( 1 ) M. F. A. NO. 7847/2002 arises out of the award in L. A. C. No. 651-D/81; M. F. A. No. 7848/2002 arises out of award in L. A. C. No. 651/81, M. F. A. No. 7849/2002 arises out of award in L. A. C. No. 651-B/1981, M. F. A. No. 7850/2002 arises out of award in L. A. C. No. 651-A/81, M. F. A. No. 7851/2002 arises out of award in L. A. C. No. 651-C/81, and M. F. A. No. 7852/2002 arises out of award in L. A. C. No. 651-E/81 passed by the court of II Additional City Civil Judge at Bangalore on 31. 8. 2002, by which the market value of the acquired properties has been fixed @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. , ( 2 ) SINCE, the Civil Court has determined the said market value by a common judgment passed in all the matters under appeal, they are taken together for consideration. ( 3 ) BRIEF facts, which gave rise to these appeals, are; The Government, in exercise of its eminent domain power, issued preliminary notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred as Act) on 23. 2. 1976, which was published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 4. 3. 1976, acquiring the properties bearing Nos. 1 to 6 situated on Lalbag Road at Bangalore for the purpose of widening Lalbag Road by Bangalore Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred as beneficiary or Corporation ). After award enquiry, the Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market value of the acquired properties @ Rs. 200/- per sq. yd by awards dated 18. 1. 1980. Not satisfied with the said market value fixed, the claimants-land owners sought reference under Section 18 read with Sections 30 and 31 of the Act to the Civil Court since, according to them, the market value of their properties as awarded by the L. A. O. was less. So, the reference made to the Civil Court was registered as L. A. C. No. 651/1981 by the Civil Court. Before the Civil Court, the claimants-land owners examined a witness and got marked 5 documents in support of their claim. However, the Land Acquisition Officer did not adduce any evidence and the Corporation-beneficiary had not participated in the proceedings then. On considering the evidence adduced, the Civil Court passed award on 1. 1. 2001, determining the market value @ Rs. Before the Civil Court, the claimants-land owners examined a witness and got marked 5 documents in support of their claim. However, the Land Acquisition Officer did not adduce any evidence and the Corporation-beneficiary had not participated in the proceedings then. On considering the evidence adduced, the Civil Court passed award on 1. 1. 2001, determining the market value @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq/yd. So, the Corporation filed Misc. Petition No. 664/2001, requesting to set aside that award. It was rejected on 24. 8. 2001. So, challenging the same, M. F. A. No. 4510/2001 was filed by the Corporation before this court. This court allowed that appeal on 5. 3. 2002 and remitted the matter to the Civil Court for reconsideration. When the matter went back to the Civil Court, the Civil Court ordered to register five more cases as LAC Nos. 651-A to 651-E/1981 in addition to the case already registered as LAC No. 651/81. Thus, for each acquired property, a separate case number was ordered. Thereafter, the claimants Land owners examined PW-1 further and also examined two more witnesses and got marked four more documents. Thus, for the claimants, three witnesses were examined and 9 documents were marked. The Corporation beneficiary examined a witness and got marked 11 documents. In addition to that, 12 documents were also filed under memo dated 3. 8. 2002. That evidence was adopted by the L. A. O. After hearing argument, the Civil Court passed the impugned judgment and awards fixing the market value @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. once again. It is against the said judgment and awards dated 31. 8. 2002, the beneficiary Corporation is before us. ( 4 ) WE have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. It is submitted for the appellant-Corporation that the Civil Court erred in holding that reference made was in time and in fixing the market value @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. , when, for the adjacent property Nos. 8/1a and 9 of Lalbag Road (covered by/referred in Ex. D2) acquired for the same purpose under the same notification, it had earlier fixed the market value @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. on 22. 2. 1990 and on 10. 12. 1,500/- per sq. yd. , when, for the adjacent property Nos. 8/1a and 9 of Lalbag Road (covered by/referred in Ex. D2) acquired for the same purpose under the same notification, it had earlier fixed the market value @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. on 22. 2. 1990 and on 10. 12. 1986 respectively and, this was the result of committing an error by it (Civil Court) in relying on the judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 and comparing the property located in different area, that too, wrongly taking that property as located on Crumbigal Road when, for Crumbigal road property, relied on by claimants and covered by Ex. P1, Civil Court had fixed market value @ Rs. 1,000/- per sq. yd. in LAC No. 218/1985 as in the year 1978 whereas, the preliminary notification issued for the acquired properties is of the year 1976 and, when even claimants themselves had claimed @ Rs. 500/- to Rs. 600/- in their objection statement at Ex. D11 and also, in not taking into consideration Ex. D-1 dated 10. 5. 1978 sale deed record of Lalbag road property on untenable grounds. So, requested to reduce it to Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. as fixed for similar and adjacent properties in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 and L. A. C. No. 646/1981. The Land Acquisition Officer represented by the learned Additional Government Advocate also supported said argument. On the other hand, it is submitted for the land owners claimants that the records produced and the reasons given by the Civil Court show that reference made was in time and, no infirmity can be found in the market value determined by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,5000/- per sq. yd. as it has relied on a decision of this court only and taken minimum escalation in price, though it could have fixed more than that in view of the evidence brought on record about the location and potentiality of the acquired properties and hence, the same does not require to be reduced or interfered with. Perused the records carefully. ( 5 ) SO, the points for consideration are: (1) Whether the reference was in time? (2) Whether the market value determined by the Civil Court is proper/correct or not? If not, what could be the market value of acquired properties? Perused the records carefully. ( 5 ) SO, the points for consideration are: (1) Whether the reference was in time? (2) Whether the market value determined by the Civil Court is proper/correct or not? If not, what could be the market value of acquired properties? ( 6 ) IT was vehemently argued for the appellant-Corporation that the reference made was not in time but still the Civil Court has held wrongly that it was in time. For this, firstly, it may be noted that the Civil Court has observed that, seeking reference, the claim applications were preferred in time before the L. A. O. by Claimant No. 1 for premises Nos. 1 to 6 (except No. 3 ). Further, according to the appellant Corporation, the awards passed by the L. A. O. required to be referred to the Civil Court under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act to decide ownership of properties as there was dispute regarding title and as such, unless title was decided to claim compensation awarded, claim for enhancement was not to arise. It has also noted that the claimant No. 1 received compensation of Rs. 57,113/- under cheque dated 4. 4. 2002 issued on 5. 4. 2002 in pursuance of the order dated 28. 9. 2001 passed by the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 75/1987, which was based on the award of the Land Acquisition Officer in LAC (Corp) No. 74 (1)/79. 80 and therefore, the claim referred was well within time and hence, held that the reference was in time. ( 7 ) FURTHER, the Civil Court observed that for premises No. 2 covered by L. A. C. No. 78/1987, the claimant No. 1 received compensation of Rs. 40,621/- on 14. 3. 2001. So also, received compensation of Rs. 82,005/- with regard to premises No. 5 covered by L. A. C. No. 80/1987. Similarly, a sum of Rs. 43,004/- was received by the first claimant on 14. 3. 2001 with regard to premises No. 6 covered by L. A. C. No. 81/1987. Even with regard to one of the two parcels of property bearing premises No. 4, the first claimant received compensation of Rs. 10,004/- on 14. 3. 2001 though, of course, he had received cheque for a sum of Rs. 34,615/- on 28. 3. 2001 with regard to another parcel of that property (bearing premises No. 4 ). Even with regard to one of the two parcels of property bearing premises No. 4, the first claimant received compensation of Rs. 10,004/- on 14. 3. 2001 though, of course, he had received cheque for a sum of Rs. 34,615/- on 28. 3. 2001 with regard to another parcel of that property (bearing premises No. 4 ). ( 8 ) SO also, the Civil Court has noted that for premises No. 3, the original claimant No. 2 could receive the notice of award on 29. 9. 1980 and submit an application before the authority on 3. 10. 1980 and even there was specific recital in the award that as title of property was not established, the awarded compensation amount has to be deposited in the court as contemplated under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, which presupposes that there was independent reference before the Civil Court under said provisions of law. Not only that, it was not established before the Civil Court that on which date, the amount of compensation awarded therein had been received by the original claimant No. 2 or by his legal representatives. In fact, no record was produced before the court in that regard so as to find out the date on which compensation was received in that matter. It is not that the records were/are with the claimant. On the other hand, records could be said to be with L. A. O. or Corporation. Even a memo dated 3. 8. 2002 for the L. A. O. was filed with a Xerox copy of the letter addressed to the D. G. P. , which reveals that all the records pertaining to the case were made over to the Corporation. Further, it needs to be noted that the L. A. O. @ Corporation, who could have produced record/ document or evidence to show that reference was not in time, had not placed any such material to hold so. ( 9 ) IN view of the above, facts and material on record, we do not find any such infirmity in the finding of the Civil Court in holding that the reference made to it was in time. May be for this reason, the Corporation laid much stress on the next point and not on this point. So, without any more discussion, the point on hand is answered in affirmative. May be for this reason, the Corporation laid much stress on the next point and not on this point. So, without any more discussion, the point on hand is answered in affirmative. ( 10 ) POINT No. 2: It is trite that claimants stood in the position of plaintiffs in proceedings of references made to Civil Court for determining the market value of the acquired properties and as such, the onus was on them to adduce necessary evidence in proof of their claim for higher compensation, as held by the Supreme Court in the cases of CHIMANLAL V. SPL. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, POONA [ air 1988 SC 1652 ], K. Posayya V. Special Tahsildar, ( AIR 1995 SC 1641 ) and Manipur Tea Co. (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Hailakandi (A. I. R. 1997 SC 1779 ). ( 11 ) SO, claimants have adduced evidence. So also the beneficiary - Corporation. It has come in the evidence of PW-1 Ramalingam that Mallya Hospital, Kantheerava Stadium, Bangalore Club are at a distance of K. M. ; Bowring Institute is at a distance of 1 K. M. ; J. C. Road is at a distance of 1 1/2 K. M. ; St. Philomenas Hospital, Century Club, Brigade Road, M. G. Road, Bishop Cotton, Baldwin and St. Josephs Schools and Colleges are at a distance of 2 K. Ms. ; city market, Lalbag and Vidhana Soudha are at a distance of 3 K. Ms. ; Vani Vilas, St. Marthas and Bowring Hospitals are at a distance of 3 to 4 K. Ms. Whereas, Railway Station and Bus Sand are at a distance of 4 K. Ms. and airport is at a distance of 6 K. Ms. from the acquired properties. ( 12 ) FURTHER, according to him, Crumbigal Road, Kalasipalyam and Chickpet are at a distance of about 4 to 5 K. Ms. to Lalbag road though, while referring Ex. P. 1, stated that the property on Crumbigal road (acquired therein) is at a distance of 1 or 1 K. Ms. from acquired properties herein. from the acquired properties. ( 12 ) FURTHER, according to him, Crumbigal Road, Kalasipalyam and Chickpet are at a distance of about 4 to 5 K. Ms. to Lalbag road though, while referring Ex. P. 1, stated that the property on Crumbigal road (acquired therein) is at a distance of 1 or 1 K. Ms. from acquired properties herein. He has further stated that Lalbag Road is a well-known area and it was the main connecting road to the City and Cantonment of Bangalore and, in fact, according to him, Crumbigal Road area was a mediocre locality and not much developed in the year 1978, though it is next to Lalbag whereas, Lalbag locality is more reputed area. So, relied on the record of judgment in L. A. C. No. 218/1985 dated 31. 5. 1986 at Ex. P. 1 in which, for property No. 27/2 situated in Venkatappa Street on Crumbigal Road, Civil Court had fixed the market value @ Rs. 1,000/- per sq. yd. acquired under preliminary notification dated 3. 3. 1978. Further, he strongly relied on the judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 in which, for the property located in Kalasipalyam and acquired in the year 1968, this Court had fixed market value @ Rs. 1,000/- per sq. yd. ( 13 ) HE has also stated that Richmond Town and Residency Road, which are posh localities, K. H. Road, Richmond Road and Lavelle Road, which are commercial roads, are nearby to the acquired properties. So, produced Ex. P2 Karnataka Gazette Notification dated 03/12/1998 under which, the Government had fixed market value of the properties situated within the vicinity of the acquired properties @ Rs. 2,000/- per sq. ft. i. e. , Rs. 18,000/- per sq. yd. , commercial property in K. H. Road (which is at a distance of about 200 meters from the acquired properties) @ Rs. 2,279/- per sq. ft. , properties in Lavelle Road @ Rs. 3,500/- per sq. ft. , properties in Richmond Road @ Rs. 7,700/- per sq. ft and properties in Residency Road @ Rs. 5,000/- per sq. ft. Thus, according to him, the acquired properties are centrally located and as such, he claimed the market value @ Rs. 2,000/- per sq. yd. for the acquired properties. ( 14 ) SIMILARLY, PW-2, who prepared and submitted a report as per Ex. P5 dated 18. 09. ft and properties in Residency Road @ Rs. 5,000/- per sq. ft. Thus, according to him, the acquired properties are centrally located and as such, he claimed the market value @ Rs. 2,000/- per sq. yd. for the acquired properties. ( 14 ) SIMILARLY, PW-2, who prepared and submitted a report as per Ex. P5 dated 18. 09. 2000 and an approved valuer of properties for the Income Tax Department, stated about the valuation of the acquired properties and supported the statement of P. W. 1 that the acquired properties could fetch the market value @ Rs. 2,000/- per sq. yd. , as on the date of preliminary notification issued in the year 1976. Of course, evidence of PW-3 is of no such help for the purpose of determining the market value of the acquired properties since her statement is with regard to the right of the claimants over the property No. 3. So also documents at Ex. P3-Fellowship certificate of PW-2, Ex. P4 order appointing PW-2 as Valuer by Income Tax Department, Ex. P6 PWD rates list, Ex. P7 Bill given by PW-2 for the fee charged by him to value the acquired properties and Ex. P8-GPA Deed in favour of P. W. 3. ( 15 ) AS against the said evidence of the claimants, the beneficiary Corporation examined DW-1 Mandanna Asst. Commissioner of Bangalore Municipal Corporation. He stated that the market value fixed by the L. A. O. @ Rs. 200/- per sq. yd. was just and proper since, under Ex. D1 sale deed dated 10. 05. 1979, property situated on Lalbag Road was sold @ Rs. 187/- per sq. yd. In fact, he stated that for properties bearing Nos. 8/1a and 9 situated on Lalbag Road, which are adjacent properties acquired for the same purpose and under the same notification under which the properties in question were acquired, the Civil Court, after contest and on merit awarded compensation @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. , and in all these matters, awards as per Exs. D. 5 to D. 10 were passed on the same day by the Land Acquisition Officer. So, according to him, the market value determined by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. is exorbitant as, in fact, in the objection petition at Ex. D. 11 itself, the claimants had claimed market value between Rs. 500/- to Rs. 600/- per sq. yd. So, according to him, the market value determined by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. is exorbitant as, in fact, in the objection petition at Ex. D. 11 itself, the claimants had claimed market value between Rs. 500/- to Rs. 600/- per sq. yd. for the acquired properties/the properties in Lalbag Road area. He has further stated that the claimants are not entitled to have compensation at the rate awarded in LAC No. 269/1984 and in LAC No. 218/1985, as they pertain to properties located at different places-one on Crumbigal Road and another near Basappa Circle, acquired under different notifications issued in June 1980 and 3. 3. 1978 for different purposes namely, for widening of Lalbag Fort road and construction of roll call shelter, respectively. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, in these appeals, the beneficiary Corporation has accepted the market value of the acquired properties @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. , but disputed correctness of market value determined by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. , which has been accepted and not challenged by the claimants though, according to them, the market value of the acquired properties was Rs. 2000/- per sq. yd,. Hence, correctness or otherwise of the market value of the acquired properties as on the date of notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act i. e. , 4. 3. 1976 determined by Civil Court, is to be decided by us. (a) In the case of SPECIAL TEHSILDAR LAND ACQUISITION, VISHAKAPATNAM V. A. MANGALA GOWRI [ (1991) 4 SUPREME COURT CASES 218], the Supreme Court held: it is settled law by catena of decisions that the market value postulated in Section 23 (1) of the Act designed to award just and fair compensation for the lands acquired. The word market value would postulate price of the land prevailing on the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1 ). . . . Same has been held in the cases of M/s. PRINTERS HOUSE PVT. LTD. VS. SAIYADAN (A. I. R. 1994 S. C. 1160), CHIMANLAL VS. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, POONA (A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 1652), PRUTHVI RAJ TANEJA VS. STATE OF M. P. (A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 1560), RAGHUBANS NARAIN VS. U. P. GOVERNMENT (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 465) and VYRICHERALA NARAYANA GAJAPATIRAJU BAHADUR GURU VS. LTD. VS. SAIYADAN (A. I. R. 1994 S. C. 1160), CHIMANLAL VS. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, POONA (A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 1652), PRUTHVI RAJ TANEJA VS. STATE OF M. P. (A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 1560), RAGHUBANS NARAIN VS. U. P. GOVERNMENT (A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 465) and VYRICHERALA NARAYANA GAJAPATIRAJU BAHADUR GURU VS. REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER, VIZAGAPATNAM, known as Chemudu case. (A. I. R. 1939 P. C. 98 ). (b) What is market value has been considered by the Privy Council in Chemudu case (Supra) and in the case of Prithvi Raj (supra) wherein it is held that: the market value means price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for the property having due regard to its existing condition with all its existing advantages and its potential possibilities when laid out in the most advantageous manner excluding any advantage due to the carrying out of the scheme for which the property is compulsorily acquired. In considering market value the disinclination of the vendor to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy should be disregarded. ( 17 ) SAME has been reiterated time and again by the Supreme Court, as is clear from the decisions in the cases of Administrator General of West Bengal VS. Collector Varanasi (A. I. R. 1988 S. C. 943), Chimanalal (Supra), Mangala Gowri (supra), M/s. Printers House Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and K. Posayya VS. Spl. Tahasildar (A. I. R. 1995 S. C. 1641 ). (c) What could be the basis to determine the market value has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of GULZARA SINGH VS. STATE OF PUNJAB [1993 (4) S. C. C. 245] as under:"3. It is settled law that to determine the market value of the land under Section 23 (1) of the Act, the sales of the land under acquisition, if any, or the sales in the neighbourhood lands that possessed of same or other similar potentialities or fertility or other advantageous features would furnish basis to determine just and fair market value on the premise of hypothecated willing vendor and willing vendee. . . . . Further, in the case of ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF WEST BENGAL (supra), the Supreme Court observed thus: prices fetched for similar lands with similar advantage and potentialities under bona fide transactions of sale at or about the time of the preliminary notification are the usual, and indeed the best, evidence of market value. . . Same view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the cases of A. Mangala Gowri (supra), karan SINGH and OTHERS -vs- UNION OF INDIA (1997 (8) S. C. C. 186) and KANWAR SINGH VS. UNION OF INDIA (1998 (8) S. C. C. 136 ). (d) In fact, in the case of SHAJI KURIAKOSE AND ANOTHER Vs. INDIAN OIL CORPN. LTD. AND OTHERS [ (2001) 7 SCC 650 ], the Supreme Court has held that: 3. Comparable sales method of valuation is preferred because it furnishes the evidence for determination of the market value of the acquired land at which a willing purchaser would pay for the acquired land it had been sold in the open market at the time of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act. However, comparable sales method of valuation of land for fixing the market value of the acquired land is not always conclusive. There are certain factors which are required to be fulfilled and on fulfillment of those factors the compensation can be awarded, according to the value of the land reflected in the sales. The factors laid down inter alia are: (1) the sale must be a genuine transaction, (2) that the sale deed must have been executed at the time proximate to the date of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act, (3) that the land covered by the sale must be in the vicinity of the acquired land, (4) that the land covered by the sales must be similar to the acquired land, and (5) that the size of plot of the land covered by the sales be comparable to the land acquired. If all these factors are satisfied, then there is no reason why the sale value of the land covered by the sales be not given for the acquired land. . . (e) Further, it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of CHIMANLAL (supra) that: 7. If all these factors are satisfied, then there is no reason why the sale value of the land covered by the sales be not given for the acquired land. . . (e) Further, it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of CHIMANLAL (supra) that: 7. In doing so by the instances method, the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value. (f) Of course, in the case of KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. UNION OF INDIA [ (1997) 8 SUPREME COURT CASES 186], the Supreme Court has held thus: 5. The sale of land on or about the issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act is stated to be the best piece of evidence for determining the market value of the acquired land. Often evidence on transaction of sale of land on or a few days before the notification under Section 4 is not available. In the absence of such evidence contemporaneous transactions in respect of lands which had similar advantages and disadvantages would be a good price of evidence for determining the market value of the acquired land (g) In the case of M/s. Printers House Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court observed thus: 8. If Comparable Sales Method of Valuation of Land is adopted for determining the market-value of an acquired plot of land, it generally holds good for determination of the market-value of several acquired plots of land if acquisition of all such plots of land is made pursuant to the same preliminary notification. But, if any of the factors, such as, location, shape, size, potentiality or tenure of one plot of acquired land widely differs from the other plot (s) of acquired land (s), then the market-value of each plot of land acquired has to be determined independently of the other (s) even if all of them had been acquired pursuant to the same preliminary notification. (h) So also in the case of SHAJI KURIAKOSE (supra), the Supreme Court has held thus: however, if there is a dissimilarity in regard to locality, shape, site or nature of land between land covered by sales and land acquired, it is open to the court to proportionately reduce the compensation for acquired land than what is reflected in the sales depending upon the disadvantages attached with the acquired land. (i) But so far as taking previous judgments/awards as instances is concerned, in the case of PALSINGH VS. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARE [1992 (4) S. C. C. 400], the Supreme Court has observed as under: a judgment of a court in land acquisition cases determining the market value of land in the vicinity of the acquired lands, even though not interparties, could be admitted in evidence either as an instance or one from which the market value of the acquired land could be deduced or inferred. But for a judgment to be admitted in evidence, it must be proved by the person relying upon such judgment by adducing evidence aliunde that due regard being given to all attendant facts and circumstances, it could furnish the basis for determining the market value of an acquired land. (j) Further in the case of M/s. Printers House Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court has held thus: 7. . . . What applies to comparable sale equally applies to comparable award, if such is relied upon as that furnishing a price-basis for determination of the market-value of the land, cannot be disputed. Thus, the best evidence for determining the market-value of the acquired land could be an authentic transaction of sale relating to the very acquired land or a portion thereof or any other land which could be favourably compared with the acquired land. The same would be the position when the available evidence relates to land covered by a previous award. " ( 18 ) AS the price fetched under a genuine sale-deed could form the basis for determining the market value of the acquired land, the market value determined by an award made under the Act for an earlier acquired land, by either the Land Acquisition Officer or the Court could also form the basis for determining the market value of subsequently acquired land. (k) So also in the case of Karan Singh and Others VS. Union of India (supra), the Supreme Court observed that: there is no quarrel with the proposition that judgments of courts in land acquisition cases or awards given by the Land Acquisition Officers can be relied upon as a good piece of evidence in determining the market value of the land acquired under certain circumstances. (1) Similarly, it is held by this Court also, in the case of SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER VS. (1) Similarly, it is held by this Court also, in the case of SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER VS. NAGAPPA (I. L. R. 1978 Kar. 1522), that: a judgment in a land acquisition case, which has become final if it relates to similar lands will be valuable evidence for purpose of fixation of market value in cases arising subsequently. (m) Further, in the case of SPL. L. A. O. KHADE VS. VASUDEV CHANDRA SHANKAR (1997 (11) S. C. C. 218), the Supreme Court observed that award of reference court relating to the same village of similar land offers comparative basis for determination of compensation. ( 19 ) THUS, it is well settled by catena of decisions, right from the time of Privy Council to till now, that the market value of the land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act and such determination has to be made as the (Court) valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land in the open market and prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that date assuming that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price. Thus, the acid test is the arm chair of the willing vendor would offer and a prudent willing buyer, taking all relevant prevailing conditions of the normal market, fertility of the land, location, suitability of the purpose for which it was purchased, its existing potentialities and likely use to which the land is capable of being put in the same condition, would offer to pay the price, as on the date of the notification. " (a) It is equally well settled that for ascertaining such market value, the court can rely upon such transactions, which would offer a reasonable basis to fix the price. The price paid in the sale or purchase of the land acquired within a reasonable time from the date of the acquisition would be the best piece of evidence. In its absence, the price paid for a land possessing similar advantages to the land in the neighbourhood of the land acquired in or about the time of the notification would supply the data to assess the market value. In its absence, the price paid for a land possessing similar advantages to the land in the neighbourhood of the land acquired in or about the time of the notification would supply the data to assess the market value. Thus, prices fetched under sale or determined under judgment in land acquisition case (s) for similar lands with similar advantage and potentialities at or about the time of the preliminary notification are the usual, and indeed the best and valuable evidence for purpose of fixation of market value in cases arising subsequently. This is called Comparable/instances method of valuation. This method is preferred because it furnishes the evidence for determination of market value of the acquired land as on the date of issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act. However, to apply said method, certain factors are required to be fulfilled and on fulfillment of those factors only, compensation can be awarded according to the value of the land reflected in the sales. And, in applying instances method, the court has to co-relate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance, which provides the index of the market value, though it cannot be fixed with mathematical precision. (b) It is also well settled that, if the area being comparable, situation also being the same and all the plots are acquired under the same notification, it would be proper to award the same rate of compensation to the claimants unless dissimilarity in the acquired site with the property reflected in the sale or acquisition is brought on record. Simply because for such properties acquired under the same notification, awards could not be passed at the same time and are to be passed at different times (with the gap of number of years), there need not and cannot be any difference in the market value, if the properties are similar in locus, fertility, user, potentialities, comparability, advantages, etc. , unless dissimilarity is proved to fix different price. (c) But, whatever may be the method adopted for determining the market value (d) of an acquired property, it must be based on sound discretion exercised by the reference court in arriving at a just, fair and reasonable/adequate price. At the same time, it should not based on facts of imagination or flight of fancy. (c) But, whatever may be the method adopted for determining the market value (d) of an acquired property, it must be based on sound discretion exercised by the reference court in arriving at a just, fair and reasonable/adequate price. At the same time, it should not based on facts of imagination or flight of fancy. This is because, misplaced sympathy or undue emphasis solely on the claimants right to compensation would place very heavy burden on the public exchequer to which every one contributes by direct or indirect taxes. However, every effort be made to see that the owners-claimants should not be put to loss by under valuation. "these are the guiding principles, which require to be borne in mind whenever market value of any acquired property is to be determined. ( 20 ) IN the matters on hand, the claimants have not produced nor relied on any sale transaction of any property whatsoever, but relied on the evidence of PWs-1 and 2 besides the judgment in L. A. C. No. 218/1985 at Ex. P1 relating to Crumbigal Road property acquired under Preliminary Notification dated 03. 03. 1978 wherein market value was fixed @ Rs. 1000/- per sq. yd. , Gazette Notification of the year 1998 at Ex. P2, report of PW-2 at Ex. P5 dated 18. 09. 2000 and map at Ex. P9 showing the location of acquired properties, though totally 9 documents had been produced. Of course, at the stage of argument (before Civil Court), relied on the judgment of this Court in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 relating to city market property acquired under Preliminary Notification dated 27. 06. 1968. On the other hand, the beneficiary Corporation relied on the evidence of DW-1, document at Ex. D1 certified copy of the sale deed of a property situated in 4th Cross of Lalbag Road sold for Rs. 19,000/- (@ Rs. 187/- per sq. yd.) on 10. 5. 1978 i. e. , about two years after the preliminary notification dated 23. 2. 1976. So also on judgment at Ex. D2 passed by the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 with regard to property No. 8/1a, situated just adjacent to the acquired properties, acquired for the same purpose under same notification, in which market value had been determined @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. , Ex. 2. 1976. So also on judgment at Ex. D2 passed by the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 with regard to property No. 8/1a, situated just adjacent to the acquired properties, acquired for the same purpose under same notification, in which market value had been determined @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. , Ex. D2 even refers an earlier award passed by the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 646/1981, in which market value was fixed @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. for another adjacent property bearing No. 9 of Lalbag Road only, acquired for the same purpose under same notification. In view of the fact that the properties bearing Nos. 8/1a and 9 of Lalbag Road were the adjacent properties and acquired under the same notification, under which properties in question were also acquired for the same purpose, the location were also acquired for the same purpose, the location and advantages available for acquired properties (as stated by P. Ws. 1 and 2), equally hold good for the properties bearing Nos. 8/1a and 9 and as such comparable one, more so, when no dissimilarity had been pleaded nor stated. So, the said records form valuable evidence to be considered to determine the market value of the acquired properties, even if ignored record at Ex. D11 objection petition filed by the claimants, wherein the market value of the properties in Lalbag Road had been claimed between Rs. 500 to Rs. 600/- per sq. yd. , besides copies of awards at Exs. D5 to D10 passed by the L. A. O. in the present matters and statement at Ex. D4 prepared by the beneficiary. However, for the reasons best known, the Civil Court has not even referred much less considered Ex. D. 2 certified copy of judgment in LAC No. 650/81 pertaining to property No. 8/1a situated on Lalbag road, in which award passed in LAC No. 646/81 about property No. 9 situated on Lalbag road, adjacent to the acquired properties acquired under dame notification and for same purpose, had been relied and followed. Of course, it has considered Ex. D1 sale deed and Ex. D11, but not referred not considered the admissions of P. W. 1 relating to market value of the said adjacent properties fixed @ Rs. 400/- per Sq. Yd. That apart, it has not even referred the judgment in LAC No. 218/1985 at Ex. Of course, it has considered Ex. D1 sale deed and Ex. D11, but not referred not considered the admissions of P. W. 1 relating to market value of the said adjacent properties fixed @ Rs. 400/- per Sq. Yd. That apart, it has not even referred the judgment in LAC No. 218/1985 at Ex. P1 concerning to property on Crumbigal Road (though compared that property with acquired properties for fixing market value), nor considered the gazette notification-Ex. P2 of the year 1998, nor the report at Ex. P5 of the valuer examined as PW-2, relied on by the claimants only in support of their claim. ( 21 ) ON the other hand, without relying on any marked document, the Civil Court, noting as advantageous to follow judgment of this Court in M. F. A. No. 822/1977, has relied and followed it, but wrongly took it as concerning to property situated on Crumbigal road, though it relate to the property situated in city market area acquired under the notification of the year 1968 and, thereafter, compared to the location of the acquired properties situated on Lalbag road and fixed their market value @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. So, let us first consider the judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977. ( 22 ) AT the outset, it may be noted that property involved in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 was located on Kalasipalyam Main Road wherein, the claimant had relied on Ex. P10 copy of the judgment of this Court in M. F. A. Nos. 93-95/1968 concerning to his properties bearing Municipal Nos. 438, 439, 440 and 441 of Chikpet and property bearing No. 1 situated in Pattegarlane acquired under preliminary notification dated 16. 11. 1960 by the C. I. T. B. and examined himself as PW-3 besides examining PW-2 an Engineer, who had prepared a map as per Ex. P9 giving location of the said properties and of the property under acquisition. In the said earlier judgment in M. F. A. Nos. 93 to 95/1968, this Court had confirmed the market value of Chikpet properties @ Rs. 1,000/- per sq/yd. Whereas, @ Rs. 450/- per sq. yd. for the property situated in Pattegarlane. P9 giving location of the said properties and of the property under acquisition. In the said earlier judgment in M. F. A. Nos. 93 to 95/1968, this Court had confirmed the market value of Chikpet properties @ Rs. 1,000/- per sq/yd. Whereas, @ Rs. 450/- per sq. yd. for the property situated in Pattegarlane. According to claimant (in that case), his property No. 304/1 situated on Kalasipalyam Main Road was in a prominent area of Bangalore City, facing a big circle in front of City Market known as City Market Circle. In M. F. A. No. 822/1977, this Court observed thus:. . . Ex. P-9 and the evidence of the Engineer PW-2 clearly give the relative locations of the property with which we are concerned and the property to which Ex. P10 pertains. It is clear from his evidence that the distance between the two sets of properties is about three furlongs. . . (emphasis supplied) it has observed further that:"it is clear from the evidence of Nagappa PW-3 that no sale transactions have taken place near about the property acquired immediately prior to the preliminary notification. It is in this background that the claimant sought to rely upon Ex. P10 on the ground that it is the only piece of evidence that is available to it for the purpose of determination of the market value. It is not the case of the Corporation that there were other sale transactions in respect of similar properties where similar lands were sold for a lesser value. If that be so, the Corporation would not have failed to produce evidence in that regard in support of their case. Therefore, we have to proceed on the basis that the only available evidence in the circumstances of the case is the one pertaining to the acquisition of land situate in Chikpet to which Ex. P10 pertains. As that is the only piece of evidence and as it is located fairly close to the property in question we cannot discard that piece of evidence at all. P10 pertains. As that is the only piece of evidence and as it is located fairly close to the property in question we cannot discard that piece of evidence at all. " (Emphasis supplied) thereafter, observed as under:"but we cannot ignore the fact that the property acquired is a very small piece of land, that it is a corner site, that it is located facing the important City Market Circle where six important roads meet, the close to the land in question are situate the biggest Hospital the Victoria Hospital, the biggest Market the City Market, the shopping centers of Avenue Road, Silver Hubilee Park Road, Narasimharaja Road and Kalasipalyam Road, and that on the adjoining site is located the Paramount Cinema. Having regard to all these special features about the location of the land acquired and as it is situate about three furlongs from the busiest shopping center of Chikpet where the property to which Ex. P10 pertains is situate, We are of the opinion that the market value of the land acquired is 30 per cent less than the market value of the land to which Ex. P10 pertains. ". . . (Emphasis supplied) and, ultimately, this Court held claimant as right in stating that the acquired land is situated in a very busy locality and can be regarded as a prominent area in Bangalore City though observed that Chikpet as admittedly a very important Shopping Centre of Bangalore City and be regarded as busiest shopping area. So, this Court did not find any infirmity in deriving assistance from Ex. P10 by the Civil Court in that case. Still, having regard to the different location of that acquired property in city market area, 30% value was taken less for the acquired properties when compared to Ex. P10 Chikpet properties and thereafter, believing the statement of claimant that between 1960 and 1970, the rise in the price of land was about 50%, this Court considered it just and proper to fix the market value of the acquired land @ Rs. 1,000/- per sq. yd. as in the year 1968 and set aside the market value determined by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. 1,000/- per sq. yd. as in the year 1968 and set aside the market value determined by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. However, unfortunately, in the matters on hand, the Civil Court wrongly took judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 as concerning to Crumbigal Road property though it related to city market area and, compared the same with the acquired properties located on Lalbag Road and thereafter, gave 5% escalation in the price and then determined the market value @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. Not only in taking the location of the property the Civil Court has committed patent error against the record, even while comparing that property with the acquired properties, it failed to note the difference in proximity in the situation in that, the property in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 was a corner property facing to a big circle called City Market Circle, where 6 prominent roads having shops (on them) join besides Cinema theatre and big hospital Victoria Hospital adjacent to it whereas, the acquired properties had no such situation as corner site nor faced to any circle much less big circle (where 6 important/big roads join) and it has only one road towards East, that too, without shops on it, much less any theatre or hospital just by the side of properties, though Richmond Circle and K. H. Circle are at a distance of about or more than 100 yeards, even if the statement of the claimant-PW1 is believed. ( 23 ) OF course, it is true that the L. A. O. has observed in the awards at Exs. D5 to 10 that the properties are situated in commercial area and they are at a distance of 1 k. ms. from Vidhana Soudha. Still, if the evidence of PW-1-claimant about the situation of the acquired properties is believed, it could not be said to be comparable to the property located on Kalasipalyam main road covered by M. F. A. No. 822/1977. This is because, inspite of prime location of City Market property, this Court itself distinguished the busiest and important shopping center namely, Chikpet and fixed the market value 30% less than the market value of Chikpet property. This is because, inspite of prime location of City Market property, this Court itself distinguished the busiest and important shopping center namely, Chikpet and fixed the market value 30% less than the market value of Chikpet property. That being so, the Civil Court could not have compared the acquired properties of Lalbag Road with the property in M. F. A. No. 822/1977, that too, wrongly taking it as Crumbigal Road property though located on Kalasipalyam Main Road. ( 24 ) FURTHER, it may also be noted that for the reasons best known to them, neither PW-1 nor PW-2 whispered about dissimilarity, if any, between the properties bearing Nos. 8/1a and 9 adjacent to acquired properties and the acquired properties. That apart, what has been stated by claimant PW-1 in L. A. C. No. 650/1981, as extracted in para No. 8 of the judgment at Ex. D2, is as under: an area of 80 ft x 67 ft in premises No. 8/1a of Lalbag Road was acquired for widening of road in Richmond Circle. The property acquired is hardly at a distance of 100 ft from Richmond Circle, which is in the heart of the City. The area is 1 k. m. away from Lalbag and Cubbon Park is also within a distance of 1 k. m. , the area is surrounded by civic amenities like Hospitals, Nursing Homes, Schools and Colleges and it is a main road where the buses ply in large number. The area acquired is hardly at a distance of 100 ft from the bus stop. ( 25 ) THIS Shows, what was stated in that case by claimant therein has been stated by PW-1 in the present matters that the acquired properties are centrally located having nearness to the commercial places, parks, hospitals, schools and colleges. Of course, the same has given in detail with reference to kms. , but the sum and substance is same namely, the acquired properties are centrally located. It is not that the property in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 was located interior to the road as against the properties in question located on roadside. On the other hand, both the properties were located in roadside, having a road in east only and, for widening that road only, under same notification, both the properties were acquired. In fact, Ex. On the other hand, both the properties were located in roadside, having a road in east only and, for widening that road only, under same notification, both the properties were acquired. In fact, Ex. D3 preliminary notification published in the gazette for the acquired properties itself shows a Corporation road to the East of the acquired properties as well as property Nos. 8/1a and 9 situated on Lalbag Road and as adjacent to each other. Further, there is no evidence whatsoever about difference, if any, in the quality, location, advantages and potentialities of the acquired properties when compared to said adjacent properties (No. 8/1a and 9) acquired under same notification for the same purpose. So, similarity only could be seen and not any dissimilarity between the adjacent property covered by L. A. C. No. 650/1981 and the acquired properties, particularly in the absence of any whisper about it by PW-1 or PW-2 with regard to any dissimilarity between them. ( 26 ) IT may not be out of place to note that Ex. P1 (relied on in this case) had been relied on as Ex. P1 in that case (in Ex. D2) also, but the property covered by Ex. P1 i. e. , Crumbigal Road property was not taken as comparable property to the acquired property No. 8/1a situated on Lalbag Road and observed as under:. . . No doubt as per Ex. P1, for the property acquired therein the compensation was determined at Rs. 1,000/- per sq. yd. It is in the cross-examination of PW-1 that the property concerned in Ex. P1 is at a distance of 2 kms. It is also suggested to PW. 1 that except plying of the buses in front of the property, there is no other commercial activity whereas the property concerned in Ex. P1 is in a busy area. . (Emphasis supplied) and ultimately, after considering the location of the acquired property bearing No. 8/1a of Lalbag Road and taking property No. 9, belonging to Bhaktavatsala located on Lalbag road just adjacent to that acquired property No. 8/1a on the right side, as comparable and not the property located on Crumbigal Road, the Civil Court relied on its earlier judgment dated 10. 12. 1986 passed in L. A. C. No. 646/1981 relating to property No. 9, situated on Lalbag Road, wherein, the market value had been determined @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. 12. 1986 passed in L. A. C. No. 646/1981 relating to property No. 9, situated on Lalbag Road, wherein, the market value had been determined @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. Thereafter, in L. A. C. No. 650/1981, Civil Court determined the market value @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. for property No. 8/1a of Lalbag Road, though the claimant therein had claimed compensation/market value @ Rs. 1,000/- per sq. yd. based on the judgment in LAC No. 218/1985 relating to Crumbigal Road property. So, no discussion in detail is necessary to hold that the award passed by the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 relating to adjacent property No. 8/1a could be taken as comparable one. As noted already, there is no whisper much less any evidence or material or circumstance whatsoever showing any dissimilarity between the acquired properties and property No. 8/1a covered by L. A. C. No. 650/1981. So, there was no reason whatsoever for the Civil Court to ignore the said record at Ex. D2 (relating to adjacent property No. 8/1a) from consideration and rely on the market value fixed for city market property a property not all comparable to the acquired properties, covered by M. F. A. No. 822/1979 that too, wrongly taking it as relating to property on Crumbigal Road, which was also non-comparable. Even otherwise, it needs to be noted that for Crumbigal road property acquired in the year 1978, market value had been fixed @ Rs. 1,000/- per sq. yd. by the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 218/1985 and as such, that could not have formed basis to determine the market value @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. for the properties of the present matters, acquired in the year 1976. ( 27 ) THUS, considered from any angle, judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 could not have been preferred to the judgment in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 at Ex. D2 relating to adjacent property of Lalbag road, that too, without considering it (Ex. D2 ). yd. for the properties of the present matters, acquired in the year 1976. ( 27 ) THUS, considered from any angle, judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 could not have been preferred to the judgment in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 at Ex. D2 relating to adjacent property of Lalbag road, that too, without considering it (Ex. D2 ). ( 28 ) OF course, it was argued for the claimants that the market value determined by the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 could not be the basis for determining the market value of the acquired properties for the reason that there was no expert evidence before the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 whereas, expert evidence was made available in the cases on hand. It is true that there was no evidence of expert before the Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 whereas, in the present cases, there is evidence of PW-2 valuer of properties recognized by Income Tax Department. Still, what is important to note is that, though PW-2 was examined as an expert (being valuer of the properties) and stated about the value of the acquired properties that was not based on his expertisation or knowledge as valuer of properties. On the other hand, as stated by him only, the valuation made by him was based on the two judgments of this court and, one among them was the judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 (relating to market area property), which has been solely relied on by the Civil Court in the present matters and another judgment relating to property located near Basappa Circle. So, his evidence cannot be taken as expert evidence to determine the market value and as such, the argument advanced for claimants to distinguish the present matters of Lalbag road from that of L. A. C. No. 650/1981 cannot be accepted, more so, when the Civil Court not relied on the evidence of P. W. 2 (as expert evidence) and, on the other hand, relied on judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 only. ( 29 ) FURTHER, Ex. D1 (relied on by corporation) shows sale of property situated in 4th Cross of Lalbag Road on 10. 5. 1978 (about 2 years after the preliminary notification issued for acquired properties) for Rs. 19,000/- i. e. , at the rate of Rs. 187/- per sq. yd. ( 29 ) FURTHER, Ex. D1 (relied on by corporation) shows sale of property situated in 4th Cross of Lalbag Road on 10. 5. 1978 (about 2 years after the preliminary notification issued for acquired properties) for Rs. 19,000/- i. e. , at the rate of Rs. 187/- per sq. yd. only. There was no dispute whatsoever about the genuineness of sale and/or location of the property covered by Ex. D1. Still it was rejected by the Civil Court on two grounds namely, (1) in the awards passed by L. A. O. only, it is mentioned that for want of sales, no sales statistics within 5 years to the date of preliminary notification were available as per reply given by the Sub-Registrar of Shivajinagar on 18. 4. 1978 and (2) the sold property under Ex. D1 comes within the jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar of Basavanagudi and not a Shivajinagar whereas, the acquired properties come within the area of the Sub-Registrar of Shivajinagar and, therefore, Ex. D1 can never be taken as a comparable sale to compare with the acquired properties situated on Lalbag Road. ( 30 ) FOR said grounds, it is pertinent to note that the record of sale deed at Ex. D1 dated 10. 5. 1978 was of Basavanagudi Sub-Registrar whereas, the reply given was dated 18. 4. 1978 and, that was by the Sub-Registrar, Shivajinagar and not of Basavanagudi. Hence, simply because the Sub-Registrar of Shivajinagar had given reply that there were no sales within the period of 5 years to the date preliminary notification, the said record of sale could not have been brushed aside when the bonafides and genuineness of the transaction covered by Ex. D1 were not at all in doubt, more so, when the record at Ex. D1 relates to a property situated in Lalbag Road area only (though within the jurisdiction of Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi and not of Sub-Registrar, Shivajinagar ). In fact, the record at Ex. P2 Gazette notification filed by the claimants themselves shows Lalbag Road area within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi. Even otherwise, as has come in evidence, K. H. Road bifurcates the area of jurisdiction of said two Sub-Registrars and hence, the property covered by Ex. D1 comes towards south whereas, acquired properties come towards north of K. H. Road. So, it could not be ignored that the properties acquired (property Nos. 1 to 6) and Ex. Even otherwise, as has come in evidence, K. H. Road bifurcates the area of jurisdiction of said two Sub-Registrars and hence, the property covered by Ex. D1 comes towards south whereas, acquired properties come towards north of K. H. Road. So, it could not be ignored that the properties acquired (property Nos. 1 to 6) and Ex. D1 sale deed property, both are situated in Lalbag Road area, that too, at some distance only from K. H. Road and K. H. Circle. So and in the absence of any other sale transaction, sale price of property covered by Ex. D1 could have been considered as comparable due to proximity in location (being at some distance from K. H. Road, from where the acquired properties located at some distance) and time (as it was about 2 years after preliminary notification) and not non-comparable (though Civil Court observed so ). ( 31 ) AT the most, depending on the differences as a plus or minus factor, the Civil Court could have admitted adjustment in terms of money and then determined the market value of the acquired properties by increasing or decreasing its price vis--vis the price fetched in Ex. D1-sale deed. For doing so, even non-examination of the vendor or purchaser under Ex. D1 could not have come in the way as the provision contained in Section 51-A of the Act says that: in any proceeding under this Act, a certified copy of a document registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), including a copy given under Section 57 of that Act, may be accepted as evidence of the transaction recorded in such document. Further in the case of L. A. O. and MANDAL REVENUE OFFICER VS. V. NARASAIAH (A. I. R. 2001 S. C. 1117), the Supreme Court, while overruling its earlier decisions in the cases of INDER SINGH VS. UNION OF INDIA (1993 (3) S. C. C. 240) and P. RAM REDDY VS. L. A. O. (1995 (2) S. C. C. 305), held as under: 17. V. NARASAIAH (A. I. R. 2001 S. C. 1117), the Supreme Court, while overruling its earlier decisions in the cases of INDER SINGH VS. UNION OF INDIA (1993 (3) S. C. C. 240) and P. RAM REDDY VS. L. A. O. (1995 (2) S. C. C. 305), held as under: 17. In the light of the above discussion, we are unable to concur with the observations made by the two Judge bench in the decisions in Inder Singh v. UOI (1993) 3 SCC 240 ; (1994 AIR SCW 1552) and P. Ram Reddy v. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad (1995) 2 SCC 305 ; (1995 AIR SCW 871) (supra) that even in spite of S. 51a of the Act certified copies of the sale-deed could not be considered without examining persons connected with the transactions mentioned therein. 18. The High Court cannot therefore be faulted for relying on the transaction recorded in Exs. A2 and A4 though no one was examined for proving such transactions. No evidence had been adduced by the State for creating any doubt regarding the bona fides or genuineness of the transactions mentioned therein. As noted already, genuineness and bonafides of the sale in Ex. D1 were not at all questioned nor doubted. Hence, there was no reason to discard Ex. D1 relating to Lalbag Road property situated within the vicinity of acquired properties and compare with the property situated in city market area (taking it as situated on Crumbigal Road), for which the market value was fixed 8 years earlier to preliminary notification issued for acquired properties. ( 32 ) HOWEVER, after considering Ex. D11-objection petition (wherein the claimants had mentioned market value of the properties on Lalbag Road @ Rs. 500/- to Rs. 600/- during the relevant period) and discarding Ex. D1 on the basis of two untenable grounds referred to already, without adverting itself to any other material or evidence or circumstance available on record, the Civil Court, stating that it is following the principles enunciated in five decisions of the Supreme Court referred to by it and placing reliance on the decision of this court in M. F. A. No. 822/1977, determined the market value of the acquired properties @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. 1,500/- per sq. yd. Thus, it is crystal clear that for no reason, the Civil Court has ignored the relevant material referred to by us already, though such material was the best and valuable evidence available to determine the market value of the acquired properties. ( 33 ) IN fact, there was no reason whatsoever for the Civil Court to place reliance on M. F. A. No. 822/1977 relating to City Market area property (that too, wrongly taking it as Crumbigal road property situated away by 3 kms from the acquired properties, as stated by claimant PW1 himself ). But, for the reasons not made known (as known to it only), the Civil Court totally ignored Ex. D2, a relevant and valuable documentary evidence while determining market value of the acquired properties. Thus, what was comparable and could have been relied on, was not compared nor relied but conveniently ignored without assigning any reason whatsoever and, what was not comparable and could not have been taken into consideration at all nor relied, was relied on by the Civil Court in determining the market value of acquired properties. ( 34 ) AT this juncture, it will be useful to note that in the case of KRAPA RANGIAH VS. SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION [air 1982 SUPREMECOURT 877], the Supreme Court has observed thus: 3. The area being comparable, the situation also being the same and all the plots having been acquired under the self-same notification for Housing Scheme it seems to us proper that the same rate of compensation should be awarded to the claimant herein as was awarded by the High Court in Appeal No. 50 of 1970. And also, in the case of THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, GULBARGA vs. SMT. KURSHEED BEGUM [ 2003 (3) KCCR 1903 (DB)] this Court has observed thus: 6. We have earlier stated that it is not open to the State, once the order of the Reference Court has been confirmed by the High Court, to re-argue or re-open that very issue in relation to similarly situated lands acquired for the same purpose, because apart from the principles of finality it is necessary to lay down that the principles of fairness would require that similarly situated land owners who are parties to the acquisition must receive compensation on similar terms. It is not a question of legal bar, but more importantly an issue of propriety and an issue of judicial discipline which would require that there must be uniformity in relation to similar situations. ( 35 ) SO, even if ignored for a moment the record of sale at Ex. D1 on the ground that sale was about 2 years subsequent to the date of preliminary notification (though the property covered by the said sale transaction is located in the vicinity of the acquired properties, i. e. , on Lalbag Road itself), the judgments passed by the Civil Court in LAC No. 650/81 at Ex. D2 and LAC No. 646/81 (referred to and relied on in LAC No. 650/81), wherein the market value fixed @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. for properties bearing Nos. 8/1a and 9 situated adjacent to the properties in question and acquired under the same notification for same purpose, which had attained finality, could not have been ignored. Still, in the present matters, the Civil Court totally went wrong in following the judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 of this Court that too, by misreading it when, neither in proximity of time nor in location, the property covered in the said M. F. A. was close/similar or comparable to the properties in question and, when the earlier awards passed by the Civil Court with regard to adjacent properties acquired under the same notification for same purpose, which had attained finality, were available besides comparable sale of a property located in the vicinity of the acquired properties (though taken place two years subsequent to the preliminary notification ). In the above view and decisions referred to already, placing reliance and following the decision of this Court in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 by the Civil Court was totally uncalled for/unwarranted. So, we strongly disapprove the approach of the Civil Court, which was presided over by an Officer of the cadre of District Judge in ignoring well settled guiding principles and in not following its earlier decisions in similar matters that too, without any reason whatsoever. ( 36 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the market value of the acquired properties fixed by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. is totally perverse and unsustainable. ( 36 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the market value of the acquired properties fixed by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. is totally perverse and unsustainable. Simply because the Civil Court determined the market value in the year 2002, it cannot ignore the market value determined as in or about the year of preliminary notification issued in 1976. It need not be said that the date, on which courts decide the market value, is not relevant. What is relevant is the date of preliminary notification. If this is kept in mind with the guiding principles referred to already, the market value of acquired properties could be at the rate fixed for similar properties acquired under the same notification, wherein market value had been fixed @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. in the year 1986 and 1990. So, according to us, having regard to the earlier awards of Civil Court in L. A. C. No. 650/1981 and 646/1981 relating to adjacent properties No. 8/1a and 9 of Lalbag Road acquired under the same notification for the same purpose, for which properties in question were acquired under the same notification, the market value of the acquired properties as on 23. 2. 1976 could be @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. only (as fixed earlier for similar properties ). ( 37 ) AT this stage, incidentally it requires to be noted that the land owners claimants themselves stated in Ex. D11 that the market value of the properties of Lalbag road as between Rs. 500/- to Rs. 600/- per sq. yd. Of course, the Civil Court, placing reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of SPECIAL L. A. O. VS. KALLANAGOUDA (I. L. R. 1993 Kar. 1), held that the provision contained in Section 25 of the Act does not prevent or take away the right of the land owners claimants to claim compensation/market value at the rate more than the rate stated/claimed by them. KALLANAGOUDA (I. L. R. 1993 Kar. 1), held that the provision contained in Section 25 of the Act does not prevent or take away the right of the land owners claimants to claim compensation/market value at the rate more than the rate stated/claimed by them. ( 38 ) SO, Section 25 of the Act, as it stood earlier to and after amendment in the year 1984 requires to be noted and as such, they are reproduced: section 25 (Old): Rules as to amount of compensation.- (1) When the applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under s. 9, the amount awarded to him by the court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under s. 11. (2) When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. (3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the court shall not be less than, and may exceed, the amount awarded by the Collector. Section 25 (New): Amount of Compensation awarded by court not to be lower than the amount awarded by the Collector.- The amount of compensation awarded by the court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11. Thus, by amendment to Section 25 of the Act in the year 1984, drastic change has been made removing the restriction imposed on awarding compensation but, at the same time, it requires to be noted that Section 25 of the Act (as amended in 1984) has no retrospective effect as it has prospective effect only. ( 39 ) IN the case of KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI VS. KANHAIYA LAL AND OTHERS (2000 (7) S. C. C. 756), the Supreme Court has observed as under:"14. The question is, whether Section 25 of the Act, would be said to be a procedural right and not a substantive right. ( 39 ) IN the case of KRISHI UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI VS. KANHAIYA LAL AND OTHERS (2000 (7) S. C. C. 756), the Supreme Court has observed as under:"14. The question is, whether Section 25 of the Act, would be said to be a procedural right and not a substantive right. In support, submission is, looking to the scheme of the Act the preceding Sections 23 and 24 merely refer how compensation is to be determined and what matters are to be neglected in determining compensation in the background, Section 25 is merely procedural. We have no hesitation to reject such a submission. Section 25 deals with the amount of compensation to be awarded by the court. It mandates the court that such compensation shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11. Awarding of compensation, curtailing, restricting or adding right to the compensation can never be said to be procedural. The language of this section clearly reveals, it is substantive in nature, hence it cannot be held to be retrospective as to make the amending Act applicable. (Emphasis supplied ). Even recently also in the case of GHAZIABAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. SINGH and ANR. (2003 (3) KCCR 1857), the Supreme Court has observed thus: 5. Construing the new Section 25, this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samti Vs. Kanhaiya Lal, (2000 (7) SCC Page 756) observed thus: section 25 before its substitution by Act 68 of 1984, mandated the Court not to award compensation exceeding the amount so claimed by the landowners and not to be less than the amount awarded by the Collector. This very clearly limits awarding of compensation within the amount claimed. On the facts of the present case it is not in dispute that the award itself was given on 27. 12. 1977 and even proceeding pursuant to referring order, was concluded on 28. 2. 1981, i. e. , must prior to the aforesaid amending Act. Thus, on the facts of this case, it is unamended Section 25 to be applicable and not the amended section. In view of this, the peripheral limitation on the Court awarding the compensation, would equally apply to the High Court exercising its power as the first appellate Court. 6. It was then emphasized in paragraph 9 that the enhancement by the High Court could only be to the extent the landowners claimed. 7. In view of this, the peripheral limitation on the Court awarding the compensation, would equally apply to the High Court exercising its power as the first appellate Court. 6. It was then emphasized in paragraph 9 that the enhancement by the High Court could only be to the extent the landowners claimed. 7. As in the above case, in the instant case too, the award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and the Reference Court earlier to the effective date of substitution of Section 25. Hence, the limitation on the power of the court to award compensation as enjoined by the pre-amended Section would be attracted. " ( 40 ) IN view of the above and the clear provision contained in Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, it cannot be held that the amended provision of Section 25 is retrospective in effect. Consequently, the Civil Court could not have awarded compensation more than the rate of Rs. 500 Rs. 600 per sq. yd. claimed by the land owners-claimants in Ex. D11. In the above view also, the market value determined by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. , which is about three times of the market value stated/claimed by claimants in Ex. D11, cannot be maintained. ( 41 ) EVEN otherwise, there is no law that while determining the market value of the acquired properties, market value stated by the land owners-claimants in their claim petition or objection should not be looked at all or considered. So, the market value of the properties situated on Lalbag Road, as stated by the claimants, could be considered. It need not be said that whenever a person wants to sell his property, normally he does not quote less price, if not more than the one prevailing in market. This being so, even the market value stated by the claimants in Ex. D11, which is Rs. 500 to Rs. 600/- per sq. yd. , lends support to the market value fixed by the Civil Court earlier in L. A. C. Nos. 646/1981 and 650/1981, i. e. , @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. ( 42 ) INSPITE of that, if ignored Ex. D11 on the grounds given by the Civil Court, neither the judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 could be preferred nor, without any reason whatsoever, the earlier judgments in L. A. C. Nos. 646/1981 and 650/1981, i. e. , @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. ( 42 ) INSPITE of that, if ignored Ex. D11 on the grounds given by the Civil Court, neither the judgment in M. F. A. No. 822/1977 could be preferred nor, without any reason whatsoever, the earlier judgments in L. A. C. Nos. 646/1981 and 651/1981 passed by the Civil Court could be ignored. Consequently, the market value fixed by the Civil Court @ Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. under impugned judgment and awards cannot be sustained, as the market value of the acquired properties could be fixed only Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. as on the date of preliminary notification in 1976. Accordingly, now fixed the market value @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. (as against Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. fixed by the Civil Court ). No other point has been raised nor remained for consideration. In the result, the appeals are allowed in part and impugned judgment and awards are modified fixing the market value of the acquired properties @ Rs. 400/- per sq. yd. (as against Rs. 1,500/- per sq. yd. fixed by the Civil Court), but, kept other things intact. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their respective cost. Draw up awards accordingly. --- *** --- .