Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. In view of the law laid down in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Nagpur V/s. Swaraj Development and Ors., J.T. 2003(41 S.C.C. 255, the revision petition filed by the petitioner under Section 115 CPC is not maintainable. 2. Faced with this difficulty, the learned counsel submits that the present revision petition be treated as petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The prayer made by the learned counsel is allowed. 3. The applicant-M/s Bathinda Construction Company who had filed an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance Act, 1996 for referring claim No. 4 to an Arbitrator is aggrieved against the order dated February 28, 2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bathinda and has filed the present revision petition. 4. The applicant-petitioner claims that it had entered into a contract for special repair of roads at Bathinda Military Station. As per clause No. 70, in case of any dispute between the parties, the same was to be referred to an Arbitrator to be appointed by respondent No. 1-Chief Engineer. A dispute arose between the parties. The applicant requested the respondents to appoint any such Arbitrator. However, the respondents did not appoint any such Arbitrator. Therefore, an application under Section 11 of the Act was filed. 5. The respondents contested the aforesaid application. It was claimed that claim No. 4 was not referred to Arbitrator inasmuch as the said claim pertained to a situation which was clearly excluded under Clause 70 of the arbitration agreement. 6. The learned trial Court accepted the contentions raised by respondents and, therefore, dismissed the application filed by applicant-petitioner. The petitioner has now approached this Court through the present revision petition. 7. At this stage, Clause 70 of the agreement may be noticed as follows: "70. Arbitration:- All disputes, between the parties to the contract "(other than those for which the decision of the CWE or any other person is by the contract expressed to be final and binding) shall, after written noticed by either party to the Contract to the other of them, be referred to the sole arbitration of an Engineer Officer to be appointed by the authority mentioned in the tender documents. Unless both parties agree in writing such reference shall not take place until after the completion or alleged completion of the Works or termination or determination of "the Contract under Condition Nos. 55, 56 and 57 hereof. Provided that in the event of abandonment of the Works or cancellation of the Contract under Condition Nos. 52, 53 or 54 hereof, such reference shall not take place until alternative arrangements have been finalised by the Government to get the Works completed by or through any other Contractor or Contractors or Agencies. Provided always that commencement or continuance of any arbitration proceedings here under or otherwise shall not in any manner militate against the Governments right of recovery from the contractor as provided in Condition 67 hereof." However, it may also be relevant to notice Clauses 11-B and 11-C of the agreement as follow: B) If the works be delayed:- a) by reasons of non-availability of Government stores shown in Schedule B or b) by reasons of non-availability or breakdown of Govt. Tools and plant listed in Schedule C; then, in any such event, notwithstanding the provisions herein before contained, the Accepting Officer may in his discretion grant such extension of time as may appear reasonable to him and the same shall be communicated to the Contractor by the G.E., in writing. The Decision so communicated shall be final and binding and the Contractor shall be bound to complete the works within such extended time. c) No claim in respect of compensation or otherwise, howsoever arising, as a result of extensions granted under Conditions (A) and (B) above shall be admitted. 8. The learned trial court rejected the claim made by the applicant-petitioner primarily on the interpretation of Clause 11-B and 11-C as reproduced above. 9. I have heard Sh. R.L. Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sh. S.K. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents and with their assistance have also gone through the record of the case. 10. Sh. Gupta has submitted that a perusal of Clause 11-B would show that it was only if the work was delayed by reasons of non-availability of Government stores that the claim was not referable. The claim of the applicant-petitioner pertained to the damages suffered due to delay in issuance of schedule B stores. 10. Sh. Gupta has submitted that a perusal of Clause 11-B would show that it was only if the work was delayed by reasons of non-availability of Government stores that the claim was not referable. The claim of the applicant-petitioner pertained to the damages suffered due to delay in issuance of schedule B stores. According to the learned counsel, the aforesaid situation was not covered by Clause 11-B of the agreement at all and as such the dispute was apparently referable to an Arbitrator, It was further submitted by Sh. Gupta that even if it be taken that the aforesaid dispute was covered by Clause 11-B and the decision of the Chief Engineer as per Clause 70 was to be treated as final and binding still that could be a matter which could be raised by way of defence by the defendants and it was for the Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the aforesaid defence. In any case, the reference of the dispute to the Arbitrator could not have been denied. 11. On the other hand Shri S.K. Sharma, the learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that if the matter was covered under Clauses 11-B or 11-C of the agreement, then the same was specifically excluded under the provisions of Clause 70 of the agreement and as such the dispute was not referable to the Arbitrator. 12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival pleas raised by the learned counsel for the parties. In my considered opinion, the claim made by the applicant-petitioner was wholly justified and was liable to be referred to the Arbitrator. 13. The defence raised by the respondents was essentially in the nature of a defence which could have been raised by them before the Arbitrator only. The aforesaid defence did not hit the maintainability of the claim petition but pertained only to sustainability of the claim made by the applicant-petitioner. Whether on facts and on merits the claim made by the applicant-petitioner was sustainable was essentially a matter which was to be adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator on a reference made by the respondents. The aforesaid defence did not hit the maintainability of the claim petition but pertained only to sustainability of the claim made by the applicant-petitioner. Whether on facts and on merits the claim made by the applicant-petitioner was sustainable was essentially a matter which was to be adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator on a reference made by the respondents. Clause 70 of the agreement (reproduced above) clearly shows that all disputes between the parties to the contract were required to be referred to the Arbitrator except such disputes which the Chief Engineer or any other competent authority under the contract was authorised to decide and whose decision was to be binding. Under these circumstance, the defence with regard to finality of the order on the question of delay in issuing the Schedule-B stores was essentially a question of fact which was to be decided by the Arbitrator alone. The said issue by itself could not be taken to be such a dispute which was excluded from the ambit of Clause 70 of the agreement. Accordingly, I allow the present revision petition and set aside the order dated February 28, 2002 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bathinda and direct the respondents to refer the claim of the applicant-petitioner to an Arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The respondents shall be entitled to take up all such defences as are available to them in law, including the defence of Clauses 11-B and 11-C of the agreement before the Arbitrator.