PRANAB KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners in this writ petition have challenged the validity of the award of the seventh Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta which was subsequently published by the government of West Bengal by the order dated november 20, 2001. ( 2 ) THE respondent No. 4 was appointed as a Junior Executive and designated as senior administration Officer in the petitioner company with effect from January 1, 1984 on certain terms and conditions. At the time of offering employment to the said respondent no. 4, it was specifically mentioned by the petitioner company that three months notice on either side or payment of salary in lieu thereof shall be sufficient to terminate the employment. The specific clause regarding termination of service as mentioned by the Joint Managing director of the petitioner company in the offer letter dated December 24, 1983 addressed to the respondent workman is quoted hereunder: "termination of service: Three months' notice on either side or payment of salary in lieu thereof shall be sufficient to terminate the employment. " the workman concerned duly accepted the terms and conditions as mentioned in the aforesaid offer letter dated December 24, 1983 issued by the petitioner company. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner company, the workman by his letter dated June 1, 1980 tendered resignation from the services of the company with effect from January 1, 1990 although according to the respondent workman the petitioner company terminated his service with effect from June 25, 1990 without complying with the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. ( 4 ) IT has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner company that the workman concerned not only submitted his letter of resignation on June 1, 1990 but subsequently requested the management of the petitioner company by sending repeated reminders by letters dated June 8, 1990, June 9, 1990 and june 21, 1990 for acceptance of his resignation and also for payment of his legal dues before august 30, 1990. The petitioner company thereafter accepted the letter of resignation and tendered necessary payment of the legal dues to the concerned workman, namely, the respondent No. 4 herein and the respondent workman granted receipt after receiving all his legal dues. The petitioner company thereafter accepted the letter of resignation and tendered necessary payment of the legal dues to the concerned workman, namely, the respondent No. 4 herein and the respondent workman granted receipt after receiving all his legal dues. ( 5 ) THE respondent workman, however, raised a dispute alleging that the petitioner company has wrongfully terminated his service without complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Ultimately the Labour Department, government of West Bengal by order dated january 18, 1992 referred the dispute to the seventh Industrial Tribunal for adjudicating the following issue: "whether termination of service of Shri g. C. Guha is justified? To what relief, if any, is he entitled. " the Seventh Industrial Tribunal adjudicated the dispute and passed the award in favour of the company with an observation that 'it is a simple case of resignation and not at all a case of retrenchment'. ( 6 ) THE workman challenged the said award and this Hon'ble Court by order dated october 30, 2000 set aside the said award. The company filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order dated October 30, 2000 which was also dismissed on May 9, 2001. The company filed an application before the tribunal challenging the maintainability of the order of reference. The Tribunal by order dated may 30, 2001 rejected the said application of the company. ( 7 ) THE petitioner company challenging the said order dated May 30, 2001 moved a writ petition and this Hon'ble Court by the judgment and order dated July 24, 2001 finally decided and disposed of the said writ petition with the following observations: "in Workman of Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Management of Hindustan Lever Ltd. , 1984 lab. I. C. 276 (SC), the Apex Court had held that ordinarily the Tribunal, after ascertaining on what issue the parties are at variance, raises issue to focus attention on points in dispute. In industrial adjudication issues are of two types: (i) those referred to by the Government for adjudication and set out in the order of reference, and (ii)incidental issues which are sometimes the issues of law or mixed issues of law and fact. In industrial adjudication issues are of two types: (i) those referred to by the Government for adjudication and set out in the order of reference, and (ii)incidental issues which are sometimes the issues of law or mixed issues of law and fact. The Tribunal may as well frame preliminary issue if the point on which the parties are at variance, as reflected in the preliminary issues as the same would go to the root of the matter. However, it appears that the Tribunal was directed to decide the reference strictly in terms of the issues framed. Section 10 (4) of the said Act empowers the Tribunal to decide the reference in relation to incidental matters. From the decision cited by Mr. Panja it appears that incidental questions can be gone into by the Tribunal. A plain reading of the operative part of the said order though confines the jurisdiction of the tribunal strictly within the terms of the reference but it was never intended to mean that the Tribunal will not be entitled to go into the question incidental to the terms of the Reference than strictly and strictly within the terms of the reference. Thus, the order rejecting the prayer with regard to the question of maintainability of the reference cannot be thrown away straightaway. Therefore,. the said impugned order is set aside. The Tribunal shall also go into the question as to whether the reference is bad or is an incidental issue, within the scope and ambit of the order dated October 30, 2000 passed in CO. No. 19267 (W) of 1996. However, while deciding the issues and questions, the Tribunal shall bear in its mind the scope and ambit of the decision to be given in the reference within the meaning of the ultimate order passe4 in C. O. No. 19267 (W) of 1996 on October 30, 2000 having regard to the decision in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. (supra) and Workmen of Hindusthan Lever Ltd. (supra) and the observation made above. It may also have regard to the question as to whether such an issue could be raised at this stage of the proceedings in the facts and circumstances of the case. (supra) and Workmen of Hindusthan Lever Ltd. (supra) and the observation made above. It may also have regard to the question as to whether such an issue could be raised at this stage of the proceedings in the facts and circumstances of the case. " ( 8 ) THE learned Judge of the Seventh industrial Tribunal thereafter passed the award on October 8, 2001 and held that termination of service of the workman concerned amounts to retrenchment and in view of non-compliance of the provision of Section 25-F of the I. D. Act the said termination was declared invalid and unjustified. ( 9 ) MR. Sumit Panja, learned advocate of the petitioners herein submitted that the aforesaid award is bad and liable to be set aside as the learned Judge of the Tribunal failed to take into account the specific directions passed earlier by this Court by the order dated July 24, 2001. Referring to the said order dated July 24, 2001 passed earlier by this Court, Mr. Panja submitted that the question as to whether the reference is bad or not is a question incidental to the reference. ( 10 ) MR. Panja further submitted that in the said order dated July 24, 2001 this Hon'ble court has also specifically observed that the order rejecting the prayer with regard to the question of maintainability to the reference cannot be thrown away straightway. According to Mr. Panja, the learned Tribunal did not consider the aforesaid specific observations and directions of this Hon'ble Court and passed the impugned award in clear violation of the specific directions of this Hon'ble Court. ( 11 ) ADMITTEDLY, the earlier award passed by the learned Seventh Industrial Tribunal was challenged by the employee concerned before this Hon'ble Court by a writ petition which was numbered as C. O. No. 19267 (W) of 1996. While deciding the said writ petition finally on october 30, 2000, BHASKAR BHATTACHARJEE, j. , held as under: "in view of the dispute referred to the tribunal, it has jurisdiction to enquire into the question whether this was a case of resignation or not. All that the Tribunal was required to consider was (sic) whether the termination was legal, valid and whether the employee was entitled to any relief, if it is held to be illegal. All that the Tribunal was required to consider was (sic) whether the termination was legal, valid and whether the employee was entitled to any relief, if it is held to be illegal. I thus set aside the award impugned and remand the matter back to the tribunal for answering the dispute that has been referred to it strictly in terms of reference. The Tribunal cannot proceed as it is a case of resignation. The Tribunal will decide the aforesaid issues on the basis of materials on record. " ( 12 ) MR. Panja submitted that the aforesaid judgment of BHATTACHARJEE, J. is to be read with the subsequent judgment of Justice D. K. SETH passed on July 24, 2001 while deciding the writ petition of the petitioners herein being w. P. No. 1301 of 2001. The learned counsel of the workman, however, submitted that D. K. SETH, J. , while deciding the subsequent writ petition being W. P. No. 1301 of 2001 did not disagree with the earlier decision of bhattacharjee, J, in any manner whatsoever and referring to the various observations of d-K. SETH, J. , as mentioned in the judgment and order dated July 24, 2001, learned counsel of the workman submitted that in view of specific order passed by BHATTACHARJEE, J. , the learned Judge of the Tribunal had no scope and/or authority and/or jurisdiction to enquire into and/or determine the question whether the workman had tendered resignation or not. According to the learned counsel of the workman, Tribunal was only required to consider whether the termination was illegal, valid and whether the employee was entitled to any relief if the same is held to be illegal. ( 13 ) MR. Panja specifically urged before this Court that the workman concerned was never retrenched by the petitioner company and the said workman tendered his resignation from the service, and accepted all his legal dues from the company. According to the learned counsel of the petitioners, it is a simple case of resignation and not termination as the employer never issued any order terminating the services of the workman. The learned counsel of the petitioners questioned the validity of the order of reference made by the Government of West bengal on the ground that the issue was not properly framed for necessary adjudication by the Tribunal. The learned counsel of the petitioners questioned the validity of the order of reference made by the Government of West bengal on the ground that the issue was not properly framed for necessary adjudication by the Tribunal. ( 14 ) BY the order of reference the learned judge of the Seventh Industrial Tribunal was required to determine whether the termination of service of the workman concerned is justified although according to the learned counsel of the petitioner company the workman concerned was never terminated by the employer and the said workman tendered his resignation and accepted all legal dues. ( 15 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel of the petitioners herein, the real issue required to be decided by the Tribunal was whether the workman tendered his resignation from service or the employer terminated him from the service. The learned counsel of the petitioners submitted that instead of referring the real issue for adjudication by the Tribunal the respondent authorities of the State of West Bengal committed serious error. ( 16 ) MR. Panja, learned counsel of the petitioners further contended that the concerned officer of the Government of West bengal while making the reference before the learned Tribunal failed to refer the real issue and the Tribunal had therefore, no scope to decide the real issue involved in the matter of dispute between the parties. The learned tribunal was never asked to determine whether the workman concerned tendered resignation or not although in the facts of the present case according to the learned counsel of the petitioners, the real controversies between the parties are centering around the determination of the said issue. ( 17 ) MR. Panja specifically urged before this Court that the order of reference was itself insufficient and/or bad as the same did not contain the real issue to be decided by the learned Tribunal. Mr. Panja referring to the judgment dated July 24, 2001 passed by Justice d. K. SETH submitted that the learned Judge of the Tribunal should have decided the question as to whether the Reference is bad or not before proceeding with the issue referred before the said Tribunal under the said reference. Mr. Panja referring to the judgment dated July 24, 2001 passed by Justice d. K. SETH submitted that the learned Judge of the Tribunal should have decided the question as to whether the Reference is bad or not before proceeding with the issue referred before the said Tribunal under the said reference. ( 18 ) THE learned counsel of the workman opposed the aforesaid contentions of the petitioners and submitted that when a reference is made under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, the Tribunal cannot widen the scope of enquiry beyond the issue referred for adjudication and the parties cannot be allowed to challenge the very basis of the issue set forth in the order of reference. The learned counsel of the respondent workman cited following decisions in support of his contentions (1) Delhi Cloth and General Mills company Ltd. v. Their Workmen, reported in air 1967 SC 469 : 1967-I- LLJ-423 and (2)sabitri Motor Service Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West bengal, reported in 1976 (33) FLR 14. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel of the respondents also referred to the earlier judgments of this Court passed by BHASKAR bhattacharjee, J. in C. O. No. 19267 (W) of 1996 and D. K. SETH, J. , in W. P. No. 1301 of 2001 and submitted that at this stage employer cannot be permitted to raise any question contending that the workman concerned had tendered resignation in view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court. Although the learned counsel of the petitioner has submitted that the workman concerned was estopped from raising any industrial dispute after receiving entire payment in full and final settlement of his all legal dues but the said objection in my opinion is devoid of any merit as the law of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence does not apply in industrial adjudication. ( 20 ) REFERRING to the following decisions of the Supreme Court and also of this Court, learned counsel of the workman submitted that accepting money, in any form or on any account does not debar the workmen to raise industrial dispute against the wrongful action of the management. ( 20 ) REFERRING to the following decisions of the Supreme Court and also of this Court, learned counsel of the workman submitted that accepting money, in any form or on any account does not debar the workmen to raise industrial dispute against the wrongful action of the management. The following decisions have been cited by the learned counsel of the workman in support of the contention: 1) Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. Subong Tea Employees Union, reported in AIR 1967 SC 420 : 1964-I-LLJ-833; 2) Auiquipo of India Ltd. v. State of West bengal and Ors. , reported in 1993 (1) CHN 266; 3) Narsing Pal v. Union of India, reported in 2000 Lab. LC. 1377. ( 21 ) IN my view, the learned counsel of the workman has rightly contended that even after accepting any money towards the legal dues the workman concerned is not prevented from raising any industrial dispute as has been done in the instant case although as a matter of fact the workman concerned has specifically denied that he had received all dues in full and final settlement by his subsequent written communication dated July 2, 1990 which is annexure P-7 to the writ petition. ( 22 ) IT is true that the Tribunal cannot travel beyond the order of reference but if a question is raised before the High Court that the real dispute has not been referred by the appropriate government to the Tribunal then the High court should examine the merit of the said question, and if necessary, the order of reference can be interfered with by the High court specially when the Labour Court cannot travel beyond the terms of reference except for ancillary matters. The Full Bench of Delhi high Court in the case of Indian Tourism development Corporation v. Delhi administration held as hereunder: "32. . . . . . . . . . . . . Making of an order of reference is undoubtedly an administrative function, but even that is amenable to judicial review in the proceedings under article 226 under certain facts and circumstances. An order of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government has not applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration. . . . . . . An order of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that the appropriate Government has not applied its mind to the material before it or has not taken into consideration certain vital facts which it ought to have taken into consideration. . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 23 ) UNDER the present terms of reference learned Tribunal cannot decide the issue whether the Workman had tendered resignation or was terminated from service by the employer. But in order to resolve the real controversy between the parties on the aforesaid issue, this Writ Court could have interfered with the order of reference so that the real controversy could be referred before the competent Labour Court or Tribunal for necessary adjudication. ( 24 ) UNFORTUNATELY, in the present writ petition the petitioners have not challenged the validity of the order of reference dated January 18, 1992. Although it has been seriously argued by the learned counsel of the petitioners that the real controversy has not been referred before the learned Tribunal for adjudication by the government of West Bengal but from paragraph 33 of the writ petition it would appear that the petitioners did not question the validity of the order of reference dated January 18, 1992 in the present writ petition. The relevant portion from paragraph 33 of the writ petition is quoted hereunder: "33. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the purported award dated October 8, 2001 of the learned Seventh Industrial tribunal, the respondent No. 3 and also with the impugned publication of the award vide order dated November 20, 2001 by the respondent No. 2 herein, your petitioners beg to move this Hon'ble Court ( 25 ) IT is settled law that the Industrial tribunal or Labour Court cannot go beyond the terms of reference and can exercise its jurisdiction and power within the limited area covered by the terms of reference. In the present case, the learned Tribunal has decided the issues referred by the appropriate government for adjudication on the basis of the materials on record and did not travel beyond the terms of reference. In the present case, the learned Tribunal has decided the issues referred by the appropriate government for adjudication on the basis of the materials on record and did not travel beyond the terms of reference. ( 26 ) ACCORDINGLY, I do not find any illegality and/or irregularity in the impugned award passed on October 8, 2001 by the learned judge, Seventh Industrial Tribunal and as such i am of the firm opinion that the aforesaid award does not call for any interference by this hon'ble Court. ( 27 ) FOR the aforementioned reasons, the present writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. ( 28 ) THERE will be, however, no order as to costs. ( 29 ) THE parties are directed to act on the basis of the operative portion of the signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking.