JUDGMENT - DAGA V.C., J.:—The petitioners, by this petition, are seeking a writ directing the respondents to remove encroachment on the land meant for public utility located in the Harijan colony being Plot Nos. 186, 187 and 111 at Jaripatka Nagpur. The Facts And Submissions: 2.The petitioners during the pendency of the petition, amended this petition so as to challenge the Notification bearing No. SCM/NGP/78/3-8-78 dated 3-8-1978 issued under the provisions of Maharashtra Slum Area (Improvements, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 ("the MHADA Act, 1976" for short) contending that the respondents could not have taken recourse to the provisions of the MHADA Act, 1976 but ought to have resorted to the provisions of Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvements Clearances and Re-development Act, 1971 ("The Slums Act", 1971 for short) looking to the preambles thereof which clearly spell out that both legislations are meant for different purposes. 3.The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the object of the Slums Act, 1971 is to make better provision for improvement and clearance of slum areas in the State and for re-development and for protection of occupiers from eviction and distress warrants and for matters connected with the said purpose. Whereas, the object of the MHADA Act, 1976 is to unify, consolidate and amend the laws relating to housing repairing and reconstructing dangerous buildings and carrying out improvement works in slum areas and went on to contend that the action of the respondent State in resorting to the provisions of the MHADA Act, 1976 is arbitrary mala fide as such the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 4.The learned Counsel for the petitioner also raised certain general contentions the reference of which is necessary since we propose to dispose of this petition on the preliminary objection raised by the learned A.G.P. appearing for the respondents, set out and dealt with hereinafter. 5.Per contra, the learned A.G.P appearing for the State and other respondents raised a preliminary objection contending that the challenges set out in the petition cannot be considered on merits since the petition suffers from delay and laches. 5.Per contra, the learned A.G.P appearing for the State and other respondents raised a preliminary objection contending that the challenges set out in the petition cannot be considered on merits since the petition suffers from delay and laches. He submits that a party seeking intervention and aid of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of his right should exercise due diligence and approach the Court within a reasonable time after cause of action arises and if there has been delay or laches on his part, Court has undoubted discretion to deny the relief. He further submitted that the State Government and MHADA authorities have spent hugs amount for the development of the slum in question keeping in view their legal obligation under the MHADA Act 1976 and if this Court holds that the notification dated 3-8-1978 issued under the MHADA Act, 1976 is bad, then, the entire expenditure made on development of slum would be nothing but turn out to be a wasteful expenditure. He submits that the persons who have been settled as slum dwellers will also be seriously prejudicated, apart from the fact that they are not party to this petition. In his submission, no order adverse to their interest can be passed behind their back. 6.The learned A.G.P. passed into service list of dates to bring home his submission. The details of which are as under: 1. 3-8-1972 - The notification was issued under the MHADA Act, 1976 declaring the area in question as slum. 2. 30-8-1972 - The notification was published in the official Gazette of the State of Maharashtra. 3. 23-10-1978 - This petition was filed after six years without challenging above notification. 4. 30-8-2002 - Petition came to be amended to challenge notification issued under the MHADA Act, 1976 i.e. after 24 years. 7.The learned A.G.P. on the basis of above list of dates successfully established delay and laches in filing this petition and tried to support the action of the respondents on merits. He, thus, prayed for dismissal of the petition with costs. CONSIDERATION 8.At the out set, we must observe that the petitioners are seeking directions against the respondent No. 7 calling upon them to remove encroachment committed by them with direction to the State to provide them alternate site. He, thus, prayed for dismissal of the petition with costs. CONSIDERATION 8.At the out set, we must observe that the petitioners are seeking directions against the respondent No. 7 calling upon them to remove encroachment committed by them with direction to the State to provide them alternate site. Such relief cannot be granted in favour of the petitioners unless the Notification dated 3-8-1978 issued under the MHADA Act, 1976 is held to be bad and set aside. Here comes the question of delay and laches. Challenge to the notification dated 3-8-1978 has been set up in the petition on 30-8-2002, practically after 24 years of the issuance of the notification that too by amendment. Even if, it is assumed that once the amendment is allowed it relates back to the date of presentation of petition in that event challenge to the Notification could, at the most be said to be in the year 1986, when the writ petition was filed i.e. after eight years. 9.Delay in moving the application is one of the important and relevant factors for which the Court may refuse to grant relief. In Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 11, page 73, in Article 133 it was observed that "except in case where the delay is accounted; for mandamus will not be granted unless applied for within a reasonable time after the demand and refusal. The mandamus is generally regarded as not embraced within the statue of limitation applicable to ordinary action but as the subject to the equitable doctrine of laches. It is well-settled that the mandamus will not be issued unless asked for within a reasonable time after the wrong happened. The Apex Court in (Kamini Kumar Das Choudhary v. State of Bengal)1, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2060, held that "it is imperative if the petitioner wants to invoke extraordinary remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India that he should come to Court at the earliest reasonable possible opportunity". A party seeking intervention and aid of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of his right should exercise due diligence and approach the Court within a reasonable time after the cause of action arises and if there has been undue delay or laches on his part Court has undoubted discretion to deny the relief. A party seeking intervention and aid of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of his right should exercise due diligence and approach the Court within a reasonable time after the cause of action arises and if there has been undue delay or laches on his part Court has undoubted discretion to deny the relief. In (Tilokchand Motichand others v. H.B. Munshi Commissioner of Sales Tax Bombay another)2, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 898, it was observed that the party claiming fundamental right must move the courts before other rights come into existence. The action of the Court cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court. To condone delay or not, is one of the discretion for the Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit. It will all depend on what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. 10.Now turning to the facts this case and the list of the dates extracted in para (5) supra, it would be clear that the petitioners filed this petition challenging notification issued in the year 1972, practically after the lapse of 8 years if the date of the representation of the petitioner is taken into account and after 24 years if the amendment to the petition is taken into account. During this long span of 24 years it is reasonable to presume that the respondents must have spent huge amount on the development of the slum and that slum dwellers by this time must have been reasonably settled. Under these circumstances, we find no justification for exercising discretion in favour of the petitioners. Considering the delay and laches for challenging the notification dated 3-8-1978 no relief can be granted in favour of the petitioner. 11.In the result, petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. -----