ORDER : Shivaraj V. Patil, J. - The tenant of the premises in question is the appellant before us. The respondent filed a petition seeking eviction of the appellant from the premises under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short "the Act"). The respondent pleaded that he purchased the property in question with a view to start consultancy service in that place, being an Orthopaedic Surgeon working as Assistant Professor in the Department of Orthopaedic Surgeon in J.J.M. College at Davangere. The appellant, a "dhobi", is carrying on his occupation in that premises for the last several years. The trial court, on consideration of the evidence, held that the requirement of the respondent was bonafide and reasonable and that if the order of eviction is refused, the respondent will be put to greater hardships than the appellant. In that view of the matter, it passed an order of eviction against the appellant. The appellant took up the matter in revision under Section 50 of the Act before the District Judge. The learned District Judge, on re-appreciation of the evidence on record and in the light of the contentions advanced, concluded that the trial court committed an error in recording a finding in favour of the respondent, both on the ground of bonafide and reasonable requirement as well as on comparative hardships, having due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. This time, the respondent filed a further revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908 (for short "the Code") challenging the validity of the order of the learned District Judge before the High Court. The High Court, by the impugned order, found fault with the order passed by the learned District Judge and reversed the same; in the result, it restored the order passed by the trial court maintaining the order of eviction passed against the appellant. Hence, this appeal. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court committed a serious error in interfering with the order passed by the learned District Judge, exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. The learned counsel pointed out that the scope of Section 50 of the Act in revision is wider than the scope of the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. The learned counsel pointed out that the scope of Section 50 of the Act in revision is wider than the scope of the jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. Although under Section 50 of the Act, a revision is provided but the powers under Section 50 of the Act are wider as compared to the powers given under Section 115 of the Code. In that, not only the legality but correctness of the findings recorded by the trial court could be examined in the first revision under Section 50 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the learned District Judge, as can be seen from the order passed by him, has examined the material placed on record appropriately and rightly concluded that the order of eviction passed against the appellant was not sustainable. The learned counsel added that the High Court interfered with the order of the learned District Judge merely by saying that the learned District Judge committed an error of record and that the learned District Judge was mostly influenced by the fact that the dimensions of the premises were so small that it was impossible for an Orthopaedic Surgeon to have it as a consultancy place. The High Court did not point out as to what was the jurisdictional error or the material irregularity so as to interfere with the order passed by the learned District Judge. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned District Judge has elaborately dealt with as to the bonafide and reasonable requirement of the respondent and has given sufficient reasons to show how the premises in question was not suitable having regard to the dimensions of the premises and the nature of the consultancy that the respondent wanted to have in that place. 3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent made submissions supporting the impugned judgment. The learned counsel contended that the appellant never pleaded either in the written statement or questioned during the course of examination of the witnesses that the requirement of the respondent was not bonafide or reasonable. 3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent made submissions supporting the impugned judgment. The learned counsel contended that the appellant never pleaded either in the written statement or questioned during the course of examination of the witnesses that the requirement of the respondent was not bonafide or reasonable. All that was emphasised was that having regard to the dimensions of the premises in question, it was not suitable for consultancy as stated by the respondent; it was for the respondent to decide in which premises he had to start the consultancy; whether the respondent should have a bigger place or should be satisfied with the premises in question depended on his affordability; the respondent has no other suitable premises for the purpose of his consultancy; it is no doubt true that the respondent has got a house and his family is a joint family; in the house, he cannot carry on the consultancy service. 4. We have considered the respective contentions urged on behalf of the parties. We have no hesitation in taking a view that the impugned order cannot be sustained. The learned Judge of the High Court has not indicated how any error of jurisdiction is committed by the learned District Judge. All that the learned Judge has stated is that the learned District Judge has committed an error of record without pointing out what was that error of record. With regard to the dimensions of the premises, the learned Judge has observed that the learned District Judge was influenced by the fact that the dimensions of the premises were small and so it was impossible for the Orthopaedic Surgeon to have it as a consultancy place. As is clear from the order passed by the learned District Judge, the learned District Judge was not simply influenced by the dimensions of the premises but he has recorded the reasons and has shown how the premises was not suitable having regard to the dimensions of the site and also taking note of the fact that out of it, even certain portions have to be left for the construction of staircase, which fact is evident from Ext. P-1, the sale deed, under which the respondent purchased the property in question. The learned District Judge has also indicated how the appellant would be put to greater hardships when compared to that of the respondent. P-1, the sale deed, under which the respondent purchased the property in question. The learned District Judge has also indicated how the appellant would be put to greater hardships when compared to that of the respondent. It may not be necessary for us to repeat what is stated by the learned District Judge in the order but we are satisfied that the order of the learned District Judge was well justified looking to the reasons stated therein. This Court in D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, (1969) 3 SCC 807 : (1970) 2 SCR 368 while dealing with Section 115 of the Code has observed: (SCC pp. 811-12, paras 4-5) "The mass of reported cases only serve to show that the High Courts do not always appreciate the limits of their jurisdiction under this section. The legal position was authoritatively laid down by the Privy Council as far back as 1894 in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, (1885) 11 IA 237 : ILR (1885) 11 Calcutta 6 (PC) . The Privy Council again pointed out in Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, (1916-17) 44 IA 261 : AIR 1917 PC 71 that this section is not directed against the conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. This view was approved by this Court in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissan Chamria, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 23 : 1953 SCR 136 and has since been reaffirmed in numerous decisions. The position thus seems to be firmly established that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 115, it is not competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order.... Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. It was not contended, as indeed it was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order.... Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to the case in hand. The words 'illegally' and 'with material irregularity' as used in this clause do not cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in which it is reached." In this view, the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code could not have interfered with the order passed by the learned District Judge having regard to the material that was placed on record. On the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that it was for the respondent to choose the premises, we may only say that suitability is judged with a view to find out whether the requirement of the respondent was bonafide and reasonable. If this premises itself is not suitable for the purpose for which the eviction is sought, then it follows that the requirement itself was not bonafide. Thus, viewed from any angle, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned order and it is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside. The civil appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned District Judge is restored. 5. No costs.