JUDGMENT By this writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought the quashment of her termination order dated 2.7.1999 (Annexure P-3) as well as order dated 31.7.2000 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Appellate Authority dismissing her appeal. Sans unnecessary details the facts lie in a narrow compass that the petitioner was serving on the post of Acharya in the institution of respondent No.2 Saraswati High School which is a non-aided institution. As per the case of the petitioner, she was appointed vide order dated 23.7.1991 (Annexure P-1) and thereafter she did serve for a considerable period and ultimately on 2.7.1999 without assigning any reason or without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, against the principles of natural justice her services were terminated. Against her termination, she preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority who vide order dated 31.7.2000 (Annexure P-6) dismissed the appeal and confirmed the termination order. Hence this petition has been filed with a prayer to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In the return submitted by respondent No.1, it has been contended that the character and conduct of the petitioner was not in accordance to the spirit of the institution for which it has been constituted. The institution has been constituted in order to maintain high standard of Indian culture and tradition and hence after due consideration the Executives of the School passed a resolution on 29.6.1999 and in accordance to the said resolution, the services of the petitioner were terminated. However, it was not disputed that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Acharya on 23.7.1991. The respondent No.1 by filing its return submitted that the decision taken by the Appellate Authority is in consonance to the law and no inteference is required. It has been contended by Shri Vipin Yadav, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that though the institution of respondent which is a private institution and not a Government aided in institution, but, as the institution is discharging the public duties, hence it is amenable to writ jurisdiction. To bolster his submission, he as has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Neeti Shan v. Miss Hill Education Society, Lashkar, 1999 (1) MPLJ 23 .
To bolster his submission, he as has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Neeti Shan v. Miss Hill Education Society, Lashkar, 1999 (1) MPLJ 23 . The other contention of Shri Yadav is that on bare perusal of the return, it would reveal that the services of the petitioner were terminated on account of mis-conduct and if that be the position, it was incumbent upon the authorities to have conducted a detailed enquiry providing an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause and after hearing her. The action of the respondent is hit by the maxim Audi alteram partem. On these premised reasons, it has been contended by Shri Yadav that the order of termination of the petitioner cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same be quashed. True, the respondent institution is a private institution and is not a Government aided institution but merely because the services being rendered by the petitioner in a non-aided school which discharges the public duties and function would not dis-entitle her to redress her grievances in the Court of law by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Articles 226 of the constitution of India. In this context, sufficient light has been thrown by this Court in the case of Neeti Shan (supra) wherein the Single Bench of this Court has laid down the law that the teacher appointed in unaided recognized school entitled to statutory protection in regard to security of tenure. Such teacher cannot arbitrarily be subjected to rule of "hire and fire". If the ratio decidendi of the case of Neeti Shan (supra) is tested on the present factual scenario, it would reveal that here also the petitioner was serving in an institution which is recognized, but is unaided. As her services have been terminated, she has knocked the door of this Court to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The other contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is now being considered. It has been vehemently argued by Shri Yadav that without affording any opportunity of hearing and against the principles of natural justice, on account of some mis-conduct the services of petitioner have been terminated.
The other contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is now being considered. It has been vehemently argued by Shri Yadav that without affording any opportunity of hearing and against the principles of natural justice, on account of some mis-conduct the services of petitioner have been terminated. On going through the averments made in the return filed by the institution, it is gathered that a stigma has been casted on the petitioner and if that be the position, then it was incumbent upon the authorities concerned to have provided an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. As the authorities had not done this exercise, therefore, the impugned order of termination cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same is hereby quashed. The order passed in appeal Annexure P-6 is also quashed for the same reason. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages and all consequential benefits. In the result, the petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.