N. V. RAMANA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are 17 in number and claim to be the legal heirs of late smt. Sakina Bai Haji Abdulla, who leased out her land in an extent of 1225 Sq. yds. situated in Municipal No. 10-3-5, mehdipatnam Cross Roads, Hyderabad, to m/s. Esso Standard Refining Company of india Limited [presently M/s. Hindustan petroleum Corporation Limited (for short the Corporation ), have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the following relief: to pass an order or orders, more particularly, one in the nature of writ of mandamus, declaring the action of the respondent-Corporation in occupying and to be in possession of the premises (land) bearing Municipal No. 10-3-5, Mehdipatnam, cross Road, Hyderabad, belonging to the petitioners, as unconstitutional, arbitrary, illegal and without any authority of law, and violative of Articles 14, 19 (1 ) (g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India, and consequently direct the respondent to hand over the premises to the petitioners, and pass such other order or orders in the interest of justice. ( 2 ) WHEN the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation took notice and sought ten days time to file counter. Thereafter, at his request, the matter was adjourned two times. On 28-4-2003, when the writ petition came up for admission, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the subject-matter of this writ petition is squarely covered by the judgment of the apex court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dolly Das as also the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court in w. P. No. 21004 of 2000, dated 5-7-2001. This fact is not disputed by the learned standing Counsel for the Corporation, and while admitting that the Corporation has implemented the judgment of this Court in w. P. No. 21004 of 2000, however, he submitted that though they filed a writ appeal before a Division Bench of this Court, no stay has been granted, and requested some more time to file counter. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on five occasions at the request of the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation. Ultimately, counter was filed on behalf of the respondents. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on five occasions at the request of the learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation. Ultimately, counter was filed on behalf of the respondents. ( 3 ) ON 18-7-2003, though the writ petition was listed under the caption "for admission", both the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Standing Counsel agreed for disposal of the writ petition itself on merit, and accordingly, they advanced their arguments for final disposal of the writ petition. ( 4 ) BEFORE we set out the arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties, it would be convenient to make a note of the factual matrix of the matter, which runs thus: in the affidavit, filed in support of the writ petition, by one Sri. M. Srinivas Rao, who claims to be the Power of Attorney Holder of the petitioners, it is stated that in the year 1975, late Smt. Sakina Bai Haji Abdulla (hereinafter referred to as the landlady ) leased out the land in question in favour of m/s. Esso Standard Refining Company of india Limited [presently M/s. Hindustan petroleum Corporation Limited (for short the corporation ), initially for a period of five years w. e. f. 1-4-1975 for carrying on business in petroleum and petroleum products, on a monthly rent of Rs. 450. 00. After expiry of the initial lease period, the landlady, by lease deed dated 22-4-1980, extended the period of lease in favour of the corporation, by another ten years, commencing from 1-4-1980 and expiring on 31-3-1990. According to the petitioners, as per Clause 1 (f) of the lease deed, it was agreed to by the Corporation to deliver vacant possession of the leased premises on expiry of the lease period. While the terms and conditions of the lease being so, it is stated that during the currency of the lease period, the landlady, left to her heavenly abode in the year 1987. ( 5 ) IT is the case of the petitioners that after the death of landlady in the month of october, 1987, the Corporation stopped making payment of the rents, and in spite of their executing indemnity bond and fulfilling the formalities as required by the corporation, they did not make payment of the rents, and on the contrary, the Chief regional Manager of the Corporation vide communication dt. 13-3-1990, in purported exercise of powers under Sections 5 and 7 (3) of the E. S. S. O, (Acquisition of undertaking in India) Act, 1974, has informed the petitioners that the Corporation has got the statutory right of renewal of lease for a further period of ten years from 1-4-1990 to 31-3-2000 on the same terms and conditions as that of the earlier leases, to which the petitioners claim to have replied the Corporation by way of legal notice demanding them to vacate the premises. Immediately, thereafter, the Corporation by their letter dated 18-3-1990 informed the petitioners that they exercised their right of renewal for another period of ten years. It is the case of the petitioners that the corporation without entering into any lease deed with the petitioners have unilaterally exercised their right of statutory renewal and extended the period of lease by another ten years from 1 -4-1990 to 31 -3-2000, and even after expiry of the said lease period, and despite the petitioners issuing legal notice dated 25-9-2000, the Corporation instead of vacating the premises has replied to the legal notice stating that they are entitled for renewal of the lease for another period of ten years. It is this action of the Corporation, which the petitioners seek to challenge in the writ petition. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the respondents, the chief Regional Manager of the Corporation filed counter. It is contended that merely because the tenant (Corporation) is a government of India Undertaking, it is not open for the petitioners to seek the remedy of writ petition for their eviction. Inasmuch as the writ petition raises disputed questions of fact, the remedy of the petitioners, if any, is to approach the competent civil court and file suit. The Corporation did not pay rents to the petitioners as they failed to produce strict proof of their legal heirship to the late landlady. Inasmuch as the Special Officer and Competent Authority under the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 vide his proceedings dated 14-6-1990 has declared that the land leased out to the corporation, is surplus land, and the appeal preferred thereagainst dismissed by the appellate authority, it is contended by the corporation that the petitioners cannot claim to have any absolute right over the property, and it is always open to the Government to acquire the same for public purpose. ( 7 ) THE petitioners filed reply-affidavit to the counter. The petitioners denied the contention of the Corporation that they have not produced strict proof of their legal heirship to the late landlady, and in support of their plea that they are the actual legal heirs of late landlady, the petitioners filed xerox copies of Death Certificates of the late landlady and her three sons, namely late Sri. Anwar AN Abdulla, Sri. Ramzan Ali Abdulla habib Abdulla Fazal, who also died during the currency of the unilateral third lease, the legal Heir Certificate issued by the Mandal revenue Officer, Asifnagar, and the proceedings before the Special Officer and competent Authority and the Chief commissioner of Land Administration to show that the said authorities have recognized the petitioners as legal heirs of the late landlady. The petitioners further denied the contention of the Corporation that the land leased out to the Corporation was declared as surplus, and submitted that the chief Commissioner of Land Administration vide his proceedings dated 2-12-2002 held that the land leased out to the Corporation is a protected land. In that view of the matter, the petitioners submit that they have absolute right over the property and as legal heirs of the late landlady, they can seek eviction of the Corporation from the premises leased out to them by the late landlady in the year 1975. ( 8 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing counsel for the respondents-Corporation. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that the late landlady is the original owner of the land in question, which she leased out to the Corporation in the year 1975 for a period of five years from 1-4-1975 to 31-3-1980. Thereafter, the landlady extended the lease in favour of the corporation by another ten years from 1 -4-1980 to 31 -3-1990. It may be noted that during the currency of the second lease period, the landlady died leaving behind her, her three sons and two daughters, namely petitioner Nos. 8 and 12. Thereafter, the landlady extended the lease in favour of the corporation by another ten years from 1 -4-1980 to 31 -3-1990. It may be noted that during the currency of the second lease period, the landlady died leaving behind her, her three sons and two daughters, namely petitioner Nos. 8 and 12. After the expiry of the second lease period, the Corporation requested the sons of the landlady for extension of the lease period by another ten years, and on their refusal to do so, the corporation unilaterally and without entering into any formal lease deed with the sons of the late landlady or the petitioners, extended the lease period by another ten years from 1 -4-1990 to 31 -3-2000, and despite expiry of the said period, the Corporation has neither paid the rents from the month of October, 1987 to the petitioners nor delivered vacant possession of the premises to the petitioners and continued to illegally squat on the property. The petitioners submit that they being legal heirs of the late landlady and her sons, are entitled to seek eviction of the corporation from the premises in question, and they are entitled to maintain writ petition when there are no disputed questions of fact involved and all the facts stand admitted, and in support of this submission, he placed reliance on the judgment of the apex Court in hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dolly Das. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Corporation having entered into the property in question under the grab of a lease in the year 1975 and despite expiry of the authorized second lease period and the purported statutory lease period, they are still continuing in the premises without paying any rents, despite producing strict proof of their relationship and legal heirship to the late landlady, and on the contrary are requesting them to renew the lease for another period of 20 years on mutually agreed terms. The continuance of the Corporation in the premises without paying any rents and squatting over the property even after expiry of the successive lease periods, according to the petitioners, is illegal and arbitrary. The learned counsel submitted that the corporation being a Government of India undertaking should be fair and reasonable in its dealings. The continuance of the Corporation in the premises without paying any rents and squatting over the property even after expiry of the successive lease periods, according to the petitioners, is illegal and arbitrary. The learned counsel submitted that the corporation being a Government of India undertaking should be fair and reasonable in its dealings. He, submitted that a learned single Judge of this court in similar facts situation and against this very Corporation, allowed W. P. No. 21004 of 2000, filed by the landlords, by his order dated 5-7-2001, and directed the Corporation to vacate the premises, and though a writ appeal was filed thereagainst by the Corporation, no stay was granted by the Division Bench, and the corporation has also delivered vacant possession of the premises to the landlords therein. ( 10 ) THE learned Standing Counsel for the corporation vigorously contended that inasmuch as the Corporation having entered the premises in question under a lease deed executed by the late landlady, and is continuing therein even after the expiry of the extended lease periods, they have attained the status of a tenant at sufferance, and if at all, the petitioners are desirous of having them evicted from the land in question, the only remedy available to them is to approach the competent civil court and file suit for eviction, and merely because the tenant (Corporation) is a Government of india Undertaking, the learned Standing counsel submits that the petitioners cannot be permitted to avoid the procedure established by law, and allowed to maintain the writ petition for eviction of the corporation, and more particularly when the writ petition raises disputed questions of fact, and in support of this contention, the learned standing Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the apex court in State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents placing reliance on the judgment of the apex court in Hindustan petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dolly Das, on which even the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance submitted that in the absence of any constitutional or statutory right being involved in the writ petition, the same is not maintainable, be it for enforcement of contractual obligations against a State. He further submitted that the corporation is entitled for renewal of lease for another period of 20 years. He further submitted that the corporation is entitled for renewal of lease for another period of 20 years. The learned standing Counsel submits that inasmuch as the land leased out to the Corporation has been declared as surplus, the petitioners cannot be said to have any right over the land, and the Government is always at liberty to acquire the same for public purpose. ( 11 ) THE learned Standing Counsel for the corporation while admitting non-payment of rentals by the Corporation to the petitioners submitted that after the death of the landlady in the year 1987, the Corporation addressed several letters on 17-9-1987, 13-3-1990, 7-10-1996 and 1-3-2000 to those who claimed legal heirship to the late landlady to provide necessary details to enable them to pay the rentals, but the petitioners neither provided the details nor complied with the formalities prescribed therefor, and therefore, the Corporation has not paid rentals to the petitioners. He submitted that unless and until the petitioners provide strict proof of their relationship and legal heirship status with the late landlady, the question of paying rents to them does not arise. Inasmuch as the Special Officer and competent Authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling) act, 1976 vide his proceedings dated 14-6-1980 had declared the property in question, which was leased out to the corporation, as surplus, and the appeal preferred thereagainst by persons who claimed to be legal heirs of late landlady, dismissed, the learned Standing Counsel submits that the petitioners cannot claim to have any absolute rights over the property, and it is always open to the Government to acquire the property declared as surplus for public purpose. ( 12 ) BEFORE proceeding to adjudicate the various rival contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it may be examined whether this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India, can give a direction to the Corporation (tenant), which is an instrumentality of the State, to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises belonging to a private individual, and more particularly, when the writ petition filed does not raise any dispute questions of fact and all the factual aspects of the matters stand admitted and undisputed by the respondents. In this context, a reference to the judgment of the apex court in Hindustan petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dolly Das, would be apposite. In this context, a reference to the judgment of the apex court in Hindustan petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dolly Das, would be apposite. In the said judgment, the apex court having considered similar question as is confronted by this court in the present writ petition, held thus:. . . . . . Where interpretation of a contract arises in relation to immovable property and in working such a contract or relief thereof or any other fallout thereto may have the effect of giving rise to an action in tort or for damages, the appropriate remedy would be a civil suit. But if the facts pleaded before the court are of such a nature which do not involve any complicated question of fact needing elaborate investigation of the same, the High Court could also exercise writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution in such matters. There can be no hard and fast rule in such matter. When the High court has chosen to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the constitution we cannot say that the discretion exercised in entertaining the petition is wrong. (Emphasis supplied) ( 13 ) IT may be noticed whether in the instant case, there does exist any complicated disputed questions of fact, precluding this court from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India for evicting the corporation from the land in question even though the statutory period of lease expired. It is the admitted case of the Corporation that they extend into the premises in question by reason of a lease deed having been executed in their favour by the landlady in the year 1975, for a period of five years, w. e. f. 1-4-1975 to 31-3-1980, on a monthly rent of Rs. 450. 00, and after expiry of the said lease period, the landlady extended the period of lease by another ten years from 1 -4-1980 to 31 -3-1990. And thereafter when the sons of the late landlady refused to extend the lease period as requested by the corporation, the Corporation without entering into any formal lease has unilaterally exercised their statutory right of renewal for another period of ten years commencing from 1-4-1980 and ending on 31 -3-1990. And thereafter when the sons of the late landlady refused to extend the lease period as requested by the corporation, the Corporation without entering into any formal lease has unilaterally exercised their statutory right of renewal for another period of ten years commencing from 1-4-1980 and ending on 31 -3-1990. It is further the admitted case of the Corporation that during the currency of the second lease period, the landlady died in the month of October, 1987 and immediately after her death they did not make payment of rents either to the petitioners or to the government, and that after expiry of the second lease, when their request for extension of lease was rejected by the sons of the late landlady, they exercised their right of statutory renewal and extended the period of lease for the third time, for another period of ten years from 1 -4-1990 to 31 -3-2000. It is even admitted by the Corporation that before expiry of the purported statutory lease, they vide their letter dated 1-3-2000 expressed their desire of having the lease extended on mutually agreeable terms, and that even after expiry of the purported statutory lease period, they did not vacate the premises and that as on today there is no lease either subsisting or existing in their favour, and they are in occupation of the premises in question only as a tenant at sufferance. When it is the admitted case of the corporation, which is a statutory authority, that they entered into the premises in question as a tenant in the year 1975 under the grab of lease for a period of five years, and having enjoyed two extended period of leases for 10 years each, one on mutually agreed terms and the other invoking their statutory right of renewal, can it be said that they are still entitled to continue in the premises and are entitled for renewal of lease for another period of ten years, and can it be said that the Corporation should be treated like any other ordinary citizen for its eviction from the premises in question, by the procedure established by law, and can the petitioners, having regard to the fact that there being no factual dispute in the matter, be relegated to the remedy of civil court for eviction of the Corporation from the premises in question. The answer to all these questions should be in the negative. ( 14 ) THOUGH the learned Standing counsel for the Corporation submitted that disputed questions of fact are involved in the writ petition, in fact, he has not disputed any of the factual aspects of the matter narrated above, and on the other hand, it his admitted case that the Corporation is not claiming any right over the property, that there is no lease either subsisting or existing between the parties, and that they are continuing in possession of the premises in question only as a tenant at sufferance. He also does not dispute the fact that after expiry of the two agreed lease periods, the Corporation has exercised their statutory right of renewal for another period of ten years from 1 -4-1990 to 31-3-2000, and thereafter they are in possession of the premises without there being any lease deed executed in their favour by the petitioners. When once it is the admitted case of the Corporation themselves that there does not exist any lease either subsisting or existing between the parties to continue in the premises in question, it should be held that the Corporation have no manner of right to continue or squat over the premises in question after expiry of the statutory lease period, and they cannot be allowed to take shelter on technicalities for their eviction and allowed to contend that the remedy of the petitioners, if any, to evict them from the premises in question, is to approach the civil Court and file civil suit. Though the Corporation entered into the premises in question under the garb of a lease deed executed by the late landlady in their favour for five years in the year 1975, it may be noticed that it continued to remain in possession of the premises for a period of 25 years - first 15 years under two agreed leases, and another ten years in purported exercise of their statutory right of renewal, now the fact remains, which is admitted and not disputed by the Corporation that as on today there is no lease either subsisting or existing between the parties or any agreement between the parties for them to be governed, disabling this court to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India. It may be noticed here that the apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum corpn. Ltd. v. Dolly Das while interpreting the provisions ot Sections 7 and 5 of the caltex [acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil refining (India) Limited] Act, 1977, which are analogous to the provisions of Sections 5 and 7 of the E. S. S. O. (Acquisition of undertaking in India) Act, 1974, whereunder the Corporation exercised their right of statutory renewal, held that renewal of lease could only be for one term and no more, but nevertheless it could be contended that the covenant for renewal was also part of the lease and, therefore, stood incorporated in the renewed lease arising under the Act. But in the instant case, even though the statutory period of lease expired on 31-3-2000, the corporation instead of handing over vacant possession of the premises to the petitioners, is seeking to exercise its statutory right of renewal once again, which cannot be permitted. ( 15 ) IT may be noticed that a learned single Judge of this court in W. P. No. 21004 of 2000, vide his judgment dated 25-7-2001, in relation to this very same Corporation, having considered the self-same question as is involved in this writ petition in the light of the judgments of the Orissa High Court in smt. Dolly Das v. Hindustan Petroleum corporation Limited, the judgments of the apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum corporation Limited v. Dolly Das, Union of india v. Harriam Shamji Thakker and chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima das held: it is not in dispute that the lease between the parties viz. , the writ petitioner and the Hindustan Petroleum corporation Limited is no more in existence, but the contention of the company is that it is in occupation of the land as a tenant at sufferance, and therefore, the company has to be ejected through process of law and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of india and the petitioner cannot approach this court under Article 226 seeking relief of ejectment. The facts as already stated are not in dispute. The facts as already stated are not in dispute. When once it is stated that the petitioner has no valid lease as on the date and it is squatting on the property as a tenant-at-sufferance, can it be said that the company can still contend that the owner of the property should go to the civil court and indulge in costly and prolonged litigation. There is no dispute that the lease does not subsist any further after 1993. In similar situation, the Division Bench of Orissa High court held that the HPCL was not a tenant holding over, but a trespasser. Even when a slight dispute is raised for the sake of dispute, this court is entitled to adjudicate the same in order to render substantial justice to the parties and mere technicalities will not preclude this court from exercising the extraordinary power when the situation warrants. ( 16 ) THE learned single Judge while rejected the contention of the Corporation that it should be treated to be as good as any other litigant, and therefore, in its ejectment from the property leased to them, the landlords should follow the process of ejectment before the civil court, held: herein is a case, the premises was leased out to the company in 1953 and the lease was enjoyed by the company for four decades and still the company contends that it is entitled to squat on the property as a tenant-at-sufferance and that it should be evicted by due process of law. The learned counsel for the company contends that the company is as good like as any other litigant and therefore the process of ejectment before the civil court has to take place. I am unable to appreciate this contention. The company is not an ordinary person against which the civil proceedings can be initiated, but it should be remembered that it is an instrumentality of the State amenable for writ Jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution enjoins upon the company to act fairly and reasonably. More over, in the case on hand, none of the disputed questions arise for consideration. The Constitution enjoins upon the company to act fairly and reasonably. More over, in the case on hand, none of the disputed questions arise for consideration. The attitude of the company appears to be that it would rather obey the decrees of rejectment passed by the civil court rather than the constitutional commands of this court under article 226 of the Constitution of india, little ealizing that the actions of HPCL being instrumentality of the state should conform to the requirement under Article 14 of the constitution even in contractual sphere also. (emphasis supplied) ( 17 ) IT is admitted by the learned Standing counsel for the Corporation that in the writ appeal filed against the above judgment of the learned single Judge, no stay has been granted, and the Corporation has also implemented the said judgment and also delivered vacant possession thereof to the petitioners therein. In the instant case also it is the admitted case of the Corporation that there does not exist any valid lease having been executed by the legal heirs of the landlady in their favour after expiry of the statutory lease period, and their continuance in the property is in the nature of a tenant at sufferance, when such is the case of the corporation, it does not lie in the mouth of the Corporation to contend that the landlords have to evict them only by following the procedure established by law, that is by filing suit for eviction before the competent civil court, and not by way of a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India before this court. When there are no complicated or disputed questions of fact involved, and all the facts stand admitted and undisputed, it would be illogical and a mockery of justice, to drive a party who leased out his premises to the Corporation in good faith, to the remedy of civil court to prove the facts which already stand admitted and claim delivery of his possession. If the petitioners are driven to the remedy of the civil suit before the civil court at this distance of time, the petitioners would suffer undue hardship for leasing out their land to the Corporation. If the petitioners are driven to the remedy of the civil suit before the civil court at this distance of time, the petitioners would suffer undue hardship for leasing out their land to the Corporation. The corporation having been bound by the terms and conditions of the lease, was expected to honour and respect them and deliver vacant possession of the premises on expiry of the lease, the Corporation should not be oblivious to the fact that it is an instrumentality of the State and every action of its should be above board, fair, reasonable and conform to the requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The attitude of the Corporation advising the petitioners to invoke the remedy of Civil suit if they intended to have them evicted and have possession of their own property, which they leased to the Corporation in good faith, does not behave of their status. It should be noticed, that the landlady leased out the land to the Corporation in good faith with a fond hope that she would earn some means for heir living. Had the landlady known that the Corporation would not have vacated the premises on expiry of lease and would have harassed her and her children and dragged them to fruitless, costly and prolonged litigation, she and, for that matter, no prudent person would have come forward or be willing to lease out their land to the corporation. The corporation having enjoyed the property of the petitioners for more than 25 years, now cannot be allowed to contend that their eviction should only be by following the procedure established by law, and more so when their present possession is not under any valid lease and is illegal, which is admitted to by the Corporation themselves. The Corporation being a mighty instrumentality of the State cannot compare itself with an ordinary weak citizen, and contend that any eviction of theirs from the premises in question, should only be in accordance with the procedure established by law through a duly constituted suit. ( 18 ) I am unable to subscribe to the contention of the Corporation that the petitioners have not come up with proper proof to show that they are legal heirs of the late landlady. ( 18 ) I am unable to subscribe to the contention of the Corporation that the petitioners have not come up with proper proof to show that they are legal heirs of the late landlady. It may be seen that the petitioners in support of their plea that they are legal heirs of the late landlady, produced death Certificates of the late landlady as also her sons. They also relied on the proceedings before the proceedings under the Urban Land (Ceiling) Act, 1976 before the Special Officer and Competent Authority as also the Commissioner of Land administration, wherein the names of the sons of the late landlady find place. It is not as if there are any rival claims as regards the legal heirship to the landlady by any third parties. Had there been any rival claims from any other persons claiming to be the legal heirs of the late landlady, the Corporation would have been justified in not paying rents to the petitioners. On the contrary, the corporation has itself entered into correspondence with the sons of the late landlady and the petitioners for renewal of leases after the expiry of the leases in their favour. Had the petitioners not been the legal heirs of the late landlady, there would have been no occasion for the Corporation to request them to renew the leases on their expiry. The exchange of communication and correspondence between the parties is enough indicia to hold that the Corporation has recognized the sons of the late landlady and the petitioners as legal heirs of the late landlady. It may be further noticed that the petitioners in support of their claim for rents have also executed indemnity bond, and in spite of execution of such bond, the corporation has not paid them the rents. The petitioners produced Family Member certificate issued by the Mandal Revenue officer, Asifnagar, Hyderabad, to show that they are part of the family of the late landlady. The materials filed by the petitioners in support of their claim clearly establish the fact that they are the only surviving legal heirs of the late landlady. In that view of the matter, the contention of the corporation that the petitioners have not produced any material to establish the fact that they are legal heirs of the late landlady, cannot be accepted. In that view of the matter, the contention of the corporation that the petitioners have not produced any material to establish the fact that they are legal heirs of the late landlady, cannot be accepted. The contention of the corporation that inasmuch as the declaration made by the Special Officer and competent Authority that the land leased out to the Corporation, is surplus, was confirmed in appeal, the petitioners cannot claim to have any absolute right over the property in question, also cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the Commissioner of land Administration vide his proceedings dated 2-12-2002 held that the land leased to the Corporation is not surplus land, but a protected area. In that view of the matter, the petitioners cannot be said to have no right over the property in question. ( 19 ) IN the result, the writ petition deserves to be allowed, and it is accordingly allowed. Having regard to the fact that the corporation is running a retail petrol outlet, and directing them to vacate the premises immediately, would affect their interests adversely, I deem it appropriate to direct the corporation to deliver vacant possession of the land to the petitioners within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.