JUDGMENT - KHANDEPARKAR R.M.S., J.:---Heard the learned Advocates for the parties. Perused the records. 2.The petitioner challenges the order passed by the authority in relation to fixation of the rent pertaining to the suit plot consequent to the directions issued by this Court in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1999 by an order dated 2nd February, 1999 on the ground that the valuation has been made in total violation of basic principles of natural justice and that it also discloses non-application of mind of the authority, who has passed the order fixing the market value of the land in question for the purpose of calculation of annual rent and further that the order in relation to fixation of rent is based on totally irrelevant materials. 3.Few facts relevant for the decision are that the petitioner was granted lease of the suit plot initially for a period of 30 years commencing from 1st August, 1962 and as regards the rent subsequent to the expiry of the said period, it was agreed that the same should be at the rate of 15% of the market value of the land as on 1st August, 1992. During the period of 30 years, annual rent was Rs. 5,117/- p.a. However, on the expiry of the said period of 30 years, the respondents demanded rent of Rs. 6,40,280/- p.a., and being aggrieved, the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the said demand of rent. By an order dated 2nd February, 1999 passed in the said Writ Petition No. 10 of 1999, it was directed that the authority shall, after taking into consideration all the materials produced before it on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents and after giving personal hearing to them, should decide about the quantum of rent payable by the petitioner. After hearing the petitioner, the authority by its letter dated 22nd August, 2000 informed the petitioner that the concerned authority has decided the quantum of rent to be Rs. 9,50,037/- on the basis of the market value of the suit plot at the rate of Rs. 2,975/- per sq. metre as on 1st August, 1992. After hearing the petitioner, the authority by its letter dated 22nd August, 2000 informed the petitioner that the concerned authority has decided the quantum of rent to be Rs. 9,50,037/- on the basis of the market value of the suit plot at the rate of Rs. 2,975/- per sq. metre as on 1st August, 1992. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred the present petition, and during the pendency of the proceedings in this Court, the petitioner obtained various copies of the proceedings before the authority in relation to fixation of the market value and quantum of rent which included the order pertaining to the fixation of the market value passed by the concerned authority on 24th March, 2000. 4.While assailing the impugned order of fixation of the market value and further the quantum of lease rent in relation to the suit plot with effect from 1st August, 1992 the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that bare reading of the said order discloses a total non-application of mind by the concerned authority to the matter in issue as well as to the materials which were placed by the petitioner before the authority and the consideration of irrelevant materials besides being that the materials having been taken into consideration without affording fair opportunity to the petitioner to putforth his say on those materials. He has further submitted that the valuation has been based on the materials which could never be the basis for fixation of the market value in terms of the procedure known to the law, and that therefore, the procedure adopted for arriving at the amount of rent payable by the petitioner from 1st August, 1992 was arbitrary and therefore, warrants interference in writ jurisdiction. 5.The learned Advocate for the respondents, on the other hand, placing reliance in the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of (Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 355, and drawing attention to the order dated 2nd February, 1999 in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1999, submitted that the petitioner having once agreed to abide by the decision of the concerned officer regarding the valuation, he is not entitled to seek interference from this Court in writ jurisdiction against the valuation report as well as the order fixing the quantum of rent. He further submitted that the order in relation to the fixation of the market value is based on the cogent materials on record produced before the concerned authority, and therefore, no fault can be found with the findings in that regard arrived at by the concerned authority. He has further submitted that valuation of the property is essentially a question of fact and cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. 6.At the outset, it is to be noted that the grievance of the petitioner in the present petition is not in relation to the quantum or figure of rent amount which has been arrived at but the methodology adopted by the concerned authority in arriving at the amount pertaining to the market value and quantum of rent. The grievance of the petitioner being not related to the decision itself as such, but in relation to the decision making process, the contention sought to be raised on behalf of the respondents about the non-maintainability of the petition on the ground that the valuation of the property is essentially a question of fact is absolutely without any substance. 7.The contention of the respondents that the parties having once agreed to abide by the decision of the concerned officer on the point of valuation, the petitioner is not entitled to approach the Court in writ jurisdiction against the order passed by such authority is also devoid of substance. The agreement to abide by the decision does not include the agreement to abide by any illegal decision or a decision arrived at by the method not known to the law and certainly, such a decision even after the agreement to abide by the decision, can be assailed by way of writ petition. Undoubtedly, if the petitioner fails to satisfy the Court about any defect in the decision making process, perhaps, the respondents may be justified in contending that the petitioner would not be entitled for the relief asked for. 8.Perusal of the communication dated 22nd August, 2000 apparently discloses that the demand for the rent of Rs. 9,50,037/- p.a. was made on the basis of the communication of the decision of the authority under the letter dated 4th April, 2000 which, in turn, discloses that the said communication was based on the decision of the concerned authority dated 24th March, 2000. 9,50,037/- p.a. was made on the basis of the communication of the decision of the authority under the letter dated 4th April, 2000 which, in turn, discloses that the said communication was based on the decision of the concerned authority dated 24th March, 2000. Perusal of the impugned decision reveals that the contentions of the petitioner were rejected as also the valuation report submitted on behalf of the petitioner. The valuation was arrived at on the basis of another valuation report dated 16th April, 1996 in relation to some other property which, in turn, was based on the provisional valuation report of yet another property. The records, however nowhere disclose the report relating to the provisional valuation for any such third property. 9.The authority has rejected the valuation report submitted on behalf of the petitioner on three grounds, firstly that the said report was based on the Award with reference to the year 1988 wherein the rate disclosed was Rs. 440/- per sq.metre, secondly that the same amount of Rs. 440/- was applied in the year 1992 without considering the increase in price of land during the passage of time from 1988 to 1992, and thirdly that the comparable features between the property which was subject matter of the Award and the suit plot were not considered while preparing the report. Drawing attention to the report submitted on behalf of the petitioner, the learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the proper reading of the report would disclose that the valuer had taken into consideration all these aspects of the matter and even the annual increase in the land price during the passage of time from 1988 to 1992 as also the comparable features. Indeed, the report on the face of it discloses that the valuer has taken into consideration the various factors which are necessary to be considered while adopting comparable method in the fixation of the market value of a plot of land on the basis of either sale instances or the Award passed by the Court. The report discloses consideration of the location frontage, encumbrances, level of ground, tenure of the holder of the land and surrounding development. In fact, the chart prepared by the valuer clearly reveals that all those factors were taken into consideration, apart from the annual increase in the value of the land during the passage of time. The report discloses consideration of the location frontage, encumbrances, level of ground, tenure of the holder of the land and surrounding development. In fact, the chart prepared by the valuer clearly reveals that all those factors were taken into consideration, apart from the annual increase in the value of the land during the passage of time. It is only after consideration of all those factors including the increase in the value of the plot of land and permissible deductions, that the said rate of Rs. 440/- has been arrived at. Being so, merely by observing that the valuer has not taken into consideration the annual increase in the market value of the land or that the valuer has accepted the amount disclosed as the land price for the year 1988 in the Award as value for the year 1991-92 or that the comparable features were not considered cannot be a justification to discard the valuation report in the manner in which it has been discarded by the authority. The petitioner is justified in contending that the findings arrived at by the authorities in relation to the valuation report submitted on behalf of the petitioner are not borne out from the records, and therefore disclose total non-application of mind on the part of the authority to the said report. 10.While discarding the said report submitted on behalf of the petitioner, the authority has sought to rely upon the report dated 16th April, 1996 in relation to the property wherein Survey No. 236 is situated and that too, which was stated to be occupied by the hutments and situated on the Northern side of the Industrial Estate. Besides, the said report dated 16th April, 1996 was based on a provisional valuation in relation to yet another property, the description and the location of which, are not available even from the said valuation report dated 16th April, 1996. Apart from that, no details in that regard are also found in the records. Yet, the same report appears to be made the sole basis while arriving at final figure pertaining to the market value in respect of the suit plot. Apart from that, no details in that regard are also found in the records. Yet, the same report appears to be made the sole basis while arriving at final figure pertaining to the market value in respect of the suit plot. It is really surprising that the authority had discarded the report submitted on behalf of the petitioner on the ground of alleged improper application of the comparable method, has totally failed to apply the same criteria while accepting the valuation of the property under the report dated 16th April, 1996. Besides it is not understood how the authority could have relied upon the report which was prepared as provisional valuation report of a property to be the basis for final valuation of another property. The matter does not end there. It is pertinent to note that the valuation report is of a totally different property and that too which was prepared on the basis of a provisional valuation of yet another property and the same is sought to be relied upon without even affording an opportunity to the petitioner to have the authenticity and correctness of the report being tested by producing the author of those reports for the purpose of cross-examination by the petitioner, after making copies of those reports available in advance to the petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioner that at no point of time either the report dated 16th April, 1996 or the so called report in relation to the provisional valuation of another property was ever made available to the petitioner and in fact the copy of the report dated 16th April, 1996 alone could be obtained after direction in that regard by this Court in this petition. In other words, apart from disclosing the total non-application of mind to the relevant materials, apparently the impugned order also discloses consideration of materials which were not disclosed to the petitioner and that too in a manner which is not permissible under the law. 11.In case any valuation report pertaining to any property other than the property under consideration is to be relied upon as comparable instance, the same can be done only after deciding the veracity and correctness of such report and for that purpose, it would be necessary for the party relying upon such report to make the author of such report available for cross-examination by the opposite party. Merely by perusal for the report of one property, it would not be possible to ascertain various aspects in relation to the nature of the two plots, one which is subject matter of valuation and another which is subject matter of the report sought to be relied upon, as also various other features of two such plots and the authority valuing the property will have to be satisfied itself in respect of all these aspects by examining the author of such report. Considering the fact that no such exercise having been done by the authority and the report dated 16th April, 1996 having been made the sole basis for decision for the purpose of deciding the market value of the suit plot and the quantum of rent payable based on such market value and that too without affording an opportunity to the petitioner to know such report and to test veracity and correctness thereof prior to relying upon such reports by the authority the findings arrived at by the authority in relation to the market value and the quantum of rent based on such reports cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. The petitioner is justified in contending that the report in the manner it was taken into consideration discloses that the authority had taken into consideration the total irrelevant materials and that too in a manner contrary to the provisions of law. 12.The reliance in the decision in the matter of Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. others (supra) is of no help to the respondents to justify the impugned order. On the contrary the decision clearly justifies interference by this Court in the impugned order. In Duncans Industriess case (supra) the valuation made by both the authorities below as well as by the valuers, was based on the documents produced by the party itself, and therefore it was observed that the valuation accepted by the Collector and confirmed by the revisional authority based on the materials produced by the party itself cannot be said to be arrived at arbitrarily. That is not the case in hand. That is not the case in hand. 13.The entire decision making process being in the manner not known to the law, the inquiry and the decision stand vitiated and the same cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed and set aside and the matter to be remanded to the authority to decide the issue of valuation and the quantum of rent afresh after hearing the petitioner as well as the other concerned authority, and in accordance with the provisions of law and on the basis of cogent and relevant materials placed or to be placed before it by the parties. The parties are at liberty to produce further materials before the authority in that regard, if so desire. The authority also has to bear in mind the observations made hereinabove while deciding the matter. Needless to say that since the matter pertains to the year 1992 onwards, the authority will have to expedite the decision in the matter. Meanwhile the petitioner to continue to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as has been paying since 1st August, 1992, till disposal of the matter by the concerned authority and such payment shall be subject to the adjustment in relation to the amount which the petitioner would be liable to pay on the basis of a decision to be arrived at. It is needless to say that all the contentions relating to the valuation and the quantum of rent are kept open. In the result , therefore the petition succeeds. The demand for rent under letter dated 22nd August, 2000 is hereby quashed and the matter is remanded as stated above and the rule is made absolute in above terms with no order as to costs. Petition succeeds. -----