D. S. R. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH the matter is listed under the caption "interlocutory", at the request of both sides, the main writ petition itself is taken up for hearing and disposal. ( 2 ) THE petitioners seek a declaration that the order of the 1st respondent in Re. No. 3842/95-4, dated 16-1-2003, superseding the Managing Committee of the 2nd respondent-Niddam Primary Agriculture co-operative Society, Srikakulam District (for short "the society") and appointing the 3rd respondent as person-in-charge, as illegal and arbitrary. ( 3 ) THE undisputed facts are as under: the petitioners are erstwhile elected members of the managing committee of the society and by virtue of the policy of the Government, the petitioners have been appointed as persons-incharge of the society for a period of six months and they are being continued from time to time. While so, the Registrar had issued certain instructions to the committee of persons-in-charge to keep the secretary of the society under suspension with immediate effect in relation to certain irregularities said to have been committed by him, after passing a resolution by convening a meeting of the committee. It appears that a committee meeting had been conducted and a copy of the resolution had been communicated to the registrar stating that there is no need to suspend the Secretary of the society. Consequent upon the said communication, the 1st respondent had passed the impugned order, dated 16-1 -2003. Hence, the writ petition. ( 4 ) SRI O. Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, firstly contends that the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent, whereby the 3rd respondent was appointed as person-in-charge of the society, invoking the jurisdiction under section 32 (7) (a) of the A. P. Co-operative societies Act, 1964 (for short "the Act") is improper. Hence, the writ petition. ( 4 ) SRI O. Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, firstly contends that the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent, whereby the 3rd respondent was appointed as person-in-charge of the society, invoking the jurisdiction under section 32 (7) (a) of the A. P. Co-operative societies Act, 1964 (for short "the Act") is improper. It is his further contention that under the circumstances or for the violations mentioned in the impugned order, the 1st respondent ought to have invoked the jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act and hence the impugned order passed under section 32 (7) (a) of the Act is illegal and without jurisdiction, and that consequently had the 1 st respondent initiated action under section 34 of the Act, an opportunity of making a representation would have been given to the petitioners and only after considering the explanation, if any, submitted by the petitioners, action of supersession of the committee could have been taken. It is also his further contention that even though an explanation had been made by the petitioners pursuant to the show-cause notice, the same was not considered and hence the impugned order is illegal and liable to be set aside. ( 5 ) SMT. Vijayalakshmi, the learned government Pleader for Co-operation, repelling the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that when the petitioners were found to have not followed the instructions of the 1st respondent, the authority under the Act, it is totally within the jurisdiction of the Registrar to invoke the provisions of Section-32 of the act. In support of her contentions, she relied on a judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Elakolanu Primary Agricultural co-op. Credit Society Ltd. v. Govt. of A. P. ( 6 ) IN this connection, it is to be seen from the impugned order, dated 16-1-2003, issued by the 1st respondent, that though the Chairman of the committee of persons- incharge of the society was advised to launch a criminal complaint against the Secretary of the society for the misappropriation committed by him, no such action had been initiated by the committee. The impugned order further discloses that in spite of the instructions issued by the 1st respondent, the Secretary of the society was not kept under suspension with immediate effect by passing a resolution. The impugned order further discloses that in spite of the instructions issued by the 1st respondent, the Secretary of the society was not kept under suspension with immediate effect by passing a resolution. ( 7 ) IT appears that the committee was further advised to take charge from the secretary and relieve him from the duty immediately and frame charges for the lapses committed by him. It further goes to show that the committee was directed to show cause within ten days from the date of receipt of the said show-cause notice, dated 18-12-2002, as to why the tenure of the committee should not be terminated for the inaction of the committee of persons-in- charge of the society. It is also recorded in the impugned order that despite the fact that the above mentioned show-cause notice had been issued and the receipt of the same had also been acknowledged, no explanation had been offered by the committee of persons-in-charge, within the stipulated time. Hence, it appears that by exercising of jurisdiction under Section 32 (7) (a) of the act, the 1st respondent had issued the impugned order superseding the committee of persons-in-charge ot the society and appointing the 3rd respondent as person-in- charge of the society. ( 8 ) AT this juncture, for convenience, it is necessary to extract sub-section 7 (a) and (b) of Section-32 of the Act, which is as under: sub-section (7) (a):"if there is no committee or in the opinion of the government or, the Registrar, it is not possible to call a general meeting for the purpose of conducting election of members of the committee, the government, in respect of such class of societies as may be prescribed and the registrar in all other cases may appoint a person or persons to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding six months and the Government may, on their own and the Registrar with the previous approval of the Government, extend from time to time, such period beyond six months, so however that the aggregate period include the extended period if any, shall not exceed three years. "sub-section (7) (b): the person or persons so appointed shall, subject to the control of the Government or as the case may be, of the Registrar and subject to such instructions or directions as they may issue, from time to time, have power to exercise all or any of the functions of the committee or any officer of the society and to take all such actions as may be required in the interest of the society. " ( 9 ) FROM a perusal of sub-section (7) (a) of section 32 of the Act, it is clear that if the government or the Registrar, as the case may be, is of the opinion that there is no committee or it is not possible to call a general meeting for the purpose of electing the members of the committee, may appoint a person/s to manage the affairs of the society for a prescribed period. ( 10 ) CLAUSE (b) of Sub-section (7) of section 32 of the Act makes it further clear that the person/s-in-charge, so appointed, shall function as per the instructions or directions issued by the Registrar or the government from time to time and they have to act subject to the control of the government or the Registrar. It is further made clear that such peron/s-in-charge, so appointed, have to exercise the functions of the elected committee of the society and to take all such actions that are required in the interest of the society. ( 11 ) A crucial factor to be noted in the instant case is that the present committee of the society was originally a body consisting of elected members. Subsequently, when the committee of persons-in-charge was appointed, the erstwhile elected members of the committee were also considered to be appointed as persons-in-charge, as a policy of the Government, in order to keep up the co-operative system. As a consequence of implementation of the said policy, the petitioners, who are originally elected members, have been transformed into persons-in-charge, appointed by the registrar. Therefore, for all purposes, even though the present committee was originally an elected body, presently the said committee has been functioning in the capacity of persons-in-charge. As a consequence of implementation of the said policy, the petitioners, who are originally elected members, have been transformed into persons-in-charge, appointed by the registrar. Therefore, for all purposes, even though the present committee was originally an elected body, presently the said committee has been functioning in the capacity of persons-in-charge. ( 12 ) IN view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, for convenience, it is also necessary to look into section-34 (1) of the Act, which is extracted hereunder:" (1) If in the opinion of the Registrar, the committee is not functioning properly or willfully disobeys or fails to comply willfully with any lawful order or direction issued by the Registrar under this Act or the rules, he may, after giving the committee an opportunity of making its representation, by order supersede the committee from a specified date; and appoint either a person (hereinafter referred to as the special officer) or a committee of two or more persons (hereinafter referred to as the managing committee) to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding two years, specified in the order which period, may, at the discretion of the Registrar, be extended from time to time, so however, that the aggregate period shall not exceed three years. " ( 13 ) THE above provision makes it clear that the Registrar is empowered to supersede the committee of the society, if he felt that the committee was not functioning properly or disobeying the instructions, directions or the orders issued by him. However, such supersession can be ordered only after giving an opportunity of making a representation by the committee. ( 14 ) AGAIN another significant factor, from a perusal of the above provision, to be noted, is that the expression "committee" refers to a body of elected members but not a body of persons-in-charge, appointed by the Registrar or the Government, as the case may be. ( 15 ) FROM a close perusal of the provisions of Section 32 sub-section (7) (a) and (b) vis-a-vis Section 34 of the Act, the legal position is abundantly clear to the effect that clause (a) of sub-section (7) of Sec. 32 of the Act relates to the power of the Registrar or the Government to appoint a persons-in-charge in certain contingencies. Clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 32 carves out the limitations of functioning of such person or committee of person/s-in-charge ( 16 ) AS already pointed out, such person or committee of persons-in-charge shall have to imperatively follow the directives issued by the Registrar or the Government from time to tome and can also exercise all the functions of a committee of members duly elected. ( 17 ) THERE is no other provision under the act prescribing as to what sort of action that can be initiated against the committee of persons-in-charge. The only provision that enables the Registrar or the Government to supersede the committee and the procedure to be adopted, in doing so, is traceable only under Section 34 (1) of the Act. But, it is to be noted that the expression "committee" relates to only a committee consisting of elected members. In other words, Section 34 does not empower the Registrar or the government to supersede the committee of persons-in-charge, appointed under section 32 (7) (a) of the Act. ( 18 ) IN the instant case, the peculiar circumstance, as already noticed, is that the present committee is not the elected committee but only a committee of persons- in-charge, appointed under Sec. 32 (7) (a) of the Act. In such an event, the said committee of persons-in-charge is expected to behave and act strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under clause (b) of sub-section (7) ot Section-32 of the Act. ( 19 ) WHEN admittedly the presen committee of persons-in-charge is the body appointed by the Registrar, exercising the jurisdiction available under Section 32 (7) (a) of the Act, the procedure prescribed to supersede the elected committee under section-34 is not applicable. In other words, the power available and the procedure prescribed under Section 34 to supersede an elected committee cannot be made use of against a committee of persons-in-charge appointed under Section 32 (7) (a) of the act. ( 20 ) THE further question that arises for consideration is what is the method to be adopted by the Registrar or the Government when the persons-in-charge of the committee of the society were found to have not been functioning properly, or contrary to the directions of the Registrar or the government, issued from time to time. ( 20 ) THE further question that arises for consideration is what is the method to be adopted by the Registrar or the Government when the persons-in-charge of the committee of the society were found to have not been functioning properly, or contrary to the directions of the Registrar or the government, issued from time to time. ( 21 ) AS already pointed out, a penal provision is available to the Registrar or the government under Section 34 of the Act to supersede an elected committee only, but such a power is not traceable under section 32 (7) (a) and (b) of the Act to supersede the committee of persons-in- charge, appointed by the Registrar or the government, as the case may be. ( 22 ) THE established principle is that the appointing authority has always the power to take such necessary action, as deem fit, when the instructions or directions are disobeyed or any irregularity is found, to keep any person/s to keep under suspension even though there is no express provision available under the statute. In a case where there is no specific provision under the Act, the power of the appointing authority to take corrective measures shall not be understood as totally stifled. ( 23 ) IN the instant case, the present committee, though originally elected I committee, has been functioning as committee of persons-in-charge, appointed by the Registrar, as a matter of policy. Therefore, the present committee is admittedly a committee of persons-in-charge and the appointing authority is the Registrar or the Government. Further, in the instant case, it is the Registrar who appointed the present committee of persons-in-charge. Therefore, when such appointed committee of persons-in-charge is found to have not been following the instructions or directions of the Registrar, particularly in the case of suspending the Secretary of the society, on account of certain irregularities, it is always open for the appointing authority to take action appropriately, by necessary implication. In other words, when the appointed committee is not functioning to the expectations and satisfaction of the appointing authority, it is always open for such appointing authority to supersede such appointed committee and appoint a fresh committee of persons-in-charge, invoking the explicit jurisdiction under Sec. 32 (7) (a) of the Act. However, since no specific provision is available under the Act, while superseding such appointed committee, the principles of natural justice have to be followed. However, since no specific provision is available under the Act, while superseding such appointed committee, the principles of natural justice have to be followed. ( 24 ) IT is an admitted fact that the present committee was served with a show-cause notice, dated 8-12-2002, calling for an explanation, and no explanation had been offered by the present committee, within the stipulated time. Hence, it appears that by exercising the jurisdiction under Section 32 (7) (a) of the Act, the Registrar had issued the impugned order superseding the present committee of persons-in-charge of the society and appointing the 3rd respondent as persons-in-charge of the society. Though it is contended that an explanation said to have been offered by the present committee, the same has not been made part of the record. But, it appears that the explanation was offered on 7-1-2003 i. e. , beyond the period prescribed. Though offering of explanation is in dispute, the fact remains that an opportunity of making a representation had been accorded to the present committee. ( 25 ) FURTHER, a Division Bench of this court in Elakolanu Primary Agricultural Coop. Credit Society Ltd. v. Govt. of A. P. (1 supra), held as under:"a bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly show that even assuming that the appellants herein do not stand disqualified, the same by itself cannot be a ground for their appointment as persons-in-charge. A writ in the nature of mandamus can be issued provided the writ petitioner establishes the existence of a legal right in himself and a corresponding legal duty in the respondent. Section 32 (7) of the Act does not envisage that only the erstwhile members of the Co-operative Society would be appointed as persons-in-charge. Section 32 (7) confers discretion upon the appropriate authority to appoint persons-in-charge. It is not the case of the appellants that such a discretion has been arbitrarily exercised or is abused by the respondents herein. In such a situation, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the plea of malice-in law, the Court shall not issue any directions, which run contrary to the discretionary power conferred upon the appointing authority in terms of the aforementioned clause. In such a situation, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the plea of malice-in law, the Court shall not issue any directions, which run contrary to the discretionary power conferred upon the appointing authority in terms of the aforementioned clause. ( 26 ) FOR the foregoing reasons and the above legal position, I am of the considered view that the Registrar had acted within the ambit of Section 32 (7) of the Act in superseding the present committee of persons-in-charge, consisting of the present petitioners. I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order and the same is not violative of principles of natural justice. I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. ( 27 ) ACCORDINGLY, the writ petition is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 28 ) THE order of status quo granted by this Court in W. P. M. P. No. 3734 of 2003, dated 18-2-2003, is hereby vacated.