Judgment S.N.JHA, J. 1. Whether movement of Veneer within the State of Bihar or outside the State requires transit permit under the Forest Laws iS the question for consideration in this writ petition. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Woodman Industries V/s. State of Bihar , 2000 (1) Pat LJR 275 : (2000 Cri LJ 1075) has already answered the question in the affirmative holding that Veneer is fashioned wood and therefore timber and forest produce within the meaning of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 . However, when the writ petition came up for hearing before a learned single Judge, accepting the submission of the counsel for the petitioners and the intervenor respondents the learned Judge referred the case to Division Bench for reconsideration of the said decision and that is how the case came up for hearing before this Bench. 2. The case of the petitioners, briefly, is as follows. Petitioner No. 1 is an association of plywood manufacturers in the State of Bihar while other petitioners are doing manufacturing business in plywood etc. For manufacturing plywood etc.. They require veneer. Veneer is manufactured from logs. The logs are taken to the mill where they are sectioned in sizes according to requirements. After removing barks the naked pieces are fitted in the peeling machine and by mechanical process (which is not necessary to describe) thin layers of timber are taken out. These thin layers are further cut into piece in sizes according to requirements which is known as Veneer. It is a finished product brought into existence by human labour and a mechanical process. It is a distinct commodity having distinct name and character. As a result of the aforesaid manufacturing process it ceases to be a produce of nature i.e. forest produce. It therefore cannot be called timber or wood . The petitioners being manufacturers of plywood, transport veneer under mill chalan to their factories either within the State of Bihar or outside the State. Before being taken out of the factory excise duty is paid on the manufacture of veneer. Further case of the petitioners is that no rule or regulation has been framed by the State Government nor there is any enactment authorising the officers of the Forest Department to interfere with the manufacture/transport of veneer from one place to another. Before being taken out of the factory excise duty is paid on the manufacture of veneer. Further case of the petitioners is that no rule or regulation has been framed by the State Government nor there is any enactment authorising the officers of the Forest Department to interfere with the manufacture/transport of veneer from one place to another. However without any authority of law they insist on obtaining of transit permit for taking veneer from one place to other either within the State or outside the State on the plea that veneer is a forest produce and as such the Department is competent to issue transit permit without which it cannot be moved from one place to another. 3. The case of the State is that Veneer is a forest produce within the meaning of Sec. 2(4} and (6) of the Indian Forest Act read with Rule 2(Kha) of the Bihar Kasth Tatha Anya Van Utpadan Abhivahan Ka Niyamawali, 1973 i.e. Bihar Timber and Other Forest Produce Transit Regulation Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Transit Rules). It also falls under the definition of wood in Sec. 2(K) of the Bihar Saw Mills (Regulation) Act, 1990. Veneer is made from logs. It is not the final product. It is only fashioned wood peeled form of logs like beams etc. used as raw material for making plywood etc. obtained from trees in forest. It is actually thin layer of timber brought into existence by peeling machine from logs. Sec. 41 of the Indian Forest Act authorities the State Government to frame rules to regulate transit of forest produce and accordingly Transit Rules have been framed in the State of Bihar under which the forest officials are obliged to check vehicles and demand transit permit non compliance whereof is a non cognizable offence for which the person concerned may be arrested. Further, in terms of the order of the Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 202/95 no saw mill, plywood and Veneer industry is supposed to run without registration with the Forest Department and for this reason too the officials of the Forest Department are obliged to check and seize the vehicle to find out whether the consignee is registered with the Department or not. 4. Shri Y.V. Giri, learned counsel for the petitioners, made the following submissions. 4. Shri Y.V. Giri, learned counsel for the petitioners, made the following submissions. The Transit Rules under which permits are required to be obtained for movement of forest produce from one place to another applies to specified forest produce, namely, wood of the size and description specified in Clause (Kha), fuel wood, sewai grass catechu (katha), gum and grasin, seeds and fruits, rots and barks described in clauses (Ga) to (ha) of the Rules. Veneer being a distinct product, and not specified therein, is not covered by the Rules. The Rules apply to primary forest product. Veneer which is the end product having a distinct identity is the result of human labour and mechanical process and it falls outside the mischief of the Rules. Sec. 41 of the Forest Act under which Transit Rules have been framed authorises the State Government to make rules for regulating transit of forest produce. Not being a forest produce in its natural form it falls outside the rule making power itself of the State Government. This aspect was not considered by the Division Bench in Woodman Industries case (2000 Cri LJ 1075) (Supra). The Forest Act refers to the stage when the produce is in its natural form. The second stage is marketing stage when the forest produce are brought into market with respect to which another law, namely , Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, 1990 has been enacted. The said Act contains a list of forest produce in the schedule in which veneer does not find place. Even in the Indian Forest Act Veneer does not find place. Sec. 2(4) of the Forest Act provides a controlled definition of the term forest produce read with definition of timber of clause (6). The Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act is a post Constitution law which would prevail over the Indian Forest Act. The Forest Act in fact stands repealed under Art. 395 of the Constitution of India except to the extent saved under Art. 372. So far as Transit Rules are concerned, even if it is held that veneer comes under the definition of wood (Kasth), it would appear from the definition clause that wood of only a particular description is covered by the term and therefore merely because veneer can be called wood, it would not fall within the mischief of the Transit Rules. So far as Transit Rules are concerned, even if it is held that veneer comes under the definition of wood (Kasth), it would appear from the definition clause that wood of only a particular description is covered by the term and therefore merely because veneer can be called wood, it would not fall within the mischief of the Transit Rules. The respondents therefore cannot insist on the petitioners obtaining transit permit for movement of veneer from one place to another within the State of Bihar or outside the State. Counsel referred to various decisions to which reference will be made at the appropriate place hereinafter. 5. On behalf of the State Shri A. P. Ittu, learned Standing Counsel No.2, referred to the dictionary meaning of Veneer and submitted that Veneer is nothing but a kind of forest produce It is not the end product as submitted on behalf of the petitioners, it is rather a raw material for making plywood which comes under the description of fashioned timber in Sec. 2(6) of the Indian Forest Act and would therefore be a forest produce under Sec. 2(4) of the said Act. It has been so held by a Division Bench in Woodman Industriess case (2000 Cri LJ 1075) which does not require any reconsideration. Apart from the Woodman Industries case, reliance was placed on Dr. D.D. Sharma V/s. Hart Prasad, 1997 (2) Pat LJR 619, M/s. Ranchi Timber Traders Association V/s. State of Bihar, 1997 (2) Pat LJR 673 : ( AIR 1998 Pat 31 ) , Md. Mokhtar Ahmad alias Md. Mokhtar V/s. State of Bihar, 1995 (2) Pat LJR 149 and Gajjan Mal Mohan Lall v. State of Himachal Pradesh , AIR 1957 Him Pra 5. Reference was also made to orders of the Supreme Court in a Public Interest Litigation in the case of T. N. Godavarman Thirumalpad V/s. Union of India, giving directions from time to time for preserving the forest, environment and ecology of the country, it was submitted that the fact that such directions were extended to veneer industries indicates that Veneer industries are treated on par with other industries relating to forest produce. 6. 6. Counsel appearing for the intervenor respondent adopted the submissions of Shri Y.V. Girl and in addition submitted that movement of vehicles carrying forest produce can be controlled only by Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act en- acted "with the assent of the President of India and Veneer not being a specified item in the schedule thereof, officials of the Forest Department have no authority to check the vehicle and/or demand transit permit. Insistence on transit permit amount to violation of Art. 301 of the Constitution of India. 7. In order to appreciate the submissions of the Counsel for the parties I would first like to refer to the definition of the term forest produce in the Indian Forest Act. Sec. 2(4) whereof defines the term as under: "forest produce" includes (a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood-oil, resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, mahua flower, mahua seeds and myrabolams, and (b) the following when found, in or brought from a forest , that is to (i) trees and leaves, flower and fruits, and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees, (ii)to(iv) ......................... The term Timber has been separately defined in clause (6) as under : "timber" includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled, and all wood whether cut up for fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not. " 8 From a bare reading of the above definition it would be manifest that items tim- ber, charcoal etc. mentioned in sub-clause (a) of Clause (4) "whether found, in or brought from a forest or not" and items mentioned in sub clause (b) such as trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce of trees not mentioned thereinbefore "when found, in or brought from a forest" would be forest produce within the meaning of the term. Similarly, timber an item mentioned in sub-clause (a) includes trees one of the items specified in sub-clause (6) "when they have fallen or have been felled", and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not. It would thus appear that the term has been given the widest possible meaning. Similarly, timber an item mentioned in sub-clause (a) includes trees one of the items specified in sub-clause (6) "when they have fallen or have been felled", and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not. It would thus appear that the term has been given the widest possible meaning. Dwelling upon the meaning and scope of the term forest produce this Court in Woodman Industries case (2000 Cri LJ 1075) observed as under: "Sec. 2(4) of the Act has been couched in the widest possible terms. Firstly, the use of the term includes suggests that the description of forest produce is not exhaustive. There may be many more items which though not mentioned therein may still be forest produce. It is settled law that the word includes is generally used as a word of extension, and when used in an interpretation clause it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the word or phrase occurring in the body of the statutes. Secondly, as if this was not sufficient, the legislature has used the words "Whether ......or not" which removes any doubt whatsoever in this regard as to the scope and amplitude of the term." This Court relied on earlier Bench decision in Shanker Traders v. State of Bihar, 1997 (2) Pat LJR 24 : ( AIR 1998 Pat 68 ), and a decision of the Orissa High Court in Kasi Prasad Sahu V/s. State of Orissa, AIR 1963 Orissa 24, In the latter case, the Orissa High Court held that use of the words "or not" suggests that the goods of the description given in the Section would be forest produce whether they are found in the forest or not, or whether they are brought from a forest or not. 9. Submission; on behalf of the petitioners however, is that by reason of the mechanical process and human labour put in a new product having altogether distinct identity comes into existence and therefore, notwithstanding the wide definition of the term "forest produce" or timber in the Indian Forest Act, veneer cannot be called timber or forest produce. In support of the contention reliance has been placed on decisions in Ganesh Trading Co. Karnal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1974 SC 1362 , State of Orissa V/s. Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 1293 and M/s. Mukesh Kumar Aggarwal & Co. In support of the contention reliance has been placed on decisions in Ganesh Trading Co. Karnal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1974 SC 1362 , State of Orissa V/s. Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 1293 and M/s. Mukesh Kumar Aggarwal & Co. V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh , AIR 1988 SC 563 . The decisions aforesaid were rendered in the context of taxation statutes and therefore, are of no help to the petitioners. In the case of M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. (supra) the Punjab General Sales Tax Act provided for exemption from sales tax on sale of paddy provided purchase tax was levied on it before it was sold. The petitioners carried on business of buying paddy and after getting it dehusked either, in their own mills or another mills selling rice to the Government and other registered companies . They claimed exemption from sales tax on sale of rice on the ground that rice is nothing but dehusked paddy i.e. both paddy and rice are identical goods and therefore when law grants exemption in respect of paddy, that exemption is also available to transactions relating to rice. Question which arose for consideration was whether paddy and rice can be considered identical goods for the purpose of imposition of sales tax. Repelling the contention the Supreme Court held that the Sales Tax laws primarily deal with dealers who are engaged in commercial activities and therefore what is of essence is to find out whether in commercial circle paddy is considered as identical with rice. The Court referred to precedents on the point and held that as paddy and rice are separate commercial entities, they cannot be treated at par with each other and therefore exemption allowed in the case of paddy is not available in the case of rice. The case of Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd.. ( AIR 1985 SC 1293 ) (Supra) also a case under the Sales Tax Act. The dispute arose in the context of notification under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, inter alia, increasing the rate of sales tax on sale of logs by the forest contractors. The forest contractors had already been assessed to sales tax on sales of seized logs. ( AIR 1985 SC 1293 ) (Supra) also a case under the Sales Tax Act. The dispute arose in the context of notification under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, inter alia, increasing the rate of sales tax on sale of logs by the forest contractors. The forest contractors had already been assessed to sales tax on sales of seized logs. Question arose as to whether they could be subjected to sales tax at the increase rate at the time of sale of timber by the State Government to the forest contractors. The Court held"that timber and sized or dressed logs are one and the same commercial commodity. Beams, rafters and planks would also be timber. As the sales of dressed or seized logs by the forest contractors and already been assessed to sales tax, the sales to the forest contractor of timber by the State Government from which logs were made by the said contractor was not liable to sales tax as it would amount to levying tax at two points in the same series of sales by successive dealers. The case of M/s. Mukesh Kumar Aggrawal & Co., ( AIR 1988 SC 563 ) (Supra) again was decided in the context of a taxing statute namely M. P. General Sales Tax Act. While timber carried tax @ 16%, for other goods included in the schedule tax was @ 10%. For firewood the tax was @ 3%. The contention of the assessee was that what was sold by it was the left over of eucalyptus trees after extraction of substantial timber in the form of poles and bailies and therefore the goods in question were nothing but firewood which carried tax @ 3%. The contention did not find favour with the High Court. Allowing the appeal of the assessee the Supreme Court held that "in a taxing statute the words which are not technical expressions or words of art, but are words of everyday use, must be understood and given a meaning , not in their technical or scientific sense, but in a sense as understood in common parlance i.e. that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it. Such words must be understood in their popular sense. Such words must be understood in their popular sense. The particular terms used by the legislature in the denomination of articles are to be understood according to the common, commercial understanding of those terms used and not in their scientific and technical sense "for the legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists or geologists or botanists. "Adverting to the case in hand the Supreme Court held that the term timber has an accepted and well recognised legal connotation and is nomen juris. It has also a popular meaning as a word of everyday use. In the circumstances, being left overs after extraction of the poles and bailies what remained could not be called timber so as to attract 16% rate of tax. The appeal of the assessee was thus allowed holding that it would be liable to pay tax on the goods in question at the rate applicable to firewood i.e. 10. It would thus appear that decision in all these cases were rendered in different context. As a matter of fact, the decision rendered in the context of tax statutes can not be a safeguide for interpreting regulatory laws. A taxing statute is to be strictly construed. There is no equity about tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read, in nothing is to be implied. Another aspect is that in taxing statutes goods are referred to by distinct names. Courts have held that where particular commodity has a definite commercial identity it has to be understood in that sense and not otherwise. This principle cannot be applied in the context of dispute under the forest laws where the words have been used as terms of art and understood in the same sense as defined in the Act notwithstanding that they may have different marketable identity in commercial world. 11. On behalf of the petitioners reliance was also placed on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Tuni Merchants Association V/s. Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Hyderabad, AIR 1997 Andh Pra 163. The point for consideration in that case was whether cashew or cashew nuts are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2{ii)(g) of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act if they are obtained from cashew trees on private land . The point for consideration in that case was whether cashew or cashew nuts are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2{ii)(g) of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act if they are obtained from cashew trees on private land . It was not the case of the petitioners that cashew nuts irrespective of the source would not be a forest produce which is evident from para 2 of the judgment. The definition of the term forest produce in Sec. 2(ii)(g) of the Act itself referred to items "when found in, or brought front a forest ". The Court held that cashew nuts by themselves cannot be forest produce in popular or commercial parlance. It is not that cashew trees are grown only in the forest. Holding thus the Court observed : "Even assuming that the learned counsel for the petitioner is right in his submission, there can be no doubt that cashew nut obtained from the cashew plantations grown in the forest area is forest produce. It does not require much of argument to say that forest produce includes any and every type of produce obtained from the plantation or trees grown in the forest area. This proposition has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for petitidher." It would thus appear that the decision far from helping the petitioner rather helps the State. In any view the case was decided on facts, the Court having found that cashew nuts had been obtained directly from trees on the raiyati lands held that could not be called forest produce. 12 Before dealing with other submissions of the counsel it would be appropriate to refer to the case of Union of India V/s. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96 , relied upon on behalf of the petitioner in support of the preposition that it is not the duty of the Court to either enlarge the scope of legislation or intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the reason that it has no power to legislate. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the reason that it has no power to legislate. It is not necessary to refer to other observations occurring in the judgment which were made in the context of a dispute relating to pension of a retired High Court Judge who had put in five years ten months and seventeen days service as Judge of the High Court and had opted for pension under Part I of the First Schedule to the High Court Judges (Condition of Service) Act,. 1954. The High Court reading the words "less than seven years" as more than five years" in the provision upheld the claim. In this context while setting aside the decision the Supreme Court made the aforementioned observations. The decision therefore is of no relevance in the present case. 13. The submission that veneer is not specified item in the schedule of Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, is completely misconceived. The said Act has been enacted for regulating in the public interest the trade and other related matter of certain forest produce by creation of a State monopoly in such trade. It is for that purpose that items the trade of which has to be regulated have been specified in the schedule. In the instant case we are not concerned with the trading and/or other related matters with respect to Veneer and therefore by no stretch of logic the provisions of the said Act can be taken in aid so as to make the provisions of Transit Rules inapplicable to veneer. As indicated above, Transit, Rules have been framed under Section 41 of the Indian Forest Act. That Section empowers the ,State Government to make rules to regulate the transit of all timber and other forest produce" Unless the officers of the Forest Department are vested with the power to check the vehicles, inspect the articles laden thereon, the movement and transit of timber and other forest produce cannot be effectively regulated and therefore the petitioners cannot contend that the officials of the Forest Department have no power to check the vehicles and take consequential action in appropriate cases against them. 14. 14. The view which I have taken about the applicability of the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, was expressed earlier by a Division Bench in M/s. Ranchi Timber Traders Association V/s. State of Bihar, 1997 (2) Pat LJR 673 : ( AIR 1998 Pat 31 ) . Therein the Court observed that Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, 1984 has been enacted for the purpose of providing monopoly to the State in trade of specified forest produce, the Bihar Saw Mills (Regulation) Act, 1990 has been enacted to control the activities of the millers of the saw mills while the Transit Rules control the transit of forest produce from the place of its cutting to the place where it is transported for consumption or other use. There is no provision in the two Acts for controlling the transit from cropping point to the saw mills or to other place for consumption and other use. 15. Coming back to the Transit Rules, as indicated above, they are applicable in terms, to wood, sewai grass, cashew, gum, resin, seeds and fruits, roots and barks of the description given respectively against those items. The definition of Wood in Rule 2(Kha) , may in particular be noted as under : (Vernacular matter omitted............ Ed.) In view of wide definition of the term I fail to understand as to how veneer would not come within the scope of the term wood. It is to be kept in mind that the Transit Rules are intended to regulate the transit of the forest produce and a narrow interpretation would defeat the object of the rule. 16. Reference may also be made to the Bihar Saw Mills Regulation Act, 1990. The said Act has been enacted in public interest to regulate the trade of sawing for the protection and conservation of forest and environment. The term wood has been defined therein to Include "trees when they have fallen or have been felled, and all Wood of any species whether cut, converted, fashioned , sawn or hollowed out for any purpose or not. The object underlying the Act cannot be achieved unless transit of wood is also simultaneously regulated. It is for plugging illicit felling and trading of forest produce that these Acts and Rules have been framed and a truncated approach would result in lop sided implementation of the relevant provisions. 17. The object underlying the Act cannot be achieved unless transit of wood is also simultaneously regulated. It is for plugging illicit felling and trading of forest produce that these Acts and Rules have been framed and a truncated approach would result in lop sided implementation of the relevant provisions. 17. Veneer, as contended on behalf of the petitioner, is certainly not a part of the tree in its natural form. It is the result of a mechanical process and human labour. It is also true that it is a distinct commodity in commercial world. But it is not correct to say that it is the end product or final product. It is in fact a raw material for making plywood. This, however, is not the true test. The true test, in my opinion , is whether it is a forest produce. In terms of Sec. 2(6) of the Forest Act all wood whether fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not are timber and therefore forest produce under Sec. 2(4). Merely because layers are extracted by mechanical process or as a result of human labour it does not mean that it looses its identity as timber. In these premises I do not think the decision in Woodman Industries case (2000 Cri LJ 1075) requires reconsideration. It has therefore to be held that dispute or issue raised in the case is covered by the decision in that case. 18. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed.