C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of the order in IA No. 722 of 2003 in OS no. 1386 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the ii Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada. ( 2 ) THE appellant filed the said suit in the Vacation Court as OS No. 52 of 2003, seeking dissolution of a firm said to have been constituted between her, her husband and respondent-1 and 2, and for consequential reliefs, and filed a petition under Order 38 Rule 5 C. P. C. seeking attachment before judgment of the amounts payable to respondents 1 and 2 lying with respondents 3 and 4. The Vacation Court had on 19-5-2003 passed an ex parte prohibitory order, restraining respondents 3 and 4 from paying any amounts due from them to respondents 1 and 2. Thereafter, the suit was transferred to the Court of Junior civil Judge, Vijayawada and was renumbered as O. S. 1386 of 2003 and LA. 106 of 2003 was renumbered as LA. No. 722 of 2003. ( 3 ) AFTER the respondents had put in their appearance and filed their counter in la. No. 722 of 2003, the Court below by the order impugned in the appeal, accepting the offer made by them to furnish a Bank guarantee for Rs. 2 lakhs, directed them to furnish Bank Guarantee for Rs. 2 lakhs within a period of one week from the date of its order and held that on their furnishing Bank guarantee, the order of attachment dated 19-5-2003 would stand raised. Aggrieved by the order accepting the Bank Guarantee for raising the attachment, plaintiff in the suit preferred this appeal. ( 4 ) HEARD both sides with regard to the maintainability of the appeal and its merits. Basing thereon the points for consideration are: (1) Whether the appeal is maintainable? (2) Whether the order of the Court below directing respondents-1 and 2 to furnish Bank Guarantee for Rs. 2 lakhs, as offered by them, is proper? ( 4 ) HEARD both sides with regard to the maintainability of the appeal and its merits. Basing thereon the points for consideration are: (1) Whether the appeal is maintainable? (2) Whether the order of the Court below directing respondents-1 and 2 to furnish Bank Guarantee for Rs. 2 lakhs, as offered by them, is proper? ( 5 ) POINT No. 1: The contention of sri Bali Reddy, the learned senior Counsel for respondents 1 and 2 is that in view of order 38 Rule 5 (4) CPC, the order dated 19-5-2003 passed by the vacation Court directing attachment of the amounts lying with respondents 3 and 4 which are due to respondents 1 and 2 is null and void, and since the Court below by accepting the offer made by respondents 1 and 2 to furnish bank Guarantee, ordered them to do so, such order does not fall under Rule 6 of order 38 C. P. C. , and so, the order directing respondents 1 and 2 to furnish Bank guarantee is not appealable under Order 43 rule 1 (Q) C. P. C. He placed strong reliance on S. P. Venkannababu v. Messrs varalakshmi F. N. Corp. , 1996 (4) ALT 223, in support of his contention. The contention of Sri Ramanarayana the learned Counsel for the appellant is that since the order under appeal, in effect, is an order withdrawing the attachment already ordered it should be deemed to be an order falling under Rule 6 of Order 38 C. P. C. , and hence is appealable. He placed reliance on Prem singh v. Bank of India, AIR 1981 NOC 71 (Pandh) and Messrs. Madan Theatres Ltd. v. Haridas, AIR 1936 Lahore 33, in support of his said contention. ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions raised by the learned Counsel it is necessary to extract the order dated 19-5-2003 passed by the learned Vacation Judge. It reads: "issue notice to respondents 1 and 2 and prohibitory orders to Respondents 3 and 4 from pay (SIC) amount lying in their hands to respondents 1 and 2. Call on 17-6-2003. " "prohibitory Order" used in the above extracted order, is but an order of attachment before judgment of the amounts lying in the hands of Respondents 3 and 4, which are payable to the respondents 1 and 2. Call on 17-6-2003. " "prohibitory Order" used in the above extracted order, is but an order of attachment before judgment of the amounts lying in the hands of Respondents 3 and 4, which are payable to the respondents 1 and 2. From Rule 11-A of Order 38 C. P. C. , it is clear that the provisions relating to attachment in Order 21 C. P. C. apply to attachment before judgment also. Rule 46 of order 21 C. P. C. relating to attachment of property of a judgment-debtor in the hands of a third party, contemplates a written order prohibiting the third party from paying the amount lying with him to the judgment-debtor. The order of the Vacation judge is akin to an order under Rule 46 of Order 21 C. P. C. and so in effect the order dated 19-5-2003 of the Vacation Judge extracted above is but an order of attachment of the amounts lying with Respondents 3 and 4. As per Rule 5 (1) Order 38 C. P. C. before passing an order of attachment to court has to first direct the defendant to furnish security for the sum ordered by it, or produce the property or the value thereof, or to show-cause as to why he should not furnish security. As per rule 5 (4) of Order 38 C. P. C. an order of attachment made without complying with the provisions of Rule 5 (1) of Order 38 c. P. C. "shall be void". It is well known that void means nonest or is deemed to be non-existing . Before passing the above extracted prohibitory order since the Vacation court did not follow the procedure prescribed by Rule 5 (1) of Order 38 C. P. C. , as rightly observed by the Court below, it is a void order. ( 7 ) IN Madan Theatres Ltd v. Haridas case (supra) the appeal was preferred by the defendant questioning the order of attachment passed by the trial Court. When a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the said appeal was taken by the plaintiff, the Court observed thus:"issue of notice to defendant under Order 38 rule 5 (1) is absolutely necessary before an order under Order 38 Rule 5 (3), is passed. Where no notice is issued no foundation is laid for an action under Order 38 Rule 5 (3 ). Where no notice is issued no foundation is laid for an action under Order 38 Rule 5 (3 ). Before passing the order of attachment before judgment, the Court must faithfully and strictly carry out the stringent procedure as laid down in Order 38 Rule 5 C. P. C. and no short cuts are permissible. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the order in question is not appealable, the Memorandum of Appeal under the circumstances of the case may be treated as an application for revision and this Court can interfere on the ground that the order of the Court below is unjust and unfair and was passed in defiance of the legal procedure prescribed by the Code. "this apart it should not be forgotten that order of attachment would, and has to be made only under Rule 6 of Order 38 C. P. C. but not under Rule 5 of Order 38 C. P. C. as rule 5 of Order 38 C. P. C. relates to calling upon the defendant to furnish security. So, when once an attachment ordered it has to be treated as an order made under rule 6 (1) of Order 38 C. P. C. Since the appeal in Madan Theatres Limited v. Haridas case (supra) was against an order of attachment, but not against an order directing or accepting security, the said decision is of no help to the appellant. The facts in prem Singh v. Bank of India (supra), are not known because it is a short noted judgment. In that case, on an application made by the defendant that he is prepared to furnish security, the truck was released from attachment. So it was held that that order would fall under Order 38 Rule 6 (2) c. P. C. and hence is appealable. Whether the order of attachment of truck was passed by following the procedure prescribed by Rule 5 (1) of Order 38 C. P. C. or not, is not known from case as reported. So it was held that that order would fall under Order 38 Rule 6 (2) c. P. C. and hence is appealable. Whether the order of attachment of truck was passed by following the procedure prescribed by Rule 5 (1) of Order 38 C. P. C. or not, is not known from case as reported. A Division bench judgment of Patna High Court in kedarnalh Himatsingh v. Tejpal Marwari, air 1935 Patna 219, following a Division bench decision of Allahabad High Court in om Prakash v. Mohamad Ishaq, AIR 1933 allahabad 557, held that an order eventually passed rejecting the application for attachment before judgment is not such an order as is made appealable by Rule 1 (q) of Order 43 C. P. C. It should be remembered that Rule 6 (2) of Order 38 c. P. C. speaks about withdrawing of an order of attachment earlier passed, obviously passed under Rule 6 (1) after the defendant furnishing security. In fact the decisions of the Lahore, Allahabad and Patna High courts referred to above relate to cases which were decided prior to 1976 Amendment to c. P. C. when Rule 5 (4) of Order 38 C. P. C. was not there in C. P. C. It is only by 1976 amendment to C. P. C. that Rule 5 (4) to order 38 C. P. C. was introduced in C. P. C. In s. P. Venkannababu v. Messrs. Varalakshmi f. N. Corp. case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court clearly held that any order of attachment made without issuing notice, is a void order. When Rule 5 (4) lays down that an attachment made without following rule 5 (1) of Order 38 C. P. C. is void, question of withdrawing a void attachment, by the order under appeal does not arise. So merely because the learned Junior Civil judge, in his order under appeal, observed that on Respondents 1 and 2 furnishing the bank Guarantee, the order of attachment would stand raised, that observation would make the order under appeal an order of withdrawing attachment as contemplated by rule 6 (2) of Order 38 C. P. C. The order under appeal is but an order directing respondents 1 and 2 to furnish Bank guarantee, and therefore does not fall under rule 6 of Order 38 C. P. C. So, I hold that the appeal is not maintainable. The point is answered accordingly. ( 8 ) IN view of my finding on Point no. 1 it is not really necessary to give a finding on point No. 2. Yet I would proceed to give my finding thereon also since i heard the learned Counsel at length on that aspect also. ( 9 ) POINT 2: Placing reliance on issardas S. Lulla v. Hari, AIR 1962 Madras 458, Sheonarian Jaiswal v. Shree Kripa shankar Jaiswal, AIR 1972 Patna 75, tilak Chand Jain v. Darshan Lal Jain, air 1985 Jandk 50, G. Ramachandrayya v. Nethi Iswarayya, AIR 1952 Hyderabad 139, and Sections 47 and 46 of the Partnership act, the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that merely because the appellant valued the suit at Rs. 1 lakh, it cannot be said that she would be entitled only to Rs. 1 lakh if the accounts are taken. It is his contention that since the amount lying with respondents 3 and 4 belongs to the Partnership, but not to respondents 1 and 2, and since appellant is a partner of the firm, if respondents 1 and 2 were to withdraw the amount and spend it away there would be many complications since appellant, as a partner can be made liable for the debts and liability of the firm and the appellant, as partner can insist on respondents 1 and 2 announcing the liabilities of the firm and the amounts due to respondents 1 and 2 from respondents 3 and 4 being spent for the discharge of the liabilities of the firm, and in any event since in a suit for dissolution of partnership appointment of a receiver to manage the affairs of the firm would almost be automatic, appellant seeking safe custody of the funds of the firm lying with respondents 3 and 4, cannot be said to be improper. The contention of learned senior Advocate for respondents 1 and 2 is that the suit for dissolution of the firm, without making the firm a party to the suit and even without mentioning what the name of the firm is not maintainable. The contention of learned senior Advocate for respondents 1 and 2 is that the suit for dissolution of the firm, without making the firm a party to the suit and even without mentioning what the name of the firm is not maintainable. It is his contention that there, in fact, is no partnership agreement or partnership between the appellant, her husband and respondents 1 and 2 and that Respondents 1 and 2 undertook the works in their individual capacity and spent huge amounts, and at the fag end after completion of the work, and when the respondents 1 and 2 are about to receive the amounts due to them, appellant obtained an ex pane order of attachment, and Respondents 1 and 2 with a view to show their bona fides, though they are not in anyway answerable to the appellant, offered to furnish bank guarantee for more amount than claimed in the suit there are no grounds to interfere with the order under appeal. ( 10 ) IT is not necessary to go into the question whether there is prima facie evidence of partnership or not for deciding this appeal. It is no doubt true that in a suit for dissolution of partnership normally receiver was appointed to safeguard the interests of partners. If the appellant felt that appointment of a Receiver was the appropriate relief to be sought, she could have sought that relief. She did not, for reason best known to her, seek such relief, probably because in such an event she has to prima facie establish the existence of the partnership, but thought it fit to seek an order of attachment before judgment. It is well-known that unless the ingredients mentioned in Order 38 Rule 5 (1) C. P. C. are satisfied, an order for attachment cannot be made. The affidavit of the appellant filed in support of the application does not disclose the conditions to be satisfied under rule 5 (1) of Order 38 C. P. C. for the Court ordering attachment before judgment. There is not even a whisper in the affidavit of the appellant that some debts are due to third parties from the firm. In C. C. Reddy v. K. C. Reddy, 1968 (2) An. There is not even a whisper in the affidavit of the appellant that some debts are due to third parties from the firm. In C. C. Reddy v. K. C. Reddy, 1968 (2) An. WR 616, while dealing with the question of payment of court fee in a suit for rendition of account, a Full Bench of this Court held that the plaintiff should make a bona fide effort to find out the worth of the relief he seeks, and cannot arbitrarily undervalue the relief, and that the estimate made by him should a real estimate acceptable to a prudent and reasonable man. Since that decision was rendered as long back as in 1968, appellant should be imputed with knowledge of the said decision. She, having known the law relating to estimate and payment of Court fees in relation to a suit for account on dissolution of a firm, valued the relief at rs. One lakh. So, it has to be taken prima facie that in her estimate the amount due to her, on taking an account of the assets and liabilities of the firm, would be around one lakh. In view thereof it is unnecessary to go into the question as to how the profits or losses of firm have to be distributed or calculated, as argued by the learned Counsel for appellant. When as per the estimate of the appellant she has to get only one lakh rupees from the firm and taking an account, she cannot be said to be aggrieved by the order under appeal directing the respondents 1 and 2 to furnish bank guarantee for two lakh rupees. The point is answered accordingly. ( 11 ) IN view of my findings on the points for consideration, I find no merit in the appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.