Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing order dated 16-3-2000 (Annexure P-1) by which the petitioner has been compulsorily retired and it has been further directed that he would not be entitled to pay and allowances from 3-7-1997 onwards on the principle of "no work no pay". ( 2. ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner was Joint Director in respondent No. 1 M. P. Dugdh Mahasangh Maryadit, Bhopal. It is a registered Co-operative Society. It comes within the definition of slate given in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. A departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner on certain charges and the punishment of stoppage of his increments for two years was imposed upon him by the Chairman. The Board of Directors in revision enhanced this punishment to compulsory retirement. The petitioner challenged the order of compulsory retirement in Writ Petition No. 2109 of 1998 on the ground that before enhancement of the punishment he was not given any opportunity of hearing. By order dated 8-10-1999 in the aforesaid writ petition the impugned order of the Board of Directors, dated 3-7-1997 was quashed. The respondents were given liberty to proceed in accordance with law. ( 3. ) AFTER the above mentioned order of this Court the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 served a show-cause notice upon the petitioner. In reply to this show-cause notice the petitioner requested the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to reinstate him in service and then give him an opportunity of hearing. The contention of the petitioner was that there is no question of hearing him until relationship of employee and employer is again established. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 overruled this contention and held placing reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 , that the petitioner can be heard even without reinstating him in service. ( 4. ) THE point for determination in this petition is whether the petitioner could be given a show-cause notice for hearing him on the question of punishment without reinstating him in service. ( 5. ) FROM the impugned order it appears that the reliance was placed by the Management on the decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 . ( 5. ) FROM the impugned order it appears that the reliance was placed by the Management on the decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 . Para 31 of this judgment is as under:-"hence, in all cases where the enquiry officers report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The Courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the dale of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the dale of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law. " ( 6. ) IT is clear from the above para that the procedure which was devised by the Supreme Court was to meet the situation where report of the inquiry officer was not furnished to the employee before considering the question of punishment. In the present case that is not the situation. Earlier order of compulsory retirement was "quashed" by this Court by order dated 8-10-1999. The effect of quashing of this order was that the petitioner stood reinstated in service. The case was not remitted or remanded to the respondents for considering the question of punishment after hearing the petitioner. The order of compulsory retirement was quashed and the respondents were given "liberty to proceed in accordance with law". Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that he should be reinstated first before he is heard on the question of punishment was correct. It is well settled that the relationship of employee and employer must subsist till the date of the culmination of disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner could not be heard on the question whether misconduct was proved against him or on the question of punishment without establishing the relationship of employee and employer between him and the respondents. ( 7. ) IN the result this petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 16-3-2000 by which the petitioner has been retired compulsorily from service is quashed. The petitioner could not be heard on the question whether misconduct was proved against him or on the question of punishment without establishing the relationship of employee and employer between him and the respondents. ( 7. ) IN the result this petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 16-3-2000 by which the petitioner has been retired compulsorily from service is quashed. The impugned order denying the petitioner the pay and allowances from 3-7-1997 is also quashed. The petitioner will be paid the pay and allowances from 3-7-1997 onwards as he was not under suspension from that date. The pay and allowances from 3-7-1997 can not be denied to him on the principle of "no work no pay" as this principle does not apply to a case where the employee is disabled to work. The Supreme Court has held in Union of India v. K. V. Jankiraman, AIR 1991 SC 2010 , that the normal rule of "no work no pay" is not applicable to such cases where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is directed that the respondents will reinstate the petitioner in service and then an opportunity of hearing would be provided to him as indicated in the earlier order of this Court.