Judgment 1. The plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants i.e. the Union of India through Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the petitioners from allowing screening Hindi Feature Film Sant Valmiki and exhibition of said film in any Cinema house of any public place in India and further restraining the defendants from circulating Audio and Video Cassettes of said film to any company in India as the said Hindi feature film injure the religious feelings of Valmiki Community of India. 2. Said suit for permanent injunction was decreed on 8-12-2000 and the certificate issued by the petitioner for permitting screening of the film was declared illegal. Defendants were further restrained from circulating the audio and video cassettes of said film to any company in India as the said Hindi feature film injure the religious feelings of Valmiki Community of India. 3. The appeal against the said judgment and decree was filed on 7-3-2001 i.e. after the expiry of period of limitation along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The application for condonation of delay was dismissed by holding that if the concerned officer was on leave, the other officer could present the appeal. It was further observed that the power of Attorney and the copy of the judgment was received on 3-3-2002 but still the appeal had been filed on 7-3-2001. Thus, the learned District Judge found no ground to condone the delay in filing the appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the petitioner Board is situated at Bombay, whereas the permission to file appeal or revision is to be granted by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting at New Delhi. It is for this reason, there is some delay in filing of the appeal. It is further stated that the delay in filing the appeal has no effect on any of the rights of the plaintiffs as the injunction order is in favour of the plaintiffs. By not filing the appeal, the defendants were not drawing any undue advantage nor the action of filing the appeal after the period of limitation was actuated on account of any mala fides. It was a bonafide delay. By not filing the appeal, the defendants were not drawing any undue advantage nor the action of filing the appeal after the period of limitation was actuated on account of any mala fides. It was a bonafide delay. He has relied upon State of Haryana V/s. Chandra Mani, AIR 1996 SC 1623; N. Balakrishnan V/s. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 : (AIR 1998 SC 3222); Vedabai alias Vaijayantabai Baburao Patil v. Shantaram Baburao Patil, AIR 2001 SC 2582 and Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu V/s. Gobardhan Sao, AIR 2002 SC 1201 to contend that there exists sufficient reasons for the condonation of delay. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a Supreme Court judgment reported as Ghasi Ram v. Chait Ram Saini, AIR 1998 SC 2476 and Ranjit Singh V/s. Faridabad Complex Administration, 1991 Pun LJ 559. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and with their assistance have gone through the case law cited at the bar. 7. A perusal of the record shows that the judgment of the trial Court was delivered on 8-12-2000 and appeal has been filed on 7-3-2001. However, the days spent by the petitioners in obtaining certified copies of the judgment and decree are not available on record. Even if days in obtaining certified copies of judgment and decree are not taken into consideration, there is delay of 57 days in filing of the appeal. 8. The question which arises is whether there is sufficient cause to condone such delay. 9. In Chandra Manis case (AIR 1996 SC 1623), the Honble Supreme Court has held that it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understood though more difficult to approve. The Honble Supreme Court held to the following effect : "When the State is an applicant praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/ agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection or sufficient cause for explaining every days delay." 10. In N. Balakrishnans case (AIR 1998 SC 3222) the Supreme Court has held that the primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The Supreme Court held as follows : "13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation strategy, the smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 11. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when Courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the Court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss." 11. In Vedabais case (AIR 2001 SC 2582), Supreme Court was considering the case where there was a delay of 7 days in filing the appeal. However, application for condonation of delay was dismissed. It has been held that while exercising discretion under S. 5 of the Limitation Act the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. The distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days, whereas in a former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise. 12. In Ram Nath Saos case (AIR 2002 SC 1201), the Supreme Court had the occasion to interpret the impression sufficient cause within the meaning of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, wherein it has been held that such provisions should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to party. It has been held that the Court should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception moreso, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. Thus the Supreme Court held as follows : "The expression sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5 of the Act or O. 22, R. 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute sufficient cause or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a strait-jacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute sufficient cause or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a strait-jacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the Court should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order is over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception moreso when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party." 13. On the other hand, the judgments relied upon by the respondents in Ghasi Rams case (AIR 1998 SC 2476) is clearly distinguishable. In the said case, the Court has granted benefit of provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the plaintiff-appellant holding that the proceedings initiated by the plaintiff before the Executing Court were prosecuted bona fide and in good faith. In the said case, the Court found that there was no lack of due care and there is no reason why the benefit of Sec. 14 of the Act should not be available to the appellant. The said judgment is clearly not helpful to the respondent. 14. In Ranjit Singhs case (1991 Pun LJ 559) the Court has declined to condone the delay on account of the strike of lawyers. The said case is again clearly distinguishable and has no applicability in the facts and the circumstances of the present case. 15. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the abovesaid judgments. I am of the opinion that there exists sufficient cause to condone the delay. At best there is delay of 57 days in filing of appeal. The plaintiffs have got injunction in their favour. The plaintiffs have suffered no prejudice on account of filing of appeal by delay of 57 days. 16. I am of the opinion that the delay in filing the appeal before the first appellate Court was not on account of lack of bonafides or inaction. Such delay has not caused any prejudice to the plaintiff-respondents as well. Therefore, the order passed by the learned District Judge declining to condone the delay is not justified. Such order suffers from patent illegalities and has caused manifest injustice to the petitioners. Such delay has not caused any prejudice to the plaintiff-respondents as well. Therefore, the order passed by the learned District Judge declining to condone the delay is not justified. Such order suffers from patent illegalities and has caused manifest injustice to the petitioners. Consequently, the delay in filing the appeal before the District Judge is condoned. The impugned order is set aside. The learned District Judge shall decide the appeal on merits in accordance with the law. 17. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned District Judge, Sangrur for further proceedings in accordance with the law on 15-9-2003. Order accordingly.