Judgment ( 1. ) TENANT, who is the non-applicant in the Court below has come up in revision under Section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act against the final order of eviction, dated 10-6-1999, passed by learned Rent Controlling Authority, Indore, in Case No. A-90 (7)/4/98. Facts of the case in short are these. ( 2. ) PETITIONER is a tenant of the suit accommodation of which the respondent is a landlady. The respondent being a widow falls within the specified category of the landlord as defined under Section 23-J of the Act and thereby entitled to seek protection of Section 23-D of the Act so far as existence of her bonafide need is concerned. In other words, the respondent being a landlord within the meaning of Section 23-J ibid has a statutory right to ask this Court to draw a presumption in her favour that the need that she has pleaded for seeking a decree of eviction is bonafide and genuine. ( 3. ) THE respondent (landlady) filed an application under Section 23-A of the Act claiming eviction of the petitioner (non-applicant/tenant) on the ground that she (respondent) requires the suit accommodation for starting a restaurant/eating house. It was alleged that her major son who is presently serving in one private store would manage the entire show alongwith the respondent. She also said that loan for this purpose will also be availed of. She alleged that she has no other reasonably alternative accommodation available in city where the intended business for her survival as also for setting of the family can be accomplished. The defence of the petitioner/tenant was that of denial. According to non-applicant, he (N. A No. 2) was not the tenant but his father Bhagchand was the tenant and hence, in the absence of any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the application must fail. It was also contended that the application made on behalf of the applicant is not maintainable but one Shiv Ram being one of the co-owner, he has to be made party to the application. It was also contended that applicants son is already engaged in the business of sale of certain items and hence, the alleged need is not genuine. It was also contended that applicant has several shops available where she can undertake the so called business. It was also contended that applicants son is already engaged in the business of sale of certain items and hence, the alleged need is not genuine. It was also contended that applicant has several shops available where she can undertake the so called business. Lastly, it was contended that applicant is interested in increase of rent rather than the eviction. Parties led evidence. Eventually, by impugned order, the Rent Controlling Authority allowed the application and held that need set up by the landlady is bonafide and genuine and since she has no other reasonably suitable suit accommodation of her own in city and hence, decree for eviction is passed. It is this order, which is impugned in this revision. ( 4. ) HEARD Shri M. Dalai, learned Counsel for the petitioners and shri R. S. Yadav, learned Counsel for respondent. ( 5. ) HAVING heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused record of the case, I find no merit in the revision. ( 6. ) IN my considered view, none of the objections taken by the petitioner (tenant) before the Rent Controlling Authority has any substance. Indeed, the question of need being held in landladys favour on the strength of Section 23-D of the Act and also on the strength of facts pleaded and proved by evidence can not be faulted with. The landlady has a son. She being a widow has to maintain her family as also ensure that her son settles in his own way in his life. There is nothing wrong or unnatural in the need of opening a restaurant in the suit shop. It is a business which a family can always carry on with the aid of family members and servants. I, thus, concur with this finding which goes in plaintiffs favour. Indeed, while concurring with the finding of bonafide need, I can do no better except to quote the subtle observations of the learned Judge R. C. Lahoti, J. when speaking for the Bench in the case of siddalingamma Vs. I, thus, concur with this finding which goes in plaintiffs favour. Indeed, while concurring with the finding of bonafide need, I can do no better except to quote the subtle observations of the learned Judge R. C. Lahoti, J. when speaking for the Bench in the case of siddalingamma Vs. Mamtha Shenoy, reported in (2001) 8 Supreme Court cases 561, learned Judge made observations while examining the question of bonafide need of the landlord under the Rent Laws as follows :- "rent control legislation generally leans in favour of the tenant; it is only the provision for seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlord for his own occupation or use of the tenanted accommodation which treats the landlord with some sympathy. The question to be asked by a judge of facts, by placing himself in the place of the landlord, is, whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive the need is bonafide. The concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself and dwell in lesser premises so as to protect the tenants continued occupation in tenancy premises. " The aforesaid observations must always be kept under consideration while judging the bonafide requirement of a landlord under the Rent Laws which if applied to the facts of the case, it uphold the bonafide need of the plaintiff. ( 7. ) COMING to the question of relationship of landlord and tenant, no fault can be found even on this issue. The petitioner never disputed that he is not the tenant of the suit accommodation. They admitted the tenancy what they said was that they are not the tenant but their father was the tenant. This was not accepted and in my view rightly. The petitioner never disputed that he is not the tenant of the suit accommodation. They admitted the tenancy what they said was that they are not the tenant but their father was the tenant. This was not accepted and in my view rightly. The petitioner No. 1 being a business concern of petitioner No. 2 and his father, it was rightly held to be a tenant of respondent so as to attract the provisions of Section 23-A of the Act for passing a decree for eviction. Similarly, there was no evidence much less satisfactory one to hold that landlady was possessed of any alternative and suitable accommodation of her own in city. ( 8. ) UNDER these circumstances, I find no merit in this revision, which fails and is dismissed. However, taking into account all facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that defendant/petitioner has been in possession, I grant petitioner/defendant three months time to vacate the suit accommodation from the date of this judgment, provided petitioner/tenant deposit entire arrears of rent together with the cost, if awarded within two weeks from the date of this judgment. The petitioner/tenant shall also deposit three months rent in advance by way of damages for use and occupation within fifteen days and shall further submit an undertaking before the Executing Court duly supported by an affidavit that he shall vacate the suit accommodation on the expiry of three months from the date of this judgment. In case, if petitioner/tenant complies with these conditions, the respondent/plaintiff will not execute the decree upto three months. Failure to comply, will entitles the respondent / plaintiff to execute the decree. No costs. C. C. within a week. Civil Revision dismissed.