GOPALA KRISHNA TAMADA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned II Additional sessions Judge, Karimnagar in S. C. No. 477 of 1996 dated 5. 2. 1997, whereby the appellants-A1 and A2 were convicted of the offences under Section 304-B, 498-A, 306 of I. P. C. and each of them were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven years for the offence under Section 304-B of I. P. C. ; imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two months for the offence under Section 498-A of I. P. C. ; and rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days for the offence under Section 306 of i. P. C. They were also convicted for the offence under Section 4 of the dowry Prohibition Act and sentenced to undergo six months imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days. All the sentences were directed to be run concurrently. ( 2 ) THE case of the prosecution, according to the evidence let in during the course of trial, is that one Vijaya (hereinafter referred to as the deceased ) was the second daughter of P. W. 1-Kolakani Papaiah and she was given in marriage to A1 two years prior to the date of offence. At the time of marriage, P. W. 1 agreed to pay Rs. 25,000/- towards dowry to the accused but paid Rs. 5,000/- only promising to pay the balance at the time of Deepavali festival. Immediately after the marriage, the deceased was taken to the house of the accused and there, A1 and the deceased lived happily for some time and thereafter the appellants-A1 and A2 started harassing the deceased for the balance amount of dowry. On coming to know of this, P. W. 1 went to the house of the accused and brought the deceased to his house. Subsequently, when A1 went to the house of P. W. 1 along with one Srinivasa Reddy, P. W. 1 sent his daughter along with A-1 promising to pay the balance dowry amount. On coming to know of this, P. W. 1 went to the house of the accused and brought the deceased to his house. Subsequently, when A1 went to the house of P. W. 1 along with one Srinivasa Reddy, P. W. 1 sent his daughter along with A-1 promising to pay the balance dowry amount. Subsequently, on the occasion of Ekadashi festival, the mother of P. W. 1 Kolakani Souravva-P. W. 3, took the deceased to her house at Bommanapally village. After festival, A-1 along with one ravinder Reddy went to Bommanapally and took the deceased along with them to their house. But, as the mother of A-1 (i. e. , A-2) did not allow the deceased into the house, the deceased went along with the said Ravinder reddy to her grand mother s (P. W. 3) house in Bommanapally. One month thereafter, the deceased committed suicide by consuming pesticide. ( 3 ) ON information given by P. W. 3, P. W. 1 went to Bommanapally and gave Ex. P1 complaint in the police station on 21. 9. 1995. The Sub Inspector of Police, chigurumamidi Police Station-P. W. 9 registered a case in Crime No. 59 of 1995 against the appellants-accused Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 304-B I. P. C. Ex. P6 is the F. I. R. On the very same day, the Inspector of Police, husnabad-P. W. 10 visited the scene of offence and took up investigation. ( 4 ) THE Mandal Revenue Officer, Chigurumamidi, (P. W. 5) conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P. W. 7 and another. Subsequently, the doctors P. Ws. 4 and 8 conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased and Ex. P2 is the post mortem examination. The Inspector of Police-P. W. 10, examined P. Ws. 1 to 3, 6 and others and recorded their statements. On 25. 9. 1995 he filed a memo Ex. P7 to alter the Section of law from 498-A, 306 I. P. C. and Section 4 of Dowry prohibition Act to Section 304-B I. P. C. On 26. 9. 1995 the accused 1 and 2 were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. On 25. 9. 1995 he filed a memo Ex. P7 to alter the Section of law from 498-A, 306 I. P. C. and Section 4 of Dowry prohibition Act to Section 304-B I. P. C. On 26. 9. 1995 the accused 1 and 2 were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. After completion of investigation and receipt of chemical report, the Sub Divisional Police officer, Karimnagar laid charge sheet against the appellants-accused 1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Section 498-A, 306 and 304-B I. P. C. and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. ( 5 ) THE plea of appellants-accused 1 and 2 is one of total denial. The prosecution in order to prove its case against the accused examined P. Ws. 1 to 10 and got marked Exs. P1 to P7. On behalf of the appellants-accused, d. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined and no documents were marked. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, on appraisal of entire evidence - both oral and documentary, held that the prosecution has proved the offences under Sections 498-A, 306, 304-B of I. P. C. and Section 4 of Dowry prohibition Act against accused 1 and 2 and accordingly convicted and sentenced accused 1 and 2 as stated supra. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, accused 1 and 2 preferred this appeal. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants, Sri C. Praveen Kumar, mainly contended that the evidence let in by the prosecution does not inspire confidence that the appellants committed the alleged offences. According to him, there is absolutely no evidence so far as the 1st appellant-accused No. 1 i. e. , the husband of the deceased, is concerned and as such the Court below ought not to have convicted him for the charges framed against him. According to the learned counsel, the alleged offence does not satisfy the requirements of Section 304-B of I. P. C. in view of the evidence that the deceased committed suicide one month after she left the house of the accused. According to him, the words used in Section 304-B I. P. C. are that soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. In the instant case, according to the learned counsel, the deceased committed suicide three months after her departure from the matrimonial house. According to him, the words used in Section 304-B I. P. C. are that soon before her death the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. In the instant case, according to the learned counsel, the deceased committed suicide three months after her departure from the matrimonial house. ( 7 ) THEREFORE, he contended that the accused are not liable to be convicted either under Section 304-B or under Section 306 of the I. P. C. In respect of the other charge for dowry harassment, he contended that there is no clinching evidence which would establish that there was any harassment by the accused for dowry and the deceased committed suicide only on account of the said harassment. Therefore, both the accused are liable to be acquitted for the charges framed under Section 498-A I. P. C. and under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the appellants relied on decisions of the Apex court in SATVIR SINGH AND OTHERS V. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER and in ramesh KUMAR V. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH. On the contrary, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that the evidence on record would clinchingly establish the case against the appellants and the Court below is justified in convicting and sentencing the appellants for the charges framed against them. He also points out that according to section 304-B of I. P. C. if a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage, a presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act has to be drawn and if the events as spoken to by the prosecution witnesses are taken into consideration, it clearly satisfies the ingredients of Section 304-B of I. P. C. and thus justifies the conviction and sentence imposed by the Court below. ( 8 ) FROM a perusal of the evidence on record, it is no doubt true that the deceased Vijaya committed suicide after consuming pesticide but the question is whether the appellants are responsible for the said suicide of the deceased. ( 9 ) IN order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses. But the entire case of the prosecution rests solely on the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 who are direct witnesses for the alleged incident. ( 9 ) IN order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses. But the entire case of the prosecution rests solely on the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 who are direct witnesses for the alleged incident. P. W. 1 is the father of the deceased. P. W. 2 is the brother of P. W. 1 and paternal uncle of the deceased. P. W. 3 is the grandmother of the deceased i. e. , mother of P. Ws. 1 and 2. According to their evidence, the marriage between the 1st appellant-A1 and the deceased was solemnized two years prior to the date of offence. At the time of settlement of marriage, an amount of Rs. 25,000/- was agreed to be given to the appellants towards dowry, but only an amount of Rs. 5,000/- was paid to the appellants by p. W. 1. Sometime later, P. W. 1 came to know that the appellants were harassing the deceased demanding the balance dowry amount and therefore he went to the house of the 1st appellant and brought the deceased to his house and after one month at the request of 1st appellant-A1, P. W. 1 sent the deceased to her in-laws house. On the occasion of Ekadashi festival, p. W. 3 i. e, the mother of P. W. 1 took the deceased from her matrimonial house to Bommanapally village and after festival as the 1st appellant-A1 requested P. W. 3 to send the deceased to his house, the deceased went along with the 1st appellant-A1 to her matrimonial house. It is stated by P. W. 1 that as the 2nd appellant-A2 did not allow the deceased into the house, the deceased again went back to the house of P. W. 3 at Bommanapally and thereafter the deceased committed suicide by consuming pesticide. The evidence of P. W. 2 is also to the same effect. According to the evidence of p. W. 3, she brought the deceased to her village Bommanapally from her matrimonial house for Ekadashi festival. Some days thereafter, 1st appellant-A1 came to Bommanaplly along with one Ravinder Reddy to take back the deceased and on the assurance given by the elders and the said ravinder Reddy, P. W. 3 sent the deceased along with the 1st appellant-A1 and the said Ravinder Reddy. Some days thereafter, 1st appellant-A1 came to Bommanaplly along with one Ravinder Reddy to take back the deceased and on the assurance given by the elders and the said ravinder Reddy, P. W. 3 sent the deceased along with the 1st appellant-A1 and the said Ravinder Reddy. But, on the next day morning, the deceased and the said Ravinder Reddy returned to the village stating that the 2nd appellant-A2 locked the house and so they returned back. It is in the evidence of P. W. 3 that the deceased died one or two months thereafter by consuming pesticide. ( 10 ) FROM the above evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3, it is clear that since three months prior to the date of offence, the deceased was not living in her matrimonial house. Now, the question is whether the accused are liable for conviction under Section 304-B I. P. C. Section 304-B of I. P. C. reads as under:"where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. " ( 11 ) ON a plain reading of the language used in Section 304-B I. P. C. , it is clear that in order to attract the provisions of Section 304-B, the deceased must have been subjected to harassment or cruelty "soon before her death". The words "soon before her death" occurring in the said provision came to be interpreted by the Apex Court in Satvir Singh s case (1 supra) and the apex court held that the death should, in all probability, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment. The relevant paragraph of the above judgment of the apex court is extracted hereunder:"it is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304-B is to be invoked. But it should have happened soon before her death . The relevant paragraph of the above judgment of the apex court is extracted hereunder:"it is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304-B is to be invoked. But it should have happened soon before her death . The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words soon before her death is to emphasize the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowry related harassment or cruelty inflicted on her. If the interval elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is wide the Court would be in a position to gauge that in all probabilities the death would not have been the immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the Court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept soon before her death . " ( 12 ) THUS, having regard to the interpretation of the words soon before her death occurring in Section 304-B I. P. C. , it must be seen whether the death of the deceased in this case is only the aftermath of the cruelty or harassment. As already observed, the deceased was not living at her matrimonial house either with the 1st appellant-A1 or with the 2nd appellant-A2 for the last more than three months prior to her death as per the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 and in such an event, it cannot be presumed that the suicide was the direct result of harassment or cruelty meted out to her by the accused. 1 to 3 and in such an event, it cannot be presumed that the suicide was the direct result of harassment or cruelty meted out to her by the accused. The benefit shall go to the appellants-A1 and A2 and the Court cannot convict them for the offence under Section 304-B i. P. C. Therefore, both the accused are entitled for acquittal for the charge framed under Section 304-B I. P. C. Coming to the other charge framed under Section 306 I. P. C. , in order to attract the ingredients of Section 306 I. P. C. , the prosecution should also establish the ingredients of Section 107 I. P. C. Section 107 I. P. C. deals with abetment of a thing, which reads as under:"a person abets the doing of a thing, who- first: Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly: Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly: intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. " ( 13 ) THE evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 does not inspire confidence that the deceased committed suicide only on account of the abetment by the appellants-A1 and a2. From a reading of their evidence, it would appear that it was on account of the refusal by the 2nd appellant-A2 to allow the deceased into her matrimonial house, the deceased committed suicide. But, even if it is accepted that the suicide was on account of the said refusal by A-2, there is no convincing evidence to show that it was the accused who instigated her to commit suicide. The evidence on record does not also establish that the appellants-accused 1 and 2 intentionally aided the deceased by any act or illegal omission. Therefore, this Court holds that the prosecution also failed to establish the charge under Section 306 I. P. C. against the accused. ( 14 ) COMING to the other charge of demand for dowry, from the evidence of p. Ws. Therefore, this Court holds that the prosecution also failed to establish the charge under Section 306 I. P. C. against the accused. ( 14 ) COMING to the other charge of demand for dowry, from the evidence of p. Ws. 1 to 3, it is clear that there was a demand for dowry and there was also harassment by the 2nd appellant-A2 in that regard, which, in my considered view, attracts the provisions of Section 498-A of I. P. C. and section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, the convictions and sentences imposed by the Court below against the 2nd appellant-A2 under section 498-A of I. P. C. and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act are liable to be upheld. Whereas, the convictions and sentences imposed under Section 498-A and section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act imposed against the 1st appellant-A1 are liable to be set aside and, therefore, he is entitled for acquittal of those two charges. ( 15 ) AS already stated, both the accused are held not guilty of the offences under Sections 304-B and 306 I. P. C. and, therefore, they are entitled for acquittal of those two charges. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed, the convictions and sentences passed by the court below against the 1st appellant-A1 under all the charges are hereby set aside and A-1 is acquitted. ( 16 ) THE convictions and sentences passed against the 2nd appellant-A2 for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 306 of I. P. C. are hereby set aside and A-2 is acquitted of the said charges. However, the conviction and sentence passed against the 2nd appellant-A2 for the offences punishable under Section 498-A of I. P. C. and under section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are hereby upheld. Set off under Section 428 of Cr. P. C. shall be given to the 2nd appellant-A2. ( 17 ) THE fine amounts, if paid, for the offences which are set aside by this Court shall be refunded to the appellants.