Judgment 1. This isplaintiffs appeal filed under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity the Code) challenging the judgment and decree dated 30-4-1983 passed by the learned District Judge, Sangrur reversing the judgment and decree dated 27-11-1981 of the sub Judge First Class, Dhuri. The learned District Judge has repelled the claim of the plaintiff appellant that he is in adverse possession of the suit land continuously, openly and adversely to the real owners and has failed to perfect his title. 2. Plaintiff-appellant filed civil suit No. 685 on 14-11-1979 seeking a declaration that he is owner in possession of the suit land. It has been asserted that the defendant-respondents were the owners in possession of the suit land but on account of adverse possession of the plaintiff-appellant for the last more than 12 years, he has become owner of the same and the adverse possession of the plaintiff appellant has ripened into ownership. The plaintiff-appellant has claimed in the suit that the defendant-respondents have no connection with the suit land and he has become the sole owner. Defendant-respondents 1 to 12 filed their joint written statement controverting the assertion of adverse possession for the last more than 12 years. It has also been claimed that the suit land was barred and as such it continued to be in possession of the defendant-respondent. The further stand taken by the defendant-respondent is that the suit land came into possession of the plaintiff-appellant for the first time in the year 1977-78 when he entered on the land as tenant. It has been claimed that vacant land is always considered to be in the possession of the owners. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following two issues were framed :- 1. Whether the plaintiff has become the owner of the suit land by adverse possession ? 2 Relief. 3. The trial Court after examining the oral as well as documentary evidence based on revenue record, recorded a finding that the plaintiff-appellant is in continuous, uninterrupted, hostile and adverse possession over the suit land prior to the year 1965-66 and, therefore, a declaration is liable to be made declaring that the plaintiff-appellant is the owner in possession of the suit land. A decree to that effect was passed. 4. A decree to that effect was passed. 4. The learned appellate Court, however, did not agree with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court and proceeded to hold that the plaintiff-appellant has miserably failed to prove his adverse possession over the suit land for the last over 12 years. It is pertinent to mention that in order to succeed, the plaintiff-appellant was under an obligation to prove that 12 years preceding the filing of the suit, he has been in cultivating possession of the suit land. The suit having been filed on 14-12-1979, the proof required to be furnished by the plaintiff-appellant was that he has been in cultivating possession over the suit land since Kharif 1967. The learned lower appellate Court has referred to the khasra girdwaris from Kharif 1966 to Rabi 1976 Ex. P9 and P.10. The analysis of the evidence of various documents placed on record by the parties, as recorded by the learned appellate Court, reads as under :- "20. Ex. P9 is the khasra girdawri for Kharif 1966 to Rabi 1976 (sic 1971 ?). A perusal of Ex. P9 would go to show that in the column of possession Nilkhi Singh (plaintiff) is entered but the land in dispute is shown as vacant land for Kharif 1966 and Rabi 1967. In Kharif 1967, land bearing khasra Nos. 1323, 1324 and 1325 is shown as "Taraddadi" and the land bearing khasra No. 1326 is shown as vacant. Then in Rabi 1968 land bearing khasra Nos. 1323, 1324 and 1325 is shown as vacant and the land bearing khasra No. 1326 is shown as banjar madid. Then in Kharif 1968 again the land bearing khasra Nos. 1323, 1324 and 1325 is shown as vacant land and the land bearing khasra No. 1326 is shown as banjar jadid. In Rabi 1969, land bearing khasra Nos. 1323 and 1324 is shown as vacant land. Land bearing khasra No. 1 326 is again shown as banjar jadid. Land bearing khasra No. 1325, measure 3-3. Out of this area, wheat was sown in an area of 0-10. In an area of 1-0, well, kotha and motor machine are entered. The remaining land measuring 1-13 is shown as vacant. It is thus clear that for the first time wheat crop was sown by the plaintiff Milkhi Singh in an area of 0-10 for Rabi 1969. Out of this area, wheat was sown in an area of 0-10. In an area of 1-0, well, kotha and motor machine are entered. The remaining land measuring 1-13 is shown as vacant. It is thus clear that for the first time wheat crop was sown by the plaintiff Milkhi Singh in an area of 0-10 for Rabi 1969. Then in Kharif 1969, land bearing khasra Nos. 1323 and 1324 are shown as banjar jadid whereas, land bearing khasra Nos. 1326 is shown as banjar qadim. Land measuring 0-10 out of land bearing khasra No. 1325 is shown as vacant. Land measuring 1-13 out of this khasra No. 1325 is shown as banjar jadid and the remaining area of 1-0 of land bearing khasra No. 1325 is shown well, kotha and machine. So the entries for kharif 1969 do not show that any crop was sown during Kharif 1969. Again in Rabi 1970, the same entries as were made in kharif 1969 were repeated. So even in Kharif 1970 no crop was sown. In Kharif 1970 and Rabi 1971, the entire land is shown as vacant. So no crops were sown in the land in dispute in Kharif 1970 and Rabi 1971. 21 Ex. P-10 is girdawri for Kharif 1971 till Rabi 1976. In Kharif 1971, the entire land in dispute is entered as banjar jadid. In Rabi 1972 the land bearing khasra No. 1323 and 1324 is shown as banjar qadim, whereas the land bearing khasra Nos. 1325 and 1326 is shown as banjar Jadid. Again in Kharif 1972, the land bearing khasra Nos. 1323, 1324 and 1326 is shown as banjar qadim, whereas the land bearing khasra No. 1325 is shown as banjar jadid. So it would thus appear that even from Rabi 1971 to kharif 1972 no crop was sown in the land in dispute. Then in Rabi 1972, land bearing khasra Nos. 1323, 1324 and 1325 is shown as banjar qadim and the land measuring 4-19 out of the land bearing khasra No. 1326 was shown as banjar jadid whereas in the remaining land measuring 6-0 out of this land bearing khasra No. 1326 barley crop is shown to have been sown. So for the second time barley crop was shown to have been sown in Rabi 1973. So for the second time barley crop was shown to have been sown in Rabi 1973. Again in Kharif 1973 land bearing khasra No. 1323 is shown as banjar qadim, whereas land bearing khasra No. 1324 is shown as Taraddadi. The land measuring 1-3 out of land bearing khasra No. 1325 is shown as Taraddadi and the remaining area of 2.0 of this khasra number is shown as banjar qadim. So, it is clear that even during Kharif 1973 no crop was sown. Then in Rabi 1974, barley was sown in land measuring 1-3 out of land bearing khasra No. 1325 and land measuring 8-19 out of land bearing khasra No. 1326 and no crop was sown in the remaining area of the land in dispute. Land bearing khasra No. 1323 measuring 2-0 out of land bearing khasra No. 1325 and land measuring 2-0 out of land bearing khasra No. 1326 is shown as banjar qadim. Land bearing khasra No. 1324 is shown as Taraddadi. Even during Kharif 1974 no crop was sown in the entire land, then in Rabi 1975 barley crop was sown in land measuring 1-10 out of land bearing khasra No. 1323, land bearing khasra No. 1324 and land measuring 8-19 out of land bearing khasra No. 1326. In kharif 1975, no crop was sown. In Rabi 1976, the entire land in dispute excepting land measuring 3-5 in all, was brought under cultivation. Wheat and sarson were sown. 22.Ex. P11 is the girdawri for kharif 1976 till Kharif 1978. Even in Kharif 1976 no crop was sown. In Rabi 1977, the entire land in dispute excepting 3-19 was brought under cultivation. Barley and wheat were sown. In Kharif 1977, the entire land excepting land measuring 0-3 is shown as vacant and in 0-3 fodder is shown to have been sown. In Rabi 1978, the entire land in dispute excepting khasra No. 1325 is shown as vacant. In this area measuring 2-13 wheat is shown to have been sown. In Kharif 1978, paddy is shown to have been sown in an area of 10-9 out of the entire land and the remaining land is either shown as vacant or site of the motor. In Rabi 1979, some land out of the entire land is shown to be under cultivation. 23. In Kharif 1978, paddy is shown to have been sown in an area of 10-9 out of the entire land and the remaining land is either shown as vacant or site of the motor. In Rabi 1979, some land out of the entire land is shown to be under cultivation. 23. Thus it is quite clear that for the first time in Rabi 1969 wheat was sown in an area of 0-10 out of land bearing khasra No. 1325 and for the second time, barley was sown in an area of 6-0 out of the land bearing khasra No. 1326 in Rabi 1973. 24. It is well settled that the adverse possession should be continuous, open and hostile to the real owner so as to perfect into full ownership." 5. A perusal of the above mentioned finding based on Ex. P9, Ex. P10 and Ex. P-11 i.e. Khasra girdawris for Kharif 1966 to Rabi 1971 and khasra girdawris for the year 1971 till Rabi 1976 and khasra girdawri for the Kharif 1966 till Kharif 1978 respectively would show that the land bearing khasra No. 1323 and 1324 was banzar jadid whereas land bearing khasra No. 1326 was shown as banzar qadim. Certain portion of the land was shown vacant from khasra No. 1325 whereas other portion of this khasra number was shown to have a well, a room and a machine. Therefore, Ex. P9 did not show that any crop was sown over the land in dispute from Kharif 1966 to Rabi 1970. Similarly, in respect of the period from Kharif 1971 till Kharif 1975, no crop was sown. It was in Rabi 1976 that the whole land except land measuring 3K-5M was brought under cultivation and the crop of wheat and sarson (mustard) were sown. From Kharif 1976 till Kharif 1978 also, some portion was shown to be cultivated whereas other was shown to be vacant as is evident from para 22 of the judgment of the learned District Judge extracted above. 6. The plea taken in the memorandum of appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant is that he is in possession of the suit land since 1956 onwards. 6. The plea taken in the memorandum of appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant is that he is in possession of the suit land since 1956 onwards. It is further claimed that the possession of the plaintiff-appellant is open, hostile and to the knowledge of the defendant-respondents and, therefore, all the ingredients of adverse possession stood satisfied and the suit of the plaintiff-appellant has been erroneously dismissed by the learned District Judge. 7. Shri R. K. Battas, learned counsel for the defendant-respondents has submitted that stray entries in khasra girdawris for one or two years would not constitute basis for recording a finding of long possession and the same deserves to be ignored. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Jai Ram V/s. Gram Panchayat Dehalka, 1978 Pun LJ 43 and the judgment in the case of Kidar Nath V/s. Ram Chand, AIR 1972 Punj and Hry 335 and argued that a mere construction of a room on a part of the open land by the plaintiff-appellant would not show that his possession was hostile and that the plaintiff-appellant must prove adverse possession for a period of 12 years. The learned counsel has then argued that intermittent possession or disrupted possession by the plaintiff-appellant would be fatal to his claim because in order to succeed in the plea of adverse possession, the possession has to be continuous, open and hostile. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Kashi Bai V/s. Sudha Rani Ghose, AIR 1958 SC 434 and a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Santa Singh Gopal Singh V/s. Rajinder Singh Bur Singh, AIR 1965 Punj 415. He has also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Bhag Singh V/s. Arjan Singh, 1982 Pun LJ 9 and argued that once the entries in khasra girdawri have been shown under cultivation or that the land was vacant, then in no eventuality it could be presumed that it was in possession of the plaintiff-appellant. According to the learned counsel if the land is capable of being cultivated then the only way to prove and shown possession is the cultivation by a person who claims adverse possession. 8. According to the learned counsel if the land is capable of being cultivated then the only way to prove and shown possession is the cultivation by a person who claims adverse possession. 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent and perusing the memorandum of appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant, I am of the considered view that this appeal is devoid of merit because the analysis of evidence in the shape of khasra girdawri produced by the plaintiff-appellant does not prove his possession being continuous, uninterrupted, open and hostile possession. The learned District Judge has adopted a correct approach by observing that the possession of the plaintiff-appellant preceding 12 years from the date of the filing of the suit i.e. from Kharif 1967 till Rabi 1979 was required to be open, hostile, uninterrupted and cultivating. However, from Ex. P9, which is a copy of the khasra girdawri for Kharif 1966 to Rabi 1971, the land is shown to be vacant and no crops were sown on the land. Similarly, Ex. P10 shows that from Kharif 1971 till Kharif 1975, no crop was sown. It was only in Rabi 1976 that crop of wheat and sarson (mustard) were sown. Similar is the position with regard to Ex. P11, i.e. Khasra girdawri for kharif 1976 till Kharif 1978. Therefore, the plaintiff-appellant has failed to establish by leading cogent evidence that his possession is continuous, uninterrupted, hostile and cultivating. It is well settled that in respect of the vacant land, possession can be shown only by adducing evidence of cultivation. Even if the possession is intermittently interrupted, then the presumption in law is that during the period such a person who claims adverse possession, did not remain in possession and the land has reverted back to the true owner. The Supreme Court in Kashi Bais case (AIR 1958 SC 434) (supra) has taken the aforementioned view. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Prasad Singh V/s. Phool Kumari, AIR 1971 SC 1337 and in the case of Bal Krishan V/s. Satya Parkash, 2001 (2) SCC 498 : (AIR 2001 SC 700). 9. The Supreme Court in Kashi Bais case (AIR 1958 SC 434) (supra) has taken the aforementioned view. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Shambhu Prasad Singh V/s. Phool Kumari, AIR 1971 SC 1337 and in the case of Bal Krishan V/s. Satya Parkash, 2001 (2) SCC 498 : (AIR 2001 SC 700). 9. It is also well settled that three elements are necessary for establishing the plea of adverse possession, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in Vidya Devi alias Vidya Vati (dead) by LRs V/s. Prem Prakash, (1995) 4 SCC 496 : (AIR 1995 SC 1789). The observations of their Lordships in this regard read as under (para 27 of AIR) :- "28. Ouster does not mean actual driving out of the co-sharer from the property. It will, however, not be complete unless it is coupled with all other ingredients required to constitute adverse possession. Broadly speaking, three elements are necessary for establishing the plea of ouster in the case of co-owner. They are (1) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted possession of the person pleading ouster, and (iii) exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly and to the knowledge of other co-owner. Thus, a co-owner can, under law, claim title by adverse possession against another co-owner who can, of course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint possession within time prescribed by law." 10 In order to succeed in a suit claiming adverse possession, it is obligatory on the part of the plaintiff-appellant to establish the ingredients of adverse possession. The aforementioned view has been reiterated by their Lordships in the case of Seshmani V/s. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (2000) 2 SCC 253 : (AIR 2000 SC 979). 11. When the principles enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as well as by a Full Bench of this Court in Santa Singhs case (supra) (AIR 1965 Punj 415) are applied to the facts of the instant case, it becomes evident that firstly the possession of the plaintiff-appellant for continuous period of 12 years have not been proved. 11. When the principles enunciated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as well as by a Full Bench of this Court in Santa Singhs case (supra) (AIR 1965 Punj 415) are applied to the facts of the instant case, it becomes evident that firstly the possession of the plaintiff-appellant for continuous period of 12 years have not been proved. When the land is vacant and is not being cultivated, then possession of such land which is banjar jadid or banjar qadim reverts back to the true owner because there is such presumption in law as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case Kashi Bais case (supra) (AIR 1958 SC 434). The plaintiff appellant has miserably failed to prove his possession by leading cogent evidence and has failed to discharge the heavy onus placed on him. Therefore, the appeal is without any merit and is thus liable to be dismissed. 12. The plea set up by the plaintiff-appellant in the memorandum of appeal that the findings recorded by the learned District Judge are contrary to evidence, would not require any serious consideration because the close analysis made by the learned District Judge makes it evident that there is ample evidence to show that the possession of the vacant land was not taken for cultivation continuously for a period of 12 years by the plaintiff-appellant. The findings are not without evidence and it cannot be concluded that a reasonable man would not record those findings on the basis of available evidence. 13. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed