Public Prosecutor, High Court of A. P. , Hyd v. Pulicherla Govinda Reddy
2003-08-28
BILAL NAZKI, K.C.BHANU
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
K. C. BHANU, J. ( 1 ) THE State of Andhra pradesh preferred this appeal against the judgment, dated 7-2-2000, in S. C. No. 361/ 1999 on the file of the I Additional Sessions judge, Chittoor, whereby all the accused were acquitted of the charges levelled against them. ( 2 ) THE facts that are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are briefly stated as follows. Accused No. 1 is the younger brother of the father of P. W. 1. A2 is the wife of A1. A3 and Balakrishna Reddy and Babu Reddy are their sons. P. W. 2, who is the father of p. W. 1, quarrelled with his father on account of some property disputes and put up his family at Madras. Since then A1 enjoyed the share in the property of the father of P. W. 1. In that regard there were disputes between the family of Al and the family of P. W. 1. P. W. 1 had an extent of 17 guntas of land adjacent to his house. The land had fencing around it. On 24-4-1999 at about 5 PM, p. Ws. 1 and 2 and the deceased brought some plastic pipes and an electric motor in a tractor to be fixed to their bore-well. Then al to A3 alleging that the tractor had passed through their land warned them with dire consequences. On the next day i. e. , 25-4-1999 while P. Ws. 1 and 2 were in their house, A 1 to A 3 and Balakrishna Reddy and Babu Reddy at about 7 pm, tried to remove the fencing laid around the field of P. W. 1. They were ,also abusing P. Ws. 1 and 2. P. Ws. 1 and 2 rushed there. Al instigated others to kill them. A2, A3 and Balakrishna reddy and Babu Reddy caught hold of P. W. land A 3 dealt a blow on the side of his head with a "baaku" (knife) as a rdsult of which p. W. 1 sustained a bleeding injury. Then P. W. 2 tried to rescue his son. Al hacked htm with a knife on the right hand middle finger causing bleeding injury to him. P. Ws. land 2 raised hue and cry on hearing which neighbours came there and separated them. At about 7. 30 prn P. Ws.
Then P. W. 2 tried to rescue his son. Al hacked htm with a knife on the right hand middle finger causing bleeding injury to him. P. Ws. land 2 raised hue and cry on hearing which neighbours came there and separated them. At about 7. 30 prn P. Ws. l and 2 narrated the deceased about the incident that had taken place half an hour before. Then the deceased wanted to question the accused about their high handedness. He left for the house of the accused persons. As he approached the land of Chinnakka, which was situated between the land of the accused and P. W. 1, a1 to A3 and Balakrishna Reddy and Babu reddy came in the opposite direction from their house armed with stick, knife etc. Al instigated others to kill the deceased. A 1 to a 3 caught hold of the deceased and A 3 stabbed him on his throat with the "baku" (a knife fitted to a stick ). They chased PWs. 1 and 2 also to some distance and scuttled from the scene of occurrence. Then P. W. 1 lodged a report-Ex. P 1 at 9 pm on the same day with the police. The police registered a case and investigated into. After usual investigation, P. W. 16 filed a charge sheet. As balakrishna Reddy and Babu Reddy were juveniles, they were tried in a Juvenile Court. Six charges were framed against A 1 to A3 firstly against A 1 to A 3 under Section 148 IPC, secondly against A 1 and A 3 under Section 324 IPC for voluntarily causing hurt to P. Ws. 1 and 2, thirdly against A 2 under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC, fourthly against A 3 under Section 302 IPC, and fifthly against A 1 and A 2 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The accused denied their guilt. On behalf of its case, the Prosecution examined 16 witnesses and marked 28 documents besides M. Os. 1 to 10. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record came to the conclusion that, since the family of the accused and p. W. 2 were inimically disposed against each other, it is not safe to rely upon the evidence of P. Ws.
1 to 10. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record came to the conclusion that, since the family of the accused and p. W. 2 were inimically disposed against each other, it is not safe to rely upon the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 and accordingly acquitted all the accused by its judgment, dated 7-2-2000, questioning the legality and correctness whereof the State came up with this appea. l. ( 3 ) LEARNED Public Prosecutor contended that the evidence 6f P. Ws. 1 and 2 would clearly show that A3 caused the death of the deceased and prior thereto A 1 and A 3 caused injuries to P. Ws. 1 and 2, that there was moonlight at the time of incident, that since the deceased was going to the house of the accused to question them, it was but natural for P. Ws. 1 and ,2 to follow him and witness the incident, that merely because p. Ws. 3 to 6 did not support the case of the prosecution the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 cannot be discarded, and that the trial Court without assessing their evidence simply observed that clue to the inimical relationship between the two families their evidence cannot be believed, and so the impugned judgment should be set aside and the accused convicted. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused contended that as the incident took place in the night and since admittedly there were no lights at that time the accused could not have been identified, that in view of the hostile relationship between the two families, there was every possibility of P. Ws. 1 and 2 implicating the accused falsely which is why the trial Court rightly did not keep reliance upon their evidence, and that there are no grounds to interfere with the order of acquittal. ( 4 ) WE are conscious of the fact that in an appeal against acquittal, jurisdiction of the appellate Court is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference has to be made with the order unless the approach made by the trial Court to the consideration of evidence is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by it is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judicially and is liable therefore to be characterized as perverse.
It is also well settled that where two views are possible and the view taken by the Court below is plausible, appellate Court cannot legally interfere with the order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the trial Court is erroneous. Bearing the above principles of law in mind, we shall scrutinize the evidence on record with a great deal of circumspection. ( 5 ) P. W. 16 the Inspector of Police held inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of PWs. 13 and 14 who turned hostile. P. W. 12 conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased. He found an incised injury over right supra clavicle fosse above the medial end of right clavicle and he opined that this injury would appear to have caused the death of the deceased. He issued Ex. P. 15-post-mortem certificate. On the basis of this unchallenged medical evidence, we hold that the death of the deceased was homicidal. ( 6 ) THE incident took place in the field of chinnakka adjoining whose land the accused owned some land in which they constructed a house. Though P. Ws. 3 to 6 were projected as ey-witnesses to the incident, they turned hostile. The remaining evidence is only of P. Ws. 1 and 2. Since A1 and his brother Krishna Reddy were enjoying the share of the property of P. W. 2, there were long standing disputes and both families had hostile relationship. In this background, the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 has to be scrutinized carefully. ( 7 ) IN Bahal Singh v. State of Haryana air 1976 SC 2032 : (1976 Cri LJ 1568) the apex Court has held that in the case of a chance witness, even if he is a relative or a friend of the victim or is inimically disposed of towards the accused, his evidence although looked upon with suspicion, should not be straightway disbelieved but should be examined with caution and close scrutiny. Learned Public Prosecutor relied upon a decision in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of Delhi 2002 SCC (Cri) 728 : (2002 Cri LJ 1844) wherein it is held that the evidence of a witness cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that he is partisan or interested or both if his evidence is otherwise found to be credible.
Learned Public Prosecutor relied upon a decision in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of Delhi 2002 SCC (Cri) 728 : (2002 Cri LJ 1844) wherein it is held that the evidence of a witness cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that he is partisan or interested or both if his evidence is otherwise found to be credible. In another decision in Bijoy singh v. State of Bihar 2003 SCC (Cri) 1093 : (2002 Cri LJ 2623), on which the learned public Prosecutor also placed reliance, the apex Court has held that merely being a relative of the deceased or the injured is no ground to reject the testimony of a witness who is otherwise found to be trustworthy and reliable. ( 8 ) KEEPING the above principles in mind, we now proceed to scrutinize the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 with circumspection. The trial Court did not properly appreciate and marshal their evidence. It just rejected their evidence on the ground that their family and the family of the accused had long standing disputes. ( 9 ) P. W. 11 examined P. Ws. 1 and 2 at 10 pm on the date of incident. He found an incised injury over the scalp of and a linear scratch over the right leg of P. W. 1 and a cut injury over the right middle finger of P. W, 2. Nothing has been elicited from this witness to discredit his testimony. Before accepting the evidence of an injured witness, his evidence must be examined from the following angles - (a) whether the alleged injury was received. in the course of same transaction, (b) whether the accused was previously known to the injured, (c) whether there was sufficient light at the place and time of the incident to identify the accused, and (d) whether the injury found on the witness rules out self infliction. ( 10 ) IT is an admitted fact that the accused and P. Ws. 1 and 2 and the deceased are closely related. P. Ws. 1 and 2 stated that half an hour before the death of the deceased, they had received injuries at the hands of the accused. They informed about the same to the deceased. When the deceased went to question the accused about that incident, he was done to death.
1 and 2 and the deceased are closely related. P. Ws. 1 and 2 stated that half an hour before the death of the deceased, they had received injuries at the hands of the accused. They informed about the same to the deceased. When the deceased went to question the accused about that incident, he was done to death. Therefore, the later incident is a continuation and consequence of the previous incident and thus both incidents form part of the same transaction. Nothing has been elicited from their cross-examination to rule out the fact that they received injuries at the hands of the accused. It was not even suggested to these witnesses that they received the injuries at some -other place and in some other manner and by some other persons. The reason for the accused to cause injuries to p. Ws. 1 and 2 was that on the date of incident when the accused tried to highhandedly remove the fencing laid around their land, they objected them. At the instigation of Al, A2 and A3 and the other two sons of Al, beat these witnesses. The evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 corroborates each other s in this respect and further the evidence of P. W. 1 is further corroborated by Ex. P1-F. I. R. lodged by him immediately after the incident. Therefore, we hold that P. Ws. 1 and 2 were injured witnesses in this case. Now the question is whether they were eye-witnesses to the main incident of causing the death of the deceased and could identify the accused as assailants of the deceased. ( 11 ) P. Ws. 1 and 2 stated that within half an hour of being injured, they informed about that incident to the deceased. As the deceased wanted to question the accused about it, he was proceeding towards the house of the accused. P. Ws. 1 and 2 followed him. On the way the deceased was attacked. Therefore, the presence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 at the time and place of the incident was not by chance. They were the most natural witnesses to be present there. Just because there was enmity between the accused and P. Ws. 1 and 2, their evidence cannot be brushed aside.
On the way the deceased was attacked. Therefore, the presence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 at the time and place of the incident was not by chance. They were the most natural witnesses to be present there. Just because there was enmity between the accused and P. Ws. 1 and 2, their evidence cannot be brushed aside. A person high-handedly removes the fence laid around the land of other persons and causes injuries to them when they object him; the brother of the injured persons goes a little later to the house of that person to question him about it: the injured persons follow their brothe. r; on the way the brother is attacked by the person; the injured persons witness the attack-the presence of the injured at that time and at that place is quite natural and so is acceptable and convincing. ( 12 ) THE deceased was attacked in the field of Chinnakka which was situated in between the houses of the accused and the deceased as spoken to by P. Ws. 1 and 2 and also as evidenced by Exs. P21 and P23 observation report and rough sketch respectively. P. W. 16 seized bloodstained earth from that place, as corroborated by P. W. 8 who was a mediator for the seizure. This evidence on record clearly establishes that the incident in question took place in the field of Chinnakka. ( 13 ) THE incident took place at 7. 30 p. m. P. Ws. 1 and 2 admitted that there were no electric lights at the time and place of the incident, but they stated that there was moonlight. Since P. Ws. 1 and 2 and the accused are close relatives, there should be no difficulty for P. Ws. 1 and 2 to identify the accused and more so when they were chased to some distance by the accused after killing the deceased. Therefore, we hold that P. Ws. 1 and 2 could identify the assailants of the deceased in the moonlight. ( 14 ) NOW coming to the main incident, P. W. 1 stated that at the time of incident, A1 was armed with a stick having nails to it, a3 was armed with a knife and A2 was armed with a stout stick. Al instigated A2 and A3 and his other two sons to kill the deceased.
( 14 ) NOW coming to the main incident, P. W. 1 stated that at the time of incident, A1 was armed with a stick having nails to it, a3 was armed with a knife and A2 was armed with a stout stick. Al instigated A2 and A3 and his other two sons to kill the deceased. Al to A3 caught hold of the deceased and A3 stabbed him on his throat with the knife M. O. 1 as a result of which the deceased collapsed on the spot. Then the accused chased P. Ws. 1 and 2 to some distance and fled the scene of occurrence. The medical evidence shows that the injury. which could be caused by a weapon like M. O. 1, received by the deceased was the cause of his death. The evidence of P. W. 1 is corroborated by that of P. W. 2 on all material particulars. ( 15 ) ON his arrest A3 made a confessional statement before P. W. 16 in the presence of p. Ws. 9 and 10 leading to the discovery of m. O. 2 his bloodstained shirt. Though P. W. 9 did support the Prosecution, P. W. 10 did. M. O. 2- was seized under Ex. P12 in pursuance of the confessional statement. ( 16 ) WHILE A3 was charged under Section 302, Al and A2 were charged for the murder with the aid of Section 34, IPC. It has to be seen whether Al and A2 shared the common intention to kill the deceased. Section 34, IPC lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. It is well settled that the common intention in this Section presupposes prior concert which is to be proved either from conduct or from circumstances or from any incriminating facts. It requires a pre-arranged plan. because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. ( 17 ) P. W. 1 stated that A1 was armed with a stick having nails to it and A2 was armed with a stout stick.
It requires a pre-arranged plan. because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. ( 17 ) P. W. 1 stated that A1 was armed with a stick having nails to it and A2 was armed with a stout stick. A1 and A2 caught hold of the deceased and A3 stabbed the deceased with a knife. P. W. 2 did not say that A1 and A2 were armed with weapons when the deceased was attacked. A1 and a2 did not cause or attempt to cause any injuries to the deceased. It is not a case of pre-planned attack by the accused. It appears that thinking that the deceased was coming to attack him, A3 attacked him. Had al and A2 too wanted to kill the deceased, they would have also attacked the deceased. They did not take any undue advantage of the situation. Therefore, it cannot be said that they shared common intention with A3. Hence, we hold that the charge against A1 and A2 under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC is not proved, but the charge under Section 302 against A3 is proved, because he caused fatal blow to the deceased. ( 18 ) AS regards the charge under Section 148, IPC, when P. Ws. 1 and 2 objected to the accused and the other two sons of A1 removing the fence, the P. Ws. 1 and 2 were attacked. Their assembly cannot be termed as an unlawful assembly. Therefore, we hold that the charge under Section 148 is not proved beyond all reasonable doubt. ( 19 ) COMING to the charge against Al and a3 under Section 324 and against A2 under section 324 read with Section 34, IPC, it is in the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 that A3 dealt a blow on the right side of the head of p. W. 1 with the knife and Al dealt a blow with the knife on the right hand middle finger of P. W. 2. A2 did not cause any Injuries to either of these witnesses. She did not take undue advantage of the situation also. It cannot therefore be said that she shared the common intention with Al and A3. At the spur of moment, when P. Ws.
A2 did not cause any Injuries to either of these witnesses. She did not take undue advantage of the situation also. It cannot therefore be said that she shared the common intention with Al and A3. At the spur of moment, when P. Ws. 1 and 2 had a quarrel, Al and A3 caused the injuries. Therefore, we hold that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge under section 324 read with Section 34 IPC against A2 but has proved its case against al and A3 under Section 324, IPC. The incident took place more than four years back. The injuries sustained by P. Ws. 1 and 2 are simple and P. W. 11, the Doctor who treated them, did not say that these witnesses were treated as in-patients in the hospital. Considering the overall circumstances of the case, we feel that instead of sending A1 and a3 to jail at this juncture, to meet the ends of justice fine can be imposed. ( 20 ) IN the result, A3 is convicted under section 302, IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of rs. 1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand Only ). He shall surrender himself forthwith to serve the sentence. Al and A3 are convicted for the offence under Section 324, IPC for causing injuries to P. Ws. 1 and 2 and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- each (Rupees five Thousand Only) within six weeks and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. The impugned judgment is modified accordingly and the appeal is thus allowed in part. Appeal partly allowed.