JUDGMENT : Padmanabhan, J.—The writ-petitioner, management of Christian Medical College and Hospital, Vellore, has prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for and quash the award, dated March 31, 1999, passed by the first respondent Labour Court in I.D. No. 844 of 1993. 2. Heard Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-management and Sri V. Selvaraj, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent. With the consent of counsel on either side, the writ petition itself is taken up for final disposal. 3. The first respondent-Labour Court by the impugned award directed reinstatement of the second respondent workman with full back- wages and all other attendant benefits by award dated March 31, 1999, besides awarded cost of Rs. 500. Challenging the said award the writ-petitioner-management has filed the present writ petition. Without prejudice, pending the writ petition, the second respondent was reinstated and he continued to work even as of today under the writ-petitioner-management in the same cadre. 4. Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel represented that the second respondent is very sincere, loyal and good, but added that he is not efficient enough to shoulder the responsibility of the post. This is being recorded as it was a statement made by the counsel for the management at the hearing and not for any other purpose. 5. The facts leading to the writ petition could be summarised briefly. 6. The second respondent was initially appointed as junior accountant on December 19, 1983 by the petitioner-management and he was confirmed in the said post with effect from June 19, 1985. The second respondent was promoted as assistant accountant on and from December 19, 1986. On April 2, 1990 the petitioner was absorbed as accounts officer. But his services were terminated on April 2, 1991 by order dated March 30, 1991. It is claimed that in recognition of sincere, honest and hard work, the second respondent was promoted besides he was qualified. The second respondent though designated as accounts officer, he was doing only a head clerk's job connected with accounts and according to the second respondent he is only a workman as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the last drawn wages being Rs. 2,753.80. The second respondent though designated as accounts officer, he was doing only a head clerk's job connected with accounts and according to the second respondent he is only a workman as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the last drawn wages being Rs. 2,753.80. The second respondent raised an industrial dispute contending that the termination is illegal, punitive and without payment of retrenchment compensation in terms of Section 25-F his service was terminated. The management issued a chargememo and after getting an explanation and closely following thereafter his services were terminated as if it is a discharge simpliciter. 7. The petitioner claimed that the second respondent was not illegally terminated and that Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act has no application and that it is a termination simpliciter. The second respondent contended that it is an illegal termination and raised an industrial dispute. The petitioner-management contested the claim by filing a detailed counter. The petitioner contended that the second respondent is not a workman as defined in Section 2(s) as he was an accounts officer and his last drawn salary being Rs. 2,753.80, the second respondent was an accounts officer from April 2, 1990 in general accounts section and exercising managerial/supervisory functions and controlling number of staff under him. The second respondent has to follow the sundry advance accounts and accounts receivable and for passing vouchers for settlement of advances and or passing payment vouchers for payment of advances, organising the work of receiving request for reimbursement certificates from patients, preparation of reimbursement certificates and arranging to despatch these certificates and arranging to keep necessary records for the above. The second respondent being accounts officer was to allot the work to his subordinates and supervise them. The second respondent has to recommend and grant leave to his subordinates while exercising supervisory functions. The second respondent was authorised to receive memos in case of any misconduct and also powers to initiate disciplinary action. Therefore the second respondent is not a workman and he cannot raise an industrial dispute. The second respondent has to recommend and grant leave to his subordinates while exercising supervisory functions. The second respondent was authorised to receive memos in case of any misconduct and also powers to initiate disciplinary action. Therefore the second respondent is not a workman and he cannot raise an industrial dispute. It is further contended that if the second respondent was fully aware of the terms and conditions of appointment of accounts officer and during his probation as accounts officer his services were satisfactory, he was also issued with a memo pointing out the lapses and inefficiency and, therefore, having no other alternative his probationary services were terminated with effect from April 2, 1991. It is a simpliciter discharge of a probationer. Being a simpliciter termination of a probationer the petitioner cannot complain, nor it is an order of termination much less, illegal termination. As the second respondent's services were not satisfactory, the petitioner terminated the services of the second respondent by letter dated March 30, 1991, enclosing one month's salary in lieu of notice. It is asserted that the second respondent was not terminated in pursuance of the chargesheet, dated June 21, 1991. But it is a termination, simpliciter of a probationer. The writ petitioner-management prayed for dismissal of the dispute. 8. The second respondent-workman examined himself as W.W.I and the writ-petitioner management examined one Manickam as M.W 1. The second respondent marked Exhibits W1 to W3 while the petitioner- management marked Exhibits M1 to M27. The first respondent Labour Court framed the following two points for consideration: (i) Whether the second respondent employee is a workman under the petitioner-management under the Industrial Disputes Act? (ii) If so, whether the second respondent-employee is entitled for reinstatement with back-wages as prayed for? 9. On the first point the first respondent-Labour Court held that the second respondent is a workman and he is entitled to invoke, the Industrial Disputes Act. On the said point the first respondent Labour Court concluded that the employee is entitled for reinstatement with back-wages and continuity of services. 10. Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel took the Court through the award of the Labour Court, material evidence let in by either side as well as the oral evidence and sought to contend that the second respondent is not a workman as defined in Section 2(s). 10. Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel took the Court through the award of the Labour Court, material evidence let in by either side as well as the oral evidence and sought to contend that the second respondent is not a workman as defined in Section 2(s). It was hextly contended that it is a termination simpliciter of a probationer and it is not a punitive termination, nor it is illegal and therefore the award of the Labour Court is liable to be quashed in its entirety. 11. Per contra, Sri V. Selvaraj, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that on the materials placed the Labour Court has rightly concluded that the second respondent is a workman as defined in Section 2(s) and his termination is illegal besides being punitive and therefore no interference is called for with the findings recorded by the Labour Court. Sri V. Selvaraj, also contended that the findings recorded by the first respondent-Labour Court is on consideration of entire evidence let in by either side, being a balanced findings supported by valid reasons, this Court will not interfere with such findings in exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel for the petitioner-management, relied upon the pronouncement of the Apex Court in (i) All India Reserve Bank Employees Association Vs. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1966 SC 305 , (ii) Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India Ltd. Vs. The Burma Shell Management Staff Association and Others, AIR 1971 SC 922 ; Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. Vs. The Workmen, (1970) 3 SCC 248 and State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Rameshwar Lal Gahlot, AIR 1996 SC 1001 , in support of his contention that in the very nature of duties performed, the second respondent is not a workman as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Sri Sanjay Mohan relied upon the above pronouncements in his usual style and with all force contended that the second respondent is not a workman but he was employed in managerial/supervisory capacity and therefore it is clear that the first respondent-Labour Court has proceeded on a misconception of law and thus committed an error of jurisdiction. Sri Sanjay Mohan relied upon the above pronouncements in his usual style and with all force contended that the second respondent is not a workman but he was employed in managerial/supervisory capacity and therefore it is clear that the first respondent-Labour Court has proceeded on a misconception of law and thus committed an error of jurisdiction. Sri Sanjay Mohan contended that essence of supervisory function means control of a person over his subordinates and supervision contemplates direction and control and hence the second respondent will not fall within the definition of workman as defined in Section 2(s). 13. Per contra, Sri V. Selvaraj, learned counsel for the second respondent, contended that the second respondent continued to discharge the same functions even in the post of accounts officer, which he has been doing as assistant accountant and the nature of work which the second respondent was discharging is neither supervisory nor managerial and he is definitely a workman as defined in Section 2(s). The learned counsel also contended that the various pronouncements relied upon by Sri Sanjay Mohan will have no application, and they are clearly distinguishable on facts as the second respondent was factually working as a workman and he has neither exercised supervisory control nor managerial control and even after promotion to the post of accounts officer he was discharging the same functions as that of accounts clerk. 14. Sri V. Selvaraj, also pointed out that after the appointment as accounts officer, he was reverted for some time and he was doing the same work of assistant accountant and even thereafter also as on date of the order of termination he was only doing the work of assistant accountant and he has no managerial or supervisory power as sought to be suggested. In this respect Sri V. Selvaraj heavily relied upon the findings recorded by the first respondent-Labour Court. 15. Both the counsel took the Court through the evidence let in by either side as well as the documentary evidence. The points that arise for consideration in this writ petition are: (a) Whether the second respondent is a workman as defined in Section 2(s) and whether he could raise an industrial dispute? (b) Whether the order of termination in this case is a termination simpliciter of a probationer or punitive action? (c) Whether the non-employment of the second respondent-employee is justified? (b) Whether the order of termination in this case is a termination simpliciter of a probationer or punitive action? (c) Whether the non-employment of the second respondent-employee is justified? (d) Whether the award of the Labour Court is liable to be interfered as one in excess of jurisdiction? And (e) To what relief if any? The above points could be considered together. 16. Certain undisputed facts could be referred at the outset. For convenience, the second respondent will be referred as employee while the writ-petitioner will be referred as employer. The employee was appointed as junior accountant in terms of appointment order Exhibit M3, dated December 19, 1983. Exhibit M5 is the confirmation of appointment. There is no dispute as to the initial appointment as junior accountant. The employee was promoted as assistant accountant with effect from December 19, 1986 as seen from Exhibit M7. Thereafter the employer invited applications for the post of accounts officer. The writ-petitioner submitted his application for the said post of accounts officer. Exhibits M8 to M12 are the copies of employment notification, selection process and the selection by the employer. The employee was provisionally appointed as accounts officer with effect from April 2, 1990 as seen from Exhibit Ml 3 which the employee accepted on March 19, 1990. On March 24, 1990 under Exhibit M19, the employee was posted in the accounts department. Exhibits M23 to 27 are xerox copies of receipts, vouchers, acquittance and invoices. Those exhibits are being relied upon by the employer to sustain his case. Exhibit M20 is the order by which the employer terminated the employee from service with effect from April 1, 1991. Though the employee was appointed as accounts officer, admittedly the employer had issued a memorandum Exhibit W2, dated February 26, 1991, calling upon the employee to show cause with respect to certain alleged omissions or laches. Exhibit W3 is the reply, dated February 27, 1991. Closely following and without proceeding further with the memo, under Exhibit M20, the employer issued orders of termination on March 30, 1991 with effect from April 1, 1991. It is also rightly pointed out that none of the functions which the employee carried out or performed even as accounts officer is a supervisory or managerial. 17. Closely following and without proceeding further with the memo, under Exhibit M20, the employer issued orders of termination on March 30, 1991 with effect from April 1, 1991. It is also rightly pointed out that none of the functions which the employee carried out or performed even as accounts officer is a supervisory or managerial. 17. M.W. 1 in his cross-examination has admitted that the employee was discharging the functions of a clerk only and he has not sanctioned any of the amounts nor he has issued any consequential proceedings in respect of Exhibits M23 to M27. M. W. 1 has also deposed that the employee has no power to issue cheques or initiate disciplinary proceedings or control any of the staff members in the Section and it is only the two Directors or the Nursing Supervisor or the College Principal are competent to issue cheques and initiate disciplinary action and they alone controlled the entire establishment. It is also admitted by M.W. 1 that the employee has no power to appoint or permit or to increase the salary or even sanction increments. Nor he had the authority to initiate any disciplinary proceedings against any of the staff members. These admissions of M.W1 have been rightly relied upon by the Labour Court and the Labour Court has come to the right conclusion that the employee is a workman as defined in Section 2(s). The Labour Court has referred to the pronouncement of the Apex Court as well as the High Court and rightly applied the law laid down by the Apex Court. That apart, the employee who has examined himself as WW1 has deposed in detail about the nature of work which he was discharging. Though he has been designated or appointed as accounts officer, he is actually doing the job of assistant accountant. The evidence of M.W. 1 and W.W. 1 has been considered in detail by the first respondent Labour Court in this respect and when the employee was not entrusted with any work of supervisory or managerial function, nor he was to make any decision or had authority to act on behalf of the employer and in the nature of work admittedly performed by the employee, it has rightly recorded a finding that he is a workman as defined in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The employee in fact who was appointed as accounts officer was reverted for a certain period under Exhibit W2 and as admitted by M.W 1, the oral evidence of WW, 1 would show that the employee was extracted only the work of assistant accountant and not that of supervisory or managerial. From the evidence it is clear that the Labour Court has rightly concluded that the second respondent herein was a workman and rejected the contentions that the second respondent is not a workman. I do not find any illegality or error of jurisdiction in the said findings recorded by the Labour Court. The Labour Court has rightly applied the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in this respect and no interference is called for with the findings of the Labour Court. 18. Though, Sri Sanjay Mohan, learned counsel for the petitioner-management referred to various pronouncements of the Supreme Court referred to (supra), applying the very same test laid down in Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Company of India, Ltd. v. Burma Shell Management Staff Association and Ors. (supra), as well as the judgment in Reserve Bank Employees' Association v. Reserve Bank (supra) this Court on facts, as to confirm the finding of the Labour Court that the second respondent is a workman as he satisfies the definition of Section 2(s) and he always remained a workman even after the appointment as accounts officer. Employee was doing the same work even as accounts officer, the tests laid by the various pronouncements referred to have been rightly applied by the Labour Court and no interference is called for in this respect. The judicial review in this respect is very limited as has been held by the Apex Court in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. Vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC 264 and the Apex Court held thus at pp. 481 & 482 of LLJ: "The Industrial Tribunal on a consideration of the facts in the light of the principles enunciated above came to the conclusion that though certain features which are usually to be found in a contract of service were absent, that was due to the nature of the industry and that on the whole the status of the agarias was that of workmen and not independent contractors. It was under the circumstances strenuously urged: before us by the learned counsel for the respondents that the question as regards the relationship between the appellants and the agarias was a pure question of fact, that the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide that question and had come to its own conclusion in regard thereto, that the High Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, was not competent to set aside the finding of fact recorded by the Industrial Tribunal and that we, here, entertaining an appeal from the decision of the High Court, should also not interfere with that finding of fact." 19. As regards the second contention that it is an order of termination simpliciter of a probationer, the Labour Court has rightly rejected the said contention while relying upon Exhibits M14, M16 and Exhibit W2. Exhibit W2 is the memo, issued by the writ-petitioner-management pointing out certain omission, deficiency and calling upon the petitioner to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken. Exhibit M16 is the memorandum issued by the employer seeking for explanation of the employee for certain alleged omission or failure. An explanation has been submitted by the employee under Exhibit W2, Thereafter without proceeding further and without reference to the same, order of. termination has been passed. Though the Labour Court has incidentally given certain findings as to the initial selection as accounts officer, which may not have a bearing, but Exhibits W2 and W3 would speak for themselves and in fact the employee was reverted from the post of accounts officer for quite some time and the work allotted was only that of an assistant accountant. In fact as seen from Exhibit W2, the employee was transferred to the patient billing reimbursement Section with effect from October 1, 1990. It is not transfer of the employee in the cadre of accounts officer. MW1 has deposed about the nature of work performed by employee which is affirmed by Exhibit W2. Typed set of papers filed by the counsel for the petitioner would show that the appointment of accounts officer is a provisional one and he was put on probation for a period of one year from March 19, 1990. Yet, he was reverted and directed to discharge the same function as accounts assistant. 20. Typed set of papers filed by the counsel for the petitioner would show that the appointment of accounts officer is a provisional one and he was put on probation for a period of one year from March 19, 1990. Yet, he was reverted and directed to discharge the same function as accounts assistant. 20. Very many exhibits filed by the management would show that the employee was performing only a clerical work. That apart, it cannot be stated on facts that it is a new or fresh recruitment, but it is a continuation of the earlier services of the petitioner in the cadre of junior accountant and assistant accountant. Otherwise, he would not have been reverted to the said posts as seen from the proceedings. As seen from the appointment of M.W. 1 it is clear that the employee was only a clerk. It is a continuation of the earlier appointment and therefore the impugned termination order as has been rightly held by the first respondent Labour Court is illegal and it is too remote even to suggest it is a termination simpliciter but it is pursuant to certain charge memo and it is not as if it is a new appointment or recruitment. In Exhibit W2 the employer had admitted about the nature of work, viz., the employee being a clerk and therefore the Labour Court rightly held that the termination is illegal. 21. In the light of the, above discussions, all the above points are answered against the writ petitioner-management and in favour of the second respondent-employee. No interference is called for in the award passed by the first respondent-Labour Court. The writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected WMPs are closed.