JUDGMENT - DAGA V.C., J.:-This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th September, 2002 passed by the Bombay City Civil Court, Mumbai in Short Cause Suit No. 3273 of 1997, dismissing the suit filed by the appellant/original plaintiff for a declaration that the action of the defendants in demolishing structures standing on the suit plot is illegal and seeking a decree for mandatory injunction directing the defendants to reconstruct the demolished structures with perpetual injunction to prevent anybody from interfering with the reconstructed structures. FACTS : The facts giving rise to the suit as disclosed in the plaint are as under: 2. Plaintiff No. 1 is an Association duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Plaintiff No. 2 is the President of the said Association; while plaintiff No. 3 is its Secretary. Plaintiffs contend that the members of the Association running into more than 400 were occupying huts on plot of land bearing Survey No. 263 (Part), located at Babrekar Nagar, Link Road, Kandivali (W), Mumbai, ("the suit property" for short). 3. The plaintiffs averred in the plaint that each of their members was having identity card issued by Election Commission. The hut in question were erected on the said plot of land by him. The said structures were leased out to various persons, after the death of Shri Bhika Bala Pawar, by one of his legal representatives by name; Shri Jagdish Yashwant Pawar, much prior to 1985, who are now members of the 1st plaintiff-society. 4. In the plaint, it is further pleaded that the policy of the State of Maharashtra, extends protection to the hutment dewellers; whose huts were erected prior to 1st January, 1995. The plaintiffs claiming to be in possession of their huts since prior to 1985 claimed to be protected under the policy of the State Government. 5. It is further pleaded that in pursuance of the new item published in the Daily "Samana" dated 4-7-1997; notices were served on the plaintiffs sometime in the month of May, 1997, under section 50 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, calling upon them to vacate the premises as the demolition work was to be undertaken. The plaintiffs claim to have replied to the said notices and took exception to the action proposed in the said notices. 6. The plaintiffs claim to have replied to the said notices and took exception to the action proposed in the said notices. 6. It is further pleaded in the plaint that the Tahasildar and Deputy Collector (Encroachment), Officer of the State Government, hastily demolished the structures standing on the suit property. The said action of the State Government, the defendant No. 2 is bad and illegal, being in violation of their declared policy in the matter of protection extended to the hutment dwellers. 7. It is further pleaded in the plaint, that defendant No. 1, MHADA was required to undertake the work of rehabilitation of the slum dwellers as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority Act ('The MHADA Act') in a lawful manner but they resorted to take possession of the suit property by illegal means. That is how the alleged action of demolition resulting consequent dispossession of the plaintiffs the respondents/defendants is made a subject-matter of challenge in a suit with a prayer to restore all the structures alleged to have been illegally demolished by the defendants. 8. On being summoned, the respondents/defendants, appeared and denied all the contentions made in the plaint by filing their written statements. 9. The defendant No. 1 challenged locus standi of the plaintiffs to file suit and also jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and try the suit in question in view of provisions of section 177 of the MHADA Act. The defendant No. 1 in defence pleaded that the suit property was originally owned by the State Government. The same was handed over to them on 15-2-1993 under Collector's order dated 3-10-1991 for development with encroachment existing thereon. Consequently, the encroachments were required to be removed in the month of June, 1996. According to the defendant No. 1, all those huts in respect of which relief was claimed in the plaint, were erected subsequent to the removal of encroachments i.e. some time after July or August, 1999; as such, according to the defendant No. 1, each of them is a rank trespasser. None of them have any legal right to claim protection of law. None of them have any legal right to claim protection of law. It is further pleaded in the defence that as per the policy of the State Government all those hutment dwellers, whose structures were demolished, and those who had documentary evidence to establish their possession, were granted alternate pitches of land admeasuring 10 x 15 sq. ft., in the nearby localities. According to them, this was also done in pursuance of the order of this court passed in Writ Petition No. 1297 of 1997. 10. The ownership of the property claimed by the plaintiffs in favour of late Bhika Pawar and his heirs was also denied. It was also pleaded in defence that MHADA had undertaken to construct 3484 transit (LIG) tenements along with development of other surrounding plots. The transit tenements were to be handed over to the Slum Redevelopment Authority. It is further stated in defence that construction work was awarded to one M/s. B.G. Shirke Construction Technology Ltd. The work order was also issued on 7-8-1998 to the said firm with specific directions to complete the project within 21 months. The defendant No. 2-State of Maharashtra also filed their separate written statement and denied the suit claim set up the plaintiffs. 11. With the aforesaid pleading in defence, the trail Court framed issues relevant to the rival pleadings. The suit was put to trial. The trial Court allowed the parties to lead oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their rival claims. 12. Plaintiffs led their evidence and examined one Mr. Ravjee Krishnaji Sable and one Shri Raghuvansh Rai, who claimed to be the President and Secretary of plaintiff No. 1-Society. The defendant No. 1 examined one Executive Engineer in support of their defence. The defendant No. 2 though filed written statement but did not examine anybody on their behalf and relied upon the evidence of the defendant No. 1. 13. The trial Court after recording evidence and after hearing parties to the suit, held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any protection as sought by them under the policy of the State Government since all the subject huts had come into existence much after the cut off date i.e. 1st January, 1995. The trail Court also recorded a finding that the procedure adopted by the State Government was as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The trail Court also recorded a finding that the procedure adopted by the State Government was as per the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The same was legal and valid. It was also held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that act of demolition of structures by the defendants was in any way illegal or improper. In nutshell, all the issues going to the root of the suit came to be answered against the plaintiffs. That is how the suit came to be dismissed by judgment and decree dated 30th September, 2002. 14. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the appellants original plaintiffs preferred this appeal contending that the impugned judgment and decree is perverse and suffers from grave error and that the findings recorded are based on misappreciation of evidence. Appellants thus prayed for setting aside impugned judgment and order by allowing their appeal with costs. While hearing this appeal for admission, this Court thought it fit to send for record and proceedings and to hear and dispose of this appeal at the stage of admission itself, looking to the interest of about 400 persons involved in this litigation. Accordingly, appeal was heard with the assistance of record and proceedings of the trial Court. ARGUMENTS : 15. The learned Counsel for the appellant by way of oral submissions contended that the trial Court committed grave error in dismissing the suit without considering various questions of fact and law pleaded and proved by them. The submission is that the trial Court failed to take into consideration the important fact that the plaintiffs were in actual physical possession and occupation of their huts since prior to 1985. It is also contended that evidence of plaintiffs witnesses, on this aspect of the matter having gone unchallenged and uncontroverted for want of cross-examination, necessary finding with respect to their possession ought to have been recorded in their favour by holding their possession over the suit property. 16. It was further contended that the trial Court wrongly presumed that notices issued under section 50 of the M.L.R. Code were legal and valid. Learned Counsel for appellants-plaintiffs submits that the plaintiffs did produce documentary evidence showing the ownership of property in favour of Mr. Bhika Pawar, as against the fact that the defendants did not produce any evidence to rebut this evidence. Learned Counsel for appellants-plaintiffs submits that the plaintiffs did produce documentary evidence showing the ownership of property in favour of Mr. Bhika Pawar, as against the fact that the defendants did not produce any evidence to rebut this evidence. It is also contended that inspite of the report of the surveyor showing that the property claimed by the plaintiffs did belong to Mr. Bhika Bala Pawar, the trial Court did not assign any reason for recording adverse finding or for rejecting contention of the plaintiffs in this behalf. Learned Counsel for the appellants thus prayed for decree in terms of prayers in the suit. PER CONTRA : 17. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellants are rank trespassers. They are precluded from seeking any relief against the respondents, let alone an order of injunction restraining the respondent No. 1 from developing the suit property. It is further submitted that respondents being the true owner of the land in question, no relief can be sought by the appellants against them as each member of the 1st plaintiff was a rank trespasser. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Premji Ratansey Shah others v. Union of India others)1, 1995(2) Bom.C.R. 374 ; wherein Apex Court has, inter alia, held that no injunction can be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession as against the true owner. 18. The learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that action of demolition carried out by the respondents on 12th June, 1997 onwards was inter alia; challenged by the appellants herein, in the City Civil Court, at Mumbai, in this suit bearing S.C. Suit No. 3273/1997, the dismissal of which has given rise to present appeal at the instance of the present appellants. He submits that the very same action was challenged by some of the Associations claiming to be the representatives of the slum dwellers, whose hutments were demolished during the aforesaid demolition drive. One of such writ petitions was (Babrekar Nagar Rahivasi Sangh another v. State of Maharashtra others)2, being Writ Petition No. 1147/1997, and another was (Sai Seva Sanghatan v. State of Maharashtra others)3, being Writ Petition No. 1297/1997. One of such writ petitions was (Babrekar Nagar Rahivasi Sangh another v. State of Maharashtra others)2, being Writ Petition No. 1147/1997, and another was (Sai Seva Sanghatan v. State of Maharashtra others)3, being Writ Petition No. 1297/1997. On the basis of the records of these writ petitions, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 pointed out that some of the other members of the appellant No. 1 herein; were also members of the said Associations who had filed the aforesaid 2 writ petitions in this Court though appellants contended in the trial Court as also before this Court that the present appellants were in no way connected with the said writ petitions. In order to bring home his point respondents Counsel produced material particulars from the record of two writ petitions, the details of which are as under : ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sr. Sr. No. Name of Members of Sr. No. of Pages where the No. in the appellant No. 1-Soci- the members said appellants suit. ety as shown in in the writ members names (Ex. C) Ex.C proceedings are reflected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. 15 Umesh Raut 808-W.P. 1297/97 19-A64 2. 21 Amarsingh 41- W.P. 1297/97 19-A37 3. 26 Mangru Ram Yadav 364- W.P. 1297/97 19-A49 4. 32 Motilal Gupta 100- W.P. 1147/97 13 5. 39 Dayaram Vishwakarma 26- W.P. 1147/97 11 6. 47 Ramchandra Vishw- 656- W.P. 1297/97 19-A59 akarma 7. 50 Suhas Chauhan 716- W.P. 1297/97 19-A61 8. 60 Ramlakhan Singh 618- W.P. 1297/97 19-A57 9. 75 Satyanarayan 671- W.P. 1297/97 19-A60 10. 79 Rajendra Maurya 521- W.P. 1297/97 19-A55 11. 83 Teju Saroj 794- W.P. 1297/97 19-64 12. 84 Parashanti Sharma 477- W.P. 1297/97 19-A53 13. 87 Surendra Rambali 722- W.P. 1297/97 19-A61 Gupta 14. 90 Shyam Sunder Yadav 734 -W.P.1297/97 19-A62 15. 104 Surender Prasad Saroj 739- W.P.1297/97 19-A62 16. 107 Baburam Saroj 79- W.P.1297/97 19-A38 17. 111 Ramakant Yadav 630- W.P. 1297/97 19-A58 18. 122 Chaurasiya Rajkumar 591- W.P. 1297/97 19-A57 19. 277 Gupta Bindu 81- W.P. 1297/97 19-A38 20. 291 Mahadev 371- W.P. 1297/97 19-A49 21. 298 Tiwari Rajendra Prasad 625- W.P. 1297/97 19-A58 22. 308 Mohammed Yunus 372- W.P. 1297/97 19-A49 23. 315 Akbar Ali 27- W.P. 1297/97 19-A36 24. 327 Khan Mahub Kitabulla 412- W.P. 1297/97 19-A51 25. 122 Chaurasiya Rajkumar 591- W.P. 1297/97 19-A57 19. 277 Gupta Bindu 81- W.P. 1297/97 19-A38 20. 291 Mahadev 371- W.P. 1297/97 19-A49 21. 298 Tiwari Rajendra Prasad 625- W.P. 1297/97 19-A58 22. 308 Mohammed Yunus 372- W.P. 1297/97 19-A49 23. 315 Akbar Ali 27- W.P. 1297/97 19-A36 24. 327 Khan Mahub Kitabulla 412- W.P. 1297/97 19-A51 25. 393 Maravar Nagnath 449- W.P. 1297/97 19-A52 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the submission of learned Counsel for the respondents, it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants herein; to contend that they were in no way concerned with the aforesaid two writ petitions filed by the two different Associations in this Court and that the orders passed by this Court in those petitions do not bind them. 19. The learned Counsel for the respondents alleged that the orders passed in the writ petitions having not been challenged in the superior Court by any of the writ petitioners as such the same having attained finality would operate as 'res judicata' between them and the State Government, respondent No. 2 through whom MHADA-respondent No. 1 is claiming interests. He placed reliance on the case of (Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Nandal)4, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 391. He submits that in view of the orders passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petitions all those hutment dwellers, whose structures were demolished, and those who had documentary evidence to prove the existence of their structures prior to 1-1-1995, were granted alternate pitches of the lands admeasuring 10 x 15 sq. ft. 20. Shri Mattos, learned Counsel submits that the aforesaid writ petitions were disposed of by this Court vide order dated 2nd December, 1997. He submits, it is clear from paragraph (5) of the order passed in Writ Petition No. 1147/1997, that this Court had directed that if the slum dwellers submit any scheme for redeveloping the plot as per the Slum Redevelopment Scheme, the respondents should consider their request before demolishing their structures. Further, it was clarified in the said order that where the premises were already demolished, the question of submitting SRD Scheme would not arise. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, the aforesaid order of the writ Court was followed and implemented. But this order did not apply to those cases, where, as per the Development Plan, the area was reserved for public housing. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1, the aforesaid order of the writ Court was followed and implemented. But this order did not apply to those cases, where, as per the Development Plan, the area was reserved for public housing. He submits admittedly, the alleged structures of the members of the 1st plaintiff-society, which were demolished were located on the plot of land reserved for public housing as such those who had proved existence of their huts prior to 1-1-1995 were given alternate pitches a submitted hereinabove. 21. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that the present plaintiffs could not show semblance of any right in their favour in respect of the suit property. At the highest, the purported documents sought to be produced on record could be said to be sufficient to prove their possession over some structures but those documents in no way revealed that they pertained to the land in question. He further submits that the plaintiff No. 1 admittedly could not prove any semblance of a right in the land in question. 22. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 further contended that the plaintiffs did not comply with the provisions of Order 7, Rule 3 of the C.P.C. inasmuch as the plaint did not disclose the description of the alleged suit property with sufficient details so as to identify it. It did not even specify its boundaries. Even the sketch annexed to the plaint showing the encroachment is devoid of material facts, details and particulars. 23. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 also brought to my notice that the appellants have contended in the Memorandum of Appeal, more particularly in ground (b) thereof; that trial Court failed to consider the fact that the suit of the plaintiffs was based on possession and not on title, whereas in paragraph 2 of the Civil Application No. 4160/2002 taken out by the appellants in the above appeal, the appellants had inter alia, contended that they have a clear title to the suit property and are the owners thereof. According to him, this contradiction in terms exposes the entire falsity of the claim of the appellants to the suit property. 24. According to him, this contradiction in terms exposes the entire falsity of the claim of the appellants to the suit property. 24. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 pointed out that the appellants claimed to be the tenants of one Bhika Bala Pawar and alleged that the said Bhika Bala Pawar was granted the land in question of lease by the respondent No. 2 and that it is the same land where the structures of the appellant No. 1 and its members were located prior to their demolition. According to him, it is pertinent to note that neither the said Bhika Bala Pawar (since deceased) during his life time nor his heirs and legal representatives, at any time initiated any legal proceedings either claiming title or challenging the alleged illegal action of the respondents herein in respect of the suit property. Moreover, neither said Bhika Bala Pawar nor his heirs after his demise were impleaded by the appellants as parties to the suit proceedings before the trial Court. The appellants did not tender any single document to substantiate their alleged tenancy in respect of the structures allegedly belonging to said Bhika Bala Pawar which were allegedly occupied by the plaintiffs. He thus prayed for dismissal of appeal being devoid of any substance. 25. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that the land in question was developed by MHADA. They have constructed about 53 buildings thereon. That further development is being carried out on the remaining vacant portion of the land. The land upon which the respondent No. 1 is carrying on development activities did not belong to Bhika Bala Pawar as reflected in Exhibit 11, which is the extract from the property Register Card. According to the respondent No. 1, the land in question wherein; the respondents are carrying out development activities bears City Survey No. 6-A, and the respondent No. 2 is shown as the holder of the title. In his submission, it is thus clear that the land in question wherein respondent No. 1 is carrying on development activities is not the land in respect whereof the said Bhika Bala Pawar had any right. This submission was made without prejudice to the contentions of the respondent No. 1 that the appellants have miserably failed to approve semblance of any right in respect of the suit land in their favour. 26. This submission was made without prejudice to the contentions of the respondent No. 1 that the appellants have miserably failed to approve semblance of any right in respect of the suit land in their favour. 26. The learned Counsel for the respondents further urged that the appellants having realised that they stood no chance in further preventing the respondent No. 1 from exercising its right over the suit property, the appellants are now making veiled attempt before this Court to obtain some reliefs by submitting that at least the respondents be directed to consider the case of the appellants for alternate accommodation. This is despite the fact that the hutment dwellers were already protected under the order passed by this Court in the two writ petitions. According to other respondents, the appellants first chose to make out a case that they were not covered by the said proceedings but belatedly are seeking alternative relief to which they are not entitled as such any prayer in this behalf cannot now be considered after a lapse of about 6 years. 27. In addition to the above submission, respondent No. 1 also prayed for dismissal of the suit for suppression of material facts from the trial Court as well as from this Court with respect to filing of two writ petitions before this Court and the orders passed thereon. 28. In the above premises, it is submitted that this Court should dismiss this appeal with costs; inasmuch as the appellants having adopted various means to stultify the development project executed by the respondent No. 1 for the benefit of the people at large the appeal should be dismissed with heavy costs. CONSIDERATION : 29. Having heard the parties at length and having gone through the record and proceedings as well as rival pleadings of the parties, one thing is clear that the plaintiffs in para 2 of the plaint stated that the names of members of plaintiffs No. 1-Society along with nature of construction and dimension thereof are shown in Exh. C. to the plaint, but no such particulars are to be found in the plaint. The plaint lacks in material facts and particulars in this behalf. C. to the plaint, but no such particulars are to be found in the plaint. The plaint lacks in material facts and particulars in this behalf. The plaint further states that the plaintiffs shall refer to and rely upon identity cards issued in favour of the members of plaintiff No. 1 society, not a single card was, produced and/ or proved by the plaintiffs. 30. In para 3 of the plaint, ownership of Late Bhika Bala Pawar was pleaded, but no material particulars thereof are to the found with regard to such ownership in the plaint or evidence. It is stated in the plaint that the lease was granted for a period of 999 years by the State Government in favour of the late Bhika B. Pawar. No material particulars in this behalf are to be seen in the plaint or evidence. I do not think lease for such unusually long period of 999 years could be granted by the state government in favour of anybody. At least, I did not come across any such case wherein lease for such an unduly long period has been granted in favour of anybody. Assuming that such lease might have been granted for 999 years, even then, it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiffs to plead the date of grant of lease, the document under which it was granted; when such document was executed; what were the dimensions of the leased property; and what were the terms and conditions on which it was granted in favour of said Mr. Bhika Pawar. No particulars in this behalf are to be seen either in the plaint or evidence. When grant of lease was pleaded, material particulars thereof ought to have been mentioned in the plaint, documents in support thereof ought to have been disclosed and filed, the evidence in that behalf ought to have been tendered and the fact of grant of lease ought to have been proved by the plaintiffs. In the plaint, plaintiffs refer to revenue record but no material particulars in that behalf are to be found either in the plaint or evidence. 31. The legal heirs of deceased Bhika Pawar have been referred to in the plaint, so as to establish title to the suit property in their favour, but no details of such legal heirs are to be seen in the plaint. 31. The legal heirs of deceased Bhika Pawar have been referred to in the plaint, so as to establish title to the suit property in their favour, but no details of such legal heirs are to be seen in the plaint. The plaint further says that the tenancy rights were granted in favour of plaintiff No. 1 Society, much prior to 1985. I fail to understand how, tenancy rights in favour of plaintiff No. 1 society prior to 1985 could have been granted when the society itself was not in existence in the year 1985; it having been formed and registered in year 1996. In the circumstances, there could not have been any lease in favour of plaintiff No. 1 prior to the year 1985. The said statement made is absolutely false to the knowledge of the plaintiffs themselves. 32. Apart from the above, plaint further makes out a case that rent was paid by plaintiff No. 1 to one Jagdish Pawar and his family members. However, no material particulars with respect to the rate of rent qua each member of the society and/or particulars of alleged payments by each of them is to be seen either in the plaint or evidence. The plaint further makes out a case that as per the policy of the State Government, slum dwellers occupying huts prior to 1995 are to be protected. But no such policy has been produced on record. No material particulars of the said policy are to be found in the plaint. Assuming it to be true, the respondents have satisfactorily pointed out implementation of such policy in respect of eligible persons in the light of orders of this Court passed in two writ petitions referred to hereinabove. 33. The plaintiffs further tried to make out a case that though notices under section 50 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code were issued and members of the society were called upon to vacate their structures, but no sufficient time was granted to them to vacate their structures. However, there is no reference in the plaint as to when such notice were issued; what was the date of such notices, on whom they were served and what type of the compliance was required to be reported either by plaintiff No. 1 Society or by its members. Thus, I hold that the plaintiffs-appellants could not prove any illegality of the notices in question. Thus, I hold that the plaintiffs-appellants could not prove any illegality of the notices in question. 34. The plaint further makes out a case that the State Government was not the owner of the suit property and one Mr. Bhika Pawar and his legal heirs were the owners of the suit property, but no evidence in this behalf is on record. None of the alleged owners of the suit property is party to the suit. None of them is claiming rights with respect to said land. No document with respect to their ownership is on record. As a matter of fact, on the basis of the plaint pleading, no protection by way of interim order could have been granted in favour of the plaintiffs considering the serious defects of the plaint pointed out herein. 35. Now, if one turns to the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, one would get the evidence of two witnesses, viz. President and Secretary of plaintiff No. 1 society. On examination of their evidence, it would be clear that the evidence is as vague as it could be. List of members has not been proved. It lacks in material particulars. It neither contains full name of the members no other particulars of such members, so as to fix identity of his hut allegedly demolished by the respondents. No details are to be found as to when the plaintiff No. 1-Society enrolled them as its members. No resolutions or proceedings of the society are brought on record to show that persons reflected in Exhibit C were at any time admitted as members of the plaintiff No. 1-society. No resolution of the General Body was either pleaded or brought on record or proved to show authorisation to file the suit on behalf of the plaintiff No. 1-society. No Constitution of the Society is on record. No identity cards have been produced on record to show that any of the members of the plaintiff No. 1-society was in occupation of the hutments in question. None of the notices, alleged to have been issued to them, is to be found on record. There is absolutely no evidence to show that at what point of time the alleged huts were occupied and demolished so as to establish that they are entitled to claim restoration of the huts alleged to have been demolished. None of the notices, alleged to have been issued to them, is to be found on record. There is absolutely no evidence to show that at what point of time the alleged huts were occupied and demolished so as to establish that they are entitled to claim restoration of the huts alleged to have been demolished. So far as other witnesses examined by the plaintiffs are concerned, they are the president and secretary of the Society. But no documents are on record to prove their status. None of the allegation made in the plaint is proved by the plaintiffs by cogent evidence. 36. The defendants examined one Executive Engineer of MHADA, who deposed that after removal of the encroachement two writ petitions were filed, being Writ Petition Nos. 1147/97 and 1297/97. The orders passed therein were produced by him at Exh. 19 and 35. There is absolutely no cross-examination by the plaintiffs on this material point to challenge its correctness. Learned Counsel for the defendants pointed out that demolition work was carried out before 12th June, 1997. Some of the occupants had filed Suit No. 2373/97 in the City Civil Court, Bombay. During pendency of the said suit, Writ Petition No. 1147 of 1997 came to be filed at the instance of Bhabrekar Nagar Rahivasi Sangh. Similarly, one more writ petition being Writ Petition No. 1297 of 1997 was filed by Sai Seva Sanghtana. Learned Counsel for the defendants produced original record and proceedings of the said two petitions on record of this case from which it is clear that some of the members of the said 1st plaintiff society were parties to these writ petition. However, neither there is any whisper in the pleading nor any material particulars thereof have been disclosed by the plaintiffs in the plaint. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 thus rightly criticised the conduct of the plaintiffs in support of the fact that some of members of the plaintiffs No. 1 society were parties to the said writ petitions and those writ petitions were disposed of by this Court by speaking orders. The respondents rightly submitted that the petitioners who are members of the plaintiff No. 1 society are bound by the decisions of the writ Court. The respondents thus rightly submitted that the suit itself was liable to be dismissed for non-disclosure of material facts. 37. The respondents rightly submitted that the petitioners who are members of the plaintiff No. 1 society are bound by the decisions of the writ Court. The respondents thus rightly submitted that the suit itself was liable to be dismissed for non-disclosure of material facts. 37. The learned Counsel for the respondents rightly pointed out that in terms of the order of this Court passed in the writ petitions and as per policy of the respondent No. 1, the slum dwellers, whose huts were in existence prior to 1-1-1995, were given alternate pitches before demolition of their huts. He also rightly submitted that the earlier orders passed in the writ petition shall operate as res judicata. The learned Counsel rightly relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (supra); wherein it was ruled that section 11, in view of Expl.VI, applies to public interest litigation. This judgment of the Apex Court shall be applicable to the facts of the present case. 38. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 is also right in his submission that the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any relief being rank trespassers and that they did not prove that they possessed the suit land or plot of land or structures thereon under any legal authority. He rightly relied upon the case of Premji Ratansey Shah v. Union of India (supra). In my view, appellants/plaintiffs are not entitled to any equitable reliefs claimed in the present suit since they suppressed material facts from this Court as well as from the trial Court. In the case of (S.P. Chengalavarya Naidu v. Jagannath)5,A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 853, Apex Court observed as under : "The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation." Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of (Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma)6, 1995(1) S.C.C. 421 . This view has been followed by our High Court in Company Petition No. 395 of 1994 decided on 3rd April, 1996. In the said judgment, noticing the earlier two judgments of the Supreme Court, this Court has observed as follows : "One who comes to Court must come with clean hands. The position in law is too well-settled to require any elucidation. The Apex Court has in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath others reported in A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 853, inter alia observed that the courts of Law are meant for imparting justice between the parties, that one comes to the Court must come with clean hands and that it can be said without hesitation that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation that a litigant who approached the Court is bound to produce all the documents which are relevant to the litigation, and that if he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side, then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party. The Apex Court therein was dealing with a case where it was found that a preliminary decree was obtained by playing fraud on the Court. It, therefore, observed that a fraud is an act of deliberate deception with design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another and that it is deception in order to gain by another' loss. A cheating intended to get an advantage. It, therefore, observed that a fraud is an act of deliberate deception with design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another and that it is deception in order to gain by another' loss. A cheating intended to get an advantage. Again the Apex Court in the decision of Chandra Shashi v. Anil kumar Verma, reported in 1991(1) S.C.C. 421, inter alia held that in order to enable the Court to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in immoral acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehood have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be possible for any Court to administer justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those who ultimately prevail, that any one who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings, that if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with administration of justice and that such a conduct is Contempt of Court." The same view has been expressed in (J.T. 1996(7) S.C. 135)7; where the Supreme Court has observed as under : "Since fraud affects solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of process of the Court, the courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon the Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the courts itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order." Keeping in view the aforesaid observations, dismissal of suit by the trial Court can perfectly be justified inasmuch as the appellants herein are also not entitled to any relief. The appeal is thus liable to be dismissed. CONCLUSION : 39. As already pointed out hereinabove, plaint is absolutely vague and material facts and particulars are not to be found in the plaint. No cause of action for filing the suit is visible in the plaint. None of the allegations made in the plaint is proved. No legal right is established. The appellants have miserably failed to prove that the Bhika Pawar for 999 years by the State Government and that the appellants were inducted as tenants on the said land or structures erected thereon as such they are entitled to have reconstructed premises from the respondents. No legal right is established. The appellants have miserably failed to prove that the Bhika Pawar for 999 years by the State Government and that the appellants were inducted as tenants on the said land or structures erected thereon as such they are entitled to have reconstructed premises from the respondents. The appellants could neither establish any of their rights nor made out a case warranting interference with the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court. 40. In the result, appeal is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Needless to mention that interim relief, if any, stands vacated with the dismissal of this appeal. Appeal dismissed. -----