JUDGMENT - BOBDE S.A., J.:---This writ petition is preferred by Shriram Dhonduji Raut against the judgment and order of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur, dated 26-9-1990. By the impugned judgment and order, the Appellate Court has held the petitioner liable to pay to the respondent No. 1 Bahu Uddesiya Sahakari Sanstha Virsi, a Co-operative Society, an amount of Rs. 62,541.87 together with interest at 16% per annum from 15-2-1983 till full realisation. 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner was appointed as the Manager of cloth section on 14-10-1979. He was put incharge of the cloth shop of the society at a small village called Shendurwafa. The entire stocks of cloth in the shop was in his charge and custody. During the yearly verification of stocks of the shop, the Auditor found that there was a discrepancy in the stocks. This was in the course of the audit of the co-operative society in the year 1981-82. The Auditor, therefore, referred the matter to the Managing Committee. The Managing Committee verified the stock position and came to the conclusion on 31-1-1983 that the stocks of the value of Rs. 52,541.87 was short and missing. The society, therefore, filed a dispute before the Co-operative Court, Nagpur, under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 thereinafter referred to as the "Act"). After the trial Court heard the evidence and submissions of the parties, it came to the conclusion that the society was not entitled to recover the amount from the petitioner. According to the trial Court, it was strange that there was no shortage upto June 1982 and after June 1982, there was a shortage. One fails to see the validity of this observation of the trial Court. As regards the admission made by the petitioner that there is a shortage of cash, the trial Court found that the mere admission is not sufficient. In doing so, the trial Court disregarded the rule that admission is the best evidence. In fact, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 has relied on letters written by the petitioner asking for time to make payment of the amount of shortage. The trial Court came to the conclusion that it is the Secretary or the Managing Committee of the co-operative society who was expected to exercise control over the stock position and, therefore, the petitioner is not responsible. The trial Court came to the conclusion that it is the Secretary or the Managing Committee of the co-operative society who was expected to exercise control over the stock position and, therefore, the petitioner is not responsible. 3. This judgment has been reversed by the Co-operative Appellate Court by judgment dated 26-9-1990. The Appellate Court found that the trial Court had ignored a material part of the evidence led by the respondent-society. In particular, the lower Appellate Court found that the petitioner had admitted the claim of shortage on four occasions and a mere denial in the written statement outweigh this admission. The lower Appellate Court came to the conclusion that it was not detrimental to the case of the society that the Auditor had not been examined, particularly in view of the fact that the Managing Committee had verified the stock position and the members of the Committee had proved the process of stock verification and the shortage. The Appellate Court found, and in my view rightly, that even if the Auditor was not examined, it does not mean that the Managing Committee was divested with the power on verification of cash, stock, ecetera and that the Managing Committee had discharged its burden. As a matter of fact, the lower Appellate Court has found that each and every item of shortage had been proved by the witnesses of the society from the original registers and record and, therefore, the virtual dismissal of the claim by the trial Court merely because the Auditor was not examined is not warranted. 4. Mr. Madkholkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, challenged the tenability of the dispute itself under section 91 of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, section 91 of the Act could not have been invoked by the respondent-society for recovery of the value of the stock for which the petitioner has been found responsible, because the recovery was on the ground that the petitioner had misappropriated the stock and funds of the society. According to the learned Counsel, since the recovery was on the ground of misappropriation, the only remedy that was available to the respondent-society was the one provided by section 88 of the Act. 5. According to the learned Counsel, since the recovery was on the ground of misappropriation, the only remedy that was available to the respondent-society was the one provided by section 88 of the Act. 5. Admittedly, when the Co-operative Court dismissed the dispute filed by the respondent-society on 29-4-1989 and when the Appellate Court allowed the dispute on 26-9-1990, there was no amendment to section 91 of the Act. By the amendment brought into force with effect from 7-9-2001 by Maharashtra Act No. 34 of 2001, "orders, decisions, awards and actions of the Registrar against which an appeal under section 152 or 152-A and revision under section 154 have been provided" have been excluded from the purview of Co-operative Court under section 91. Thus, throughout the relevant time i.e. from the time of the institution of the suit till the decision thereon by the Co-operative Appellate Court, on such amendment was in force. The amendment was brought into force while this writ petition was pending. It is clear that as a result of the amendment, a matter which is triable or liable for adjudication under section 88 of the Act would, being appealable under section 152 of the Act, be excluded from the purview of a dispute under section 91 of the Act. 6. It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether the subject-matter of the dispute was liable for adjudication under section 88 of the Act. Section 88 of the Act reads as follows:-- "88. 6. It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether the subject-matter of the dispute was liable for adjudication under section 88 of the Act. Section 88 of the Act reads as follows:-- "88. Power of Registrar to assess damages against delinquent promoters, etc.---(1) Where, in the course of or as a result of an audit under section 81 or an inquiry under section 83 or an inspection under section 84 or the winding up of a society, the Registrar is satisfied on the basis of the report made by the auditor or the person authorised to make inquiry under section 83 or the person authorised to inspect the books under section 84 or the Liquidator under section 105 or otherwise that any person who has taken any part in the organisation or management of the society or any deceased, or past or present officer of the society has, within a period of five years prior to the date of commencement of such audit or date of order for inquiry, inspection or winding up, misapplied or retained, or become liable or accountable for, any money or property of the society, or has been guilty of misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the society, the Registrar or a person authorised by him in that behalf may frame charges against such person or persons, and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the person concerned and in the case of a deceased person to his representative who inherits his estate, to answer the charge, make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof, with interest at such rate as the Registrar or the person authorised under this section may determine, or to contribute such sum to the assets of the society by way of compensation in regard to the misapplication, retention, misfeasance or breach of trust, as he may determine. (2) The Registrar or the person authorised under sub-section (1) in making any order under this section, may provide therein for the payment of the cost or any part thereof, as he thinks just, and he may direct that such costs or any part thereof shall be recovered from the person against whom the order has been issued. (2) The Registrar or the person authorised under sub-section (1) in making any order under this section, may provide therein for the payment of the cost or any part thereof, as he thinks just, and he may direct that such costs or any part thereof shall be recovered from the person against whom the order has been issued. (3) This section shall apply, notwithstanding that the act is one for which the person concerned may be criminally responsible." On a plain construction, this section empowers the Registrar to make an inquiry on the basis of an Auditors report in respect of any misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the funds of the society. This section also empowers the Registrar to make an order requiring to pay, repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof with interest at such rate as the Registrar may determine. But who does section 88 apply to? A plain reading of the section makes it clear that the Registrar is empowered to take this action in regard to "any person who has taken any part in the organisation or management of the society or any deceased, or past or present officer of the society". Therefore, whether section 88 was available in the present case depends on the answer to the question whether the petitioner was a person who has taken part in the organisation or management of the society or was an officer of the society. Now there seems to be no dispute about the fact that the petitioner was appointed on a salary of Rs. 90/- per month and was placed incharge of the cloth section of the shop of the society at Shendurwafa. In the dispute, the society has described the petitioner as Manager. However, a perusal of the appointment order shows that the petitioner was appointed as a Pramukh i.e. head or a person incharge of the cloth section. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be a person who has taken part in the organisation or management of the society in the sense used in section 88 of the Act. This phrase contemplates a person who has taken part in organising the society itself i.e. in forming it or running it or its management. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be said to be a person who has taken part in the organisation or management of the society in the sense used in section 88 of the Act. This phrase contemplates a person who has taken part in organising the society itself i.e. in forming it or running it or its management. There is an appreciable difference between a person having taken part in the organisation and management of the society and someone having taken part in the organisation and management of a shop belonging to or run by the society. Clearly the petitioner belongs to the latter category. On the principle that the greater includes the lesser, a person who has taken part in the management of the society may be considered to be a person who has taken part in the management of a shop, but the reverse is not true. 7. The next thing that requires consideration is whether the petitioner can be said to be an officer of the society. The word "officer" has been defined by the Act itself. Sub-section (20) of section 2 of the Act defines "officer" as follows :-- "(20) "officer" means a person elected or appointed by a society to any office of such society according to its bye-laws; and includes a chairman, vice-chairman, president, vice-president, managing director manager, secretary, treasurer, member of the committee and any other person elected or appointed under this Act, the Rules or the Bye-laws, to give directions in regard to the business of such society." On application of the section, it is clear that the petitioner is not a person elected. He is a person who is appointed. But that still does not make him an officer as defined because the election or the appointment must be in order to "give directions in regard to the business of such society." There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was empowered to give directions in regard to the business of the society. If anything, it appears that he was subject to the directions of the society having been appointed to be incharge of one of its shops at Shendurwafa. 8. It appears that there is a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in (Kailash Nath Halwai v. Registrar, Co-operative Society, U.P. others)1, A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 294. If anything, it appears that he was subject to the directions of the society having been appointed to be incharge of one of its shops at Shendurwafa. 8. It appears that there is a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in (Kailash Nath Halwai v. Registrar, Co-operative Society, U.P. others)1, A.I.R. 1960 Allahabad 294. In that case, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, Per Raghubar Dayal, J. (as he then was) took the view that a manager of one of the shops run by the co-operative society is an officer of the society because he is in a position to give directions in regard to the business of the shop. Mr. Madkholkar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, fairly pointed out that this judgment has been overruled by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court as observed by the Supreme Court in (U.P. Co-operative Cane Union Federation Ltd. v. Liladhar and others)2, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 152 vide para 10. In this case, the Supreme Court construed a similar definition of "officer" occurring in section 2(d) of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1912. The word "officer" is defined in that Act as follows :-- "(d) officer includes a chairman, secretary, treasurer, member of committee, or other person empowered under the Rules or the Bye-laws to give directions in regard to the business of the society." While construing the meaning of the word, Their Lordships observed as follows :- "Undoubtedly, it is an inclusive definition. If only the officers enumerated in the definition are comprehended within the expression officer, the first respondent is not an officer in the sense that he was neither a Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, or a member of the Committee. But the expression officer also embraces such other person empowered under the Rules or the Bye-laws to give directions in regard to the business of the society. If ejusdem generis canon of construction were to be invoked in construing the expression officer, the expressing other persons must take colour from the words preceding it and accordingly other persons therein envisaged must have some semblance of comparison in respect of power and authority to give directions with regard to the business of the society with the enumerated persons such as chairman, secretary, treasurer or member of the Committee. If every employee of the society were to be an officer it would not be necessary for the legislature to provide that persons other than chairman, secretary, treasurer or member of the committee must be such who must have under the Rules or the Bye-laws the power to give directions in regard to the business of the society." It has been further observed as follows :-- "We are conscious of the fact that the definition of the expression officer is an inclusive definition. An inclusive definition widens the etymological meaning of the expression or term including therein that which would ordinarily not be comprehended therein. Firstly, keeping apart the expansive definition by including officers who would otherwise not be comprehended in the expression officer, it may be necessary to ascertain whether first respondent, giving the expression officer its ordinary etymological meaning, would be comprehended therein. It may be noticed that the legislature never intended to include every employee or servant of the society within the expression officer. There is some element of a right to command in the word officer with someone whose duty it would be to obey. If there is an officer ordinarily there will be someone subordinate to him, the officer enjoying the power to command and give directions and subordinate to obey or carry out directions. It may be that even one who is to carry out directions may be an officer in relation to his subordinates. Thus, what is implicit in the expression officer is made explicit by the latter part of definition which provides that such other persons would also be an officer who is empowered under the Rules and Bye-laws to give directions with regard to the business of the society. If it is contended that a particular person is an officer because he is empowered to give directions with regard to the business of the society, it would be a question of fact in each case whether a particular person is an officer or a servant or an employee." Therefore, applying the above observations to the facts of the present case, I am of view that the petitioner who was placed incharge of one of the cloth shops of the society was not a person who was empowered to give directions in regard to the business of such society. Directions in regard to the business of such society normally emanate from the Managing Committee of the society or an officer empowered to give such direction. The directions contemplated are directions in regard to the business of the "society" and not merely directions for running a particular shop. These directions, therefore, would be in regard to the manner in which the society should do its business, ecetera and not merely the selling of cloth in one of the shops of the society. In fact, the petitioner in his deposition stated that he was appointed as a salesman and was working as a salesman in the branch at Shendurwafa. That the goods in his shop were purchased by the President and Manager of the head office and salesman of the head office. From the above, it is clear that the petitioner had nothing to do with giving directions regarding the business of the society. The submission on behalf of the petitioner that the subject-matter was capable of being inquired into under section 88 is not tenable. Section 88, in my view, is not attracted to the facts of the present case at all. Therefore, there is no reason to hold or even consider the tenability of the dispute under section 91 of the Act. In fact, it must be noted that Explanation 2 to section 91 specifically includes a dispute. Clause (iii) of Explanation 2 to section 91 reads as follows :-- "(iii) a claim by a society for any loss caused to it by a member, past member or deceased member, by any officer, past officer or deceased officer, by any agent, past agent or deceased agent, or by any servant, past servant or deceased servant, or by its committee, past or present, whether such loss be admitted or not." I am of view that the petitioner was a servant of the society and the dispute is squarely covered by the provisions of section 91 of the Act. As regards the merits of the matter which has been dealt with earlier in the judgment, I am of view that the finding of the lower Appellate Court is not vitiated by perversity, much less an error of law apparent from the face of the record or an error of jurisdiction. 9. Mr. As regards the merits of the matter which has been dealt with earlier in the judgment, I am of view that the finding of the lower Appellate Court is not vitiated by perversity, much less an error of law apparent from the face of the record or an error of jurisdiction. 9. Mr. Madkholkar for the petitioner submits that the audit report has not been submitted to the Registrar as required under sub-section (5-A) of section 81 which reads as follows:-- "(5-A) If, during the course of audit of any society, the auditor is satisfied that some books of accounts or other documents contain any incriminatory evidence against past or present officer or employee of the society the auditor shall immediately report the matter to the Registrar and, with previous permission of the Registrar, may impound the books or documents and give a receipt thereof at the society." Mr. Daga, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, is not in a position to controvert this position. The society is, therefore, directed to submit the report of the Auditor to the Registrar in accordance with section 81, sub-section (5-A). The Registrar may thereupon take such action as he deems appropriate, in accordance with law. 10. In this view of the matter, I see no merit in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it is hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged. Interim order stands vacated. Petition dismissed. -----