JUDGMENT P. C. Verma, ACJ. : This writ petition has been filed seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Charge-sheet and criminal proceeding arising thereof, contained in Annexure No.1 to the writ petition, including the order of cognizance of the said crime number, contained in Annexure No. 1-A to the writ petition, in case No. 42 of 1996 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and others versus Anant Kumar Singh and others pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate (CBI), Dehradun arising out of R. C. No.2 (S) of1995 and 3(3) of 1995, under Section 302, 324 & 326 read with Section , 34 of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that allegations contained in the Chargesheet relating to the discharge of the official duties of the petitioner being a public servant are incorrect. The sanction sought by cm under Section 197 Criminal Procedure Code has been refused by the State Government and the CBI has not challenged the said refusal order by the State Government. Therefore, the learned Magistrate has no right and jurisdiction either to take cognizance or to proceed against the petitioner and the entire proceedings on the basis of Charge-sheet is liable to be quashed. 2. Brief facts of the case are stated thus; that the protagonists of the Uttarakhand agitation had organized a rally at Delhi on 2.10.1994 "to demonstrate\against the reservation policy of the State Government and to press their demand for separate Statehood. Although the N.C.T. Government of Delhi had granted them permission to hold rally, it had banned the carrying of arms, spears, lath is or any other lethal weapon in the whole of Delhi and requested the U. P. Government to make proper arrangement for search and not to permit any rallyists to enter Delhi with these weapons. Government of India also issued detailed instructions regarding promulgation of prohibitory order, arrangements of search, seizure and arrests in cases of violation of prohibitory order, round the clock continuous vigilance, surveillance and patrolling and exchange of information. In the forenoon of 30.9.1994 the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division held a meeting of all the District Magistrate, Senior Superintendents of Police/Superintendents of Police of the six districts of the division in which the Inspector General (Police), Meerut Zone and the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Meerut Range also participated. In the forenoon of 30.9.1994 the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut Division held a meeting of all the District Magistrate, Senior Superintendents of Police/Superintendents of Police of the six districts of the division in which the Inspector General (Police), Meerut Zone and the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Meerut Range also participated. In this meeting the officers were instructed to make proper arrangements for the checking of bus permits, arms etc. in their respective districts. In the same afternoon a meeting was also held at the level of the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to re" view the preparations made by the State Government in this regard in which the I.G. and D.I.G., Meerut Zone/Range also participated. In furtherance of the decisions taken in the meeting held at various levels and verbal instructions received from the Director General of Police, U.P. the D.I.G., Meerut Range issued written instructions in this regard on 1.10.1994. All these letters/instructions have been annexed in the writ petition as Annexures 3 to 7. 3. In compliance of the above orders elaborate arrangements were made for checking of arms/ ammunitions and other weapons from 8.00 a.m. on 1.10.1994. This arrangement had worked smoothly and the officers/officials on duty were able to search the passengers and buses and to allow them to proceed further for Delhi. But when the rallyists came inlarge number and refused to undergo the process of search, the officers on duty repeatedly explained to them the instructions regarding checking and requested them to subject themselves to search and proceed further. The rallyists had some misunderstanding that the administration was there to somehow stop them from proceeding further and thus, the more efforts were made to explain to them the need for search, the more was the resistance and violence from the rallyists. When the rallyists tried to proceed further forcibly without undergoing search, the district administration had to use reasonable force to disperse the unruly crowd under the provisions laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code and the Police Regulation. In the night of 1.10.1994 the illegal violent assembly was dispersed with lathi charge, whereas in the morning firing had to be resorted to for the dispersal of illegal violent assembly of the rallyists as all other means including the rubber bullets had failed to produce the desired results. In the night of 1.10.1994 the illegal violent assembly was dispersed with lathi charge, whereas in the morning firing had to be resorted to for the dispersal of illegal violent assembly of the rallyists as all other means including the rubber bullets had failed to produce the desired results. The written order dated 2.10.1994 passed by the petitioner clearly directs the Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarnagar to use minimum firing for dispersal and control of the unlawful assembly which had dISturbed the public order and some human lives were lost. 4. It may be stated that the Uttarakhand Sangharsh Samiti approached the High Court at Allahabad through Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32982 of 1994 and the cm under the directions of a Division Bench of High Court, Allahabad, lodged an FIR. The investigating .agency cm also filed a Charge-sheet under Sections 304,307,324,326 read with Sec. 341.P.C. under the observations and directions of the High Court dated 9.2.1996 before the Special Judicial Magistrate (CBI) on 6.4.1996. Quoting the observations of High Court the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 302,307,324,326 read with Sec. 341.P.C., on 22.4.1996. This is case No. 42 of 1996. 5. The petitioner challenged the judgment of the High Court before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by way of SLP No. 7920. of 1996. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has set aside the entire judgment and order dated 9.2.1996 passed by the High Court, Allahabad, vide its judgment and order dated 13.5.1999. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Judges should have avoided making observations concerning matters which are pending considerations by the subordinate courts. Such observations regarding commissions of various offences were premature and bad in law and further directions of the High Court, that no sanction is required, has also been set aside. 6. In view of the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the investigating agency sought sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. of the U. P. State Govt. to prosecute the petitioner and other officers and informed the court of Special Judicial Magistrate of the same through an application dated 26.2.2000. 7. Now we may proceed to examine as to whether the act was done by the petitioner in official discharge of duty and was, therefore, protected by the immunity granted under Section 197 Cr.P.C. 8. to prosecute the petitioner and other officers and informed the court of Special Judicial Magistrate of the same through an application dated 26.2.2000. 7. Now we may proceed to examine as to whether the act was done by the petitioner in official discharge of duty and was, therefore, protected by the immunity granted under Section 197 Cr.P.C. 8. The case of the cm in the Charge-sheet is that the petitioner and other police officers under the garb of checking tried to stop the rallyists from going to Delhi, provoked them to resort to violence, when they dispersed after the use of rubber bullets the remaining few protesters were unnecessarily shot dead. 9. It has been stated in Para 1 of the Charge-sheet that, "the Delhi Police and the Home Ministry of the Government of India had sent detailed instructions and informed the Director General Police of U.P. that rallyists coming to Delhi should be searched for arms/riverstones etc. and should not be permitted to carry arms/weapons etc. as entry of rallyists in Delhi with arms/weapons etc. had been banned." Also the CBI in its application dated 26.2.2000 before the learned Special Judicial Magistrate (CBI) Dehradun has admitted that the alleged offences are connected to the discharge of the official duty of the petitioner and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 13.5.1999 sanction is to be obtained for the prosecution of these public servants for which necessary steps have been taken. Thus, we there should be no hesitation in accepting the contention of the petitioner that the alleged offences, if committed, are committed in the discharge of official duty. 10. Annexures 8,9 and 10 of the writ petition are the joint reports of the District Magistrate and Senior Superintendent Police, Saharanpur, Commissioner and Dy. Inspector General, Garhwal Division and District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police, Hardwar respectively regarding the occurrences of 1/2.10.1994 in Raiwala (District-Dehradun), Mohand (District-Saharanpur) and Narsen (District-Hardwar) checkposts. They all narrate violence. by the rallyists at these check posts which fall before Rampur Tiraha (District-Muzaffarnagar). Inspector General, Garhwal Division and District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police, Hardwar respectively regarding the occurrences of 1/2.10.1994 in Raiwala (District-Dehradun), Mohand (District-Saharanpur) and Narsen (District-Hardwar) checkposts. They all narrate violence. by the rallyists at these check posts which fall before Rampur Tiraha (District-Muzaffarnagar). In Para III of the Chargesheet it is stated that, "the representatives of the rallyists entered into a dialogue with officers of administration including Sri A. K. Singh A-I and Police Sri R. P. Singh A-2 on duty at Rampur Tiraha pleading to them that when there buses have undergone checking at several times at earlier check points, there could be no occasion for any further checking". 11. The first para of the joint report. dated 2.10.1994 of the OM/SSP, Saharan pur read as under: XXX XXX XXX 12. Thereafter, it gives detailed description of how the agitationists became violent on learning the intentions of the District Administration, Saharanpur to dissuade them from participating in the rally at Delhi. 13. There is no dispute that the instructions were for effective checking and not dissuasion. Therefore, from the above mentioned letter it is apparent that the district administration, Saharanpur misunderstood the instructions and indulged in dissuasion which must have made the rallyists suspicious of the role of the administration at subsequent check posts, namely, Narsen, (District-Hardwar) and Rampur Tiraha (District-Muzaffarnagar) and incited them to force their way ahead by violent means. This fact is clearly stated in para. III of the Charge-sheet which reads as follows: "The situation, however, did not become very explosive and the rallyists in order to push their passage indulged in raising slogans and there was also exchange of brick bats. The D: M.Shri A. K. Singh, A-1, S. P. Shri R. P. Singh, A-2 and Addl. S. P. Shri Mahesh Kumar Mishra, A-3 and others then without any justification resorted to tear gas shelling but owing to the opposite direction of the wind this affected the members of the administration and police party. This was followed by a lathi charge and firing of rubber bullets. The rallyists scattered and ran hither and thither except a few who remained demonstrating their anguish against their stoppage at Rampur Tiraha. There after under the cover of dispersing an alleged violent mob, indiscriminate and close range firing was resorted to against the rallyists by Shri R. P. Singh, A-2. The rallyists scattered and ran hither and thither except a few who remained demonstrating their anguish against their stoppage at Rampur Tiraha. There after under the cover of dispersing an alleged violent mob, indiscriminate and close range firing was resorted to against the rallyists by Shri R. P. Singh, A-2. Shri Mahesh Kumar Mishra, A-3, G. P. Nainwal, A-4, Shri Jagdish Singh, A-S Shri Sub hash Chand, A-6 and others under the orders of A-I Sri A. K. Singh." 14. Considering the entire material on record as well as the Charge-sheet which was submitted in the court of learned Magistrate (CBI), Dehradun on the basis of which, the cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate under the directions of the High Court dated 9.2.1996 which was set aside by the Apex Court, vide its judgment dated 13.5.1999, the State Government have refused to grant sanction to prosecute the petitioner after considering the full facts of the Charge-sheet in case No. 42 of 1996. The State Government on the basis of material on record issued the refusal letter after coming to a decision that action taken by the petitioner was in discharge of his official duty and no offence was committed by him. The refusal letter No. 14481 (1)/SA(S)/22(47)/86/2000 dated 4.11.2000 of the State Government is on record as Annexure SA-1. 15. Thus from the aforesaid facts, it is evident that the action taken by the petitioner was in good faith and in official discharge of duty. 16. Now we may notice the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of the bar created under section 197 Cr.P.C. for taking cognizance on the basis of Charge-sheet for which the State Government has refused the permission to prosecute, the proceedings in case No. 42 of 1996 are liable to be quashed. He further submitted that the petitioner, the then District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar, who was present on the spot acted in good faith and in a bonafide manner under the provision of Section 129 Cr.P.C. Therefore, his acts were fully protected under Section 132 (2) of the Cr.P.C. and he can not be made liable for any offence. Section 132 (2) Cr.P.C. reads as under: "No executive Magistrate or police officer acting under any of the said sections in good faith shall be deemed to have thereby committed any offence." 17. Section 132 (2) Cr.P.C. reads as under: "No executive Magistrate or police officer acting under any of the said sections in good faith shall be deemed to have thereby committed any offence." 17. Time to file counter affidavit was given to Sri U. K. Uniyal, learned counsel for the CBI but he chose not to file any counter affidavit and submitted that he will file written submissions alongwith case laws at the time of final hearing on the matter. 18. Learned counsel for the CBI contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has upstaged the judgment of High Court passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32982 of 1994, whereby the High Court had held that for the prosecution of the petitioner and other accused, no sanction is required. He further contended that the grounds taken by the petitioner for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court in the above noted writ petition, wherein criminal proceedings against the petitioner had been sought to be quashed stand reverted in the light of the stand taken by the Apex Court in plethora of decisions which have stood the test of time and still hold good. 19. Learned Counsel for the CBI also contended that the contention of the petitioner on the basis of the Charge-sheet filed against him as no case is made out against him is also false and stands belied from the perusal of the charge-sheet filed after comprehensive investigation, conducted by the top officials of the CBI. That charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner before the Special Magistrate (CBI), Dehradun contains the serious charges of unjustified, uncalled for and without any bonafide situation in discriminate firing on the rallyist, under the orders of petitioner from the close range, lodging of false concurrent and imaginary F.I.R., making of false firing party constituting six police personal whereas five out of six police personnel have given statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. disclosing their absence in any firing, implantation of pellets of bullet and this fact is being confirmed by he statement of four constables given under Section 164 Cr.P.C. He relied on the following case laws : (1) Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu, (1955) Supreme Court Reports 1 Page 302. (2) R. R. Chari v. State of U. P AIR 1962 SC 1562-1573; SCR 1963 (1) 121 (3) Dhanajay v. M. S. Upadhaya, 1960 SCJ 1223 (4) P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 (5) B. Saha & others v. M. S. Kochar, 1979 (4) SCC, 177 (6) Raj Kishore Roy v. Kamleshwar Pandey and other 2002 SCC (Cri) 1423; 2002 (2) J.Cr.c. 573 (SC); 2002 (2) UC 563 20. We have examined the judgment cited by the learned counsel for CBI, Sri U. K. Uniyal and we find that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the ratio of these judgments are not attracted as in the present case the State Government has refused the sanction to prosecute the petitioner under Sec. 197 Cr.P.C. which could be done only if it is found by the State Government that the action taken by the officer was in discharge of his official duty. The refusal under Section 197 Cr.P.C. for prosecution has not been challenged by the CBI, the prosecuting agency in any court of law. 21. The question that falls for determination in the instant case is about the ambit of the inherent powers of the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India to quash criminal proceedings. 22. In case of Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar and another, reported in 2000 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 872, the appellant Gauri Shankar Prasad, S.D.M., Nangachhia was officially entrusted to remove the encroachments from road and roadside lands as well as unauthorized structures. Under his supervision, the National Highway division of PWD carried out operations for removal of encroachments. When he and other officials tried to remove the encroachment on 12.8.1996, the respondent protested and filed a complaint for offence under Sections 323,504,452 I.P.C. and the learned Add!. Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance by the order dated 22.5.1998. But the Hon'ble Supreme Court while allowing the appeal set aside and quashed the cognizance order. When he and other officials tried to remove the encroachment on 12.8.1996, the respondent protested and filed a complaint for offence under Sections 323,504,452 I.P.C. and the learned Add!. Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance by the order dated 22.5.1998. But the Hon'ble Supreme Court while allowing the appeal set aside and quashed the cognizance order. Para 14 of the said judgment is being reproduced below: "Coming to the facts of the case in hand, it is manifest that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence in his official capacity as Sub-Divisional Magistrate for the purpose of removal of encroachment from government land and in exercise of such duty, he is alleged to have committed the facts which from the gravamen of the allegations contained in the complaint lodged by the respondent. In such circumstances, it cannot be held that the acts complained of by the respondent against the appellant have a reasonable nexus with the official duty of the appellant. It follows, therefore ,that the appellant is entitled to the immunity from criminal Proceedings although sanction provided under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is not applicable in the case." 23. In case of Abdul Wahab Ansari versus State of Bihar and another, 2001 Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) 18; 2001 J.Cr.C. 12 (SC); 2001 (1) UC 102 (SC), the appellant was a public servant and on 17.7.1993 when the appellant alongwith armed force, reached the encroachment• site, several miscreants armed with weapons, stated hurling stones and as the situation became out of control, after giving due warning the appellant was compelled to give order for opening fire and disperse the mob. On account of such firing, one of the persons died and two others were injured and the appellant then sent a report to his senior officer about the incident. A complaint was filed, alleging the commission of offence by the appellant under Sections 302, 307, 380, 427, 504, 147, 148 and 149 I.P.C. as well as Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 24.11.1995, came to the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence available to establish that prima facie case under Sections 302,307,147,148,149 and 380 is made out against the accused and, therefore, he directed issuance of non-bailable warrants against the appellant and other accused persons. The Chief Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 24.11.1995, came to the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence available to establish that prima facie case under Sections 302,307,147,148,149 and 380 is made out against the accused and, therefore, he directed issuance of non-bailable warrants against the appellant and other accused persons. The Chief Judicial Magistrate was of the opinion that the provisions of Section 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure will have no application to the facts of the case. The appellant then moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying inter alia that no cognizimce could be taken without a sanction of the appropriate Government, as required under subsection (2) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the' appellant was discharging his official duty pursuant to an order of the competent authority. The High Court, however, without going into the merits of the matter and being of the opinion that all the questions may be raised at the time of framing of charge, disposed of the application filed by the appellant. Hence the appeal was filed in the Apex Court in which the following questions were referred to the larger Bench. (i) as to at what stage the accused can take such plea of Section 197 Cr.P.C.? Is it immediately after the cognizance is taken and process is issued or is it only when the court reaches the stage of framing of charge as held by the Supreme Court in Birendra K. Singh case.? (ij) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is it possible for the Court to come to a conclusion that the appellant was discharging his official duty and in course of such discharge of duty, ordered for opening of fire to control the mob in consequence of which a person died and two persons were injured and in which , event, Section 197 Cr.P.C. can be held to be attracted? . 24. The larger Bench of the Apex Court has held that there being no sanction, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate is bad in law and unless the same is quashed qua the appellant, it will be an abuse of the process of Court. 25. Paras 7 & 9 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: "7. . 24. The larger Bench of the Apex Court has held that there being no sanction, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate is bad in law and unless the same is quashed qua the appellant, it will be an abuse of the process of Court. 25. Paras 7 & 9 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: "7. Previous sanction of the competent authority being a precondition for the court in taking cognizance of the offence if the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused can be said to be an act in discharge of his official duty, the question touches the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in the matter of taking cognizance and, therefore, there is no requirement that an accused should wait for taking such plea till the charges are framed. In Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. Pandey Ajay Bhushan a similar contention had been advanced by Mr. Sibal, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in that case. In that case, the High Court had held on the application of the accused that the provisions of Section 197 get attracted. Rejecting the contention, this Court had observed : (SCC pp. 217-18, para 23) "The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of an offence except with a previous sanction of the Government concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is prohibition, imposed by the statute from taking cognizance, the accused after appearing before the court on process being issued, by an application indicating that Section 197(1) is attracted merely assists the court to rectify its error where jurisdiction has been exercised which it does not possess. In such a case there should not be any bar for the accused producing the relevant documents and materials which will be ipso facto admissible for adjudication of the question as to whether in fact Section 197 has any application in the case in hand. In such a case there should not be any bar for the accused producing the relevant documents and materials which will be ipso facto admissible for adjudication of the question as to whether in fact Section 197 has any application in the case in hand. It is no longer in dispute and has been indicated by this Court in several cases that the question of sanction can be considered at any stage of the proceedings." The court had further observed: (SCC pp. 218-19, para 24) "The question of applicability of Section 197 of the Code and the consequential ouster of jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance without a valid sanction is genetically different from the plea of the accused that the averments in the complaint do not make out an offence and as such the order of cognizance and/or the criminal proceedings be quashed. In the aforesaid premises we are of the considered opinion that an accused is not debarred from producing the relevant documentary materials which can be legally looked into without any formal proof, in support of the stand that the acts complained of were committed in exercise of his jurisdiction or purported jurisdiction as a public servant in discharge of his official duty thereby requiring sanction of the appropriate authority. " 9. Coming to the second question, it is now well settled by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari that in the matter of grant of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. In other words, there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. In other words, there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty, the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. In the said case it had been further held that where a power is conferred or a duty imposed by statute or otherwise, and there is nothing said expressly inhibiting the exercise of the power of the performance of the duty by any limitations or restrictions, it is reasonable to held that it carries with it the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are reasonably necessary for such execution, because it is a rule that when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorizes the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command. This decision was followed by this Court in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain case and in a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Gauri Shankar Prasad v. State of Bihar. The aforesaid case has full force even to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the said case, the Court had observed (SCC p.21, para 14) It is manifest that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence in his official capacity as Sub-Divisional Magistrate for the purpose of removal of encroachment from Government land and in exercise of such duty, he is alleged to have committed the acts which form the grievance of the allegations contained in the complaint lodged by the respondent. In such circumstances, it cannot but be held that the acts complained of by the respondent against the appellant have a reasonable nexus with the official duty of the appellant. In such circumstances, it cannot but be held that the acts complained of by the respondent against the appellant have a reasonable nexus with the official duty of the appellant. It follows, therefore, that the appellant is entitled to the immunity from criminal proceedings without sanction provided under Section 197 Cr.P.C." It is not necessary for us to multiply authorities on this point and bearing in mind the ratio of the aforesaid cases and applying the same to the facts of the present case as indicated in the complaint itself, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the appellant had been directed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to be present with police force and remove the encroachment in question and in course of discharge of his duty to control the mob, when he had cirected for opening of fire, it must be held that the order of opening of fire was in exercise of the power conferred upon him and the duty imposed upon him under the orders of the Magistrate and sin that view of the matter the provisions of Section 197(1) applies to the facts of the present case. Admittedly, there being no sanction, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate is bad in law and unless the same is quashed qua the appellant, it will be an abuse of the process of Court......" 26. The pendency of the criminal case No. 42 of 1996 on account of the charge-sheet filed by the cm is mere abuse of process of Court and is liable to be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India as it falls in one of the category illustrated in Para-102 of the judgment of State of Haryana & others Versus Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 which has been relied by the Apex Court in recent judgment dated 13.3.2003, B. S. Joshi and others versus State of Haryana and another, reported in JT 2003 (3) SC 277; 2003 (2) J.Cr.C. 866; 2003 (2) UC 827 which reads as under: "In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may "lot be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulate and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 27. Therefore the ratio of the Apex Court in the decision quoted above apply with full force in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the Apex Court in the case of Abdul Wahab Ansari versus State of Bihar and another; 2001 SCC (Cr) 18; 2001 J.Cr.C. 12 (SC); 2001 (1) UC 102 (SC) did not remit the matter to the Magistrate to drop the proceedings for want of sanction but quashed the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate holding that it was bad in law and unless it is quashed qua the appellant, it will be an abuse of process of Court. 28. In view of the foregoing discussions, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 29. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 28. In view of the foregoing discussions, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 29. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The order of cognizance in crime number, contained in Annexure No. 1-A to the writ petition, in case No. 42 of 1996 Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and• others versus Anant Kumar Singh and others pending in the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate (CBI), Dehradun arising out of R. C. No.2 (S) of 1995 and 3(3) of 1995, under Sections 302, 324 & 326 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. is set aside for want of sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the petitioner is fully protected by the immunity granted under this Section. Consequently, the proceeding arising out of charge-sheet contained in Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition, so far as it relates to the petitioner, is also quashed. No order as to costs.