JUDGMENT - BHOSALE D.B., J.:-Heard Mr. A.D. Vyawahare, learned Counsel for the applicant and Mr. Khati, learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. A short yet important question of law as to the maintainability of revision under section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the C.P.C.") against the order of the Appellate Court, rejecting an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, is involved in this revision. Since the answer to the question does not involve any factual adjudication a brief reference thereto would suffice. 3. The petitioner original defendant has impugned the order dated 28-10-1998 rendered by the 1st Additional District Judge, Nagpur in Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 753 of 1997 (Exh. 1) rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing First Appeal assailing the judgment and decree dated 13-3-1997 passed by Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ramtek in Regular Civil Suit No. 89 of 1994. The respondent-original plaintiffs had filed suit for partition, separate possession and damages, claiming one half share in the joint family property. 4. In this revision, Mr. Khati, learned Counsel for the respondents, raised an issue of maintainability of the instant revision, placing reliance upon the judgment of this Court in (Chandrakant Govind Sutar v. M.K. Associates another)1, 2003(4) Bom.C.R. 169 . Mr. Khati, submitted that this Court in the above judgment has taken a view that no revision can lie against an order dismissing an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal under section 115 of the C.P.C. as amended by Act 46/99. The amendment was brought into force with effect from 1-7-2002. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Chandrakant Sutar v. M.K. Associates, in paragraphs 4 and 6 held thus : 4. The principal aspect that needs to be addressed while examining the question of maintainability of revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the present case is; whether the order passed on application for condonation of delay is an order passed in any "other proceedings" or in the appeal ? The principal aspect that needs to be addressed while examining the question of maintainability of revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the present case is; whether the order passed on application for condonation of delay is an order passed in any "other proceedings" or in the appeal ? If the answer to this query is that it is former, it would necessarily follow that Revision Application under section 115 Civil Procedure Code as amended would be amenable; whereas if the answer is the latter, then the Revision Application will be unavailable inasmuch as if the Revision application against the order rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was to be allowed then this Court will have to necessarily revive the appeal proceedings before the Appellate Court and, since the appeal will not be finally disposed of by the order of this Court, this Court is precluded to exercise revisional jurisdiction under section 115. The position would, however, be different when the first appeal Court allows the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, for if this Court was to interfere in the Revision Application filed by the aggrieved party and set aside the order passed on the application for condonation of delay then, obviously the appeal itself would stand finally disposed of. In other words, in cases where the application for condonation of delay is allowed by the subordinate Court, revision under section 115, Civil Procedure Code would be available. 6. To my mind, the question that needs to be addressed in this case is not as to whether the memorandum of appeal which is presented beyond limitation is an appeal or a proposed appeal or whether the Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and pass any other order till the delay in filing the same is condoned. Whereas, the proposition that arises for consideration in the present case is the settled legal position as would be seen from the reported decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Mela (Rani Choudhury v. Lt. Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury)2, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1397. (supra) and in particular in Rani Choudhury (supra). The law is well settled that the order dismissing the appeal as time barred is the one passed in appeal. Col. Suraj Jit Choudhury)2, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1397. (supra) and in particular in Rani Choudhury (supra). The law is well settled that the order dismissing the appeal as time barred is the one passed in appeal. The Apex Court in Rani Choudhurys case (supra) while dealing with the provisions of Civil Procedure Code has observed that an appeal may also be dismissed on the ground of limitation, if condonation of delay in filing an appeal is not allowed by the Court. The consequence of dismissing the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal in law is one of disposing of the appeal as time barred and therefore one passed in appeal". 5. The learned Single Judge, thus, in Chandrakant Sutar v. M.K. Associates, held that the order rejecting an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal is an order passed in "appeal" and not in "any other proceedings" and in view thereof, revision would not be available. It has also been expressed in the judgment that in cases where the application for condonation of delay is allowed by the subordinate Court, the revision under section 115, C.P.C. would be available, since allowing such revision would finally dispose of the appeal. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Vyawahare, learned Counsel for the applicant/petitioner, invited my attention to the order dated 25-6-2003 passed by another learned Single Judge of this Court, Aurangabad Bench, in Civil Revision Application No. 136 of 1996, (Chandu Jagannath Ambekar others v. Digambar Kisanrao Kulkarni others)3. In that revision application, the learned Single Judge, Aurangabad Bench, while recording his reasons for disagreeing with the view expressed in Chandrakant Sutar v. M.K. Associates, has directed the Additional Registrar to place the matter before the Honble the Chief Justice for suitable directions requiring reference to a Larger Bench. The terms of reference made in Chandu Ambekar v. Digambar Kulkarni read thus : "Whether the revision petition against rejection of applications for condonation of delay in institution of proceedings passed by subordinate Court are maintainable by virtue of section 115(1), in view of the fact that the rejection of such applications has an effect of case decided i.e. disposal of the proceeding as time barred, by a finding on the issue of limitation?" 7. With great respect to my learned brother, who has delivered the judgment in Chandrakant Sutar v. M.K. Associates, I am also unable to agree with the view expressed therein and in view thereof, while agreeing with the conclusion arrived at in Chandu Ambekar v. Digambar Kulkarni, I would like to add some more reasons for consideration of the larger Bench, which would be answering the reference. Quite a few number of civil revision applications came before me where identical question was involved and in view thereof, the learned Counsel appearing in the instant revision application and in some other revision applications prayed for adjournment, till the issue is settled by the larger Bench. 8. Now coming to the question raised in the instant revision, it appears to me that while deciding the revision in Chandrakant Sutar v. M.K. Associates, the judgment of the Apex Court in (Prem Bakshi others v. Dharam Dev others)4, 2002(2) S.C.C. 2 , was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge. In Prem Bakshis case, the Apex Court while referring to the scope of the first clause of the unamended proviso, which corresponds to the proviso in its entirety as its stands today, in paragraph 5 of the judgment observed thus : 5. The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 115 puts a restriction on the powers of the High Court inasmuch as the High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding a issue, in course of a suit or other proceedings except where (i) the order made would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, or (ii) the said order would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made. Under Clause (a), the High Court would be justified in interfering with an order of a subordinate Court if the said order finally disposes of the suit or other proceedings. By way of illustration we may say that if a trial Court holds by an interlocutory order that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case or that suit is barred by limitation, it would amount to finally deciding the case and such order would be revisable. By way of illustration we may say that if a trial Court holds by an interlocutory order that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case or that suit is barred by limitation, it would amount to finally deciding the case and such order would be revisable. The order in question by which the amendment was allowed could not be said to have finally disposed of the case and, therefore it would not come under Clause (a). (emphasis supplied). 9. It is thus clear that the Apex Court, while dealing with the first clause of the unamended proviso, which corresponds to the proviso its entirety as its stand today, held that the High Court would be justified in interfering with an order of subordinate Court, if the said order finally disposes of the suit or other proceeding. In other words, that rejecting an application by an interlocutory order, if amounts to finally deciding "a case" or "termination of lis" such order would be revisable. That being the position, in my opinion, whether an order is passed in "appeal" or "other proceedings" would become inconsequential. The Apex Court, while considering the requirement of "case decided" for the purpose of exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the C.P.C. in (Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig F.J. Dillon)5, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497, held that the said word is of comprehensive import and includes civil proceedings other than suits and is not restricted to the entirety of the proceedings in a Civil Court. It then proceeds to observe that to interpret the expression "case" as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceeding would be to impose restrictions upon exercise of powers of superintendence, and the supervisory jurisdiction and may result, in certain cases, in denying the relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. It was further ruled that the expression "case" includes a suit but in ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, as was in force then, it was observed that the exercise of jurisdiction was discretionary and the High Court was not bound to interfere merely because the conditions stipulated in section 115 were existing. It was further ruled that the expression "case" includes a suit but in ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, as was in force then, it was observed that the exercise of jurisdiction was discretionary and the High Court was not bound to interfere merely because the conditions stipulated in section 115 were existing. The interlocutory character of the order, the existence of another remedy to an aggrieved party by way of an appeal from the ultimate order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the High Court, even in cases where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction or not. A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purpose of suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy, every order in the suit cannot be regarded as case decided within the meaning of section 115 C.P.C. This view has been reiterated even after the amendment of 1976 in Prem Bakshi others v. Dharma Dev (supra). In my opinion, the order to be interfered in exercise of revisional jurisdiction must decide an issue in the suit or proceedings, which would have the effect of deciding the suit or other proceedings. 10. The Apex Court had an occasion to deal with section 115 as unamended in 1976 and as amended by Act No. 46/99, in (Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers others)6, 2004(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)380, where it has compared the provisions of section 115 as amended in 1976 and 1999. It would be advantageous to reproduce paragraph 8 and 9 of the report for better appreciation of the issue and controversy involved in the instant civil revision application. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report reads thus : "8. A comparison of two provisions shows that while proviso (a) of the unamended provision has been retained in its totality, in the amended provisions Clause (b) of the proviso has been omitted. 9. It is to be noted that prior to the amendments to the Code by the Old Amendment Act, the power of revision was wider. A comparison of two provisions shows that while proviso (a) of the unamended provision has been retained in its totality, in the amended provisions Clause (b) of the proviso has been omitted. 9. It is to be noted that prior to the amendments to the Code by the Old Amendment Act, the power of revision was wider. By the amendment, certain positive restrictions were put on the High Courts power to deal with revisions under section 115. Prior to the said amendment, it was no strictly necessary that the impugned order would have the result of finally deciding the lis or the proceedings in the lower courts. In fact, the power could be exercised in any case where jurisdictional error was committed by the original Court or where substantial injustice had resulted. By the Old Amendment Act, the condition of finally deciding of lis and the proceedings in the subordinate courts was introduced. The proviso which was introduced contains qualifications which are pre-requisites before exercise of power under section 115. They were Clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. Logically, the High Court has suo motu power to revise and order where total failure of justice would have occasioned or where irreparable loss would have caused to the parties against whom it was made. These powers were retained by Clause (b). Though, after 1976, the exercise of power was somewhat circumscribed, it was not totally curtailed. In other words, the High Court could even after the 1976 amendment interfere in cases where there was failure of justice or irreparable loss caused, the nature of the proceedings was substantially changed and the suo motu power of the High Court was retained. It was in the nature of power of superintendence of the High Court over the subordinate courts. Changes were related to indicating limitations in exercise of power." 11. The Apex Court while comparing the provisions of section 115, prior and after amendment of 1999, has categorically held that prior to amendment it was not strictly necessary that the impugned order should have the result of finally deciding the lis or the proceeding in the Lower Court. In my opinion, it has made clear that if the order impugned in the revision has resulted in finally deciding the lis or the proceedings in the lower Court, the revision would be maintainable. In my opinion, it has made clear that if the order impugned in the revision has resulted in finally deciding the lis or the proceedings in the lower Court, the revision would be maintainable. In paragraph 32 of the report, it is further made clear that if the impugned order is interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, revision will not be maintainable, meaning thereby that even if the impugned order is interim in nature but finally decides the lis, revision would be maintainable. Paragraph 32 of the report read thus: 32. A plain reading of section 115 as it stands makes it clear that the stress is on the question whether the order in favour of the party applying for revision would have given finality to suit or other proceedings. If the answer is yes then the revision is maintainable. But on the contrary, if the answer is no then the revision is not maintainable. Therefore, if the impugned order is of interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the revision will not be maintainable. The legislative intent is crystal clear. Those orders, which are interim in nature, cannot be the subject-matter of revision under section 115. There is marked distinction in language of section 97(3) of the Old Amendment Act and section 32(2)(i) of the Amendment Act. While in the former, there was clear legislative intent to save applications admitted or pending before the amendment came into force. Such an intent is significantly absent in section 32(2)(i). The amendment relates to procedures. No person has a vested right in a course of procedure. He has only the right of proceeding in the manner prescribed. If by a statutory change the mode of procedure is altered the parties are to proceed according to the altered mode, without exception unless there is a different stipulation". (emphasis supplied) 12. The learned Single Judge in Chandrakant Sutar v. M.K. Associates, has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Mela Ram Sons v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab)7, reported in A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 367, and held that the order passed in the application for condonation of delay in filing appeal is an order passed "in appeal" and not in "other proceeding". Now, even if we take the order passed rejecting an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal is an order passed "in appeal" then it will have to be examined whether proviso to sub-section 1 of section 115 would at all apply to hold that revision against such order is not tenable. Section 115 of C.P. Code read thus: 115. Revision.-(1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears-- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: (Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, very or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceedings before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by High Court. Explanation.-In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding. 13. The proviso has put positive restriction in the powers of the High Court to vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, "in the course of suit" or "other proceeding", except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. If the order passed on the application for condonation of delay is taken as an order passed in appeal and not in the course of suit or other proceedings, probably the proviso would not bar the revision inasmuch as it would be available under section 115 sub-section (1) of the C.P.C. Moreover, an appeal is a continuation of suit. The Apex Court in (Rachakonda Narayan v. Ponthala Parvathamma another)8, 2001(8) S.C.C. 173 . While dealing with the provisions of sections 96, 100 and 101 of the C.P.C. in paragraph 10 of the report held that: "An appeal is a continuation of the suit. When an Appellate Court hears an appeal, the whole matter is at large. The Appellate Court can go into any question relating to rights of the parties which a trial Court was entitled to dispose of provided the plaintiff possesses that right on the date of filing of the suit". In view of this, what has to be examined is whether it is possible to hold that the order passed on the application for condonation of delay is an order passed in "appeal" in relation to the provisions of section 115 of the C.P.C. while addressing the reference. If the order impugned in the instant revision is passed in "appeal", it disposes of the lis. In other words, the order impugned has disposed of the appeal which was continuation of the suit. 14. Furthermore, it may also have to be considered that if a suit is dismissed or finally disposed of, the period of limitation for filing an appeal has expired and the application for condonation of delay in filing appeal is made, there is no appeal on the file of the Appellate Court although memo of appeal is lodged. The application for condonation of delay is not a continuation of the suit. It is not even "a supplementary proceeding" as there is no suit in existence to which is can be supplementary to. It may be an independent "proceeding" contemplated by the proviso to section 115 C.P.C. In view thereof, if the application for condonation of delay is dismissed by the lower Court, according to the learned Single Judge in Chandrakant Sutar v. M.K. Associates, revision lies to the High Court. In such case what is finally disposed of is only the condonation application and not the suit. The suit has been disposed of long back. In such case what is finally disposed of is only the condonation application and not the suit. The suit has been disposed of long back. It was not before the Court even as a continuation in appeal, as appeal itself was not in existence. The revision, probably, would be maintainable because a proceeding namely application for condonation of delay was finally disposed of. The identical situation arises when such application for condonation of delay is granted. Only that "proceeding", is finally disposed of. Appeal was not before the Court and the suit had been finally disposed of long ago. A petitioner, therefore, would be able to invoke the revisional jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C., if he can satisfy the High Court that if he had succeeded in the Lower Court the "suit " or "other proceeding" would have been finally disposed of. Looking at the question involved from this dimension probably the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115, C.P.C. would stand attracted with equal force where the lower Court grant or reject the petitioners application for condonation of delay, which can be a "proceeding" as contemplated by the proviso to section 115 of the C.P.C. 15. While considering the reference made in Chandu Ambekar v. Digambar Kulkarni, the Larger Bench may have to examine the question involved in the light of the statement of object and reasons for amending section 115 by Act 46/99. By the amendment, certain positive restrictions were put on the High Courts powers to deal with a revision under section 115 of the C.P.C. Earlier it was not strictly necessary that the impugned order have the result of finally deciding the lis or the proceeding in the Lower Court. In fact, prior to the amendment, the power could be exercised in any case where jurisdictional error is committed by the original Court where substantial injustice has resulted. It is interesting to note that the Law Commission of India had recommended deletion of section 115. In the Law Commissions opinion, provisions of section 115 are analogous to provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and, therefore, litigants would not be prejudiced in any way if the entire section was deleted. The statement of object and reasons and the recommendations of the Malimath Committee, require to be looked into while addressing the issue. In the Law Commissions opinion, provisions of section 115 are analogous to provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and, therefore, litigants would not be prejudiced in any way if the entire section was deleted. The statement of object and reasons and the recommendations of the Malimath Committee, require to be looked into while addressing the issue. The Malimath Committee, upon consideration of Clause (b) as it stood earlier and which has been deleted now, observed thus : "If revision against all types of interlocutory orders is barred, it will virtually denude the High Court of the power of revision. Having regard to the constraints already placed upon the exercise of the revisional powers by the existing provisions of sub-section (1) of section 115, C.P. Code, there may not be many cases where revisional powers can be exercised if the said recommendations is accepted. Besides, barring of revision petitions against interlocutory orders while retaining Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 115, C.P. Code would, to some extent, come in conflict with the said clause which envisages interference by the High Court even with interlocutory orders which, if had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. In fact, the retention of the existing revisional power with the restrictions contained in Clause (a) of the proviso would enable the High Court to put an end to unsustainable and protracted litigation in subordinate courts. For example, in case a suit is already barred by limitation or by the principles of res judicata or is not maintainable on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and an erroneous order passed by the trial Court on an issue covering such a dispute is not corrected in revision on the ground that the decision is of interlocutory nature, there would be unnecessary protraction of the litigation in the subordinate courts contributing to increase in arrears. At the same time, Clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 115, C.P. Code which enables interference in revision on the ground that an order if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it is made, leaves wide scope for the exercise of the revisional power with all types of interlocutory orders presumably not intended. While the committee agrees, in principle, that the scope of interference against interlocutory orders should be restricted, it feels that object can more effectively be achieved without, at the same time, denuding the High Court of the power of revision, by deleting Clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 115 C.P. C. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the only amendment which is required to be made in sub-section (1) of section 115 of C.P.C. is to substitute the existing proviso to sub-section (1) by following: "Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings". It has been noticed that often records of the lower Court in a pending proceeding are sent for reference in revision petitions. It cannot be gainsaid that once the records are sent to the High Court, the trial of the suit, proceeding or hearing of the appeal comes to a halt, even though no stay of proceedings has been granted by the High Court. It is imperative that records of proceedings pending in the subordinate courts should not be sent unless the High Court expressly so desires. In order to effectively implement this proposal, instead of leaving the matter to the respective High Courts to make an appropriate provision in their Rules or orders, we recommend that the following shall be added as sub-section (3) to section 115 of C.P. Code. "In a revisional proceeding under this section against interlocutory decisions, the subordinate Court shall not send its records unless the High Court expressly so directs." 16. It is thus clear that the legislative intent was not to bar the jurisdiction of the High Court in interfering with interlocutory orders. There may be cases where revisional power can be exercised against interlocutory orders where it finally disposes of the lis or other proceeding. The legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to retain the revisional power of the High Court where it would enable the High Court to put an end to unsustainable and protracted litigation in the subordinate Court. There may be cases where revisional power can be exercised against interlocutory orders where it finally disposes of the lis or other proceeding. The legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to retain the revisional power of the High Court where it would enable the High Court to put an end to unsustainable and protracted litigation in the subordinate Court. While putting positive restrictions, the legislature cannot be said to have had an intention to leave the party remediless. In other words, no restriction, in my view, has been put on the powers of the High Court to interfere in "the orders", whether passed "in the course of a suit" or "other proceeding" or for that matter in "appeal", which has terminated the lis or other proceedings or appeal, if the order impugned is otherwise not appealable. 17. Thus, the legislature, besides barring of a revision petition against an interlocutory order, by retaining Clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) section 115 of the C.P.C. has to some extent, postulated interference by the High Court even with interlocutory orders which, if had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. The retention of the existing revisional power with the restrictions contained in Clause (a) of the proviso would enable the High Court to put an end to unsustainable and protracted litigation in subordinate courts. This would, in my opinion, certainly not mean that no revision would be tenable against the order passed either in "other proceedings" or "in the course of suit" or "in appeal" for that matter which terminates the lis or other proceedings or appeal. 18. In the circumstances, the larger Bench while addressing the reference made by the learned Single Judge in Chandu Ambekar v. Digambar Kulkarni may consider the reasoning recorded by me in this order. 18. In the circumstances, the larger Bench while addressing the reference made by the learned Single Judge in Chandu Ambekar v. Digambar Kulkarni may consider the reasoning recorded by me in this order. In my opinion, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Chandrakant Ambekar v. Digambar Kulkarni (supra) is plausible and it would be possible for the High Court to entertain the revision against the orders passed by the lower Court disposing of or terminating the lis or other proceeding or appeal, if the order is otherwise not appealable, as contemplated under sub-section (2) of section 115 of the C.P.C. A plain reading of section 115 and proviso thereto in particular, in my opinion, does not anticipate a result of the revision, in a case like the one in hand, as to whether allowing of revision terminates the lis or other proceedings, but it considers the effect of an order impugned in revision and in view thereof it may have to be considered whether revision would be maintainable against the order allowing the application for condonation of delay only and not if it was rejected as held in Chandrakant Sutar v. M.K. Associates. 19. In the circumstances, the Additional Registrar (Judicial) is directed to place the matter before the Honble the Chief Justice for suitable directions along with Civil Revision Application No. 136 of 1996 Chandu Ambekar v. Digambar Kulkarni. If the reference to a larger Bench has already been made in CRA No. 136/1996, suitable directions be obtained from the Honble the Chief Justice to place this matter also before the larger Bench, which would be considering the reference made in Chandu Ambekar v. Digambar Kulkarni (CRA No. 136/96). Matter before Larger Bench. -----