JUDGMENT : B.S. Chauhan, J. This writ petition has been filed against the order dated 13.3.2003, passed by the Respondent No. 1 Chancellor, Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar University, Agra, by which, the claim of the Petitioner to hold the post of Principal upto 30th June, 2003 by virtue of the statutory provision has been rejected. 2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that Petitioner had been duly appointed by the U.P. Higher Education Service Commission as a Principal of the Jawahar Lal Nehru Post Graduate College, Etah, and he joined the service on 10.7.1989. Petitioner's date of birth is 1.12.1942 and the age of the superannuation is 60 years, and thus, Petitioner ought to have retired on 30th November, 2002. But he claims that by virtue of the provisions of Statute 16.15 of the University he is entitled to continue upto 30th June, 2003, as it provides that if the superannuation comes prior to the end of the academic session, the Principal shall continue till the end of the academic session. In September, 2001, the State Government in exercise of the powers u/s 57 of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter called the Act 1973) superseding the Committee of Management appointed District Magistrate as Authorised Controller of the college. The Authorised Controller vide order dated 28.11.2002, provided that Petitioner would stand retire on 30.11.2002 on completing the age of 60 years and further direction was issued to hand over the charge to the Respondent No. 3 being the senior most teacher in the college. When the Management Committee of the College was restored vide order dated 4.12.2002, it allowed the representation of the Petitioner vide order dated 12.12.2002 providing that he would hold the post upto the end of the academic session. Respondent No. 3 filed Writ Petition No. 53518 of 2002 challenging the said order, which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail the statutory remedy before this Court. Respondent No. 3 filed a representation u/s 68 of the Act 1973 before the Respondent No. 1, who passed the interim order dated 27.12.2002 restraining the Petitioner to work as a regular Principal of the college, and finally vide order dated 13.3.2003, the said representation has been allowed. Hence, this petition. 3. Facts are not in dispute at all. Respondent No. 3 filed a representation u/s 68 of the Act 1973 before the Respondent No. 1, who passed the interim order dated 27.12.2002 restraining the Petitioner to work as a regular Principal of the college, and finally vide order dated 13.3.2003, the said representation has been allowed. Hence, this petition. 3. Facts are not in dispute at all. Petition involves pure question of law as to whether under the Statute, Petitioner is entitled to continue upto the end of the academic session, and in the fact-situation, wherein it has been alleged that a criminal prosecution has also been launched against the Petitioner, wherein charges have not yet been framed and the trial is yet to commence, he is entitled for the benefit of the Statute? The relevant provisions of the Act 1973 read as under: 2 (15) 'principal', in relation to an affiliated, associated or a constituent college, means the head of such college; 2 (18) 'teacher' means a person employed (for imparting instruction or guiding or conducting research in the University or in an Institute or in a constituent, affiliated or associated college) and includes a Principal or Director. Relevant provisions of Ist Statute of Agra University read as under: 12.20. When the office of the Principal of an affiliated college falls vacant, the Management may appoint any teacher to officiate as Principal for a period of three months or until the appointment of a regular Principal, whichever is earlier. If on or before the expiry of the period of three months, any regular Principal is not appointed, or such a Principal does not assume office, the senior most teacher in the college shall officiate as Principal of such college until a regular Principal is appointed. [Sections 37 and 49 (m)]. .... 15.04. (1) A teacher of the university may be dismissed or removed or his services terminated on one or more of the following grounds. (Section 49 (d)): (a) wilful neglect of duty; (b) misconduct; (c) breach of any of the terms of contract of service; .... (h) abolition of the post. .... 16.06. [Sections 37 and 49 (m)]. .... 15.04. (1) A teacher of the university may be dismissed or removed or his services terminated on one or more of the following grounds. (Section 49 (d)): (a) wilful neglect of duty; (b) misconduct; (c) breach of any of the terms of contract of service; .... (h) abolition of the post. .... 16.06. (1) No order dismissing, removing, or terminating, the services of a teacher on any ground mentioned in Clause (1) or Clause (2) of Statute 15.04 (except in the case of a conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude or of abolition of post) shall be passed unless a charge has been framed against the teacher and communicated to him with a statement of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and he has been given adequate opportunity. [Section 49 (o)]. .... 16.14. (1) The age of superannuation of a teacher of an affiliated college shall be 60 years. (Section 49). (2) The date of superannuation of such a teacher shall be the date immediately preceding his 60th birthday. 16.15. No extension in service beyond the age of superannuation shall be granted to any teacher after the commencement of these Statutes. [Section 49 (o)]: Provided that if the date of superannuation of a teacher does not fall on June 30, the teacher shall continue in service till the end of the academic session, i.e., June 30 following and he will be treated as on re-employment from the date immediately following the date of his superannuation till June 30, following. 4. In view of the aforesaid statutory provisions, Dr. Padia has submitted that by operation of law though the Petitioner reached the age of superannuation on 30.11.2002, but he is entitled to hold the post upto 30th June, 2003 and as in the criminal case, charges have not yet been framed and trial has not commenced nor any disciplinary proceedings have been initiated by the Respondents, he cannot be deprived of the benefits of the statutory provisions and the order passed by the Respondent No. 1 is liable to be set aside. Respondent No. 3 had no legal right for enforcement of which he had filed the writ petition, nor he could maintain the representation before the Chancellor u/s 68 of the Act. 5. Respondent No. 3 had no legal right for enforcement of which he had filed the writ petition, nor he could maintain the representation before the Chancellor u/s 68 of the Act. 5. On the contrary, Sri T. P. Singh, Pradeep Gupta and the learned Standing Counsel have submitted that as the Petitioner reached the age of superannuation and he is a Principal not a teacher, he cannot be permitted to take the benefit of the statutory provisions permitting a teacher to continue upto the end of academic session. More so, where there are charges against the Petitioner of embezzlement etc., the writ court, being a court of equity, should not come to his rescue. It has further been submitted that as the order passed by the Authorised Controller was of a nature of quasi-judicial, the Committee of Management had no competence to review it as there is no statutory provision permitting the review of such an order. More so, the Government order dated 21st March, 1984 (C.A. 6') provides that after reaching the age of superannuation if a teacher is permitted to continue in service till the end of academic session it would be a re-employment and giving a re-employment involves application of mind, and therefore, the authority has to consider as to whether the person is fit for re-employment and Clause (4) thereof specifically provides that those employees who are not associated with the teaching work may not be allowed to hold the post till the end of the academic session. Respondent No. 3 as is entitle to officiate on the post, being the senior most teacher, he has a locus standi to maintain the petition/representation. Therefore, petition is liable to be rejected. 6. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. The first question does arise as to whether the order passed by the Authorised Controller is of a nature of administrative order or quasi-judicial. 8. The quasi-judicial order must contain the following conditions: (a) the body of persons must have legal authority; (b) the authority should be given to determine question affecting the rights of subjects; and (c) they should have a duty to act judicially. 8. The quasi-judicial order must contain the following conditions: (a) the body of persons must have legal authority; (b) the authority should be given to determine question affecting the rights of subjects; and (c) they should have a duty to act judicially. (Vide Rex v. Electricity Commissioner, ex-parte, London Electricity Joint Committee Co., (1924) 1 KB 171; Rex v. London Countsy Council, ex-parte Entertainments Production Association Ltd., (1931) 2 KB 215 Province of Bombay Vs. Kusaldas S. Advani and Others, AIR 1950 SC 222 ; Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Others Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Another, AIR 1959 SC 308 and The State of Orissa and Another Vs. Chakobhai Ghelabhai and Company, AIR 1961 SC 284 . 9. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Raja Mahendra Pal and Others, AIR 1999 SC 1786 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the test to determine whether the proceedings are quasi-judicial or not, is as under: Quasi-judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs but after a discretion, in its nature, judicial. The exercise of power by such Tribunal or Authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claim of persons by an act of mind or judgment upon the proposed course of official action as to an object of the corporate power, for the consequence of which the official will not be liable, although his act was not well judged. A quasi-judicial function has been termed to be one which stands midway on judicial and administrative functions. The primary test is as: whether the authority alleged to be a quasi-judicial, has any special judicial duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is in affirmative, the Authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial and if the reply is in negative, it would not be. The dictionary meaning of the word quasi-judicial is 'not exactly'. 10. In Lt. Col. P.R. Chaudhary (Retd.) Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2000) 4 SCC 577 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when an authority acts in quasi-judicial capacity, it cannot arbitrarily ignore principles of law or the principles of natural justice. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar Jain Vs. 10. In Lt. Col. P.R. Chaudhary (Retd.) Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (2000) 4 SCC 577 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when an authority acts in quasi-judicial capacity, it cannot arbitrarily ignore principles of law or the principles of natural justice. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar Jain Vs. State Through CBI, N. Delhi, AIR 2000 SC 2754 ; Union of India v. H.C. Goel AIR 1964 SC 364 and Rakesh Kumar Jain Vs. State Through CBI, N. Delhi. 11. Be that as it may, in State of Orissa Vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and Others, AIR 1967 SC 1269 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered this very issue and held that passing the order of superannuation is purely administrative in character. Same view has been reiterated in Hari Nandan Sharan Bhatnagar Vs. S.N. Dixit and Another, AIR 1970 SC 40 , wherein it has been held that selection on a particular post is purely an administrative function. 12. In A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1970 SC 150 , the issue was raised as to what was the nature of the power conferred on the Selection Board under the Statute. As the selection involves “adjudging” the inter se merits of the candidates and it is to be determined as to whether a candidate is “found worthy of selection”, the Court held that the dividing line between the administrative power and a quasi-judicial power was quite thin and was being gradually obliterated. To make a distinction between the two, one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequence ensuing from the exercise of that power, and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised, and after examining the entire procedure, the Court held as under: It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But for the purpose of present case, we shall assume that power exercised by the Selection Board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selection on that basis. 13. In Km. Nelima Misra Vs. Dr. But for the purpose of present case, we shall assume that power exercised by the Selection Board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selection on that basis. 13. In Km. Nelima Misra Vs. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal and others, AIR 1990 SC 1402 , while examining the case of the appointment in Lucknow University under the Act, 1973 the Hon'ble Apex Court rejected the contention that powers of the Chancellor has features of judicial powers, observing that even if he performs the administrative function, he has to take a decision in accordance with statutory provisions. He cannot be guided by extraneous or irrelevant considerations nor he can act illegally, irrationally or arbitrarily and if he acts in an arbitrary manner, where the function is administrative or quasi-judicial in nature, becomes liable to be quashed being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 14. Therefore, in view of the above, we are of the candid view that the order passed by the Authorised Controller directing that Petitioner would stand superannuated on 30th November, 2002, was purely administrative in nature and the instant case requires to be examined keeping the aforesaid view in mind. 15. A Full Bench of Delhi High Court in K.R. Raghavan v. Union of India and Ors. (1979) 2 SLR 478 , examined the scope of review of an administrative order and held that the same can be reviewed (i) if it is based on irrelevant ground, (ii) it is unjust, and/or (iii) it is contrary to law. 16. In Godde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, AIR 1966 SC 828 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that review of administrative order is permissible if (i) there is a mistake of fact or law and (ii) if the order is prejudicial to a party and has been passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the said party. 17. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that as order passed by the Authorised Controller was of purely administrative in nature could be reviewed if the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled. 18. The issue involved herein has already been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.K. Rathi Vs. 17. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that as order passed by the Authorised Controller was of purely administrative in nature could be reviewed if the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled. 18. The issue involved herein has already been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.K. Rathi Vs. Prem Hari Sharma and Others, (2001) 9 SCC 377 , wherein interpreting the provisions of the same Statute it has been held that an officiating Principal may not have the benefit of the Statute to hold the post till the end of the academic session, but a Principal duly appointed has a right to continue till the end of the academic session. A Division Bench of this Court in Udai Narain Pandey Vs. Director of Education (Higher Education), Allahabad and others, (1999) 1 AWC 897 . examining the same issue has categorically held that as the Principal had been appointed on a substantive post of the institution concerned, and while holding the said post, date of superannuation reached, he would have a right to continue in service on re-employment as Principal till the end of the academic session. 19. We are of the view that the case does not present any special feature warranting us to re-examine the issue or to take a view contrary to which has been taken by the Division Bench earlier in Udit Narain Pandey (supra), and once the matter has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is neither desirable nor permissible to examine the issue again. 20. The Authorised Controller has admittedly passed the order dated 28.11.2002, without giving an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner. It has definitely adversely affected the Petitioner and it is in contravention of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by the Division Bench of this Court as referred to above. The order passed was purely administrative in character. Therefore, the contention that the management committee could not review the said order is preposterous and hereby rejected. 21. In Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 1999 SC 3609 and Mallikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa and Others Vs. The order passed was purely administrative in character. Therefore, the contention that the management committee could not review the said order is preposterous and hereby rejected. 21. In Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Shahdeo Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 1999 SC 3609 and Mallikarjuna Mudhagal Nagappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 2000 SC 2976 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that even if the order is found to be bad/illegal/without jurisdiction, the Courts may not interfere if setting aside the order amounts to reviving an invalid order. 22. Thus, even otherwise, the order dated 12.12.2002 passed by the Committee of Management is not liable to be set aside as it would revive a wrong order dated 28.11.2002, passed by the Authorised Controller dated 28.11.2002. 23. Much reliance has been placed by Shri T. P. Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3 upon the Government order dated 21st March, 1984 (C.A.-6), which provides for certain guidelines for providing re-employment of teachers till the end of academic session after reaching the age of superannuation. The said order relates only to the teachers employed in Government Colleges, and, therefore, has no application in the instant case, nor the judgment relied upon by Shri Singh in Collector of Central Excise, Vadodra Vs. Dhiren Chemical Industries, AIR 2002 SC 453 , wherein it has been held that instructions/circulars issued by the department are binding on its officers and it is not permissible to give a different interpretation to the same, has any bearing herein. 24. We also find no force in the submissions made on behalf of the Respondents that Petitioner has been involved in embezzlement of a huge amount and a criminal prosecution has been launched against him, thus, he cannot be re-employed. In the said case, charges have not yet been framed. Earlier after investigation the final report had been submitted by the investigating agency and it also stood accepted by the competent criminal court. However, the case has been re-opened by this Court in criminal revision only on the ground that at the time of the acceptance of the final report, the complainant had not been heard. Whatever may be the fate of the prosecution, unless the trial commences on charges being framed, it is difficult for this Court to take such factors into consideration. Whatever may be the fate of the prosecution, unless the trial commences on charges being framed, it is difficult for this Court to take such factors into consideration. More so, the statutory provisions quoted above enable the authorities to proceed against the Petitioner by initiating the disciplinary proceedings even on such charges. Therefore, it is for the authorities concerned to consider as to whether such a course is warranted but unless such a decision is taken, mere pendency of some criminal proceedings may not disentitle the Petitioner to continue till the end of the academic session. 25. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that the locus standi of the Respondent No. 3 to raise any grievance in this respect, whatsoever is also doubtful. Section 68 of the Act 1973 provides for a reference if a person is aggrieved of the order of the authorities. 26. In P.S. Malik v. Chancellor and Ors. 1982 ALJ 774, this Court held that a person, who has been found non-suited in a selection has a right to approach the Chancellor u/s 68 of the Act, 1973. Generally, right to approach an authority arises when a person is wrongfully deprived of his entitlement which he is legally entitled to receive, but it does not include any kind of disappointment or personal inconvenience. Person concerned has to satisfy that he is injured by the order of the authority and simultaneously adversely affected in a strict legal sense. (Vide K.N. Lakshminarasimaiah v. Secy. Mysore S.T.A.T., (1966) 2 Mys LJ 199). 27. Whether a person is injured in strict legal sense, must be determined by the nature of the injury considering the facts and circumstances involving in each case. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance, as the law can appreciate and not a stat pro ratione valuntas reasons. 28. In Thiruvengadam v. Muthu Chatiar AIR 1970 Mad 34 , it has been held that a person can be said to be aggrieved if apart from the general interest, such a person, as a member of the public, has particular or special interest in the subject matter supposed to be wrongly decided. 29. 28. In Thiruvengadam v. Muthu Chatiar AIR 1970 Mad 34 , it has been held that a person can be said to be aggrieved if apart from the general interest, such a person, as a member of the public, has particular or special interest in the subject matter supposed to be wrongly decided. 29. In S.M. Transport Ltd. v. Raman and Raman AIR 1961 Mad 180 , the Full Bench of Madras High Court, while considering the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, considered the issue and approved the law laid down in Rex v. Richmond Confirming Authority, ex-parte Hobbit 1921 (1) KB 248 and Rex v. Groom, ex-parte, Cobbold 1901 (2) KB 157, and laid down the principle as under: The true principle is to determine whether the applicant has an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered. 30. In Gram Sabha v. Ramraj Singh 1968 All WR 844, this Court held that such a person must necessarily be one whose rights or interest are adversely affected or jeopardized, and not who suffers from psychological or imaginary injury. 31. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid that only a person who has wrongfully been deprived of something or wrongfully refused something or his interest/title is adversely affected can seek the redressal of his grievance. 32. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 , held that the existence of a legal right in favour of the writ Petitioner is the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Kalyan Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1183 , the Hon'ble Apex Court enunciated the proposition that the right to maintain a writ postulates a subsisting personal right in the claim which the Petitioner makes and in the protection of which he is personally interested. The existence of a legal right is a condition precedent to approach the Court/Tribunal. (Vide The Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, AIR 1962 SC 1044 Mani Subrat Jain and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1977 SC 276 ; State of Kerala Vs. Smt. A. Lakshmikutty and others, AIR 1987 SC 331 ; State of Kerala and Others Vs. (Vide The Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, AIR 1962 SC 1044 Mani Subrat Jain and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, AIR 1977 SC 276 ; State of Kerala Vs. Smt. A. Lakshmikutty and others, AIR 1987 SC 331 ; State of Kerala and Others Vs. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and Others, AIR 1989 SC 49 ; Rajendra Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, AIR 1996 SC 2736 and Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Vs. Chand Behari Kapoor and Others, AIR 1998 SC 3104 . 33. The term “person aggrieved” was considered and explained in Re Sidebotham 1880 (14) Ch. D. 458, observing as under: The words 'person aggrieved' do not really mean a man who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some other order had been made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. 34. In Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N. Teekappa Gowda and Bros. AIR 1971 SC 246 and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, AIR 1976 SC 578 , there has been strict interpretation regarding locus standi as it had been held therein that a rival businessman cannot have any grievance against the grant of promotion permitting the installation on a new site. However, that interpretation had subsequently been diluted and wherever it is found that an order which cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, if challenged, the Court may entertain the petition without insisting on the issue of locus standi. (Vide M.S. Jayaraj Vs. Commissioner of Excise, Kerala and Others, AIR 2000 SC 3266 . 35. In Ghulam Qadir Vs. Special Tribunal and Others, (2002) 1 SCC 33 , the Apex Court held as under: There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person, except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the Petitioner, which is alleged to have been violated, is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the said Article. 36. In Lakhi Ram v. State of Haryana and Ors. AIR 1981 SC 1655 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined an issue where writ petition was entertained by a person whose promotion chances had been adversely affected by expunging the adverse remarks of another officer. The petition was filed on the ground that had the adverse remarks continued to remain in the confidential report of the said officer, it would have improved the chances of promotion of the Petitioner vis-a-vis the said officer. The Apex Court held that in such a case writ can be entertained only if the Petitioner successfully establishes that while expunging the adverse remarks, the authority had acted beyond the scope of its powers. 37. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1974 SC 259 , the Apex Court held that no employee has a right or vested right to chance of promotion. He simply has a right to be considered for promotion, provided he falls within zone of consideration on fulfilling the pre-requisite conditions for that. While deciding the said case, the Apex Court placed reliance upon the judgment in State of Mysore v. G. B. Purohit 1967 SLR 753, wherein it has been held that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service mere chances of promotion are not, the rule which merely affects chance of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition. The Apex Court rejected the contention that even a person whose chances are affected has a right to be heard observing as under: It is said on behalf of the Respondents that as their chances of promotion have been affected, their conditions of service have been changed to their disadvantage. We see no force in this argument because chances of promotion are not conditions of service. 38. In Mohammad Shujat Ali and Others Vs. We see no force in this argument because chances of promotion are not conditions of service. 38. In Mohammad Shujat Ali and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1631 , the Court held that where a rule confers a right of actual promotion, or a right to be considered for promotion is a rule prescribed in a condition of service, but, mere chance of promotion does not fall within the said right. 39. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Mohammad Bakar v. Y. Krishna Reddy 1970 SLR 768 Reserve Bank of India, Bombay Vs. C.T. Dighe and Others, AIR 1981 SC 1699 , State of Maharashtra and another Vs. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni and others, AIR 1981 SC 1990 ; Reserve Bank of India and Others Vs. C.N. Sahasranaman and Others, AIR 1986 SC 1830 ; Paluru Ramkrishnaiah v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 166 K. Jagadeesan Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1990 SC 1072 and Chandra Gupta, I.F.S. Vs. The Secretary, Govt. of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests and others, AIR 1995 SC 44 . 40. In view of the above, legal proposition can be summarised that a person having a mere chance of promotion cannot raise the grievance in a Court. However, in the instant case, Petitioner has a mere chance to officiate. 41. Under the statutory provisions, Respondent No. 3 being a senior most teacher could be appointed as officiating Principal till the regularly selected Principal is made available by the Commission. He could have grievance only and only if a person junior to him working in the institute is appointed as a Principal ignoring his claim. For example, in case the Petitioner gets convicted in a criminal case and is being removed from the post by the authorities only for being convicted and the Respondent No. 3 being the senior most teacher is appointed as an officiating Principal, and in appeal/ revision the Petitioner is acquitted and he claims reinstatement, as to whether in such a situation Respondent No. 3 would raise objection or would have a right to file an appeal or SLP before the higher courts. If not, what was the legal right of the Respondent No. 3 for the enforcement of which he had approached this Court earlier and how the Chancellor would entertain representation made by him. If not, what was the legal right of the Respondent No. 3 for the enforcement of which he had approached this Court earlier and how the Chancellor would entertain representation made by him. Respondent No. 3 merely has a chance to officiate, not the right to be considered for the promotion to the post of Principal, what to talk of the right of appointment to the said post. We fail to understand as to how a person, who has merely a chance to officiate has the standi to sue in such a case. If the issue is not decided here, Respondent No. 3 shall also assume the right to sue even when the name of regularly selected Principal would be referred to by the Commission for appointment as Principal, contending that he is not eligible or the selection process has not been fair. It is beyond imagination as to how an officiating person can raise the issue in respect of regularly selected candidate and if he cannot, how could he be heard complaining that the order passed by the Management Committee is bad. 42. As to whether the Petitioner should continue till the end of academic session in spite of the fact that he is facing criminal prosecution depends upon the action taken by the statutory authorities. But Respondent No. 3 cannot raise this kind of grievance before any forum just on the ground that in case Petitioner is not permitted to continue, he may get a chance to officiate on the post. Therefore, we are very much doubtful regarding the right of the Respondent No. 3 to maintain a writ petition filed by him earlier and to maintain the reference u/s 68 of the Act 1973. 43. In the totality of the circumstances as explained above, the initial order passed by the Authorised Controller dated 28.11.2002 was bad being contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and had been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice as Petitioner had not been heard before passing the order. The Management Committee has rightly reviewed the said order by order dated 12.12.2002 and the Chancellor has set aside the said order on the grounds which were not available to the Respondent No. 3. More so, the Respondent No. 3 had no right to maintain a representation u/s 68 of the Act 1973. The Management Committee has rightly reviewed the said order by order dated 12.12.2002 and the Chancellor has set aside the said order on the grounds which were not available to the Respondent No. 3. More so, the Respondent No. 3 had no right to maintain a representation u/s 68 of the Act 1973. Even if he could maintain it, the order passed by the Chancellor on his representation cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 44. Thus, petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 13.3.2003 is hereby set aside. The Petitioner shall be permitted to continue till 30th June, 2003, unless the authorities concerned pass an appropriate order in exercise of their powers under Statute 15.05, i.e., initiation of disciplinary proceedings for misconduct and that order is approved by the Statutory Authority as required by Statute 16.06. 45. There shall be no order as to costs.