Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 1055 (PNJ)

Prem Properties (P) Ltd. , Through Director, Shri Satish Gehlot v. Randhir Singh

2003-07-31

M.M.KUMAR

body2003
Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, the Code) challenges order dated 10.10.2000 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon allowing the appeal of the plaintiff-respondents and its application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code holding that the defendant-petitioner was liable to be restrained from interfering in peaceful possession of the plaintiff-respondents. 2. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff-respondents filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction alleging that they have executed a power of attorney dated 10.10.1995 in favour of the defendant-petitioner which was cancelled on 21.7.1997. It is further alleged that the defendant-petitioner has forged a lease deed dated 17.6.1997 with regard to the suit land after obtaining signature of the plaintiff-respondents on some blank papers. A declaration has been sought that the aforementioned lease deed is null and void and that the plaintiff-respondents are owners in possession of the suit land. An application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code was also filed with the pleadings that plaintiff-respondent 1 had entered into an agreement dated 8.9.1995 to sell the land measuring 10 kanals 4 marlas for a total consideration of Rs. 8,27,396/-and earnest amount of Rs. 5,27,396/- had already been paid through cheques. It is further alleged that plaintiff-respondents 2 and 3 had also executed agreement to sell the land for a sale consideration of Rs. 8,27,395/- each and they have also received the entire consideration amount by cheques and the possession was delivered to the defendant-petitioner. The defendant-petitioner also took the stand that plaintiff-respondent had already sold 10 marias of land vide sale deed dated 24.1.1989 to one Prabhu Pritam Dass and, therefore, they have committed a criminal offence. The agreement to sell and general power of attorney dated 8.9.1995 and 10.10.1995 were irrevocable and could not be cancelled. The application was dismissed by the trial Court by observing that the signatures of the executant on the agreement were admitted and the dispute was whether the signatures were obtained on blank papers or the executant had actually executed the documents. The trial Court concluded that once the signatures have not been denied the version of the plaintiff-respondents that the signatures were obtained on blank papers is a matter of evidence and, therefore, the application was dismissed. 3. The trial Court concluded that once the signatures have not been denied the version of the plaintiff-respondents that the signatures were obtained on blank papers is a matter of evidence and, therefore, the application was dismissed. 3. The learned Appellate Court accepted the appeal and held that the execution of the lease deed dated 17.6.1997 itself has been rendered doubtful and both the parties have been levelling allegations of dishonesty against each other. The view of the learned Additional District Judge reads as under:- "After giving my considerable thoughts to the submissions made by learned counsel for both the parties and going through the trial court file, it can safely be said that some transaction qua the suit land took place between the parties to the suit. The plaintiffs might have entered into an agreement to sell by reposing confidence in the defendant and the defendant might have sold some land on their behalf. However, now the stand of the plaintiff-appellants is that defendant-company became dishonest and did not render true accounts of the sale consideration of the land sold by it on their behalf, whereas the stand of the defendant-company is that the plaintiffs became dishonest and concealed various true facts from the court. Admittedly, there is no registered sale deed in favour of the defendant-company till date. Learned counsel for the defendant-company has admitted clerical mistake of 4 kanals in the lease deed. Hence, I am of the considered view that the execution of the lease deed itself creates suspicion about its genuineness. It is well settled law that entering into of an agreement to sell does not confer any title on the vendee. However, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff-appellants have a prima facie case and balance of convenience in their favour. Lease deed has been disputed by the plaintiff-appellants on the ground that the same is the result of fraud and misrepresentation. Hence, at this stage, no benefit, whatsoever, can be given to the defendant-company of the said lease deed because the questions of law and facts are involved. Lease deed has been disputed by the plaintiff-appellants on the ground that the same is the result of fraud and misrepresentation. Hence, at this stage, no benefit, whatsoever, can be given to the defendant-company of the said lease deed because the questions of law and facts are involved. xx xx xx xx Consequently, the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC moved by the plaintiffs before the trial court, is accepted and the defendant-company is hereby restrained from interfering into the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land till disposal of the suit. Defendant-company is also hereby restrained to execute any lease deed on the basis of the impugned lease deed allegedly executed by the plaintiff, till disposal of the suit. However, for the sake of clarity, it is observed that the sale deeds already executed by the defendant-company on the basis of the registered power of attorney allegedly executed by the plaintiff-appellants, shall be deemed as valid for all intents and purposes." 4. Mr. Sudhir Aggarwal, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner has argued that the trial Court has taken the correct view by taking into consideration the validity of all the documents, namely, power of attorney dated 10.10.1995 and its cancellation dated 21.7.1997, lease deed dated 17.6.1997 and agreement to sell dated 8.9.1995. According to the learned counsel, the defendant-petitioner has been given possession in pursuance to the lease deed dated 17.6.1997 and, therefore, no interim direction could have been issued by the learned lower Appellate Court. 5. Mr. C.B. Goel, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has submitted that a fraud has been played with the plaintiff-respondents inasmuch as the lease deed has recorded the lease of land measuring 34 kanals 18 marias whereas the plaintiff-respondents were owners in possession of land measuring 16 kanals 16 marlas. According to the leaned counsel, the aforementioned lease deed is fictitious and cheques etc. alleged to have been issued to the defendant-petitioner are also alleged to be fictitious. 6, After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the orders passed by both the Courts below, I am inclined to accept the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge that some transaction with regard to the suit land has taken place between the parties. alleged to have been issued to the defendant-petitioner are also alleged to be fictitious. 6, After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the orders passed by both the Courts below, I am inclined to accept the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge that some transaction with regard to the suit land has taken place between the parties. However, there was no registered sale deed in favour of the defendant-respondents and there are valid doubts about the genuineness of the lease deed on account of the fact that the land included in the lease deed was much more than owned and possessed by the plaintiff-respondents. It is also well settled that agreement to sell does not, as such, confer any right on the proposed vendor. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the direction exercised by the Additional District suffers from any legal infirmity. No interference is called for in the interim order issued nor it is the scope of revisional jurisdiction. The petition is without any merit and is, thus, liable to be dismissed. For the reasons aforementioned, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.