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2003 DIGILAW 1044 (JHR)

Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Union Of India

2003-08-25

GURUSHARAN SHARMA, LAKSHMAN URAON

body2003
ORDER 1. This appeal has been preferred by M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited (hereinafter referred to as the BCCL) against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 18.7.2002, passed in CWJC No. 2775 of 2000(R), whereby Reference No. 32 of 1998 dated 30.6.1998, made by the Central Government was not interfered with. 2. It is not in dispute that some time in the year 1973 certain lands belonging to private persons were acquired by M/s. BCCL on payment of consideration amount. Subsequently in the year 1978 a circular was issued, whereby those persons, whose 2 acres agricultural land or 3 acres non- agricultural lands were acquired by M/s, BCCL, were entitled to get employment of one person by way of compensation, besides the consideration amount. 3. Jharkhand Colliery Sharmik Union, a trade Union registered under the Act, in the year 1996, raised an Industrial dispute on behalf of those land-owners, whose lands were acquired by M/s. BCCL in the year 1973 and the Central Government being the appropriate Government, referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad, under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). "Whether the demand of the Union for the employment of land losers as per the enclosed annexure by the management of M/s BCCL is justified ? If so, to what relief are these persons entitled ? 4. M/s. BCCL challenged the said reference in this Court, vide CWJC No. 2775 of 2000(R), raising the questions whether the land owner concerned can be said to be workman, within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and the dispute as referred can be termed as a dispute as contemplated under Section 2(k) of the Act. Besides this, at any rate the reference was a stale one. 5. It is not in dispute that the Jharkhand Colliery Shramik Union is a trade union, duly registered under the Act and the persons on whose behalf the Union raised such dispute for reference were neither the employees of M/s. BCCL nor were claiming their employment through the workman thereof, in terms of the National Coal Wage Agreements or under any Rule or circular. 6. 6. The claim raised on behalf of the land owners, whose lands were acquired are loosely called Land losers are private individuals and, therefore, the two questions raised against the reference as to whether an Industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act relating to their claim of employment could have been referred to under Section 10 of the Act and that too at the instance of a trade union at such a belated stage. 7. In this regard, it is relevant to quote Section 2(k) of the Act. "Industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. 8. The definition of the word Industrial Dispute indicates a dispute connected with non-employment between the employers and the workman as also of any person. Now the question is whether a dispute in relation to a person who is seeking employment neither through a workman nor in terms of any circular or order applicable in his case can be treated within the expression of any person occurring in third part of the definition clause. 9. This question was considered by the Apex Court in Workman of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353 , wherein it was observed that definition under Section 2(k) did not contain any word of qualification or restriction in respect of expression any person occurring in third part and if any limitation as to its scope are to be imposed they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the definition clause itself or other provisions of the Act. The expression any person, therefore, cannot mean anybody and everybody in the wide world. Secondly, the definition has to be read in context of the subject matter of the scheme of the Act and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. The expression any person cannot be given its ordinary meaning so as to make it so wide as to become inconsistent not merely with the objects and other provisions of the Act, but also to the other parts of that very clause. There must be possible community of interest between a person or persons on the one hand and the employer on the other. There must be possible community of interest between a person or persons on the one hand and the employer on the other. The Apex Court, therefore, held that "To summarize: Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and in other provisions, the expression any person in Section 2(k) of the Act, must be read subject to such limitations and qualification as arise from the contest; the two crucial limitations are (i) the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute (as indicated in the first two part of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other, and (ii) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such interest the dispute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties. Where the workmen raised a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised, need not be, strictly speaking, a workman within the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest. 10. Applying the ratio of the said decision of the Apex Court in the present case, we find that those land owners, who have been described as land losers in the reference in question do not come under the expression any expression in Section 2(k). 11. Secondly, those land-owners had also not raised such dispute themselves, rather their cause was being advanced by the trade union, when admittedly they were not the workmen within the meaning of the Act and probably were not entitled to be the members of such union too. 12. It is well settled that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, when there is allegation that either there was no Industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) and non-apprehended which could be subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, under Section 10 of the Act. 12. It is well settled that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition, when there is allegation that either there was no Industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) and non-apprehended which could be subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, under Section 10 of the Act. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended, the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference. 13. In National Engineering Industries Limited v. State of Rajasthan 2000(1)SCC 371, the Apex Court held that it was incorrect to say that once the reference was made under Section 10 of the Act, the Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court under the writ jurisdiction cannot interfere with the proceedings. 14. Following the aforesaid decision in Nedugadi Bank Limited v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 839 , the Apex Court held that an administrative order, which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside is certainly subject to judicial review, limited through it might be, High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to consider the question of very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. 15. The third objection raised on behalf of the appellant to the reference impugned is that it was a stale dispute and no industrial dispute existed in the year 1994, even at the instance of those land owners and, therefore, such dispute would not have been the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. 16. It is not in dispute that the lands were acquired some time in the year 1973 and the dispute was raised in the year 1996 and that too by the aforesaid trade union on behalf of the land owners. 17. Therefore, in our view, not only no industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act on behalf of those land-owners could have been called as industrial dispute and no such dispute existed in the year 1996, hence, such a stale dispute could not have been the subject matter of the reference, under Section 10 of the Act. 18. 18. We, therefore, allow this Appeal and set aside the impugned order making reference dated 30.6.1998 (Reference No. 30, of 1998) by the Central Government as contained in Annexure 4 as also the order dated 18.7.2002, passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 2775 of 2000(R). No costs.