P. K. TRIPATHY, J. ( 1 ) AN ex parte decree was passed against the petitioners in Money Suit No. 215 of 1993. As against that, petitioners filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. , which has been registered as Misc. Case No. 87 of 2001 in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Rourkela. During the pendency of that Misc. Case, an application filed by the petitioners to stay further proceedings of Execution Case No. 19 of 1999 was rejected by the Court below. As against that, petitioners preferred C. R. P. No. 39 of 2002 and, this Court on 18-11-2002 disposed of the said revision by directing the Court below to dispose of Misc. Case No. 87 of 2001 within two months. After that, in that Misc. Case petitioners filed an application under Order 26, Rule 1, C. P. C. praying for examination of one of the Directors of the Company as a witness in the said Misc. Case through a Commission on the ground that the said witness is suffering from blood cancer and is unable to attend the Court at Rourkela being residing at Bhilai in the State of Madhya Pradesh. That petition was rejected by the Court below as per the impugned order passed on January 30, 2003. Asserting to the aforesaid facts, petitioners seek indulgence of this Court under Section 115, C. P. C. ( 2 ) WHEN the case is taken up for admission, being posted with the recent amendment in Section 115 of the C. P. C. , learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the aforesaid amendment does not take away the jurisdiction of this Court to consider the legality and propriety of the impugned order, because the matter which has been considered and disallowed is a proceeding within the meaning of the term so used in Section 115, C. P. C. and therefore the revision be admitted and after notice to the opposite party, that be duly considered. In that context, Mr. R. K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioners makes a labourious argument to canvass the aforesaid contention and to convince this Court relating to the maintainability of the Civil Revision. In that context, Mr. R. K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioners makes a labourious argument to canvass the aforesaid contention and to convince this Court relating to the maintainability of the Civil Revision. ( 3 ) HIS argument is that the term 'proceeding' having not been clearly defined in the Civil Procedure Code, it should be given a wider meaning as per the ratio in the case of Ram Chandra Aggarwal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1888 . He also refers to the provision in Sections 94, 141 and 146 of the C. P. C. and states that supplementary matter which enables the Court to effectively adjudicate the original case should also be construed as proceeding. In that context, he argues that interpretation of Section 115 by the Karnataka High Court in the case of K. R. Subba Raju v. Vasavi Trading Co. , AIR 2002 Kant 407 is not consistent with the view expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chandra (supra ). ( 4 ) SECTION 115, C. P. C. , as it stands now, reads as hereunder:-"115. Revision.- (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit: (Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.) (2) The High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. (3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court. Explanation.- In this Section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding. " ( 5 ) IN that context, the Orissa Amendment of Section 115, C. P. C. reads as hereunder:-"115. Revision.- The High Court, in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value exceeding one lakh rupees, and the District Court, in any other case including a case arising out of an original suit or other proceedings instituted before the commencement of the Code of Civil Procedure (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1991, may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court or the District Court, as the case may be, make such order in the case as it thinks fit: provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section: provided further that the High Court or the District Court shall not under this section, vary or reverse any order, including an order deciding an issue, made in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where- (i) the order, if so varied or reversed, would finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings; or (ii) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Explanation.- In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order deciding an issue in the course of suit or other proceeding. Explanation.- In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order deciding an issue in the course of suit or other proceeding. Saying.- The amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced in the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 5 of 1908, prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding such amendment, continue to be heard and decided by such Court. " ( 6 ) IT be borne in mind that the aforesaid Orissa Amendment came into operation with effect from 7/11/1991, vide Orissa Act 26 of 1991, whereas the above quoted provision of Section 115, C. P. C. is as per the Act 46 of 1999 which came into force with effect from 1st July, 2002. Relevant portion of Section 32 of the Amendment Act 46 of 1999 which prescribes for repeal and savings, reads as hereunder:-"32. Repeal and savings:- (1) Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the principal Act by a State Legislature or High Court before the commencement of this Act shall, except insofar as such amendment or provisions is consistent with the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act, stand repealed. (2) Notwithstanding that the provisions of this Act have come into force or repeal under sub-sec. (1) has taken effect, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.- (a) to (h ). . . . . . (i) the provisions of S. 115 of the principal Act, as amended by S. 12 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any proceeding for revision which had been finally disposed of. (j) to (v ). . . . . . "in view of the provision in Article 254 of the Constitution of India, any provision of the State Law if repugnant to any provision of law made by the Parliament then to the extend of inconsistency or repugnancy, the law made by the Parliament shall supersede and prevail, and to that extent the law made by the State Legislature shall not be enforceable. Therefore, on a comparison of Section 115, C. P. C. after the aforesaid amendment in the year 1999 and the Orissa Amendment Act of Section 115 which has been made in the year 1991, this Court finds that though the Orissa Amendment is enforceable but only to the extent it is consistent with the law made by the Parliament. Therefore, Clause (ii) to the second proviso below Clause (c) of Section 115 of the Orissa Amendment, i. e. , "the order if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made" is no more enforceable being repugnant to Section 115 as it stands now. It is needless to say that the remaining part of Section 115 of the Orissa Amendment shall still be operative being not repugnant to the existing provision of Section 115, C. P. C. ( 7 ) THE statutory provision, as it stands, puts an embargo to exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order which if would have been passed in favour of the revision-petitioner, then it would not have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. In that context, the term 'other proceedings' gathers momentum for a judicial interpretation because of lack of definitions in C. P. C. or the General Clauses Act. Proceeding, as it means according to the dictionary meaning, cannot be totally imported to interpret the term 'proceeding' used in this section. In that context, a reference to the wisdom expressed by the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chandra (supra) is beneficial. ( 8 ) IN that case, when a reference under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. was pending in one Civil Court that proceeding was transferred by the District Judge in exercise of the power u/s. 24 (1) (b) of the C. P. C. That was objected to by the opponent after the transferee Court adjudicated the dispute against him. The opponent, i. e. , the petitioner before the Apex Court raised the issue that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to transfer the reference under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. and the transferee Court had no territorial jurisdiction to answer that reference and therefore, the decision of the transferee Court is a nullity. The opponent, i. e. , the petitioner before the Apex Court raised the issue that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to transfer the reference under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. and the transferee Court had no territorial jurisdiction to answer that reference and therefore, the decision of the transferee Court is a nullity. Keeping in view the provision in Section 24 of the C. P. C. which empowers a District Judge to transfer a suit or other proceedings from one subordinate Court to any other subordinate Court working under him, the Apex Court negatived the contention of the petitioner for putting a restrictive meaning to the term 'other proceeding' and opined that the reference under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. was a proceeding pending before the Civil Court and therefore, the District Judge had jurisdiction to transfer such proceeding in exercise of the power under Section 24 of the C. P. C. In that context, the Apex Court have held that:-". . . . . . . . . . The expression 'proceeding' used in this section is not a term of art which has acquired a definite meaning. What its meaning is when it occurs in a particular statute or a provision of a statute will have to be ascertained by looking at the relevant statute. Looking to the context in which the word has been used in S. 24 (1) (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear to us to be something going on in a Court in relation to the adjudication of a dispute other than a suit or an appeal. Bearing in mind that the term 'proceeding' indicates something in which business is conducted according to a prescribed mode it would be only right to give it, as used in the aforesaid provision, a comprehensive meaning so as to include within it all matters coming up for judicial adjudication and not to confine it to a civil proceeding alone. "it is clearly indicated in the above quoted passage that meaning attributed to a term has to be understood with reference to the context in which such term has been used. In that context, the Karnataka High Court (supra) has quoted in extenso, the object of the Amending Act 46 of 1999. "it is clearly indicated in the above quoted passage that meaning attributed to a term has to be understood with reference to the context in which such term has been used. In that context, the Karnataka High Court (supra) has quoted in extenso, the object of the Amending Act 46 of 1999. Clause 12 of the Bill, which pertains to amendment of Section 115 of the C. P. C. , reads as hereunder at Pages 409-410 :-"clause 12.- Section 115 of the Code provides for revision by the High Court of an order or decision of any Court subordinate to such High Court. The Malimath Committee noticed that often the records of the lower Court are sent to High Court in the revisional proceedings. It is imperative that records of proceedings pending in the subordinate Court should not be sent unless High Court so desires and revision should not operate as stay of proceedings before the trial Court. The Committee while agreeing in principle that scope of interference against interlocutory orders should be restricted, felt that object can be achieved more effectively without demanding the High Court of the power of revision. Clause 12 seeks to achieve the above object by suitable amendments to S. 115. " ( 9 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Mohanty, any application considered and decided in a suit, be it relating to any 'incidental proceedings' as provided in Part III, C. P. C. or 'supplemental proceedings' as provided in Section 94, C. P. C. any order passed on such subjects reaches to finality on that aspect and therefore each of them has to be construed as 'a proceeding' within the meaning of the term 'proceeding' used in Section 115, C. P. C. If that interpretation to the term 'proceeding' shall be given with reference to Section 115, C. P. C. then any and every interlocutory order passed in furtherance of a suit shall each be regarded as a proceeding. That is neither the intention of the Parliament nor it is so readable from the amended provision in Section 115 of the C. P. C. ( 10 ) TO understand, reasonably and comprehensively, meaning of the term 'proceeding' with reference to Section 115 of the Code, and intention of the Legislators in that respect, useful reference is made to Sections 24 and 141, C. P. C. Section 24 provides general power of transfer and withdrawal of suit, appeal or other proceeding and Section 141 provides the procedure to be followed in all proceedings, i. e. , proceedings which are other than suit or appeal. Rule 431 in the General Rules and Circular Orders of the High Court of Judicature, Orissa, (Civil) (in short, 'g. R. and C. O. ') provides the list of applications under certain provisions in the C. P. C. and provisions in other statute cognizable by Civil Court with the prescription to register them as Miscellaneous Judicial Cases. In short, such proceedings are mentioned as M. J. C. or Misc. case. Section 24, C. P. C. provides for transfer of a proceeding. Similarly, Section 141, C. P. C. provides for the procedure regarding the suit to be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings. Procedurally and also traditionally the aforesaid procedures are followed with respect to Misc. Cases or M. J. Cs. and such cases only qualify to the term 'other proceeding' mentioned in Section 115 of the Code. On the other hand, if wider meaning shall be given to that term by treating any and every interlocutory matter arising and decided/disposed of in a suit, then that does not fit into the provision of law in Section 24 or 141 of the Code. Even Section 146, C. P. C. which speaks of proceedings by or against representatives does not mandate that any interlocutory application should be regarded as a proceeding within the above defined meaning of the term 'proceeding'. Therefore, unless application is registered as a Misc. Even Section 146, C. P. C. which speaks of proceedings by or against representatives does not mandate that any interlocutory application should be regarded as a proceeding within the above defined meaning of the term 'proceeding'. Therefore, unless application is registered as a Misc. Case in accordance with the provision of the C. P. C. read with the G. R. and C. O. , that cannot be termed and determined as a proceeding for the purpose of Section 115, C. P. C. That is so in view of the language in Section 115 that "except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings. " ( 11 ) SO far as the case at hand is concerned, application filed by the petitioner under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. , having been registered as Misc. Case No. 87 of 2001, is a proceeding but application filed by the petitioner under Order 26, Rule 2 being not prescribed in Rule 431 of the G. R. and C. O. to be registered as a M. J. C. or Misc. Case, and that being an interlocutory application relating to examination of a witness in Commission, that cannot be given the meaning of the term 'proceeding'. Hence, the impugned order, i. e. , the order passed relating to rejecting that application is not revisable under Section 115 of the Code. Accordingly, this Civil Revision stands dismissed. ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners states that when the application for examination of the witnesses in Commission was not opposed by the plaintiff-opp. party save and except claiming the cost/expenditure in that respect, and when the illness of the witness is not in dispute, therefore the Court below should not have rejected that application merely because the target so fixed by the High Court is going to expire in the meantime. If the petitioners thought that the proceeding in the Court below was not going to be disposed of within the targeted period, it was incumbent on his part to seek for extension of time by moving appropriate application in that Civil Revision and without doing that he could not have over-reached the target fixed by the Court by moving such application only in the month of January, 2003. When the petitioner was a consenting party to the target fixed by the High Court for disposal of the Misc. Case, he should have acted in such manner that the Misc. Case could have been disposed of within the targeted period. Under such circumstance, this Court also finds no bona fide in the conduct of the petitioners. However, in that respect the above opinion is only a passing remark and petitioners are not precluded from approaching appropriate forum for concerned relief. Order accordingly.