TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) MOTOR Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore Rural District, has dismissed a claim petition filed by the appellant for payment of compensation for the death of Lakshminarayana in a road accident, holding that the same did not arise out of use of a motor vehicle. The correctness of that order has been assailed by the appellants in the present case. ( 2 ) THE deceased Lakshminaryana was on 7. 5. 1992 travelling by a Super Deluxe bus owned by the respondent Corporation from Secunderabad to Mysore. When the bus had reached Baralagurki village on the Bangalore-Bellary Road at about 4. 30 a. m. , a stone hurled at windscreen of the bus, smashed the glass and hit the deceased on his forehead. The deceased was immediately rushed to Devanahalli Government hospital for treatment, from where he appears to have been referred to Bangalore. While on his way to Bangalore for further treatment, the deceased breathed his last. M. V. C. No. 1331 of 1992 was filed by the widow and two sons of the deceased for payment of compensation. Their case as set out in the claim petition was that some villagers including women and children were on the fateful day standing by the side of the road and signalling the driver to stop the bus near the place of occurrence. The claim petition further alleged that the driver of the bus instead of stopping the bus took the vehicle very close to the people standing on the roadside thereby provoking them to pelt stones at the bus. The accident it was alleged had taken place on account of the rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver. It was also alleged that respondent Corporation had failed to provide adequate security to the passengers by wire meshing of the windows and/or by using toughened window glass screens. The accident having arisen out of the use of vehicle entitled the claimant to payment of compensation which was assessed at rs. 19,01,200. ( 3 ) THE claim made by the appellants was contested by the Corporation. It was, inter alia, contended that the accident in question had not occurred because of any rash or negligent driving of the bus by its driver nor had the same arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle. 19,01,200. ( 3 ) THE claim made by the appellants was contested by the Corporation. It was, inter alia, contended that the accident in question had not occurred because of any rash or negligent driving of the bus by its driver nor had the same arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle. It was further contended that the vehicle in question was a Super Deluxe Express bus with only a limited stopovers between Secunderabad and Mysore. The driver of the bus was not according to the respondent supposed to stop the bus at the place of occurrence and that the injury sustained by the deceased had been caused by a stone thrown by miscreants. The driver of the bus could not have according to the respondent avoided the accident which was described by the corporation as unexpected and unnatural. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the above pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following three issues:" (1) Whether petitioners prove that I. Lakshminarayana died while travelling in the bus No. AP 9-Z 3842 on 7. 5. 1992 at about 4. 30 a. m. near Baralagurki gate in Devanahalli taluk as a result of the negligence of the driver of that bus? (2) Whether the petitioners prove that the respondent No. 1 liable to pay compensation for the death of I. Lakshminarayana? If so, what amount? (3) What order or award?" ( 5 ) IN support of their case, the claimants examined the wife of the deceased as PW 1 and his son I. Anand as PW 2, besides relying upon documents marked Exhs. P-1 to P-18. Corporation in rebuttal examined only the driver of the bus as RW 1. ( 6 ) ON appreciation of the evidence so assembled by the parties led the Tribunal to answer the issues in the negative and dismiss the claim petition. The Claims Tribunal recorded a finding that the accident in question had taken place solely due to rash and negligent act of an outside agency not attributable in any way to the driver of the bus. The deposition of Varalakshmi, pw 1 was found to be of no assistance while determining the genesis of the accident as she was not one of the passengers travelling in the bus. The deposition of Varalakshmi, pw 1 was found to be of no assistance while determining the genesis of the accident as she was not one of the passengers travelling in the bus. Insofar as the deposition of PW 2 is concerned, although the witness was travelling in the bus with his father, his version that the driver was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle was held to be unbelievable in the absence of any material to corroborate the same. The contrary version given by the driver of the vehicle was found to be more probable by the Tribunal while holding that the driver was not in any way responsible for the accident which according to the Tribunal did not arise out of the use of the motor vehicle having been caused solely because of the act of an outside agency. ( 7 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the parties. ( 8 ) THE short question that falls for consideration is whether the accident resulting in the death of deceased Lakshminarayana arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. As to what would constitute an accident arising out of use of a motor vehicle has been the subject matter of a few pronouncements of the Supreme Court. In Shivaji dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, 1991 ACJ 777 (SC), a collision between a petrol tanker and truck had resulted in the petrol tanker turning turtle. Hours after the accident people from the neighbouring villages appear to have gathered around the tanker with a view to collect the petrol leaking from the same. While they were engaged in doing so, the tanker caught fire and exploded causing death of some of those who were standing near it and injuries to others. The question that fell for consideration was whether the accident could be said to have arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle. Answering the same in the affirmative, the court held that the collision between the tanker and the truck and the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion were events that were not unconnected or unrelated to each other. Merely because there was an interval of about four hours between the collision and the explosion did not mean that there was no relationship between the accident, explosion and the consequent death and injuries to those standing nearby. Merely because there was an interval of about four hours between the collision and the explosion did not mean that there was no relationship between the accident, explosion and the consequent death and injuries to those standing nearby. The court also rejected the contention that after the collision since the tanker had turned turtle, it had ceased to be a motor vehicle so that any explosion on account of the petrol leaking from the tanker could not be said to be an accident arising out of the use of such a vehicle. The petrol tanker, declared the court, continued to be a motor vehicle even when it had turned turtle. The claimants were on that basis held entitled to claim compensation. ( 9 ) IN Gouri Bi v. Khemraj, 1992 ACJ 623 (Karnataka), a similar question arose in a somewhat similar situation. In that case also, a tanker filled with motor spirit had toppled and fallen on the land adjacent to the Bombay-Hyderabad Highway. The driver it appears had fled the scene after the accident. Some curious passers-by ignorant of what had happened appear to have gathered near the vehicle which suddenly caught fire and burst into flames killing a number of persons standing nearby. A division Bench of this court relying upon the decision in Shivaji Dayanu's case, 1991 ACJ 777 (SC) and the decision of the house of Lords in Samick Lines Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the Antonis P. Lemos, (1985) 2 WLR 468, held that in order that an accident may be said to have arisen out of the use of a motor vehicle what is important is that there should be a connection between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident which need not necessarily be direct and immediate. ( 10 ) IN Rita Devi v. New India Assurance co. Ltd. , 2000 ACJ 801 (SC), the facts were all the more peculiar. Deceased in that case was an autorickshaw driver employed to drive the rickshaw for carrying passengers on hire. On the fateful day, some passengers hired the rickshaw, killed the driver and escaped with the booty. A claim for payment of compensation was filed by the widow of the deceased driver. The question that arose for consideration was whether the incident was an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. On the fateful day, some passengers hired the rickshaw, killed the driver and escaped with the booty. A claim for payment of compensation was filed by the widow of the deceased driver. The question that arose for consideration was whether the incident was an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Supreme Court held:" (14) Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the autorickshaw, was dutybound to have accepted the demand of fare paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the autorickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the autorickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the autorickshaw then it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the autorickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the autorickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the autorickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the autorickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing the theft of the autorickshaw. " ( 11 ) REFERENCE may also be made at this stage to Sharlet Augustine v. K. K. Raveen- dran, 1992 ACJ 1131 (Kerala) and Himachal road Trans. Corpn. v. Om Prakash, 1992 ACJ 40 (HP ). In the former case, the question was as to what constitutes 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle' in the context of an accident which involved a bus colliding against a wayside electric post. One of the passengers of the bus who was engaged in rescue operations after coming out of the ill-fated bus, got electrocuted by a stray live wire and died. The court held that there was a causal connection between the accident and the use of the motor vehicle entitling the legal heirs for payment of compensation. One of the passengers of the bus who was engaged in rescue operations after coming out of the ill-fated bus, got electrocuted by a stray live wire and died. The court held that there was a causal connection between the accident and the use of the motor vehicle entitling the legal heirs for payment of compensation. ( 12 ) IN the latter case from Himachal pradesh, a bomb was planted in Himachal road Transport Corporation bus which exploded when the bus had covered a short distance after starting from the bus stand causing injuries to some and proving fatal to other passengers. The question that arose was whether the accident arose out of the use of the motor vehicle. The answer was in the affirmative. The court held that it was the duty of the driver and the conductor of the bus to ensure that no explosive substances were allowed to be planted inside the bus by any miscreant and that the failure of the staff in charge of the bus to do so amounted to negligence in managing the bus thereby endangering the lives of the passengers. ( 13 ) WE may while concluding also refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Kaushnuma begum v. New India Assurance co. Ltd. , 2001 ACJ 428 (SC), in which the accident had resulted in the death of a pedestrian on the road on account of the bursting of the front tyre of the jeep. The tribunal came to the conclusion that there was neither rashness nor negligence on the part of the driver in charge of the vehicle. No liability, therefore, arose against the owner or the insurance company. The high Court concurred with that view. The supreme Court, however, invoked the rule of strict liability recognised in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1861-73) All ER 1 and held that the accident had occurred when the vehicle was in use and the rule of strict liability propounded in above case was applicable for claiming compensation. ( 14 ) A conspectus of the above decisions would therefore show that the term 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle' has been given a wide interpretation. What is important is that there should be a causal connection not necessarily a direct and immediate one between the use of the vehicle and the accident causing death or injuries to the claimants. What is important is that there should be a causal connection not necessarily a direct and immediate one between the use of the vehicle and the accident causing death or injuries to the claimants. An explosion that takes place hours after the vehicle has turned turtle or a case where the passengers in autorickshaw commit a crime by looting and killing the driver have thus been viewed as cases in which there is a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the death of the victim or injuries sustained by the claimant. Similarly, cases in which a passenger gets electrocuted or dies because of an explosive kept in the bus have been held to have arisen out of the use of motor vehicle. Such being the amplitude of expression 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle', it is difficult to see how an accident in which a passenger sitting in the bus is hit by a stone hurled at the bus which smashes the front windscreen and hits the passenger on the head resulting in his death cannot be said to have arisen out of the use of motor vehicle. There is no gainsaid that the accident in question could not have arisen or occurred if the deceased was not travelling in the bus on the fateful night. It is true that the injury which the deceased sustained may have been caused because of the stone hitting him on the head but it is equally true that the stone was hurled at a moving bus and not at the innocent passenger travelling in the same. The passenger was in no way responsible for provoking the stone pelting by the miscreants. The bus was attacked resulting in injuries to the passenger travelling in the same. The position is no different from an attack on a driver of the autorickshaw resulting in his death or the attack on the passengers by miscreants planting a bomb in the same. In either event, the accident occurs in relation to a motor vehicle. A causal connection is, therefore, obvious between the use of the vehicle and the accident, a factor that is crucial for a true and correct answer to the question. In either event, the accident occurs in relation to a motor vehicle. A causal connection is, therefore, obvious between the use of the vehicle and the accident, a factor that is crucial for a true and correct answer to the question. The Claims Tribunal was, in the light of what we have said above, in error in holding that the accident had not arisen out of the use of the motor vehicle and that a claim petition was not maintainable on behalf of the legal heirs of the deceased. ( 15 ) THE next question then is whether the accident in question had arisen because of any act of tort on the part of the driver or the owner of the vehicle involved in the same. The proof of fault on the part of the driver or the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident is essential having regard to the fact that the claim was a fault claim under section 166 filed before the 1994 amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act by which proof of fault was dispensed with in terms of section 163-A (2) of the said act. The decision of the Supreme Court in minn B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra nayan, 1977 ACJ 118 (SC), holds the field making proof of fault essential in cases of fault under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles act. In Kaushnuma Begum's case, 2001 ACJ 428 (SC), Apex Court has no doubt borrowed and applied the rule of strict liability as propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1861-73) All ER 1, but the facts of the case before the Supreme Court were materially different from those before us. The accident in that case had occurred because of the bursting of the front tyre of the bus killing a pedestrian. Their Lordships were of the view that the rule of strict liability could be attracted in such cases. It was at the same time made clear that the rule of strict liability is subject to certain exceptions. The rule has no application if any one of the recognised exceptions is proved. ( 16 ) THE question whether the driver of the vehicle was in the instant case guilty of any rashness or negligence and whether the rule of strict liability was applicable to the proved facts has remained obscure before the Tribunal. It is true that issue no. ( 16 ) THE question whether the driver of the vehicle was in the instant case guilty of any rashness or negligence and whether the rule of strict liability was applicable to the proved facts has remained obscure before the Tribunal. It is true that issue no. 1 framed by the Tribunal brought the alleged negligence of the driver of the bus into focus but the Tribunal appears to have approached the said issue from a different angle, namely, whether the accident had arisen out of the use of motor vehicle. This is evident from the following passage of the order passed by the Tribunal:"after thorough scrutiny and weighing of oral and documentary evidence led by both sides I come to the conclusion that the alleged incident is 'unfortunate, inevitable accident', the driver is not responsible for the same in any way and the alleged incident has not arisen 'out of the use of motor vehicle'. There is no connection, much less the direct, in respect of the injuries suffered by the victim in a motor vehicle and act of the driver. The unfortunate and inevitable accident is solely due to act of outside agency. Under the circumstances driver of the bus and respondent A. P. S. R. T. C. cannot be held responsible in view of the above discussion. " ( 17 ) WE have for the reasons set out earlier come to the conclusion that the accident in question had arisen out of the use of motor vehicle. What then remains to be examined is whether the driver of the vehicle was in any way responsible for the accident. In other words, whether the driver was in any way responsible for provoking the pelting of stones by the miscreants. That part of the controversy, in our opinion, needs a fresh look by the Tribunal in the light of the evidence already on record and any further evidence that the parties may wish to adduce in support of their respective versions. Besides a remand to the Tribunal will give an opportunity to all concerned to argue whether the principle of strict liability could be invoked in a situation like the present and, if so, whether any exception excluded its application on the proved facts. Besides a remand to the Tribunal will give an opportunity to all concerned to argue whether the principle of strict liability could be invoked in a situation like the present and, if so, whether any exception excluded its application on the proved facts. ( 18 ) IN the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal and remit the matter back to the Tribunal for a fresh order in accordance with law after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce further evidence in support of their cases. In the circumstances, however, the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .