Research › Search › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 1032 (PAT)

Udai Shankar Singh v. Sulo Singh

2003-09-19

P.K.DEB

body2003
Judgment P.K.Deb, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendants/appellants who were interveners in the suit and defendant nos. 7 to 10 against the judgment and decree passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Nawadah in Title Appeal No. 20/1986 (48/1986) affirming the judgment and decree passed by the 2nd Additional Sub-Judge, Nawadah in Title Suit No. 6 of 1984. 2. The original plaintiff late Chatharu Singh filed Misc. case no. 24 of 1972 to sue the original defendant as forma pauparis. The misc. case was allowed on 15.11.1982 and a suit was registered as Title Suit no. 454/1974 on 6.9.1974 before the Subordinate Judge, Nawadah. During the pendency of the aforesaid suit the original plaintiff Chatharu Singh sold the suit land to Sub Singh the plaintiff respondents first party who stepped into the shoes of the Chatharu Singh and replaced him as plaintiff but the suit even after substitution of Sulo Singh had continued as a pauper suit. No where it is there that Sulo Singh after his substitution as plaintiff in place of Chatharu Singh had also made any prayer for issuing forma Pauparis. The case of the original plaintiff was that he and his brother Rupan Singh owned and possessed rayati kasti land in khata nos. 378, 379 and 760 in village Upsarh P.S. Warisaliganj district Gaya. Chathrau Singh became very old and the family affairs was being looked into jjy Rupan Singh who was a simpletion rustic and illiterate person and they were alleged to be credulous persons and can be made to believe in the words of other and, as such, they were being deceived. Taking advantage of the age and the mental condition of the two brothers the persons in the village started to begin for grabbing their properties. The first attempt was made by Kapildeo Singh and Rajdeo Singh who by duping Chatrahu Singh got manufactured sale deed in their favour for which compulsory registration case was started by the predecessors. 3. The further cese of the plaintiff is that during the pendency of the compulsory registration case Chathrau fell in need of money and negotiated to sale 9 katha of land bearing plot Nos. 2171 and 2564 under Khata no. 378 with Raj Kumar Singh and Jawala Singh. 3. The further cese of the plaintiff is that during the pendency of the compulsory registration case Chathrau fell in need of money and negotiated to sale 9 katha of land bearing plot Nos. 2171 and 2564 under Khata no. 378 with Raj Kumar Singh and Jawala Singh. Raj Kumar Singh and Jawala Singh were alleged to be the persons of the gang who had conspired to grab the properties of the plaintiff. The proposed execution and registration of sale deed at Gaya, Chetahru and his brother agreed to the proposal in good faith. They went to Gaya and did everything with the help of scribe and witnesses etc.The plaintiff and his brother put their thumb impressions on different papers and registers as and when asked to do so in good faith. After a week of the registration of the said document Raj Kumar Singh approached the plaintiff and represented that the plot no. 2564 has been wrongly entered in place of plot no. 2560 in the sale deed and requested to execute the deed of Titimanama (rectification). The plaintiff and his brother in good faith agreed and accompanied Raj Kumar Singh and Jawala Singh, Chandrika Singh and Arun Pathak to Gaya. They were again made to put their LTI on certain documents and registers which they did all in good faith and believing the bonafides of Raj Kumar Singh but then a rumour was spread in the village that the plaintiff and his brothers have become beggers having sold their all lands and they have to leave the village. On enquiry it could be found that dishonestly and fraudulently entire lands of the plaintiffs were transferred under the sale deed besides that of Raj Kumar Singh. Both the brothers were shocked. Rupan Singh committed suicide. The plaintiff Chethru Singh lost his mental balance. After a year, Chethru Singh got himself recomposed. Thereafter he obtained a certified copy of the sale deed alleged to have been executed by Chethru Singh in favour of the defendants/respondents second party. The plaintiff thereafter came to know that his entire lands have been sold to the defendants and, as such, fraud has been committed upon him. The sale deed in favour of the defendants are sought to be declared as null and void vitiated by fraud. Plaintiff and his brother had never executed the sale deed in favour of the defendants. The plaintiff thereafter came to know that his entire lands have been sold to the defendants and, as such, fraud has been committed upon him. The sale deed in favour of the defendants are sought to be declared as null and void vitiated by fraud. Plaintiff and his brother had never executed the sale deed in favour of the defendants. The suit was brought as a declatory suit for declaring the sale deed dt. 23.1.1971 and 3.2.1971 standing in favour of the original defendants are all null and void and vitiated with fraud. Their prayer was for recovery of possession and mesne profit pendenfelite and also future against the original defendants. There was also further relief claimed for payment injunction. 4. Two written statements were filed one by Defendant no. 5 (Respondent no. 6 Belayati Singh) and another written statements were filed by defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3. In the written statement filed by defendant no. 5-respondent no. 6 it was stated that the plaintiff and his brother were fully knowing as to what they were doing and, as such, the sale deed dated 23.1.1971 was executed on a consideration of Rs.2000/- as the value of the land and then the vendees were put in possession. The allegation in the plaint were all denied. It was also stated that the executant had admitted his signature in the sale deed before the Sub-Registrar and, as such, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. The defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 who are the respondent nos. 2, 3 and 4 in this appeal have challenged the status of Sulo Singh, the present plaintiff who have been substituted in place of Chatrhu Singh and deed of 16.4.1980 in his favour has been claimed to be erroneous, untenable. According to them when the suit property had already been transferred vide sale deeds dated 23.8.1971 and 3.2.1971 to defendant nos. 1 to 6 there remained no interest left with Chathrau Singh the original plaintiff to execute the sale deed in favour of the substituted plaintiff Sulo Singh. Description of the lands included in the sale deed have been described in the written statement itself. During the pendency of the suit the present appellants had filed an intervention petition for intervening in the suit on the plea that their vendor Kapildeo Singh and Rajdeo Singh had acquired right title and interest. Description of the lands included in the sale deed have been described in the written statement itself. During the pendency of the suit the present appellants had filed an intervention petition for intervening in the suit on the plea that their vendor Kapildeo Singh and Rajdeo Singh had acquired right title and interest. These defendants did not know about the suit, so by these defendants right have been traversed. The purchase from Chatahru Singh and his brother by these defendants were made by full knowledge on payment of an adequate consideration and still then when no registration has been made by the executants Chathrau and Rupan then a compulsory registration case was filed as contemplated under Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act and then by order of the court the same was ordered to be registered. Practically against the defendants/intervenors who are the appellants in the case no relief was claimed against them or regarding their purchase deeds but it is not known as to how these intervenors/defendants had intervened in the suit and even after their intervention also the relief in the suit had not been changed. In that way the intervenor ought to have misioined as the parties and that there was no scope of considering their deeds or the suits by which their deeds were compulsorily registered and the validity thereof in the present suit. But it appears that the court below committed error. They have made issue regarding the validity and genuinity or otherwise of the deeds of the intervenor/defendants and the suit had been decreed in favour of the plaintiff declaring the deeds of the original defendants and also of the intervenor/defendants as invalid in the eye of law. Hence the present appeal. Besides the present appeal another appeal being S.A. No. 230/1998 was also filed by the original defendants against the same judgment and decree passed but very peculiarly in that appeal the plaintiffs and the original defendants have compromised and the appeal was not passed and, as such, dismissed on withdrawal. 5. Hence the present appeal. Besides the present appeal another appeal being S.A. No. 230/1998 was also filed by the original defendants against the same judgment and decree passed but very peculiarly in that appeal the plaintiffs and the original defendants have compromised and the appeal was not passed and, as such, dismissed on withdrawal. 5. On hearing the facts and also the legal position by order dated 7.8.2002 this court formulated the following substantial questions of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure : (i) Whether both the courts below had wrongly allowed the persons to intervene in the suit or in the appeal while the subject matter of the suit they had got no interest whatsoever? (ii) Whether both the courts below committed error in deciding the legality or otherwise of the purchase of the deeds of the appellants registered on 27.10.1977 on the basis of decree being granted in Title Suit No. 59/1973 filed under Section 77 of the Indian Registration Act. (iii) Whether the observation made by the courts below in respect of the appellants sale deeds were uncalled for having no point in issue in the suit itself? 6. Before going into the legal aspect of the matter and the substantial questions of law framed let the facts be concisely enumerated as mentioned below. 7. The admitted position remains that Chethru and Rupan Singh were two brothers being the owners of the suit property. In the year 1970 they jointly sold the suit property to Kapildeo and Rajdeo Singh. The deed was dated 22.1.1970. As the deeds were not being registered by the vendors, Title suit Nos. 59 of 1972 and Title suit No. 60/1972 were filed for compulsory registration by Kapildeo and Rajdeo Singh against Chathru and Rupan Singh. The suits were decreed on 30.8.1977. Against the decree passed in the suit Title Appeal No. 8 of 1977 and Title Appeal No. 9/1977 were filed by Rupan Singh and Chethru but the same were ultimately dismissed for default on 3.1.1980 and during the pendency of the appeal itself in execution proceeding the deed dated 22.1.1970 were registered compulsorily under Section 77 of the Registration Act on 27.10.1977 and defendants no. 7 to 10 purchased from Kapildeo Singh and Rajdeo Singh on. 1.11.1983. These defendants 7 to 10 are the intervenors/defendants and are appellants in the present appeal. 7 to 10 purchased from Kapildeo Singh and Rajdeo Singh on. 1.11.1983. These defendants 7 to 10 are the intervenors/defendants and are appellants in the present appeal. But in the present suit Chetharu Singh alone had filed Title suit no. 454 of 1974 challenging the sale deed dated 3.1.1971 and 3.2.1971 executed by him in favour of defendants nos. 2 to 6. During the pendency of the suit Chethrau sold away to the present plaintiff/ respondent no. 1 Sulo Singh on 16.4.1980. Sulo was substituted as plaintiff in place of Chethrau. It should further be mentioned here that Chethru had filed the suit originally as forma pauperis which was allowed and then the suit was registered but even after purchase of Sulo Singh the suit continued as forma pauperis although nothing could be proved from the side of the Sulo Singh regarding his paupership. So after 16.4.1980 practically the registration of the suit becomes questioned as forma pauperis and even if it is held that due to some mistake the matter was allowed to be continued as forma pauperis for Sulo Singh but then when decree was granted in favour of plaintiff, he ought to have been to pay the court fee first as a pre condition of the decree. In the suit the relief was only in respect of the deeds on 23.1.1971 and 3.2.1971 even after intervention of the defendant nos. 7 to 10 (present appellants) on 15.1.1984. No where the plaintiff had changed his relief for a further declaration that the deeds dated 22.1.1970 which was registered on 20.7.1977 was also a void document. So the matter remains that the documents of the venders of the defendants nos. 7 to 10 dated 22.1.1970 registered on 27.10.1977 although the date of registration relates back of compulsory registration to the date of the execution of the deed i.e. 22.1.1970. Now even if deed dated 27.1.1970 remains unchallenged then practically the suit becomes redundant for the purpose of declaration of the deed dated 29.1.1971 as invalid even if those were valid deeds then also when deed dated 22.1.1970 remained unchallenged, then by such sale on 23.1.1971 and 3.2.1971 by Chethrau Singh alone to the defendant nos. 2 to 6 do not give any title to the defendant nos. 2 to 6. Because at that time Chethrau Singh had no title over the suit property. 2 to 6 do not give any title to the defendant nos. 2 to 6. Because at that time Chethrau Singh had no title over the suit property. Moreover Rupan Singh had not joined with it and in that way during the pendency of the suit the deed dated 16.4.1980 in favour of Sulo Singh, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 becomes also redundant and without title. In that way alone the plaintiffs suit requires to be dismissed. 8. But then question comes in when the defendant nos. 2 to 7 have intervened in the suit then whether there was any scope for consideration regarding the deeds of defendant nos. 7 to 10 dated 2.1.1970 of its validity etc. when even after their intervention also the relief remained only against the original defendants nos. 2 to 6. On the first point as formulated under the head of substantial question of law, it appears that the learned trial court committed error in allowing the intervention petition of the defendants no. 7 to 10 and unnecessarily defendant nos. 7 to 10 had placed their fate before a forum wherein their interest in the suit property had never been challenged. At least on the intervention matter the trial court could have held without entering into any discussion about the deeds in question i.e. 23.1.1971 and 3.2.1971 to be carrying no title in the existence of deed dated 22.1.1970 in favour of defendant nos. 7 to 10. Definitely the defendant nos. 7 to 10 i.e. the appellant have committed error unnecessarily entering into litigation and they are now paying their mistake by being stretched into the second appellate court when their interest over the suit property was not the subject matter of the suit. It is true that issue Nos. 3 and 5 were unnecessarily framed for adjudicating the deeds of defendants nos. 7 to 10 and also their vendors deed dated 22.1.1970. The decisions of those issues are not only illegal but without jurisdiction as those issues do not conform to the reliefs claimed. A point may be raised that as and when the defendants/appellants themselves have intervened in the suit and wanted their title to be perfected in the present suit also then the same cannot be construed to be without jurisdiction. A point may be raised that as and when the defendants/appellants themselves have intervened in the suit and wanted their title to be perfected in the present suit also then the same cannot be construed to be without jurisdiction. Such sort of submission has got no footing on the ground that the suit is to be decided on the basis of the reliefs claimed and not beyond that. When even after intervention of defendant nos. 7 to 10 the reliefs in the suit had not been changed then the courts below ought to have held that the intervention petition is redundant and the defendant nos. 7 to 10 had unnecessarily been included in the suit. When there was no relief claimed in respect of the deed of the defendants/appellants or their vendors then the trial court ought not to have allowed the petition of intervention on 15.1.1984. That order is a misnomer and had created all trouble for which unnecessarily the defendant nos. 7 to 10 had been stretched up to this court. In that way the first substantia! question of law is decided in favour of the defendant/appellants and against the respondents. The second question is practically interdependant on the first question itself.There was no jurisdiction or authority of the courts below to decide the legality or otherwise of the purchase deed of the defendant/appellants registered on 27.10.1977 and executed on 22.1.1970. Those decisions are unnecessary for the purpose of determination of the present suit rather when that fact had been brought to the notice then the court should have easily dismissed the suit of the plaintiff but I dont want to say anything about it as also compromise has been arrived at between the plaintiffs and the other defendants in the other appeal. Moreover if we will take the decision and the legal implication regarding the limitation etc. as has been held by the appellate court while declaring invalidity of deed dated 22.1.1970. Moreover if we will take the decision and the legal implication regarding the limitation etc. as has been held by the appellate court while declaring invalidity of deed dated 22.1.1970. I find that the same finding is totally on wrong conception of law when the deed was dated 22.1.1970 and registration was by the Executing court on 22.10.1977 then it cannot be said that from the decree the document has not been done in time but already then appeal was pending and appeal becomes the continuation of the suit and those appeals had been dismissed for default on 3.1.1980 and during the pendency of the appeal in the execution proceeding the deed was executed compulsorily. Be it what it may I should not go in details in this matter because any observation made with regard to deed of the defendant/appellants dated 22.1.1970 and registered on 27.10.1977 and not only illegal but without jurisdiction and in that way any observation regarding the deeds of the defendant nos. 7 to 10 or their vendors is a nullity. Mr. S. Singh senior counsel appearing for and on behalf of the respondent has very strenously argued that when the defendants/appellants have themselves intervened in the suit then they are bound by decision. If such decision is beyond the jurisdiction of the court then the question of boundness does not come rather the same is a nullity in the eye of law. Hence I must hold that any decision made by the courts below in respect of the deed of the defendant/appellants are without jurisdiction and, as such, is a nullity, and similarly on the above discussion alone the substantial question no. 3 shall also be answered to the effect that any observation made regarding defendants title on the basis of their deed in their favour and also on the deed of their vendors not only being redundant but being without jurisdiction hence a nullity. 9. In that way the present appeal is allowed to the extent that the decisions given in respect of the defendants/appellants sale deed dated 1.11.1983 on the basis of their vendors Kapildeo Singh and Rajdeo Singhs deed dated 22.1.1970 being registered on 27.10.1977 are without jurisdiction and hence a nullity. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case no order as to costs.