Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 115 (HP)

OM CHAND PARWAL v. STATE OF H. P.

2003-05-22

M.R.VERMA

body2003
JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J. (Oral) - This petition mentioned to be one under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, and Section 482 read with Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter referred to as the Code) and there appropriate Sections of law praying for discharging the petitioner/accused (hereafter referred to as the accused) in/or quashing the case F.I.R. No. 344 of 1998 dated 27.11.1998 under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 120-B IPC registered at Police Station, Sadar, Shimla on the ground of delay in filing the charge-sheet had been submitted by the accused to the Honble the Chief Justice of this High Court and a copy thereof was endorsed to another Honble Judge also from Model Jail, Chandigarh where he is lodged since 28.8.1999. The petition add read to the Honble Chief Justice was registered as Cr.M.M.O. The petition addressed to a learned Judge of this Court was examined by the PIL Section of the Registry and the learned Judge in-charge of the PIL ordered to connect it along with the petition addressed to the Honble the Chief Justice which was taken up on the judicial side as Cr.M.M.O. It was in view of the prayers made for quashing of the F.I.R./discharging of the accused that the petition could be considered only as one under Section 482 of the Code, therefore, it was registered as Cr.M.M.O. and was admitted for hearing as such vide order dated 7.5.2003. 2. The relevant and material facts are that the accused was Director-cum-Advisor of Alpine Floritech, Ali Cottage, Ram Bazaar, Shimla allegedly dealing in fixed and recurring deposits. The Company had been alluring the customers on the assurance that it would pay higher interests on such deposits than the interested paid by the Banks. One Parveen Walia also come in contact with the-accused in September, 1997 and the accused informed her that the Company aforesaid deals in the fixed and recurring deposits in a rate higher than that of the Banks and issue cheques for the principal amount and the interest in advance. Parveen Walia delivered a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to the accused in her own name and another sum of Rs. 15,000/- in the name of her mother Parveen Walia against receipts. She was given the advance cheques and the RDs. The cheques so issued purported to be signed by B.M. Jain and Suresh Jain. Parveen Walia delivered a sum of Rs. 30,000/- to the accused in her own name and another sum of Rs. 15,000/- in the name of her mother Parveen Walia against receipts. She was given the advance cheques and the RDs. The cheques so issued purported to be signed by B.M. Jain and Suresh Jain. Accused remained in Shimla till July, 1998 and during this period by adopting similar course the accused had cheated so many persons of their money and there were no arrangements with the concerned Banks to make payment against the cheques issued by the Company. Therefore, Parveen Walia lodged the aforesaid F.I.R. The investigation in the case is still on and charge-sheet against the accused has not been filed as yet. The accused, therefore, has moved the present petition for cancellation/quashing of the F.I.R. and discharging him. It has further been averred that he is a patient of blood sugar and high blood pressure and is in custody for the last about five years. If the remission earned from time to time is added to his custody he had been in custody for more than five years and benefit of delaying the investigation and the filing of the charge-sheet has been claimed either by quashing the F.I.R. or discharging the accused. 3. The respondent in its reply while admitting the registration of the aforesaid F.I.R. against the accused and pendency of investigation has claimed that the accused had already been released on bail in the aforesaid case and ho is in custody in Chandigarh in other cases which have arisen outside the territorial jurisdiction of Himachal Pradesh, therefore, he is not entitled to any relief. It is also claimed that during the course of investigation cognizable offences are found to have been committed by the accused. It is, however, admitted that the charge-sheet against the accused has not been submitted as yet. 4. It may be pointed out that the accused made a specific request in the petition that he wanted to argue his case himself, therefore, his presence in the Court on the date of hearing was ensured and he is present to argue his case in person. 5. I have heard the accused in person and the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State and have also gone through the material placed on record. 6. 5. I have heard the accused in person and the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State and have also gone through the material placed on record. 6. It may be pointed out at the very outset that the inherent powers of the High Court preserved by Section 482 of the Code gives the widest jurisdiction to the Court to pass orders to secure the ends of justice and for that purpose to entertain such applications which are otherwise not contemplated under the Code. However, these powers are not to be resorted to if there is any specific provision in the Code for the redressal of the grievance raised. Further such powers must be sparingly exercised only with a view to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; and should not be exercised when there is any express bar created by law. It is by now well settled that the High Court can quash F.I.R./criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. However, the High Court can quash the F.I.R. only if it does not disclose commission of any offence. When the F.I.R. constitutes an offence as per the allegations made therein and the investigation is in progress the F.I.R. should not be quashed. A perusal of the F.I.R. in the case in hand contains the allegations which make out the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 120-B I.PC. by the accused. It is not in dispute that the matter is still under investigation. Thus, the F.I.R. in question cannot be quashed on the ground that it does not disclose the commission of any offence. 7. The offences alleged to have been committed by the accused are not of minor nature but are of grave nature for which severe punishments have been provided under the law, therefore, the delay in the investigation by itself is no reason to quash the F.I.R. It is more so when in the case accused has already been admitted to bail. The contention that the F.I.R. should quashed is thus not sustainable. 8. Since the accused is already on bail in the case, therefore, his prayer for his release from custody in the case is also misconceived. The contention that the F.I.R. should quashed is thus not sustainable. 8. Since the accused is already on bail in the case, therefore, his prayer for his release from custody in the case is also misconceived. In so far as the present custody of the accused is concerned that is in those cases which he is alleged to have committed outside the State of H.P., therefore, if he is aggrieved by such custody he has to approach the Courts having jurisdiction and not this Court within whose territorial jurisdiction none of such cases has arisen or is registered. 9. In the given circumstances of the case, the contention (hat the accused had been in confinement for such period as could be the term of imprisonment passed against him if convicted, therefore, he should be discharged is also not sustainable for the reason that he is not in custody in the case registered against him at Shimla. 10. In view of the above, there is no merit and substance in this petition and accordingly it is dismissed. -