D. S. R. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THIS court initially dismissed the writ petition on 24-1-2003 following the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in m/s. Rayalaseema Roller Flour Mills v. A. P. S. E. B. , Hyderabad and also on the decision of the Apex Court in S. L. P. No. 13004/1989. ( 2 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, the learned counsel for the petitioner represented that this court while dismissing the writ petition did not take into consideration the law laid down by the apex Court with regard to situation that arose due to the earlier interim orders of this court. He stated this court granted interim directions in favour of the petitioner and by virtue of the said direction, the petitioner was extended the subsidy during the pendency of the writ petition and in view of the dismissal of the writ petition though the petitioner repaid the subsidy availed by him, the respondents are demanding to pay the surcharge on that amount, treating as if the petitioner has paid the amount belatedly. He stated that the stay been not granted, the petition would have paid the amount within the prescribed period and he would not have been penalized with surcharge. In support of his contention, he also relied on judgments of the Apex Court. ( 3 ) IN view of the above submission, the matter was directed to be posted under the caption for being mentioned and taken up for rehearing and disposal. Accordingly the matter is reheard and the order dated 24-1-2003 is hereby recalled. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri. C. Kodandaram counsel for the petitioner and Sri M. Vinoba Devi, standing Counsel for the respondents. ( 5 ) THIS writ petition is filed to declare the action of the respondents-A. P. State electricity Board (now formed as A. P. Transmission Corporation. Hence, herein after referred to as the Corporation ) in demanding additional charges for belated payment, amounting to Rs. 6,08,490. 00 from the petitioner, as illegal and arbitrary. ( 6 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the petitioner -unit is a Roller Flour Mill. The government in order to encourage the establishment of industries in the State, announced several incentives through g. O. Ms. No. 224 Industries and Commerce department dated 9-3-1976. Subsequently the Corporation adapted the said G. O. and issued B. P. Ms. No. 691 (Commercial) dated 10-8-1976. The government in order to encourage the establishment of industries in the State, announced several incentives through g. O. Ms. No. 224 Industries and Commerce department dated 9-3-1976. Subsequently the Corporation adapted the said G. O. and issued B. P. Ms. No. 691 (Commercial) dated 10-8-1976. As per these proceedings, the industries were entitled for 25 per cent rebate on consumption charges for a period of five years. But in the said G. O. , the government have excluded certain industries which do not need much investment. The flourmills are among those, which were excluded by the Government for extension of incentives. The respondent- corporation taking the view that roller flour mills also fall in the category of flour mills , denied the benefit under B. P. Ms. No. 691 to the petitioner-unit. Aggrieved by this denial, a batch of writ petitions were filed before this court. It is stated that this court while disposing of the said batch of writ petitions directed the Government to appoint a committee to decide whether roller flour mills are not entitled for the benefit under b. P. Ms. No. 691. It appears that accordingly a committee was constituted and it submitted its report. As per the report of the committee dated 6-8-1979, the roller flour mills are different from that of flour mill and accordingly the committee recommended for the extension of the benefit of 25 per cent rebate on electric consumption charges for the roller flour mills. However, the government refused to accept the recommendations of the committee. Thereupon W. P. No. 10337/1985 and batch were filed seeking a direction to Government and the Board to extend 25 per cent rebates as per the committee recommendations dated 6-8-1979. This court disposed of the said batch of writ petitions on 3-10-1988 and directed the Government to take a decision on the recommendations of the committee and further ordered that the concession which was extended by way of interim orders would continue till the Government takes a decision in this regard. On 7-6-1989, the government issued a memo clarifying that roller flour mills are not included in g. O. Ms. No. 224 for the purpose of extending 25 per cent rebate. Thereafter another batch of writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 3429/1989 and batch were filed contending that under b. P. Ms. No. 691 (Commercial) dt. 10-8-1976 read with G. O. Ms. No. 224 for the purpose of extending 25 per cent rebate. Thereafter another batch of writ petitions in W. P. Nos. 3429/1989 and batch were filed contending that under b. P. Ms. No. 691 (Commercial) dt. 10-8-1976 read with G. O. Ms. No. 224, roller flourmills are eligible for concessional subsidy. Even though interim stay was granted initially, ultimately the said batch was dismissed on 12-12-1996. Consequently upon the dismissal, the respondent Corporation issued letter No. SE (O)NLR/jao/ht/ d. No. 1014/1997 dt. 17-4-1997 demanding an amount of Rs. 3,22,269-88 ps. towards 25 per cent rebate amount and Rs. 6,08,419. 00 towards additional charges for belated payment. The petitioner made a representation on 5-5-1997 for waiving of additional charges. However, the respondent rejected the said representation on 25-5-1997. Challenging the said rejection, the present writ petition is filed. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel sri C. Kodandaram appearing for the petitioner submitted that the pursuant to the dismissal of the batch of writ petitions, the petitioner - unit repaid the 25 per cent rebate on consumption charges availed by it on 4-6-1997 and this fact is not in dispute. He submitted that the petitioner was extended the benefit by virtue of the orders of this court. He further submitted that this court while disposing of the writ petition directed the Government to constitute a committee and consider the case of the roller flourmills for the extension of the benefit under g. O. Ms. No. 224 and in the meanwhile directed the respondent-Corporation to extend the benefit till the decision is taken in that regard. ( 8 ) THE specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the petitioner was given the benefit by virtue of the interim orders of this Court and that till the dismissal of the writ petitions, as there was no occasion for the petitioner to repay the amount, the action of the respondent- corporation in demanding the petitioner to pay additional charges for the said interregnum period, is illegal and arbitrary. He further contended that had there been no interim directions, the petitioner would have paid the usual charges without claiming any rebate and in such a case there would not have been any delay. He further contended that had there been no interim directions, the petitioner would have paid the usual charges without claiming any rebate and in such a case there would not have been any delay. In other words, he submitted that even though the writ petition is dismissed, the parties shall be placed as they were at the time of entertaining the lis and the petitioner shall not be relegated to a defaulter. He stated that since the petitioner repaid the amount after the dismissal of the writ petition, the respondent-Corporation shall not be allowed to impose any surcharge or additional charge. In support of his contention, he relied on the judgments of the Apex Court reported in Kanoria chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U. P. State electricity Board and Kerala State Electricity board v. M. R. F. Limited. ( 9 ) ON the other hand Smt. Vinobha Devi standing Counsel for the respondent- corporation vehemently contended that the facts of the judgments of the Apex Court relied on by the counsel for the petitioner are different and hence the ratio laid down on those set of facts, cannot be made applicable to the present set of facts, which are totally and in fact they support the action of the respondent-Corporation in imposing surcharge. ( 10 ) IN order to appreciate the relative contentions, I will consider the judgments relied on by counsel for the petitioner. Firstly i will consider the facts in M. R. F. s case. The facts of the said case reveal that the revision of the tariff for the electricity charges effected by the Board, was challenged before the kerala High Court and the said revised tariffs were set aside by the Single judge and the same was confirmed by the division Bench and in the appeal, the Apex court reversed the judgment of the High court. The Apex Court did not grant any interim order during the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court. Consequently the Kerala State Electricity Board issued bills o revised tariff to the consumers from the date of revision and not from the date of order of the Apex Court in their favour. Further the Board also imposed interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the date of revision till the date of payment. Consequently the Kerala State Electricity Board issued bills o revised tariff to the consumers from the date of revision and not from the date of order of the Apex Court in their favour. Further the Board also imposed interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the date of revision till the date of payment. When the same was challenged, High Court of Kerala allowed the writ petitions and the again Division Bench confirmed the order of single Judge. In appeal by the Board, the apex Court once again reversed the judgment of the Kerala High Court. But however held that relief in appeal by way of action for restitution must be reasonable, fair and practicable to that respondent therein may not suffer any unmerited hardship and further held that the appellant i. e. , the electricity Board should be put back to the original position as prevailed prior to passing of the High Court s order. Apex Court further held that the respondent therein became liable to pay as per revised tariff from the date of its revision and not merely from the date of the judgment and further upheld the rate of interest levied by the Board at 18 per cent per annum for the belated payment, since the same was in conformity with the principles of equity and restitution. ( 11 ) THE relevant portions at paragraph nos. 22 and 24 are extracted as under:"22. . . . . . PENDENCY of appeal before this Court only ensured that the proceedings had not been finally concluded. But in the absence of any interim order of this Court granting stay of operation of the impugned judgment, the judgment of the High Court was binding between the parties to the lis despite pendency of the appeal. Viewed from this aspect, it is quite evident that the Company of for that matter, similarly placed consumers had no obligation to take notice of the revised tariffs and to make any payment on the basis of such revised tariffs. Consequently, the Company cannot be held to be a defaulter for non-payment at the enhance rate during the period when revisions, though made, remained unenforceable on account of the decision of the High court. 24. Consequently, the Company cannot be held to be a defaulter for non-payment at the enhance rate during the period when revisions, though made, remained unenforceable on account of the decision of the High court. 24. There is no manner of doubt it is an imperative duty of the court to ensure that the party to the lis does not suffer any unmerited hardship on account of an order passed by the court. The principle of restitution as enunciated by the Privy Council in Rodger case (1871)3 PC 465 has been followed by the Privy Council in later decision and such principle being in conformity to justice and fair play be followed. It should, however, be noted that in an action by way of restitution, not inflexible rule can be laid down. It will be the endeavor of the court to ensure that a party who had suffered on account of decision of the court, since finally revised, should be put back to the position, as far as practicable, in which he would have been if the decision of the court adversely affecting him had not been passed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . But in giving such relief, the court should not be oblivious of any unmerited hardship to be suffered by the party against whom action by way of restitution is taken. In deciding appropriate action by way of restitution, the court should take a pragmatic view and frame relief in such a manner as may be reasonable, fair and practicable and does not bring about unmerited hardship to either of the parties. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 12 ) FROM the above judgment it is clear that while ordering restitution and placing the successful party in the final proceedings, in the position where it would have been, but for the erroneous decision of the courts below, the court shall not be oblivious of any unmerited hardship to be suffered by the other party and shall be practicable to deciding appropriate action by way of restitution. ( 13 ) COMING to Kanoria Chemicals (cited 2 supra), the facts of this case reveal that the petitioners therein challenged the revision of tariffs by the Board. ( 13 ) COMING to Kanoria Chemicals (cited 2 supra), the facts of this case reveal that the petitioners therein challenged the revision of tariffs by the Board. Though the petitioners therein were successful in obtaining interim stay of operation of the impugned notification, ultimately failed in getting the impugned notification set aside. During the period of stay, the petitioner did not pay the revised tariffs and when the writ petition was dismissed, the Board raised the bills from the date of the tariff revision and also imposed surcharge/interest for the belated payment i. e. , for the period during the pendency of the proceedings, the contention of the petitioners therein was that they are not liable to pay the surcharge for the belated payment, since during the said period, they had an interim order staying impugned revision and, therefore, they are not defaulters. They also contended that in view of the interim stay, they are liable to pay only the actual revised tariffs. The Hon ble Apex court did not agree with the contention of the petitioners and held that the imposing of surcharge is not penal. However, the Apex court taking into consideration the fact that since the petitioners therein under bona fide impression have withheld payment having understood that they are not obliged to pay interest covered by the interim order of stay of operation of the notification, reduced the rate of interest to 18 per cent, only for the period of stay. ( 14 ) THE Apex Court while coming to the above conclusion, agreed with the view of the three Judge bench of the Apex Court in shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. , case which is re-extracted in the succeeding paragraphs, wherein Their Lordships tried to draw a distinction between the interim orders staying the operation of the order under challenge and the quashing of an order. It was held that the stay of operation of order or notification only means the order of notification which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the order or notification has been wiped out from existence and that an order of stay granted pending disposal of a writ petition/suit or other proceedings, comes to an end with the dismissal of the substantive proceedings and it is the duty of the court in such a case to put the parties in the same position, they would have been but for the interim order of the court. The relevant portions at paragraphs. 12 and 14 are extracted as under:"12. As has been pointed out by s. C. Agrawal, J. speaking for a three judge Bench in Shree Chamundi mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India trust Assn. (1992)3 SCC 1 (SCC p. 9, para 10): while considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We cannot agree that the rate of late payment surcharge provided by clause 7 (b) is penal, but having regard to the particular facts and circumstances of this case and having regard to the fact that petitioners could possibly have understood the decision in Adoni Ginning (1979)4 SCC 560 as relieving them on their obligation to pay interest/late payment surcharge for the period of stay, we reduce the rate of late payment surcharge payable under clause 7 (b) to eighteen per cent. But this direction is confined only to the period covered by the stay orders in writ petitioner filed challenging the Notification dated 21-4-1990 and limited to 1-3-1993, the date on which those writ petitions were dismissed. " ( 15 ) THEREFORE, from the above two judgments of the Apex Court it is clear that the party which initially looses its cases and finally succeeds, shall be placed in original position i. e. , as on the date of filing of the original proceedings. But the law laid down in both the judgments would indicate that the courts while ordering restitution, shall adopt a reasonable, fair and practicable approach and see that the other party against whom an order of restitution has been passed, shall not suffer any unmerited hardship. ( 16 ) THOUGH in the above cases, the facts are slightly different but from a combined reading of the judgments, I do not find any conflict in the ultimate ratio laid down therein i. e. , when the relief sought for in the writ petition was rejected by the court, notwithstanding the interim directions granted, initially, the position as on the date of challenge of the impugned proceedings should be restored. But while restoring the same, the disadvantages that are likely to be caused to the aggrieved person i. e. , against whom an order of restitution has been passed, shall also be not ignored. Therefore in the judgment of Kenoria s case (cited 2 supra), there was considerable slash in the rate of interest in calculating the surcharge amount. ( 17 ) IN the present case it is to be seen that the petitioner - unit had received benefit of 25 per cent rebate on consumption charges by way of interim orders of this court and eventually when the writ petition was dismissed, it paid back the incentives received. But the said repayment was made after a considerable period inasmuch as the lis had been pending for a said period. No doubt, this delay in repayment cannot be strictly termed as default, but by virtue of the operation of the principles of restitution, the respondent - corporation had to be kept in the place as on the date of starting of the Us. In such a case, it would be entitled not only for the repayment, but also the interest for the period of delay. In such a case, it would be entitled not only for the repayment, but also the interest for the period of delay. ( 18 ) BUT the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that had the stay been not granted, the petitioner - unit would have repaid the amount and in such a case, payment of surcharge would not have been arisen. This argument cannot be accepted in view of the above judgment of the Apex court in Kanoria Chemical s case (cited 2 supra ). As per the said judgment, the relevant portion at paragraph No. 11, which is already extracted above, indicates that the grant of stay of the notification will not have the effect of relieving the consumers/ petitioners of their obligation to pay late payment surcharge/interest on the amount withheld or incentives availed by them, when their writ petitions were dismissed ultimately. ( 19 ) BUT as already noted, the petitioner repaid the amount availed by it under incentives after dismissal of the writ petition. However, as per the decision of the Apex court, the respondent-Corporation is entitled for the said amount along with interest, since it had received the amount belatedly. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between these two situations. Exactly in this area, the principles of equity should be allowed to play their role, as held by the apex Court in the above decision of that while ordering restitution, court shall take a pragmatic view and frame the relief which is reasonable, fair and practicable and does not bring about unmerited hardship to either party. Further, as already, noted, in kanoria s case, considering the situation, the apex Court had reduced the rate of interest levied by the respondent-Board therein to 18 per cent. ( 20 ) ANOTHER thing that is to be taken note of as represented by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner unit had been closed long back. ( 21 ) IN view of the above peculiar facts and circumstances and for the foregoing reasons, and also keeping in view the observations of the Apex Court in the decisions referred to supra, I direct the respondent -Corporation to fix the rate of interest at 15 per cent per annum for the period of delay in repayment of incentives availed by the petitioner - unit. Accordingly the proceedings of the 2 respondent in lr. No. SE (O) NLR/jao/ht/d. No. 1014/97 dated 17-4-1997 are modified. ( 22 ) WITH the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No costs.