JUDGMENT S.L. Jain, J.—Invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashment of the order dated July 4, 2002 passed by the State Administrative Tribunal (for short "Tribunal") in Original Application No. 2693/2000, rejecting the claim of the petitioner for quashment of recovery of an amount of Rs. 2,78,845.00 from his retiral benefits and also against the unilateral action of the State of Madhya Pradesh for changing the date of birth from July 1, 1934 to July 1, 1924. 2. The brief resume of the facts required to be stated for disposal of the writ petition is that the petitioner having been appointed in service under the respondent No. 1 on September 1, 1950, as Primary School Teacher, retired after attaining the age of superannuation of 60 years of June 30, 1994 from the post of Head Master. He was paid provisional pension of Rs. 2,224.00 per month from July 1, 1994, accepting his date of birth to be July 1, 1934 which was recorded in the service book of the petitioner at the time of initial appointment. This very date of birth was recorded in all the gradation lists published during the service tenure of the petitioner. 3. Petitioner pleaded that State authorities conducted an inquiry behind his back and arrived at a unilateral decision of amending recorded date of birth from July 1, 1934 to July 1, 1924 and issued the pension and gratuity payment order on June 30, 1999 on that basis. In this payment order petitioner was shown deemed to have been retired on June 20, 1982 at the age of 58 years which was the then prevailing age of superannuation. In the said order, petitioner's qualifying service of 44 years was reduced to 31 years and 10 months. Other retiral benefits were calculated at proportionately reduced amount. Impugning the aforesaid action the petitioner approached the Tribunal in Original Application No. 2693/2000. 4. Combating, the allegations made by the petitioner, respondents submitted the return before the Tribunal, stating that the date of birth of the petitioner is July 1, 1924 and the same was manipulated by the petitioner in the scholar register and also in the service book as July 1, 1934. 4. Combating, the allegations made by the petitioner, respondents submitted the return before the Tribunal, stating that the date of birth of the petitioner is July 1, 1924 and the same was manipulated by the petitioner in the scholar register and also in the service book as July 1, 1934. After his retirement objections were raised by the treasury in respect of doubtful entry of the date of birth in service book and an inquiry was conducted to verify the correct date of birth. In this inquiry the petitioner was also afforded an opportunity to explain as to why his date of birth should not be treated as July 1, 1924 instead of July 1, 1934. On the basis of manipulation in the service book and scholar register the petitioner continued to work beyond his actual date of superannuation. Having continued unauthoriscdly upto June 30, 1994, the petitioner was liable to pay an amount of excess payment of Rs. 2,78,845.00 which was received by him between the period July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1994. The respondents also submitted that the original. Application is hopelessly barred by limitation. Respondents further submitted that on the basis of date of retirement of the petitioner as July 1. 1982 all the retiral dues have been settled and paid to the petitioner. 5. In order to resolve the controversy the Tribunal directed the production of the original service book of the petitioner. This service book was perused by the Tribunal and was also shown to the petitioner's counsel. 6. The Tribunal found that in the relevant page of the service book the entry of the date of birth was tampered with. The entry of the year which is given in figure has been altered. The alteration was in the last but one digit, The Tribunal also found that on the same page in the certificate appended by the District Education Officer in which it was mentioned that the date of birth of the Petitioner is July 1, 1924. The figure 24' was changed by altering digit 2' to 3'. The District Education Officer also recorded the date of birth of the petitioner in words and the last word 'chountis' also appeared to be altered, it earlier being 'choubees'. The Tribunal concluded that the entry of date of birth has been changed and tampered with. The figure 24' was changed by altering digit 2' to 3'. The District Education Officer also recorded the date of birth of the petitioner in words and the last word 'chountis' also appeared to be altered, it earlier being 'choubees'. The Tribunal concluded that the entry of date of birth has been changed and tampered with. The Tribunal also found that in the leave account of the petitioner the date of superannuation is recorded as July 30, 1979. The Tribunal did not find any alteration or change in the date of superannuation which was recorded in the leave account. At the relevant time the prescribed age of superannuation of the State employees was 55 years. Thus calculated date of birth comes to July 1, 1924. By the impugned order the Tribunal dismissed the application observing that the documentary evidence is more than sufficient proof of the fact that petitioner's date of birth is July 1, 1924 and no objection can be raised by the petitioner to the order of recovery of excess amount paid to him. 7. We have heard Shri Sheel Nagu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri P.D. Gupta, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the respondents, and also perused the annexures filed with the petition. 8. The main thrust of the contention of Shri Sheel Nagu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that in the service book of the petitioner his date of birth was recorded as July 1, 1924 but the respondents have unilaterally changed it. The finding of the Tribunal that the entry of the service book has been tampered with is based on conjectures and surmises and the same cannot be countenanced. 9. Tribunal has very carefully examined the original service book of the petitioner and found that the entry of the date of birth which was originally recorded as July 1, 1924, has been tampered with. This conclusion is also supported by the first page of leave account of service book of the petitioner, which is a part of the service book and starts from the time of entering of the petitioner in service. In this leave account the date of superannuation of the petitioner has been recorded as June 30, 1979. At the time of entering of the petitioner in service, age of superannuation of the employees of the State Government was 55 years. In this leave account the date of superannuation of the petitioner has been recorded as June 30, 1979. At the time of entering of the petitioner in service, age of superannuation of the employees of the State Government was 55 years. If the petitioner was to retire on June 30, 1979, his date of birth as per this entry comes to July 1, 1924. 10. Petitioner had also submitted copies of two pages of scholar register before the Tribunal. These documents reveal that petitioner got admission in Martand Singh High School, Rewa, on July 10, 1944 in class IX. If the contention of the petitioner that his date of birth is July 1, 1934 is believed, he was the student of class IX at the age of ten years and thus, was admitted in Ist standard when he was only one year of age. This scholar register reveals that petitioner failed thrice. Firstly, on June 23, 1947, secondly, on June 22, 1948 and thirdly on July 1, 1949. Petitioner can by no means be said to be a brilliant student. It is not his case that he had secured double promotion so as to able to have been entered in IXth class at the age of ten years. The Tribunal rightly observed that the petitioner tried to mislead it by furnishing false documents. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that admittedly in the continuation service book the date of birth of the petitioner has been recorded as July 1, 1934, but it cannot be treated as authentic as this is not service book page which was filled at the time of entering into service. This appears to have been prepared in or around the year 1972. It appears that petitioner manipulated the date of brith in the original service book prior to 1972 that is why in the continuation service book date of his birth has been recorded as July 1, 1934 on the basis of the said manipulation at the instance of petitioner, therefore, recording of date of birth in the continuation service book cannot give any advantage to the petitioner when the entry of the original service book has been found to be altered. 12. 12. Counsel for petitioner submitted that if in the original service book wrong entry was made by the official concerned and subsequently the same was corrected by over-writing, the petitioner cannot be blamed for the same and should not suffer for the same. It is surprising that a person who manipulated an alteration in the service book has cheeks to raise such contention. It has been discussed above in detail that the date of birth in the original service book has been tampered with. It appears that the petitioners has at some point managed with the official concerned who might have been incharge of the service books, and got his date of birth altered on the first page of the service book. It is apparent that the change has been made at the behest of the petitioner because the change in the service book in this manner would benefit the petitioner only and none else and it could not have been made by any one who was not interested in changing the date of birth. Thus it cannot be said that over-writing in the service book has been made to correct the error which might have crept in at the time of making the entry. 13. Learned counsel further contended that no change in the pension etc. could be made unilaterally without giving an opportunity to contest the same. Respondents in paragraph 22 of the return before the Tribunal, have specifically denied that petitioner was not given an opportunity of being heard before effecting the recovery. However, if the petitioner had any explanation to give or furnish any material to support his contention, he had ample opportunity to submit the same before the Tribunal or before this Court, but on the contrary petitioner made unsuccessful attempt to mislead the Tribunal by making false averments. If the petitioner was aggrieved and had any material to support his contention, he had liberty to make a representation before the authorities and satisfy them that his date of birth is July 1, 1934. He had ample opportunity to submit material, if any, available with him before the authorities or before the Tribunal. He did submit photocopy of the continuation service book and the copies of relevant entries made in the scholar register of Maharaja Martand High School, Rewa. He could not successfully establish that his date of birth was July 1, 1934. He had ample opportunity to submit material, if any, available with him before the authorities or before the Tribunal. He did submit photocopy of the continuation service book and the copies of relevant entries made in the scholar register of Maharaja Martand High School, Rewa. He could not successfully establish that his date of birth was July 1, 1934. He has deliberately not submitted the copy of scholar register of the primary school where he was first admitted. 14. It is true that any authority cannot make any decision adverse to any party without giving an effective opportunity of meeting any relevant allegation against him. This principle requires that every person whose right is affected must be reasonably noticed of the case he has to meet or must have furnished with the information upon which the action is based. But whether a reasonable opportunity has been given or not in a particular case will depend upon its own circumstances, there being no uniform formula or rigid rules for the same. The duty to offer a reasonable opportunity of being heard does not include any obligation to hear a party in person or through a lawyer. In this case, only an explanation regarding altered entry was involved. If the petitioner had any explanation he could have given the same by submitting a representation, and by producing the documents in support of this explanation. This liberty was available to him and his representation would have met the requirement of natural justice. Thus, the petitioner cannot say that no opportunity of hearing was given to him. 15. When in post decisional judicial review, petitioner had an opportunity to explain the facts, it cannot be said that reasonable opportunity was not available to the petitioner. 16. Yet another contention of the petitioner is that the conclusion of the Tribunal was based solely on presumption, conjecture and surmises, and it actually overstepped its jurisdiction by taking upon itself the task of ascertaining the genuineness and authenticity of the entries made in the service book by calling the original service book. It should not have stepped into the shoes of the petitioner. This contention is also bereft of any substance. The Tribunal directed to produce the original service book of the petitioner which was perused by the Tribunal and was also shown to petitioner's counsel. The conclusion of the Tribunal is based on the documentary evidence. It should not have stepped into the shoes of the petitioner. This contention is also bereft of any substance. The Tribunal directed to produce the original service book of the petitioner which was perused by the Tribunal and was also shown to petitioner's counsel. The conclusion of the Tribunal is based on the documentary evidence. Petitioner tried to mislead the Tribunal by filing the copies but the Tribunal by calling the original service book exposed the petitioner. It was the obligation of the Tribunal to reach to the truth. The finding of the Tribunal is based not only on the sound logic but also on the documentary evidence. Man may speak lie but circumstances do not. Petitioner did try to speak lie, but the documents and the attending circumstances exposed him. Thus the contention of the petitioner cannot be countenanced. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that petitioner has actually worked/served with the government from June 30, 1982 to June 30, 1994 and accordingly salary was paid to him, therefore, there was no justification in recovering the amount of salary paid to him for the duties actually discharged. 18. Petitioner cannot be allowed to take the benefit of his own wrong as his actual date of birth was known to him. The petitioner without any authority, on the basis of manipulation done in the service book, and in the scholar register continued to work beyond his actual date of superannuation, therefore, he was liable to pay back excess amount of payment made to him. In fact, having secured the advantage in the aforesaid manner the petitioner should have been saddled with the interest which Government has not done and for that petitioner ought to have been indebted to the Government instead of raising ill-founded grievance before this Court. He was certainly liable to pay back the excess amount received by him for the period June 30, 1982 June 30, 1994. 19. For the foregoing reasons, we decline to interfere either with the impugned order of order of recovery made by respondents. Petition is without any merit and as such it is dismissed in limine. Final Result : Dismissed