner by giving him severe warning vide order, dated contained in the letter dated 21.5.97 (Annexure-XIV to the writ petition) issued by the respondent No. 2. Officer. Even then the respondent, particularly, the respondent No. 2 accepted the enquiry report and imposed penalty on the petitioner by giving him severe warning vide order, dated contained in the letter dated 21.5.97 (Annexure-XIV to the writ petition) issued by the respondent No. 2. The petitioner preferred an appeal (Annexure-XV to the writ petition) on 2.7.97 against the said warning given to him, but no action on the appeal has been taken by the respondents. The Regulations 1988 and the Rules 1964 have not been formally adopted by the said Corporation and the same are inapplicable to the case of the petitioner. This apart, principles of natural justice, as indicated hereinabove, have been violated not only while holding the enquiry, but also while imposing the penalty on the petitioner. 3. The petitioner has, therefore, approached this Court, with the help of his present application made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking issuance of appropriate writ/writs setting aside and quashing not only the impugned order, dated 21.5.97 (Annexure-XIV to the writ petition) issued by the respondent No. 2, whereby the petitioner was severely warned, but also setting aside and quashing the disciplinary proceeding, which was initiated against the petitioner on the basis of the show-cause notice, dated 10.5.94, aforementioned. 4. The respondents have, not contested this case. 511 have carefully perused the materials on record. I have heard Mr K.P. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. None has appeared, as indicated hereinabove, on behalf of the said Corporation. 6. Before proceeding any further, it may be pointed out that since the respondents have not filed any affidavit-in-opposition disputing or denying the averments of facts made in the writ petition, it logically follows that the averments not controverted by the respondents should be treated as admitted facts. Reference made by Mr. Sharma to the case of Naseem Banu-Vs-State of U.P. and Ors. ( AIR 1993 SC 2592 ) is, therefore, not misplaced. 7. Presenting the case of the petitioner before this Court, Mr Sharma has submitted that the Regulation 1988 and the Rules 1964 have not been formally adopted by the Corporation and hence, the same are inapplicable to the employees of the said Corporation. In fact, no service rule, according to Mr Sharma, exists in the said Corporation governing the service conditions of the employees. 8. In fact, no service rule, according to Mr Sharma, exists in the said Corporation governing the service conditions of the employees. 8. It is submitted by Mr Sharma that since the Regualtions 1988 and the Rules 1964 are inapplicable to the employees of the said Corporation, disciplinary proceeding launched against the petitioner and the penalty imposed by the respondents, on the strength of the Regulations 1988 and Rules 1964, are without jurisdiction, void abinitio and should be treated as nonest in law. 9. It is also submitted by Mr. Sharma that while a Presenting Officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority to present the case of the employer before the Enquiry Officer, no defence assistance was offered to be given to the petitioner, which is, according to Mr Sharma, a serious violation of the principles of natural justice and has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. 10. It is further submitted by Mr Sharma that despite specific request made by the petitioner to allow him to inspect the documents relied upon by the disciplinary authority, no such inspection was allowed and the petitioner was forced to submit his reply without going through the documents, which forms the foundation for the charges levelled against the petitioner. The prejudice, thus, caused to the petitioner is palpable and apparent on the face of the records. So contends Mr Sharma. 11. Coupled with the above, points out Mr Sharma, the witness Nos. 2 to 5 from the list of witnesses furnished to the petitioner and also one unlisted witness aforementioned were examined by the Enquiry Officer behind the back of the petitioner and no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to cross-examine the said witnesses. This act of the Enquiry Officer caused, accordingly to Mr Sharma, serious prejudice to the petitioner, but even this aspect of the prejudicial act committed against the petitioner by the Enquiry Officer was wholly ignored by the disciplinary authority. The findings of the Enquiry Officer were, therefore, contends Mr Sharma, wholly illegal and the reliance placed by the disciplinary authority on such an enquiry report for imposing penalty on the petitioner is highly illegal and unjust. 12. Without, thus, affording the petitioner, submits Mr Sharma, any reasonable opportunity of hearing, the petitioner has been awarded penalty of severe warning. 13. 12. Without, thus, affording the petitioner, submits Mr Sharma, any reasonable opportunity of hearing, the petitioner has been awarded penalty of severe warning. 13. It is also pointed out by Mr Sharma that before acting upon the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority did not furnish to the petitioner any copy of the enquiry report and, hence, the petitioner was denied the opportunity of pointing out errors in the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer in his report. Reliance placed on such a report to found the penalty of warning on the petitioner is, according to Mr Sharma, wholly without jurisdiction and void. 14. On the basis of what he has pointed out hereinabove, Mr Sharma submits that it is a fit case in which this Court should interfere in exercise of its power of judicial review and set right the course of injustice perpetrated on the petitioner. 15. Mr Sharma has also pointed out that despite clear direction issued by this Court to produce the relevant record, the respondents have not produced the record of the proceeding. Non-production of the record, contends Mr Sharma, gives rise to the presumption that no procedural safeguard necessary for complying with the principles of natural justice was followed by the respondents and that is why, they have not produced the relevant record. Strength for this submission is sought to be derived by Mr Sharma from the law laid down in Jalal Uuddin Laskar-Vs-State of Assam and Ors, reported in 1995(1) GLJ 589: 1995(2) GLT 371. In support of his contention that non-production of record should make this Court draw adverse inference against the respondents to the effect that they did not follow the relevant regulations, rules and principles of natural justice, Mr Sharma has also placed reliance on Tondon Brothers-Vs-State of W.B. (2001)5 SCC 664 . 16. Since the witnesses have been examined, submits Mr Sharma, from outside the list aforementioned furnished by the respondents, the same is, contends Mr Sharma, a serious violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the very purpose of furnishing the list of witnesses to the petitioner stands, according to Mr Sharma, defeated. This lapse to has caused further contends Mr Sharma, serious prejudice to the petitioner. In support of this contention, Mr Sharma has placed on Dibya Harsh Goswami-Vs-Dibrugarh University and Ors., reported in 1995(2)GLJ 65:1996(2) GLT 179. 17. This lapse to has caused further contends Mr Sharma, serious prejudice to the petitioner. In support of this contention, Mr Sharma has placed on Dibya Harsh Goswami-Vs-Dibrugarh University and Ors., reported in 1995(2)GLJ 65:1996(2) GLT 179. 17. Before entering into the merit of the various submissions made before me, on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to point out that I am required to deal with, and dispose of, this writ petition with the limitation that there has been no assistance received from the end of the respondents inasmuch as they have chosen not to contest this case. 18. Let me, first, deal with the question as to whether the Regulations 1988 and the Rules 1964 could not have been applied to the employees of the said Corporation for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against them on account of the fact that the same have not been formally adopted by the said Corporation. 19. While dealing with the above aspect of the matter, it needs to be borne in mind that an appointing authority has the inherent right to take disciplinary action against his employee and the disciplinary action may include imposition of such penalty as may be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct. It is also worth bearing in mind that the set of disciplinary .rules, such as, Rules 1964 and/or CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, are nothing but embodiment of principles of natural justice in a codified form. Hence, it is possible to initiate disciplinary action against an employee by taking resort to a set of rules, which has not been formally adopted by the employer provided, of course, that the rules, so resorted to, are consistent with the principles of natural justice. However, if the disciplinary action is initiated under a particular set of rules, the penalty can also be imposed under the same rules; but if the penalty imposed on an employee is one, which has not been prescribed under the rules so resorted to, then, such a penalty will not be sustainable in law. 20. I am guided to adopt the above view from the law laid down in State Bank of India & Ors.-vs-TJ. 20. I am guided to adopt the above view from the law laid down in State Bank of India & Ors.-vs-TJ. Paul, (1999)4 SCC 759 , wherein the Apex Court has dealt with the question as to whether the punishment not provided for a set of rules, which has been resorted to, can be imposed by disciplinary authority under the inherent power of the employer. While indicating that every employer has the inherent power to inflict punishment commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct of his employee, the Court has laid down that while exercising powers under such set of rules for disciplinary purpose, the authority concerned cannot traverse beyond the rules. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are quoted hereinbelow: "19. Learned senior counsel for the appellants, Shri T.R. Andhyarujina tried to submit that if the appellate authority decided not to dismiss the respondent, it still had inherent power to award a punishment of 'removal', which was lesser in severity. Learned senior counsel contended that the discretion of the authorities to award such an appropriate punishment could not be interfered with in view of the decision of this Court in Union of India-Vs-G. Ganayutham. In our view, this decision is not applicable to the facts of the case. Here the Court is not interfering with the punishment awarded by the employer on the ground that in the opinion of the Court the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. Here, the gradation of the punishments has been fixed by the rules themselves, namely, the rules of Bank of Cochin and the Court is merely insisting that the authority is confined to the limits of its discretion as restricted by the rules...." (Emphasis is supplied) 21. It logically follows from the above that if the disciplinary authority relies on a particular set of rules and the rules satisfy the principles of natural justice, action taken thereunder will not be illegal even if the rules have not been formally adopted by the employer. It logically follows from the above that if the disciplinary authority relies on a particular set of rules and the rules satisfy the principles of natural justice, action taken thereunder will not be illegal even if the rules have not been formally adopted by the employer. Viewed from this angle, it is clear that though the said Corporation has not formally adopted the Regulations 1988 and/or the Rules, 1964 and though no Government notification has been produced showing that the regulations and the rules aforementioned are applicable to the employees of the said Corporation, the fact remains that the employee does not suffer any prejudice in the Regulation 1988 and/or the Rules 1964 are resorted to inasmuch as the disciplinary authority had informed the employee (i.e. the petitioner) as to what rules and/or regulations would be followed for the purpose of taking disciplinary action against him and, particularly, when the rules and regulations aforementioned are not shown to be inconsistent with the principles of natural justice. Hence, such an action taken by the employee cannot be interfered with as illegal and/or without jurisdiction. I am guided to adopt this view from the case of Director General of Ordinance Services and Ors-Vs-P.N. Malhotra, 1995(Supp)3 SCC 226, wherein the Apex Court while dealing with a somewhat similar situation, has observed as follows: "10. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the respondent cannot be said to have suffered and prejudice by following the procedure prescribed by 1965 rules. He submits that the said rules are nothing but a codification of the principles of natural justice. Indeed, it is submitted, they are more specific, more elaborate and more beneficial to the employees than the broad principles of natural justice. If we assume for the sake of argument that the respondent was entitled to insist upon an enquiry before he could be dismissed, we must agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants." (Emphasis is added) 22. In short, the position of law is that an employer has the inherent power to take disciplinary action against his employee irrespective of the fact whether rules/ standing orders/executive instructions / regulations providing for taking such disciplinary action exist or not. In short, the position of law is that an employer has the inherent power to take disciplinary action against his employee irrespective of the fact whether rules/ standing orders/executive instructions / regulations providing for taking such disciplinary action exist or not. In the absence of any such rules, etc., the employer may choose to take recourse to any set of rules and as long as the rules, so resorted to, are not contrary to the principles of natural justice, the employer's action will be valid and it cannot be objected to on the ground that the rules, so resorted to, have not been formally adopted or made applicable to the employees of the establishment concerned. However, taking resort to any set of rules is subject to the condition that when an employer, takes resort to any set of rules, he cannot impose a penalty and/or adopt a procedure, which is not covered by the rules so resorted to, 23. What, if I may reiterate logically follows from the above discussion is that notwithstanding the fact that the Regulations 1988 and the Rules 1964 have not been formally adopted by the said Corporation making the same applicable to the petitioner's case, taking of such resort to the regulations and rules aforementioned is not illegal, particularly, when it has not been pointed out before me that the regulations and/or the rules aforementioned run contrary to the principles of natural justice. 24. Let me, now, in the face of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, ascertain whether, while taking disciplinary action against the petitioner, the procedure prescribed under the . Regulations 1988 and the Rules 1964 have been followed by the respondents. In this regard, it is of utmost importance to note that Section 9 of the Rules 1964 lays down the procedure for imposing penalties. In T.S. Shrivastava-Vs-State of Assam & Ors. (AIR 1972 Assam 2), it has been held that the procedure prescribed by Rule 9 is mandatory. What is, however, pertained to point out is that when this decision was rendered, Rule 9 did not have sub-rule (2), which, now, reads as follows: "(2) The disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. What is, however, pertained to point out is that when this decision was rendered, Rule 9 did not have sub-rule (2), which, now, reads as follows: "(2) The disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the Government servant, and he shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the disciplinary authority, a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. At the time of delivering the charges, the disciplinary authority shall invariably furnish to the Government servant a list of documents and witnesses by which each article of charges is proposed to be sustained." (Emphasis is-supplied) 25. A Division Bench of this Court in Madhav Chandra Das- Vs-State of Assam &Ors. (1987)2 GLR 210, had the occasion to consider Rule 9(2) and held that this Rule cannot be allowed to be by-passed or observed in casual and/or mechanical manner. The Division Bench further held that the provisions of Rule 9 are, as a whole, mandatory and any violation thereof shall amount to violation of the principles of natural justice vitiating thereby the entire disciplinary proceedings. 26. It may, now be pointed out that Rule 9(3) of the Rules 1964 reads as follows: "(3) The Government servant shall, for the purpose of preparing his defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such official records as he may specify, provided that such permission may be refused if. for reasons to be recorded in writing, in the opinion of the disciplinary authority, such records are not relevant for the purpose, or it is against the public interest to allow him access thereto: Provided that when a Government servant is permitted to inspect and take extracts from official records due care shall be taken against tempering, removal or destruction of records." (Emphasis is supplied) 27. In the case at hand, it is not disputed before me that the petitioner requested the authority concerned to allow him to inspect the papers/documents, which had been relied upon by the subsidiary authority for sustaining the charges levelled against the petitioner. In the case at hand, it is not disputed before me that the petitioner requested the authority concerned to allow him to inspect the papers/documents, which had been relied upon by the subsidiary authority for sustaining the charges levelled against the petitioner. It is also not contended before me that the papers/documents sought to be so inspected were irrelevant or against public interest; but even then inspection was not allowed and no reason was assigned by respondents for not acceding to this request nor is there, I notice, any explanation discernible, in this regard, from the materials on record. 28. Situated thus, it is clear that the petitioner was not allowed to inspect the essential papers/documents, which the disciplinary authority had themselves relied upon to sustain the charges. This was, undoubtedly, in violation of Rule 9(3) and consequently, an unpardonable violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was clearly not allowed adequate opportunity to prepare his defence and meet effectively the accusations made against him. 29. Coming to the submission of Mr Sharma that the witnesses were not examined, at the enquiry, in the presence of the petitioner, I am constrained to hold that this too was in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner received no opportunity whatsoever to cross-examine the witnesses and in consequence thereof, the Enquiry Officer had no effective way of testing the veracity of the statements made before him by the witnesses and the petitioner received no opportunity to prove that the statements made by these witnesses were untrue or false. In effect, thus, the petitioner was condemned without having been properly heard. 30. While dealing with the above aspect of this writ petition, I may refer to Kuldeep Singh-Vs-Commissioner of Police and others, (1999)2 SCC 10 , wherein it has been observed as follows: "32. Reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 311(2) means 'hearing' in accordance with the principles of natural justice under which one of the basic requirements is that all the witnesses in the departmental enquiry shall be examined in the presence of the delinquent who shall be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. Reasonable opportunity contemplated by Article 311(2) means 'hearing' in accordance with the principles of natural justice under which one of the basic requirements is that all the witnesses in the departmental enquiry shall be examined in the presence of the delinquent who shall be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. Where a statement previously made by a witness, either during the course of preliminary enquiry or investigation, is proposed to be brought on record in the departmental proceedings, the law as laid down by this Court is that a copy of that statement should first be supplied to the delinquent who should thereafter be given an opportunity to cross-examine that witness. 33. In State of Mysore-Vs-Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur, the witness was not examined in the presence of the delinquent so far as his examination-in-chief was concerned and it was his previous statement recorded at an earlier stage which was brought on record. That statement was put to the witness who acknowledged having made that statement. The witnesses was thereafter offered for cross-examination and it was held that although the statement (examination-in-chief) was not recorded in the presence of the delinquent, since the witness had been offered for cross-examination after he acknowledged having made the previous statement, the rules of natural justice were sufficiently complied with. 34. In Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd.-Vs-Gangadhar and State of U.P.-Vs-Om Prakash Gupta, the above principles were reiterated and it was laid down that if a previous statement of the witness was intended to be brought on record, it could be done provided the witness was offered for cross-examination." (Emphasis is supplied) 31. From what has been observed and laid down by the Apex Court in Kuldeep Singh (supra), it is clear that every witness in the disciplinary enquiry shall be examined in the presence of the delinquent, who shall be given opportunity of cross-examining the witness except, perhaps, when his/her presence cannot be procured at all. 32. That a witness, whose statement is required to be used in a disciplinary enquiry, has to be, normally, produced for cross-examination by the delinquent in the departmental proceeding is also emphasised by the Apex Court in Union of India and another-Vs-P. Thyagarajan (1999) 1 SCC 733 . 33. 32. That a witness, whose statement is required to be used in a disciplinary enquiry, has to be, normally, produced for cross-examination by the delinquent in the departmental proceeding is also emphasised by the Apex Court in Union of India and another-Vs-P. Thyagarajan (1999) 1 SCC 733 . 33. In the case at hand, it is not the respondents' case that the presence of the witnesses, in question, could not have been procured for the purpose of the disciplinary enquiry. For from this, the witnesses were, in fact, examined and their statements were recorded, but the same were done behind the back of the petitioner, which was not only in violation of the principles of natural justice, but also against the settled position of law indicated hereinabove and the same has, undoubtedly, caused, for the reasons discussed above, serious prejudice to the petitioner and, hence, the enquiry report, which followed such an enquiry, if sustained, would, in my firm view, cause serious miscarriage of justice. 34. Strictly speaking, therefore, the charges levelled against the petitioner had remained wholly unsubstantiated by any dependable piece of material on record. 35. As regards the submission of the petitioner that one witness, namely Professor Kalakeswar Sharma aforementioned was examined, whose name did not appear in the list of witnesses aforementioned, it is clear that since Rule 9(2) is, as indicated hereinabove, mandatory, furnishing of list of witnesses to the delinquent cannot be treated as a mere formality and there has to be cogent and convincing reasons for the disciplinary authority to examine a witness, whose name has not been mentioned in the list of witnesses furnished to the delinquent. It does not mean, I must hasten to emphasise, that no witness from outside such a list can be examined. What it means is that no witness, unless his/her name is included in such as list, be, normally, examined in the disciplinary enquiry, and if a witness from outside such a list has to be examine, then, the disciplinary authority must assign cogent and convincing reasons therefore; otherwise, such liberty will be used by the employer as means to plug loopholes and in such a situation, the enquiry will become an empty formality or farce. For the conclusions so reached, I respectfully agree with the observations made by J.N. Sharma, J, in Dibya Harsh Goswami (supra), wherein his Lordship, while dealing with the question as to whether a witness outside the list, furnished to the delinquent, can be examined by the disciplinary authority as a witness, observed as follows: "No doubt, it may be possible for the disciplinary authority to examine witnesses not named in the list... but for that the authority has to show sufficient reasons/cause.... If witnesses are allowed to be examined according to wish of disciplinary authority, the very purpose of furnishing a list shall be otiose. This cannot be allowed to be done." (Emphasis is added) 36. In the case at hand, examination of the witnesses behind the back of the petitioner and, more so, examination of the unlisted witness were grave violations of Rule 9(2). Situated thus, I have no hesitation in holding that the -entire proceeding stands vitiated for breach of the Rules 9(2) and 9(3). 37. Turning to the question as to what bearing non-furnishing of the enquiry report to the petitioner, before imposing the penalty of warning on him, will have, it is of immense importance to note that had the enquiry report been furnished to the petitioner, he would have been able to inform the disciplinary authority of the lapses committed by the enquiry officer in conducting the proceeding, but having not furnished the enquiry report to the petitioner, the disciplinary authority not only caused prejudice to the petitioner, but also denied to itself an effective opportunity of knowing as to how the proceeding had really progressed, how it had been conducted and whether the conclusions reached by the Enquiry Officer were sustainable. 38. In the case at hand, the pleas taken by the petitioner are of fundamental importance, but the same were not considered or could not have been considered effectively by the disciplinary authority, for, on account of non-furnishing of the copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner, the petitioner could not point out to the disciplinary authority as to how or why the reasoning applied by the Enquiry Officer were wrong or where, in reaching the conclusions, the Enquiry Officer had gone wrong. Thus, the non-furnishing of the enquiry report had, in the facts and attending circumstances of the case at hand, caused, if I may reiterate, serious prejudice to the petitioner. Thus, the non-furnishing of the enquiry report had, in the facts and attending circumstances of the case at hand, caused, if I may reiterate, serious prejudice to the petitioner. 39.1 may also instantly mentioned that despite the fact that while issuing Rule, this Court had, on 23.07.97, called for the records, the respondents have not produced the same. It may be noted that the initial burden to sustain a disciplinary proceeding is always on the disciplinary authority and by producing the records, the authority concerned can satisfy the Court that the procedural safeguards given to the employee had been adhered to. However, despite being directed, since the authority concerned have not produced the record, the irresistible conclusion to be drawn, in such a case, is, and I do draw, that had the records been produced, the same would have shown that the procedural safeguards, which were required to be followed, have not been followed. In other words, in a situation such as the present one, there is no reason why adverse inference cannot be drawn against the employer. Reference made by Mr. Sharma, in this regard, to the Apex Court's decision in Tandan Brothers(supra) and this Court's decision in Jalal Uddin Laskar(supra) is not misplaced. 40. I may also point out that as far as "warning" is concerned, it is not a penalty within the meaning of the Rules 1964. However, since the Regulations 1988 have not produced before this Court. I refrain from entering into the question as to whether warning could have been given to the petitioner, as a penalty, following the regulations and/or the rules aforementioned. 41. What crystallises from the above discussion is that notwithstanding the fact that the Regulations 1988 and Rules 1964 were not formally adopted by the said Corporation, the respondents could have legally proceeded against the petitioner for his alleged lapses/mis-conduct under the Regulations 1988 and the Rules 1964, yet, the fact remains that apart from the fact that the disciplinary authority ignored, as indicated hereinabove, the procedural safeguards provided to a delinquent under the Rules aforementioned, the Enquiry Officer too, while holding the enquiry, violated as mentioned hereinabove, the procedural safeguards provided under the Rules aforementioned to a delinquent for ensuring compliance with the principles of natural justice. Coupled with the above, the report, so rendered, was accepted by the disciplinary authority without caring to ascertain if the enquiry had been completed in conformity with the procedural safeguards guaranteed to a delinquent under the rules aforementioned. Since the Rule 9 aforementioned has been held to be mandatory and the procedural safeguard guaranteed therein are , as held above, consistent with the principles of natural justice, denial thereof has, for reasons already indicated hereinabove, caused serious prejudice to the petitioner's defence. Thus, the warning given to the petitioner following such a proceeding, which is commenced, held and concluded in total disregard of the principles of natural justice causing serious prejudice to the petitioner would, if allowed to stand good on record, cause, in my firm view, serious mis-carriage of justice. The findings of the Enquiry .Officer and the warning given to the petitioner in consequence thereof must, therefore, be interfered with and set aside. This does not mean, I hasten to add, that the charge -sheet issued to the writ petition cannot, now, be acted upon and/or that respondents cannot take such disciplinary action against the petitioner as may be permissible under the law. 42. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this writ petition succeeds. Not only the impugned order, dated 21.5.97 aforementioned, but also the report of the enquiry, in question, are hereby set aside and quashed. The respondents are, however, left at liberty to take such disciplinary action against the petitioner as may be permissible under the law. 43. With the observations and directions contained hereinabove, this writ petition shall stand disposed of. 44. No order as to costs.