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2003 DIGILAW 1120 (PAT)

Most. Noor Jahan v. Arbind Pal Singh

2003-11-02

S.K.KATRIAR

body2003
Judgment 1. Heard Mr. Ajay Kumar for the appellants, and Mr. Shailendra Kumar for respondent no. 3 (the New India Assurance Company Limited). None has appeared on behalf of the remaining respondents. These severv appeals are directed against the judgment and award dated 1.6.2000, passed by the learned 1st. Additional District Judge-cum-Motor Vehicles Accident Claim Tribunal, Muzaffarpur, whereby four of the claim cases under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), have been dismissed and the remaining three claims cases have been allowed in part. 2. The basic facts are not in dispute and all the claims cases are with respect to the same accident. A coal-laden truck bearing registration no. U.R-78-9569, carrying 14 labourers working at Zorhat (Assam), met with an accident near village Hari Shankar Maniyari on N.H. 28 within the district of Muzaffarpur (Bihar), on 4.3.1990. Nine of the said labourers died and the remaining five of them suffered injuries. Altogether nine claim cases were filed before the Claims Tribunal atMuzaffarpur and eight of which were disposed of by a common judgment impugned herein. Four of the claim cases were dismissed, and three were allowed in part. One claimant died during the pendency of the proceeding before the Tribunal and therefore, the same was dropped. In so far as the 9th case is concerned, he (the claimant) has not preferred appeal before this Court. As stated hereinabove, all the eight cases were disposed of by the impugned judgment, but only seven have come up to this Court in separate appeals and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 3. We shall first take up Misc. Appeal No. 499 of 2000, arising out of Claim Case No. 56 of 1990. The learned Claims Tribunal has dismissed the same on two grounds, namely, the name of the deceased (being the husband of the claimant) is mentioned differently in the claim application, the post-mortem report, and the deposition of the claimant. His name is stated in the claim application as Masraf, in the post-mortem report as Musriqu, and in the deposition of the applicant as Mosrif. The claim application has been dismissed on the further ground that the widow has alone filed the claim application and the parents of the deceased, have not joined the same. Hence this appeal at the instance of the widow. 3.1. The claim application has been dismissed on the further ground that the widow has alone filed the claim application and the parents of the deceased, have not joined the same. Hence this appeal at the instance of the widow. 3.1. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the validity of the impugned judgment on various grounds. Learned counsel for respondent no. 3 (the Insurance Company) has supported the impugned judgment. 3.2. Learned counsel for the appellant is right in his submission that her husbands name was Masraf which is correctly stated in the claim application and is also correctly reproduced in the memoran- dum of appeal. The spelling error made in the post-mortem report and the deposition of the applicant were not put to her during the course of her deposition. Secondly, both these documents were not in her handwriting and, therefore, she cannot suffer. It can not be overlooked" that she is an illiterate and rustic woman, being the widow bf the deceased. It appears to be a slip of the pen on the part of the Doctor and the court concerned. I, therefore, uphold the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant and hold that the name of the deceased was Masraf, and the names stated in the post-mortem report and the deposition of the applicant are slip of the pen. 3.3. The next ground for dismissal of the application assigned in the impugned judgment is that the widow has alone filed the claim application not accompanied with the parents of the deceased. I regret my inability to agree with the same because who can be a better claimant than the widow. Furthermore, neither the statute nor any judgment of binding authority lays down to the effect that the parents must join the claim application in a situation where the same has been preferred by the widow. Thirdly, learned counsel for the appellant has rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in (1987) 3 Supreme Court Cases page 234. (Gujrat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad V/s. Raman Bhai Prabhat Bhai and another), Paragraph 11 of which is relevant in the present context and supports the appellants case. 3.4. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 submits that the mode and manner of accident disentitles the applicant from the amount of compensation because it violates the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. 3.4. Learned counsel for the respondent no. 3 submits that the mode and manner of accident disentitles the applicant from the amount of compensation because it violates the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. In other words, in his submission, the deceased was travelling in a truck carrying coal and was not meant to carry passengers. I regret my inability to accede to the submission. The issue is no longer Res Integra. It has been held by the Supreme Court in its judgment reported in (1987) 2 Supreme Court Cases 654 (Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Kokilaben Chandravadan and others), that the "very concept of infringement or violation of the promise that the expression breach carries within itself and induces an inference that the violation or infringement on the part of the promisor must be a wilful infringement or violation. If the insured is not at all at fault and has not done anything he should not have done or is not amiss in any respect how can it be conscientiously posited that he has committed a breach?" It was further observed on facts "that it was only when the insured himself places the vehicle in charge of a person who does not hold a driving licence, that it can be said that he was guilty of the breach of the promise that the vehicle will be driven bv a licensed driver. It must be established by the insurance company that the breach was on the part of the insured and that it was the insured who was guilty of violating the promise or infringement or the contract. Unless the insured is at fault and is guilty of a breach, the insurer cannot escape from the obligation to indemnify the insured and successfully contend that he is exonerated having regard to the fact that the promisor (the insured) committed a breach of his promise. Not when some mishap occurs by some mischance." 3.5. The next question which arises for consideration is quantification of the amount of compensation. In view of my findings recorded hereinabove, is it necessary to remit the matter back to the learned Claims Tribunal, or this Court can undertake the responsibility of appraising the evidence and come to its own conclusion. Not when some mishap occurs by some mischance." 3.5. The next question which arises for consideration is quantification of the amount of compensation. In view of my findings recorded hereinabove, is it necessary to remit the matter back to the learned Claims Tribunal, or this Court can undertake the responsibility of appraising the evidence and come to its own conclusion. We cannot overtook the stark reality.of this case that the accident took place way back on 4.3.1990, and the claim case has still not been finalized. This is a court of facts and is obliged to reappraise the entire evidence and come to its own conclusions. Remitting the matter back to the learned Claims Tribunal will further delay the matter and will surely not be in the interest of justice. Thirdly, quantification of the amount now substantially depends on the second schedule of the Act which is fairly objective in nature. Fourthly, appeals are provided to correct the errors in the impugned judgment. It has been held in the judgment of binding authority that it is not necessary in appropriate cases to remit the matter and the appellate court may reappraise the evidence and conclude the litigation to save the parties from harassment and the courts from avoidable remand. 3.6. A.W. 5 is the claimant herself and has deposed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of her deposition to the effect that her husband was earning Rs. 1,200/- per month, and he was sending Rs. 1,000/- to 1,200/ to her per month. As submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, I take Rs. 1,000/ to be his monthly income and Rs. 12,000/ would be the yearly income. One third of the same for the personal expenses of the deceased comes to Rs. 4,000/-. The balance sum of Rs. 8,000/- becomes the annual dependency of the family which has to be multiplied by 17 which comes to Rs. 1,36,000/-. The deceased was aged 32 years on the date of the accident and, therefore, the multiplier of 17 as per the second schedule of the Act is applicable in the present case. 3.7. The next question for consideration is whether or not the claimant is entitled to interest. Section 171 of the Act provides for interest which reads as follows : "171. 3.7. The next question for consideration is whether or not the claimant is entitled to interest. Section 171 of the Act provides for interest which reads as follows : "171. Award of interest where any claims is allowed.Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf." Learned counsel for the applicant (appellant) submits that she may be suitably compensated with interest. He submits that the accident had taken place way back on 4.3.1990, and she has been left high and dry in life, her husband was aged 32 years on the date of death, and has been subjected to a long-drawn litigation. The matter has remained pending in court for such an unduly long time. In fact, it is stated in the impugned judgment that the matter could not be disposed of by the learned Claims Tribunal because the court remained vacant for quite some time. Learned counsel for the appellant has rightly relied on the judgment of five Judges Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in 2002 Accidents Claims Journal page 1846 (Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another V/s. B. Vijaya and others), and the judgment of Supreme Court reported in (2003) 3 Supreme Court Cases 148 (Abati Bezbaruah V/s. Dy. Director General Geological Survey of India and another). The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that once claim for compensation is allowed, then grant of interest is consequential. It has further held that the rate of interest is discretionary which is dependent on a number of relevant factors, namely, the rate of interest must be just and reasonable depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and taking all relevant factors including inflation, change of economy, policy being adopted by Reserve Bank of India from time to time, how long the case has remained pending, permanent injuries suffered by the victim, enormity of suffering, loss of future income, loss of enjoyment of life and the period tor which the applicant has been kept out of the money. The first part of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, namely, "... The first part of the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, namely, "... the grant of interest is consequential once the claim for compensation is allowed..." seems to have been diluted by the Supreme Court in the said case of Abati Bezbaruah (supra). However, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, I hereby order and direct that the applicant (appellant) shall be entitled to interest at the rate of nine per cent from the date of the claim application till the date of payment. The claim application was filed on 1.6.1990. 3.8. Misc. Appeal No. 499 of 2000 is accordingly allowed. Respondent no. 3 (the Insurance Company) is hereby directed to forward the entire decretal amount by means of an account payee demand draft in favour of the appellant within a period of two months from today along with the statement of accounts. 4. We now take up M.A. No. 500 of 2000, arising out of Claim Case No. 54 of 1990. The husband of this appellant, namely, Sk. Sobrati, was also travelling in the same truck and met with the accident. This claim case has been dismissed on the ground that there is a variation in the age of her husband as on the date of death stated in her deposition. The learned Claims Tribunal has stated that the applicant (the widow) has stated in paragraph 6 of her deposition that she was elder than her husband. He was aged 40 years, and she is 46 years of age. It is further stated at another place in her deposition that she was 25-26 years of age. I disagree with the ground of dismissal taken by the learned Claims Tribunal for the reason that she being an illiterate and rustic woman, might have made the mistake on account of slip of the tongue due to a feeling of trepidation on account of the court atmosphere. The mistake may also be attributable to slip of the pen on the part of the learned Claims Tribunal. Furthermore, this description is inconsequential in determining the whole question. The mistake may also be attributable to slip of the pen on the part of the learned Claims Tribunal. Furthermore, this description is inconsequential in determining the whole question. It appears to me on a plain reading of the deposition of the applicant (appellant) that the husband was 40 years of age on the date of death which is more consistent with her deposition to the effect that she was elder to her husband, the difference would not normally be as wide as 25-26 years of age between her and the husband. Difference of six years between them in the present case appears to be more probable than the order version which appears to me to be on account of some error discussed hereinabove. Furthermore, this issue does not go to the root of the matter. I, therefore, hold that the husband was aged 40, years on the date of the accident. 4.1. The learned Claims Tribunal has rejected the claim application on the further ground that the parents of the deceased have not joined as co-applicants. I have already dealt with this issue in the aforesaid appeal and reject this contention on same or similar grounds. 4.2. Learned counsel for the applicant (appellant) submits that the choice of multiplier depends on the age of the claimant or the deceased, which ever is higher. In the present case, the age of the claimant is higher than that of the deceased and, therefore, the multiplier of 13 would apply in the present case. The applicant (appellant) has stated in her deposition that her husband was drawing a salary of Rs. 1200-1300/- per month. As submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, Rs. 1,000/- may be taken to be the monthly income, and Rs. 12,000/- the yearly income, the 1/3rd of which towards the personal expenses of the deceased comes tq Rs. 4,000/-. The balance sum of Rs. 8,000/-would be the annual dependency of the family which has to be multiplied by 13 which comes to Rs. 1,04,000/- and is the amount of compensation determined in the present case. The appellant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of nine per cent from the date of filing of the claim application, i.e. 1.6.1990, till the date of payment. 4.3. M.A. No. 500 of 2000 is accordingly allowed. Respondent no. 1,04,000/- and is the amount of compensation determined in the present case. The appellant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of nine per cent from the date of filing of the claim application, i.e. 1.6.1990, till the date of payment. 4.3. M.A. No. 500 of 2000 is accordingly allowed. Respondent no. 3 (Insurance Company) is hereby directed to forward the entire decretal amount by means of an account payee demand draft in favour of the appellant within a period of two months from today along with the statement of accounts. 5. We now take up M.A. 505 of 2000, arising out of Claim Case No. 53 of 1990. The applicant along with her minor son (Basudeo Manjhi), and minor daughter (Sunaina), jointly filed the claim application 2004(1) PLJR Most. Noor Jahan claiming compensation on account of the death of her son (Ramdeo Manjhi) who was aged 20 years on the date of his death and was unmarried. Applicant no. 2 (Basudeo Manjhi), aged six years, and Sunaina aged 3 three years, are the other two children of Most. Kailashiya, and were represented by their mother in the claim case. However, Most. Kailashiya has alone preferred this appeal. The claim application has been rejected on the ground that name of the deceased has been wrongly mentioned in the post-mortem report. It may not be out of place to mention that the husband (Sitaram Manjhi) died in the same accident and for which Most. Kailashiya preferred Claim Case No. 60 of 1990, giving rise to M.A. No. 507 of 2000, and is being disposed of by the present judgment. 5.1. It appears to me on a perusal of the materials on record that the claim application correctly mentions the name of the deceased as Ramdeo Manjhi whose parentage, age and address are correctly stated therein. The same is correctly mentioned in the deposition of A.W. 1 (Most. 1 Kailashiya). It appears that the post-mortem report, which was originally filed in the criminal case, was hand-written and the name of the deceased has inadvertently mentioned as Rajdeo Manjhi. In the totality of the circumstances, it appears to me to be a slip of the pen and is fit to be ignored. The attendant circumstances of the case lead to the conclusion that the name of the deceased was Ramdeo Manjhi. In the totality of the circumstances, it appears to me to be a slip of the pen and is fit to be ignored. The attendant circumstances of the case lead to the conclusion that the name of the deceased was Ramdeo Manjhi. I, therefore, disagree with the impugned judgment, set aside the same, and hold that the name of the deceased was Ramdeo Manjhi. 5.2. We now take up the question of quantification of the compensation amount A.W. 1 (Most. Kailashiya), who is mother of the deceased, has stated in her deposition that the deceased was aged 20 years Arbind Pal Singh-on the date of the accident, and has further deposed to the effect that he used to send about Rs. 700/- per month to her, which was used for her own living and the minor children. In other words, the deceased used to send Rs. 700/- to his home after retaining the money needed for his own expenses. Therefore, the annual dependency comes to Rs. 8,400/-. As stated hereinabove, he was 20 years of age on the date of the accident and, therefore, the multiplier of 16 as per the second schedule of the Act is applicable in the present case, and the amount of compensation accordingly comes to Rs. 1,34,400/-which is the amount of compensation hereby determined in the present case. The applicant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of nine per cent from the date of the claim application (1.6.1990) till the date of payment. 5.3. M.A. No. 505 of 2000 is accordingly disposed of. Respondent no. 3 (Insurance Company) is hereby directed to forward the entire decretai amount by means of an account payee demand draft in favour of the appellant within a period of two months from today along with statement of accounts. 6. We now take up M.A. No. 506 of 2000, which arises out of Claim Case No. 58 of 1990. The same was preferred by Mostt. Anisa Khatoon, widow of the deceased and Sk. Suba, father of the deceased. The deceased was Md. Maqbool who died in the same incident. The learned Claims Tribunal has rejected the claim application on two grounds, namely, parents of the deceased have not been impleaded as applicants, and the further ground that age of the husband has been sitated to be 50-60 years which is improbable in the present case. 6.1. The deceased was Md. Maqbool who died in the same incident. The learned Claims Tribunal has rejected the claim application on two grounds, namely, parents of the deceased have not been impleaded as applicants, and the further ground that age of the husband has been sitated to be 50-60 years which is improbable in the present case. 6.1. On a perusal of the materials on record and consideration of the submission of learned counsel for the parties, it appears to me that A.W. 8 (Anisa Khatoon) has stated in paragraph 2 of her deposition that after the death of Md. Maqbool, she and the father-in-law are the only two persons left in the family. I observe from the original claim application that Sk. Suba is applicant no. 2. Therefore, it is manifest on the face of it that the learned Claims Tribunal has committed an error of record. The net result is, therefore, that the widow as well as the only surviving parent of the deceased have joined together as applicants. The first ground for rejection of the claim application is non-existent. 6.2. In so far as the second ground for rejection of the claim application is concerned, paragraph 6 of the claim application states that the deceased was aged 25 years and was hale and hearty. He was earning 1,800/- as specialist brick builder in Assam. A.W. -3 (applicant no. 1) has stated in paragraph 1 of her deposition that the deceased was aged 50-60 years on the date of death, whereas the postmortem report says that he was aged 35 years. 6.3. On a perusal of the materials on record and consideration of the submission of learned counsel for the parties, it appears to me that the figure 25 mentioned in paragraph 6 of the claim application is an over-typing and is obviously a typographical error. In so far as the deposition of A.W. 8 to the effect that the deceaed was aged 50-60 years is concerned, it appears to me that he is a completely illiterate and rustic woman and perhaps felt overwhelmed by a feeling of trepidation of the court atmosphere. It appears from the court question put to her about the age of the Courts Peon (Sarfuddin), she stated that he was of the same age as that of her husband, but, according to the court, was aged 35 years. It appears from the court question put to her about the age of the Courts Peon (Sarfuddin), she stated that he was of the same age as that of her husband, but, according to the court, was aged 35 years. Furthermore, she has stated in paragraph 2 of her deposition that her husband was young and they were married two years prior to the accident. The post-mortem report states that he was aged 35 years. It thus appears to me that the deceased was aged 35 years on the date of the accident which is consistent with the deposition of A.W. 8 that he was young and they were married two years and equally consistent with the post-mortem report. I, therefore, conclude that the deceased was aged 35 years on the date of accident. 6.4. We next come up to the question of quantification of amount of compensation. It appears to me that A.W. 8 was 32 years and the deceased was aged 35 years on the date of accident. Therefore, the multiplier of 17 would apply in the present case. Paragraph 6 of the claim application says that the deceased was earning Rs. 1,800/- as specialist brick builder. She has further stated in paragraph 3 of her deposition that he was earning Rs. 60/- per day, and was sending Rs. 1,000-1200 per month to her. This amount was obviously sent to the family after retaining the amount for personal expenses. Therefore, the annual dependency comes to Rs. 1000 x 12, i.e. Rs. 12,000/- and multiplier of 17 would apply which comes to Rs. 2,04,000/-, and would be the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. They will be entitled to interest at the rate of nine per cent from the date of filing of the claim application (1.6.1990) till the date of payment. 6.5. M.A. No. 506 of 2000 is accordingly allowed. The Insurance Company shall ensure despatch of sixty per cent of the amount of compensation in the name of A.W. 8 (applicant no. 1), and the balance forty per cent in the name of applicant no. 2 (Sk. Suba), within a period of two months from today, by means of demand drafts along with statement of accounts. 7. We now take up M.A. No. 503 of 2000, arising out of Claim Case No. 57 of 1990. 1), and the balance forty per cent in the name of applicant no. 2 (Sk. Suba), within a period of two months from today, by means of demand drafts along with statement of accounts. 7. We now take up M.A. No. 503 of 2000, arising out of Claim Case No. 57 of 1990. The present appeal and the two appeals disposed of hereinafter are of the same group, namely, the claim applications have been allowed in part and the claimants have come up to this Court for enhancement of the amount of compensation. They have been granted a sum of Rs. 55,000/- plus interest by way of compensation. The widow is appellant no. 1 (Most. Maisum Khatoon), Shamim Ahmad and Guriya are the two minor children of applicant no. 1 and the deceased. Mansoor was the deceased aged 30 years on the date of the death. A.W. 4 (Maisum Khatoon) has stated in paragraph 1 of her deposition that her husband had gone to work as brick kiln worker prior to six months of his death. He had sent about Rs. 7000-8000/-in a period of six months. In order to follow the line of least resistance, learned counsel for the applicants (appellants) submits that Rs. 1,000/- may be taken to be the annual income of the deceased out of which 1/3rd may be deducted and the annual dependency comes to Rs. 8,000/-. She has further stated in her deposition that the deceased was aged 30 years on the date of death. In the submission of learned counsel for the appellants, the multiplier of 18 were really applicable in the present case but he submits in the same spirit that the multiplier of 17 may be applied in the present case and, therefore, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 1,36,000.They will be entitled to interest at the rate of nine per cent from the date of filing of the claim application (1.6.1990) till the date of payment. 7.1. M.A. No. 503 of 2000 is accordingly disposed of. Let the Insurance Company ensure payment of the decretal amount (after deducting the amount already paid, if any) by means of an account payee demand draft in favour of applicant no. 1 (Mostt. Maisum Khatoon) within a period of two months from today along with statement of account. 8. 7.1. M.A. No. 503 of 2000 is accordingly disposed of. Let the Insurance Company ensure payment of the decretal amount (after deducting the amount already paid, if any) by means of an account payee demand draft in favour of applicant no. 1 (Mostt. Maisum Khatoon) within a period of two months from today along with statement of account. 8. We now deal with M.A. No. 504 of 2000, arising out of Claim Case No. 59 of 1990. Mostt. Rabina Khatoon (widow), and Sk. Shakeel (aged four years), preferred claim application seeking compensation for the demise of Sk. Ekramul, the husband and father respectively of the two applicants who died in the same accident. The applicants have been granted compensation amount of Rs. 70,000/- with interest. The appellants have preferred this appeal with the prayer for enhancement of the amount of compensation. 8.1. It appears to me from the deposition of A.W. 2 (Rabina Khatoon) that the husband was aged 30 years on the date of the accident and had been sending Rs. 2,000/- every six months. Therefore, the annual dependency of the family comes to Rs. 4,000/-. The age of the deceased being 30 years on the date of the accident, the multiplier of 18 would apply and, therefore, the amount of compensation comes to Rs. 72,000/- which I determine to be payable to the applicants (appellants). They will be entitled to interest at the rate of nine per cent from the date of the claim application (1.6.1990) till the date of payment. 8.2. M.A. No. 504 of 2000 is accordingly disposed of.The Insurance Company shall ensure payment of the amount of compensation by means of an account payee demand draft in favour of applicant no. 1 (Mostt. Rabina Khatoon) within a period of two months from today after deducting the amount, if any, already paid, along with statement of account. 9. We now take up M.A. No. 507 of 2000, arising out Claim Case No. 60 of 1990. The claimants filed this application on account of the demise of Sitaram Manjhi (husband of applicant no. 1) who was working as labourer in the brick kiln in Assam. The two minor children have not joined this memorandum of appeal. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 60,000/-with interest by way of compensation. It appears from the deposition of A.W. 1 (Most Kailashiya Devi) that the deceased was sending Rs. 1) who was working as labourer in the brick kiln in Assam. The two minor children have not joined this memorandum of appeal. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 60,000/-with interest by way of compensation. It appears from the deposition of A.W. 1 (Most Kailashiya Devi) that the deceased was sending Rs. 700/- per month to the family for expenses. The annual dependency of the family, therefore, comes to Rs. 8,400/-. Applying the multiplier of 16, the amount of compensation comes at Rs. 1,34,400/- which I determine to be the amount of compensation payable to the applicants in the present case. They will be entitled to interest at the rate of nine per cent from the date of the claim application (1.6.1990) till the date of payment. 9.1. M.A. No. 507 of 2000 is accordingly disposed of Respondent no. 3 (the Insurance Company) is hereby directed to forward the entire decretal amount by means of an account payee demand draft in favour of appellant no. 1 (Most. Kailashia Devi) within a period of two months from today after deducting the amount, if any, already paid, along with statement of accounts. 10. In the result, M.A. Nos. 499, 500, 505, 506, 503, 504 and 507 of 2000 are allowed in the manner indicated hereinabove.