( 1 ) SINCE common questions of law arise in all these appeals, they are being disposed of by a common judgment. ( 2 ) THE claimants in all these appeals are either injured or the legal representatives of the persons who died while travelling in a jeep bearing No. AP 23b 2105. They allege that a lorry bearing No. HR12-G A-0265 being driven by its driver at a high speed and in a rash and negligent manner dashed against the jeep in which the victims were travelling. They laid claims for-compensationas against the owner and the insurer of the lorry involved in the accident. In support of their case they examined witnesses and produced documentary evidence. The owner of the lorry remained ex parte. The appellant- insurance company contested the claim petitions putting the claimants to proof of petition averments and taking the plea that it is not liable to pay compensation as the owner and insurer of the jeep, who are necessary parties, are not made parties to the O. P. However, no oral or documentary evidence was adduced on its behalf and admittedly no petitions under Section 170 of the M. V. Act 1988 seeking permission of the Tribunal to take all the pleas open to the owner were filed. The Tribunal, after considering the evidence on record, held that the accident had occurred only on account of rash and negligent driving of the lorry and awarded compensation to the claimants as mentioned in the awards. These appeals are filed questioning those awards not only on the ground that the compensation awarded is on the higher side but also on the ground that the finding arrived at by the Tribunal that the accident had occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry is incorrect and improper and that the tribunal ought to have held that the accident had occurred due to negligence or composite negligence of the driver of both the vehicles involved in the accident. ( 3 ) AT the time of admission of these appeals, when a question arose as to the maintainability, Mr. Kota Subba Rao, the learned counsel for the appellants strongly relying on the observations made by the supreme Court in British India General insurance Co. ( 3 ) AT the time of admission of these appeals, when a question arose as to the maintainability, Mr. Kota Subba Rao, the learned counsel for the appellants strongly relying on the observations made by the supreme Court in British India General insurance Co. Ltd. v. Captain Itbar Singh contended that the insurer has the right, provided it has reserved it by the policy, to defend the action in the name of the assured and if it does so, all the defences available to the assured can then be urged by the insurer, and since the conditions in the insurance policy taken by the owner of the lorry involved in the accident shows that the insurer did reserve such a right, irrespective of the fact that the appellant did not file petitions under Section 170 of the M. V. Act 1988 before the Tribunal, it has the right to maintain these appeals and contended that since the Supreme Court in National insurance Co. v. Nikolete did not refer to the above decision of the Supreme Court of a co- ordinate bench, this Court can consider the issue relating to the maintainability of the appeal. He relying on New India Assurance co. Ltd. v. Chinta Devi and others contended that when a Tribunal permits the insurance company to cross-examine the witness on all aspects, the insurance company is entitled to question the quantum of compensation awarded in an appeal and as such the appeals are maintainable. ( 4 ) I am unable to agree with the contention of Sri Subba Rao. In Nikolete s case (2 supra) the Supreme Court clearly held that unless the insurer obtains permission under section 170 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 it cannot maintain an appeal questioning the quantum of compensation or the finding on negligence recorded by the Tribunal. In Itbar singh s case (1 supra) the Supreme Court did observe that if under the policy the insurer reserves such a right it can take all the defences open to the owner. It should be remembered that the Supreme Court in that case was interpreting sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 96 of the M. V. Act, 1939 and observed as under: we think that this contention is without foundation. Sub-section (2) in fact deals with defences other than those based on the conditions of a policy. It should be remembered that the Supreme Court in that case was interpreting sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 96 of the M. V. Act, 1939 and observed as under: we think that this contention is without foundation. Sub-section (2) in fact deals with defences other than those based on the conditions of a policy. Thus clause (a) of that sub-section permits an insurer to defend an action on the ground that the policy has been duly cancelled provided the conditions set out in that clause have been satisfied. Clause (c) gives him the right to defend the action on the ground that the policy is void as having been obtained by non-disclosure of a matter fact or a material fact or a material false representation of fact. Therefore, it cannot be said that in enacting sub-section (2) the legislature was con tmplating only those defences which were based on the conditions of the policy. It also seems to us that even if subsection (2) and sub-section (3) were confined only to defences based on the conditions of the policy that would not have led to the conclusion that the legislature thought that other defences not based on such conditions, would be open to an insurer. If that was what the legislature intended, then there was nothing to prevent it from expressing its intention. What the legislature has done is to enumerate in sub-section (6) that he cannot avoid his liability excepting by means of such defences. In order that sub-section (2) may be interpreted in the way the learned solicitor General suggests we have to add words to it. The learned Solicitor general concedes this and says that the only words that has to be added is the word "also" after the word "grounds". But even this the rules of interpretation do not permit us to do unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning, neither of which we think it is. The addition suggested will, in our view, make the language used unhappy and further effect a complete change in the meaning of the words used in the sub-section. As to sub-section (6) the learned Solicitor general contended that the proper reading of it was that an insurer could not avoid his liability except by way of a defence upon being made a party to the action under sub-section (2 ). As to sub-section (6) the learned Solicitor general contended that the proper reading of it was that an insurer could not avoid his liability except by way of a defence upon being made a party to the action under sub-section (2 ). He contended that the word "manner" in sub-section (6) did not refer to the defences specified in sub-section (2) but only meant, by way of defending the suit-the right to do which is given by sub-section (2 ). We think that this is a very forced construction of subsection (6) and we are unable to adopt it. The only manner of avoiding liability provided for in sub-section (2) is through the defences therein mentioned. Therefore, when subsection (6) talks of avoiding liability in the manner provided in sub-section (2), it necessarily refers to these defences. If the contention of the learned Solicitor general was right sub-section (6) would have provided that the insurer would not be entitled to avoid his liability except by defending the action on being made a party thereto. ( 5 ) THE contention of Sri Kota Subba Rao that since the provisions of Section 170 of the m. V. Act 1988 are in para-materia with section 110-C (2) and (3) of M. V. Act 1939 the fact that petitions under Section 170 of m. V. Act, 1988 are not filed is of no consequence, when the appellant insurer reserved a right under the policy to defend the action on all the grounds that are available to the owner, though prima facie, appears to have some force, on a deeper examination, I find no force in the said contention because the Supreme Court in Itbar Singh Case (1 supra) was dealing with M. V. Act 1939 as it stood in 1959. Section 110-C (2a) was incorporated in M. V. Act 1939 Act by way of the Amendment Act 56 of 1969. So by 1959, when the Supreme Court was considering the question relating to the defences available to the insurer, the statute did not contain any section relating to the defences available to an insurer. After the observation of the supreme Court, the legislature by incorporating Section 110-C (2a) in M. V. Act, 1939, laid down what are the defences available to the insurer and when the insurers can take the defences that are open to the owner. After the observation of the supreme Court, the legislature by incorporating Section 110-C (2a) in M. V. Act, 1939, laid down what are the defences available to the insurer and when the insurers can take the defences that are open to the owner. When the statute clearly lays down the defences open to the insurer, and clearly lays down after obtaining permission from the Tribunal only, the insurer can take the defences open to the owners also, the fact that by the policy issued by it the insurer reserved a right to take all the pleas open to the owner, would not cloth the insurer with an ipso facto right, without express permission from the Tribunal, to take all the self-defences open to the owner. The ratio in Chinta Devi case (3 supra) has no application to the tacts of this case-4. ( 6 ) SINCE the appellant did not, admittedly, take permission under Section 170 of the Act, in view of the ratio laid down in Nekolete s case (2 supra), appellant cannot question either the quantum of compensation or the finding of the Tribunal on the question of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the lorry. Therefore, these appeals are not maintainable and hence are dismissed. No costs.