S. R. NAYAK, J. ( 1 ) THE management of the Cauvery Grameena Bank feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 8-3-1999 in W. P. No. 14167 of 1992 has preferred this writ appeal. ( 2 ) LEARNED Single Judge by the order under appeal has directed the management to pay the "salary and consequential benefits" as earlier directed in the writ petition within 2 weeks from the date of the order. This case has had a chequered career and there is no need for us to deal with the entire past history. Suffice it to state that the respondent herein was imposed with penalty of reprimand in terms of the Cauvery grameena Bank Staff Regulations, 1980 (for short, 'regulations' ). A simple question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether the charged officer (for short the 'c. O. ') is entitled to pay and allowances for the period during which he was kept under suspension pending departmental enquiry. This question need not detain the Court for long. ( 3 ) AT the outset, it will be beneficial to notice the provisions of Regulation 30 of 1980 which reads as under. "30 (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of other regulations, an officer or employee who commits a breach of these regulations or who displays negligence, inefficiency of indolence, or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interests of the Bank in conflict with its instructions or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other act of misconduct, shall be liable to the following penalties: la) Reprimand; (b) Delay or stoppage of increments or promotion; (c) Degradation to a lower post or grade or to a lower stage in his/her incremental scale; (d) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Bank by the officer or employee: (e) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; (f) Dismissal. 30 (2) No officer or employee shall be subject to the penalties referred to in clause (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of sub-regulation (1) except by an order in writing signed by the Chairman and no such order shall be passed without the charge being formulated in writing and given to the said officer or employee so that he/she shall have reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or in person, as he/she prefers and in the latter case his/her defence shall be taken down in writing and read to him/her; provided that the requirements of this sub-regulation may be waived, if the facts on the basis of which action is to be taken have been established in a Court of law or court-martial, or where the officer or employee has absconded or where it is for any other reason impracticable to communicate with him/her or where there is difficulty in observing them and the requirements can be waived without injustice to him/her. In every case where all or any of the requirements of this sub-regulation are waived, the reasons for so doing shall be recorded in writing. 30 (3) The enquiry under this regulation and the procedure with the exception of the final order may be delegated in case the persons against who proceedings are taken is any of who is senior to such officer and in the case of an employees to any officer. For purposes of the inquiry, the officer or employee may not engage a legal practitioner. 30 (4) An officer or employee may be placed under suspension by the officer empowered to pass the final order under the regulation. During such suspension, the officer or employee shall receive subsistence allowance equal to one-third of basic pay the officer or employee was receiving on the date prior to the date of suspension, plus dearness allowance and other allowance excluding conveyance allowance, entertainment allowance and special allowance calculated on the reduced pay for the first three months of suspension. During such suspension, the officer or employee shall receive subsistence allowance equal to one-third of basic pay the officer or employee was receiving on the date prior to the date of suspension, plus dearness allowance and other allowance excluding conveyance allowance, entertainment allowance and special allowance calculated on the reduced pay for the first three months of suspension. For the subsequent period after three months he/she shall be entitled to draw half of the basic pay plus the dearness allowance and other allowances specified above calculated on the reduced pay provided that if no penalty under clause (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of sub-regulation (1) is imposed, the officer or employee shall be refunded the difference between the subsistence allowance and the emoluments which he/she would have received but for which suspension, for the period be/she was under suspension and that, if a penalty is imposed on him/her under all or any of the said clauses, no order shall be passed which shall have the effect of compelling him/her to refund such subsistence allowance. The period during which an officer or employee is under suspension shall, if he/she is not dismissed from the service, be treated as period spent on duty, leave or period not spent on duty as the officer who passes the final order may direct". ( 4 ) PENALTY of reprimand is a penalty specified in clause (a) of sub- remulation (1 ). The proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 30 in an unmistakable term indicates that in the case of imposition of clause (a) penalty, the charged officer shall be entitled to the difference between the subsistence allowance and the emoluments which he/she would have received but for such suspension, for the period he/she was under suspension. In that view of the matter, it is trite that the C. O. could not be denied the benefits flowing from the proviso to sub-regulation (4) of regulation 30. That is what exactly the learned Single Judge has done in this case in substantive terms by passing the order impugned in this appeal. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, Sri Ramesh, learned Standing Counsel for the management put forth two contentions to deny the benefit of the proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 30. They are. That is what exactly the learned Single Judge has done in this case in substantive terms by passing the order impugned in this appeal. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, Sri Ramesh, learned Standing Counsel for the management put forth two contentions to deny the benefit of the proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 30. They are. (I) 1980 Regulations have no application to the facts of this case because, the Disciplinary Authority imposed "penalty of reprimand" after 1980 Regulations were repealed and a new set of regulations called Cauvery Grameena Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2000 were framed and brought into force with effect from 15-4-2002 and therefore, the penalty imposed on the C. O. would be governed by the provisions of 2000 Regulations and not 1980 Regulations; (II) that though the penalty of reprimand was imposed on the C. O. , as could be seen from the order of the disciplinary Authority, the Disciplinary Authority strongly felt that having regard to the gravity of misconduct committed by the C. O. , the proper punishment would have been dismissal or removal from service but, however, showing lenience and compassion, the Disciplinary authority imposed lesser penalty of reprimand and in that view of the matter, the opinion formed by the Disciplinary Authority that in ordinary course, the appropriate penalty would have been dismissal or removal from service should not be eschewed by this Court in decision making and if that factor is also taken into account, it could not be said that the C. O. is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 30. ( 6 ) WE find no merit in any of the above contentions of Sri Ramesh. Admittedly, the C. O. committed the misconduct even according to the management at a time when 1980 Regulations were holding the field. The substantive rights and obligations flowing from 1980 Regulations whether in favour of the management or in favour of the employees could not be altered by applying the new regulations. It is a well-settled principle of law that in the domain of disciplinary proceedings and misconduct, the rules prevailing on the date of commission of misconduct should govern and not subsequent regulations that may be brought into force. It is a well-settled principle of law that in the domain of disciplinary proceedings and misconduct, the rules prevailing on the date of commission of misconduct should govern and not subsequent regulations that may be brought into force. If that is so, since the C. O. has been imposed penalty of reprimand, a penalty specified in clause (a.) of Regulation 30 (1) of 1980 Regulations, it goes without saying that, he will be entitled to the benefit of proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 30. Be that as it may, in the new regulations of 2000 also, we do not find any provision by force of which the benefit accrued to the C. O, under the proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 30 could be denied. In addition, even the management itself in its circular issued to all the officers of the Bank dated 5-12-2002 rightly directed that 2000 Regulations would come into force only prospectively and they have 110 retrospective application. ( 7 ) WE do not find any merit in the second contention of Sri Ramesh also. Simply because, the Disciplinary Authority in the order has made an observation that in the normal course, the C. O. would have been dismissed or removed from service as a disciplinary measure, only on that basis, it is impermissible for the Court to ignore the actual penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and to deny the benefit of the proviso to sub-regulation (4) of Regulation 30 to the delinquent employee. The management in its wisdom and discretion and having noticed perceptible change in the conduct of the C. O. , imposed the penalty of reprimand and therefore, it should not lie in the mouth of the management to contend before the Court that the C. O, was actually liable to be punished with more severe punishment like dismissal or removal from service and not reprimand. ( 8 ) IN the result, we do not find any substantive ground to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the learned Single Judge and the writ appeal is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. ( 8 ) IN the result, we do not find any substantive ground to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the learned Single Judge and the writ appeal is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. The benefits flowing from the order of the learned single Judge, if not already paid to the C. O. , the appellant/management is directed to comply with the directions of the learned Single Judge within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. --- *** --- .