JUDGMENT P.K. Balasubramanyan, CJ.-LPA No. 237 of 2003 is filed by the State. LPA No. 176 of 2003 is filed by an Intervener in the writ petition, with the leave of the Court. WP (C) No. 1359 of 2003 is filed by the petitioner therein claiming to be aggrieved by the modified order or direction issued by the State. That writ petition, when it came up before a Learned Single Judge who had rendered the decision under appeal, was referred to the Division Bench in view of the pendency of the appeal by the State. 2. The subject matter of the dispute is the reservation for admission to professional colleges in the State. The State of Jharkhand proposed 73 percent reservation for the Schedule Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Extremely Backward Classes and the Backward Classes put together. The same was challenged before this Court in various writ petitions. The matters were referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench of 5 Judges, took up the matter for hearing. It was then brought to their Lordships' notice that the question to be decided was pending decision in the Supreme Court in Voice (Consumer Care Council) vs. State of Tamil Nadu. It was submitted that the question whether the State could make reservation exceeding fifty percent was the question that was involved in that proceeding pending before the Supreme Court and that was the question that had to be decided by this Court in the case before it. The Full Bench thereupon adjourned the proceedings to await the decision of the Supreme Court. But the Full Bench thought that an interim direction was necessary, especially in the context of the ratio of the decision in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India [1992 Suppl. (3) SCC 217]. The Full Bench therefore directed that only 50% of the appointment may be from the reserved categories and the balance 23 percent out of 73% may be provisionally made on the basis of merit. The Court also directed that the appointment to be made in the 50% reserved categories should be on proportionate basis with due reference and regard being had to the percentage of the categories as constituting the sum total of the original impugned 73%. We may notice that at that stage, reservation to the respective categories was as follows:(i) Scheduled Castes .. 14%. (ii) Scheduled Tribes ... 32%. (iii) Extremely Backward Classes ... 18%. We may notice that at that stage, reservation to the respective categories was as follows:(i) Scheduled Castes .. 14%. (ii) Scheduled Tribes ... 32%. (iii) Extremely Backward Classes ... 18%. (iv) Backward Classes 9%. Total 73%. 3. Apparently, the State felt some difficulty in implementing the interim direction of the Full Bench. The difficulty was felt, according to the State, in working out the proportion as indicated by the Full Bench. The State, therefore, sought a clarification or modification of the direction. The Full Bench clarified the order. The Court made it clear that the Court had not intended to fix any particular percentage with respect to any class or category constituting the fifty percent sum total of the reservation. Based on the established norms and applicable parameters, it was open to the State to fix the, appropriate percentage of quotas with respect to each individual class and category as it may objectively and fairly decide, constituting sum total of fifty percent. We may notice here that the two sets of writ petitions before the Full Bench related to appointment and admission to educational institutions. A quota for admission to educational institution was fixed by an executive order at 73 percent. That had also to be reduced to 50% pending final decision by the Full Bench. The Full Bench had postponed the final decision to await the decision of the Supreme Court in view of the pendency of the case before that Court. The State, therefore, issued another direction or an executive order reducing the quota to fifty percent in all. This time around, the State did not provide separately for Extremely Backward Category or Backward Category, but made reservation in that behalf applicable to both categories. The reduced percentage of reservation provided was as follows:- (i) Scheduled Caste 10% (ii) Scheduled Tribes 26% (iii) Other Backward Categories (including both Extremely Backward Categories & Backward Categories) 14% Total 50% 4. Writ petitions were tiled challenging the action of the State in taking away the separate reservation for the Extremely Backward Categories and Backward Categories and providing for 14% reservation for other Backward Categories, including both Extremely Backward and Backward Categories. Writ petitions were tiled challenging the action of the State in taking away the separate reservation for the Extremely Backward Categories and Backward Categories and providing for 14% reservation for other Backward Categories, including both Extremely Backward and Backward Categories. The challenge was by those who claimed to belong to Extremely Backward Categories and their contention was that the clubbing together of the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories would act to their prejudice and that the clubbing together was against the interim direction issued by the Full Bench. They argued that the percentage had to be reduced, but a separate percentage had to be assigned to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories, as was done earlier. The State met this argument by contending that it was for the State to decide upon the quota of reservation and that there was nothing in the interim order of the Full Bench which restrained it from bringing within the fold of other Backward Categories, both Extremely Backward and Backward Categories. It was submitted that it was a matter of policy, and the Government had fixed the quota fairly, and going by the modified interim order of the Full Bench, it was enabled to fix appropriate percentage of quotas with respect to each individual class and category as it may objectively and fairly decide constituting the sum total of 50 percent" (emphasis supplied). In its wisdom, the Government had decided that reservations must be made applicable to the classes of other Backward Categories and that the same should take in both the Backward and the Extremely Backward Categories. 5. The learned Single Judge in the judgment under appeal held that in the light of the decision referred to by him and in view of the Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India, no person could claim any right of reservation in favour of the class or category and the State Government was not bound to make separate reservation for each and every class or category. But, the learned Single Judge took tile view that the interim direction of the Full Bench precluded the State from re-categorizing the recipients of reservations and, therefore, the State had gone beyond its mandate under the interim direction, by doing away with the separate reservations for the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories. Hence, its order was unsustainable. But, the learned Single Judge took tile view that the interim direction of the Full Bench precluded the State from re-categorizing the recipients of reservations and, therefore, the State had gone beyond its mandate under the interim direction, by doing away with the separate reservations for the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories. Hence, its order was unsustainable. Thus, the learned Single Judge set aside the subsequent Resolution dated 10.10.2002 passed by the Government in that behalf and remitted the matter to the State to determine separately what will be the percentage of reservations for the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories for the purpose of the interim arrangement and for admission into professional/technical institutions, subject to the final decision that may be rendered by the Full bench in the earlier pending writ petitions. 6. Though there were three writ petitions before the learned Single Judge, which were disposed of by a common judgment, the State has chosen to file only L.P.A No. 237 of 2003 against the judgment in the WP(C) No. 6332 of 2003. Appeals have not been filed against the decisions in WP(C) No. 6220 of 2002 and WP(C) No. 6545of 2002. An intervener claiming to be an Association had sought to intervene in the writ petitions. Though no formal order was passed by the learned Single Judge, in the petition for intervention filed by the intervener, counsel for the intervener was also heard while disposing of the writ petitions. That intervener Association has filed L.P.A. No. 176 of 2003 purporting to challenge the decision in WP (C) No. 6220 of 2002. The Intervener has also filed an application for permission to appeal against the judgment and we had granted that permission by allowing that application. Though in the submission part of the appeal, it is mentioned that the Association is aggrieved by the judgment in W.P. (C) No. 6223 of 2003 and other analogous cases, the appeal can be understood as only against the judgment in WP (C) No. 6220 of 2002. The result is that strictly speaking, there is no challenge to the decision in WP (C) No. 6545 of 2002 before us. 7. The result is that strictly speaking, there is no challenge to the decision in WP (C) No. 6545 of 2002 before us. 7. In this context, learned counsel for the contesting respondents in the appeals raised a contention that the hearing of the appeal is barred by res judicata in view of the fact that the decision in WP (C) No. 6545 of 2002 has become final and this Court cannot render a judgment inconsistent with the judgment, which has become final. He submitted that the Court is precluded from rendering inconsistent judgments in the same matter and that would be the result if the appeal by the State and the intervention were to be allowed and the Resolution dated 10.10.2002 upheld as canvassed for in this appeal. It was contended by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the State and counsel for the Intervener, that the appeal is against a common judgment and considering the nature of the question, it was not necessary to file a separate appeal and it would be unjust to apply the rule of res judicata to preclude the consideration of the contention of the State and the Intervener on merits. Learned Advocate General submitted that the State can even now file appeals against the other two judgments along with applications for condoning the delay. But that would delay the hearing of the appeal. The question related to admission to professional colleges and a quick decision was imperative since otherwise, admissions could not be completed and the sufferers would be the candidates belonging to other Backward Categories, including the Extremely Backward Categories, who were before the Court espousing their own cause. 8. This is really a dispute regarding the arrangement to be made relating to admission in Colleges pending final decision in the writ petitions pending before the Full Bench, awaiting the decision of the Supreme Court. As clarified by the learned. Single Judge himself, this arrangement is to enure only till a final decision is taken by the Full Bench. 8. This is really a dispute regarding the arrangement to be made relating to admission in Colleges pending final decision in the writ petitions pending before the Full Bench, awaiting the decision of the Supreme Court. As clarified by the learned. Single Judge himself, this arrangement is to enure only till a final decision is taken by the Full Bench. Though there is merit in the contention raised on behalf of the contesting respondents based on the plea of finality of the order in view of the writ petitions, we are of the view that in the circumstances of the case and the nature of the problem that has surfaced, it may not be appropriate to throw out these appeals on the ground that their hearing is barred by res judicata. After all, even today, the State could file an appeal against the decision in WP (C) No. 6545 of 2002, of course, with a petition for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. We have also the discretion to treat the appeal filed by the intervener as an appeal against all the three orders. The question involved is of such a nature and is of such immediate moment, that we feel that it is better to put an end to that controversy on merits rather than declining to consider the appeal of the State on merits now or postpone the hearing of the appeals awaiting formal filing of appeals by the State. We are, therefore, not inclined to accept the argument on the sustainability of the appeals raised by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents. 9. The learned Advocate General pointed out that the earlier Resolution that was the subject matter of challenge before the Full Bench was the one based on the policy of the undivided State of Bihar, taking note of the conditions as obtaining in that State as a whole. That order or the Resolution had, therefore, provided for separate reservations to the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories. But, afterwards, the State of Jharkhand, in the light of the interim interdict by the Full Bench, had come to the conclusion that it was not necessary to provide for separate reservations to the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories and that the reservation for Backward Categories can be kept common and that reservation could take in both the categories. He emphasized that it was for the State to decide what was necessary in that regard. Even though, a sub categorization of a particular category may not be interfered with by the Court, the Court cannot direct that the State should make a sub categorization of a reserved category, that was really a matter of policy. In fact, this plea has been upheld by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was not justified in thinking that there was anything in the modified interim direction of the Full Bench, which precluded the State from implementing its policy of reservation, provided the reservations were restricted to fifty percent as a whole. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents, on the other hand, argued that the direction in the interim order was clear and categorical and the State could not depart from the scheme it had adopted earlier of providing reservation to four separate categories. The modified interim direction did not give freedom to the State to club together the reservation for the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories while reducing the percentage of seats. Counsel also contended that it was open to the State to sub-categorize a category and provide for reservation separately to subcategories and there was no infirmity in the earlier categorization which needed to be changed by the State under cover of the interim direction of the Full Bench. It was therefore submitted that the learned Single Judge was justified in his interpretation of the interim direction of the Full Bench and remitting the matter to the State Government to pass a fresh order as indicated by him. Counsel for the intervener, supporting the argument of the learned Advocate General, contended that the intervener Association was formed by a Backward Category, formed 60 percent of the Backward Categories in the State of Jharkhand and it will be deprived of its proper share of reservation of seats if there is a separate categorization of other Backward Categories and the Extremely Backward Categories. 10. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions. Obviously, the right to decide on reservation, categories to be brought in and the percentage of reservation subject to the upper limit, is that of the Government. In essence, it involved a policy to be followed by the Government. 10. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions. Obviously, the right to decide on reservation, categories to be brought in and the percentage of reservation subject to the upper limit, is that of the Government. In essence, it involved a policy to be followed by the Government. In that context, when the Government says that it had decided on reservation after considering the relevant aspects and had provided separate percentage for the respective categories in the manner it deemed just and fit, it is not possible to hold that the State has no power to do so. In fact, the learned Single Judge also accepted this position. But then, the question is whether there is anything in the interim order of the Full Bench as modified, which compels the State to provide separate quotas for the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories or to maintain the earlier subcategorization. No doubt, in the first order, the Court had spoken of proportionate reduction and fixation of the quota, but that had been deleted or clarified by the subsequent order, which gave the State the freedom to decide objectively and fairly the percentage of reservation, but limiting it to fifty percent of the seats. On a fair understanding of the relevant sentence in the order, it appears to us that the expression 'as it may objectively and fairly decide' qualifies both the separate percentage of quota and the individual categories or classes to be included for reservation. It cannot be understood as confined to altering the proportion and not the category or as preventing it bringing together two categories into one common category. Consistent with the finding that it is really a matter of policy for the State, what we should look for is whether there is any restriction on the exercise of power by the State in regard to the matter of providing reservation. On pursuing that line of inquiry, we are persuaded to think that there is nothing in the modified interim order of the Full Bench which justifies the insistence that the State Government should provide separate quotas for the Extremely Backward Categories and Backward Categories or should not include both in a common category known as the Backward Category. On pursuing that line of inquiry, we are persuaded to think that there is nothing in the modified interim order of the Full Bench which justifies the insistence that the State Government should provide separate quotas for the Extremely Backward Categories and Backward Categories or should not include both in a common category known as the Backward Category. With respect, we are not in a position to agree with the interpretation placed on the interim order of the Full Bench by the learned Single Judge. We may mention here that normally we would have hesitated to interfere with the interpretation placed on the order of the Full Bench by the learned Single Judge, since he was also a party to that order of the Full Bench and we were not. But considering the nature of the question involved, namely, the right of the State to decide upon the question and the principle involved in this adjudication, we have ventured to differ from the learned Single Judge on the interpretation of the modified interim order or direction of the Full Bench. On our part, we are satisfied that Resolution No. 5800 dated 10.10.2002 passed by the Government cannot be called in question either on the ground that it is beyond the power of the Government generally, or on the ground that it is against the term of the interim order of the Full Bench as modified. The direction of the learned Single Judge remitting the matter to the State Government to determine separately the percentage of seats for the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories, has therefore to be set aside. 1•1. In the writ petition filed by the candidates claiming to be belonging to the Extremely Backward Categories, the prayer is essentially for staying the counselling for admission 2002 which were to start on 15.3.2002. Objection to the counselling was on the basis that the State was. not justified in not providing separate quotas to the Extremely Backward Categories and the Backward Categories. In view of our conclusion recorded above in the appeals, the petitioner in WP (C) No. 1359 of 2003 has to be found to be not entitled to any relief in the writ petition. The writ petition has only to be dismissed. 12. In the result, the appeals are allowed. In view of our conclusion recorded above in the appeals, the petitioner in WP (C) No. 1359 of 2003 has to be found to be not entitled to any relief in the writ petition. The writ petition has only to be dismissed. 12. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The decision of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the validity of Resolution No. 5800 dated 10.10.2002 is upheld. WP(C) No. 1359 of 2003 is dismissed.