V. Achuthan Nair v. The Presiding Officer Labour Court
2003-07-18
D.MURUGESAN
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- The petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 4.7.81 while he was working as driver in the second respondent management. The petitioner filed I.D.No.134 of 1982 and was unsuccessful. Thereafter, he preferred W.P.No.3724 of 1984 questioning the award. This Court while allowing the writ petition remanded the matter to the Labour Court, Coimbatore for passing fresh award on merits. By award dated 13.9.93 the Labour Court found that the non employment of the petitioner was not justified since the petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 30.6.92. The Labour Court did not direct reinstatement, but directed the second respondent management to pay the monetary benefits for the period of non employment upto 30.6.92 to the petitioner. 2. Based upon the said award, the petitioner issued lawyer's notice dated 28.7.94 to the second respondent requesting for compliance of the award. The second respondent refused to comply with the award in their reply dated 12.8.94. Therefore, the petitioner filed a claim petition in C.P.No.172 of 1994 under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act claiming backwages in a sum of Rs.1,30,902/-. The second respondent contested the said claim in respect of quantum on the ground that the petitioner was allegedly employed in Mayilvaganan Motors at Kalapally from 1983 as a temporary driver on daily wage basis and therefore he was not entitled to wages from the year 1983 to 30.6.92 and the petitioner was entitled only to Rs.9,814.89 for the period of non employment upto 31.12.82. However, the petitioner denied the said claim of the second respondent as to his employment. The Labour Court having come to the conclusion that the second respondent management did not establish the claim that the petitioner was employed in Mayilvaganan Motors, had directed the second respondent to pay only 50% of the wages. The said order of the first respondent is challenged in this writ petition. 3. Mr.D.Hariparanthaman, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that when the award was passed in I.D.No.134 of 1982 dated 13.9.93 holding the non employment as not justified and by directing the second respondent to pay the petitioner all monetary benefits for the period of non employment from the date of dismissal till 30.6.92, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to reduce the amount awarded in the I.D. while considering the claim petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Hence, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order is unsustainable in the eye of law. 4. Mr.S.Ravindran, learned counsel for the second respondent, on the other hand, submitted that before the Labour Court the management examined one witness and established the fact that the petitioner was gainfully employed in one Mayilvaganan Motors as temporary driver. Therefore only, very rightly the Labour Court reduced the quantum of arrears of wages by 50%. 5. In view of the above submissions, the only question to be considered now is as to whether the Labour Court could vary the directions issued in I.D. by reducing the quantum of arrears of backwages. This question had come up before this Court on more than one occasion. In the decision in "SAMBANDAM A.R. v. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LABOUR COURT AND ANOTHER (1969 (II) LLJ 422)", this Court has held that in a petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court cannot go behind the terms of the award under which the terms of the backwages were sought to be computed. In the decision in "S.SUNDARESAN AND ANOTHER v. PRESIDING OFFICER, I ADDITIONAL LABOUR COURT, MADRAS AND ANOTHER (1988 LAB.I.C. 172)" also, this Court has taken a similar view by holding that the Labour Court cannot go into the question of entitlement of the workman for backwages when the same was considered and ordered in I.D. Recently also in the decision in "K.MURUGESAN v. MANAGEMENT OF BARAGATH INDUSTRIES AND ANOTHER ( 2002 (I) LLJ 259 )", the same view has been taken by another learned Judge of this Court. Coming to the facts of this case, it is not in dispute that the second respondent management did not raise the question that the petitioner was gainfully employed elsewhere while resisting the I.D., and allowed the Labour Court to pass an award in the I.D. with direction to pay the entire arrears of wages. Having failed to do so, the second respondent management cannot raise the said question at the time of resistance in the claim petition, though the management is entitled to raise the question while defending a claim petition in respect of the quantum of wages after the date of the award.
Having failed to do so, the second respondent management cannot raise the said question at the time of resistance in the claim petition, though the management is entitled to raise the question while defending a claim petition in respect of the quantum of wages after the date of the award. That apart, from the judgments referred supra, I am of the view that the Labour Court cannot go behind the findings in the I.D., as the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) is very limited. In this case the facts are also in favour of the petitioner. Though evidence was let in on behalf of the second respondent to contend that the petitioner was gainfully employed in one Mayilvaganan Motors, the same was disbelieved by the Labour Court. Having disbelieved the same, there is absolutely no reason given by the Labour Court to determine the arrears of backwages only at 50%. No material was relied upon by the Labour Court to reduce the amount of arrears of wages awarded in I.D. 6. For the above reasons, I find that the award of the Labour Court in reducing the quantum of arrears of wages awarded to the petitioner at 50% cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the same is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. The second respondent is directed to pay the arrears of wages as directed by the Labour Court in I.D.No.134 of 1982 to the petitioner. No costs.