DEVINDER GUPTA, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the order passed on 24. 6. 2003 by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad on an application (LA. No. 1735 of 2003) filed in O. P. No. 1303 of 2003 granting interim mandatory injunction against the appellant herein directing it to restore signal services consisting of SET, setmax, AXN, CNBC, DISCOVERY and animal PLANET etc. to the respondent s network forthwith and directing the respondent to clear the arrears payable to the appellant within one week from the date of the order. ( 2 ) THE respondent herein dealing in cable Network operations had entered into an agreement with the appellant on 19. 11. 2002 for distribution of package of satellite channels to various subscribers. It appears that disputes arose between the parties. On 23. 6. 2003 respondent filed an application under Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) in the Court of the chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad praying that an interim injunction be issued directing the appellants to restore the signal services of the bouquet of channels consisting of SET, SETMAX, AXN, CNBC, Discovery and Animal Planet to the respondent s network upon discharge of subscription arrears as per the respondent, basing upon the connectivity disclosed in the affiliation agreement dated 19. 11. 2002 and on payment of future subscription fee as per the said agreement pending the dispute of connectivity to be resolved by the parties through the arbitration procedure, as contemplated under Clause 14 of the said agreement. Simultaneously along with the said O. P. , an application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also filed praying that pending disposal of the main petition filed under Section 9 of the Act, interim direction be issued as prayed for in the main petition. ( 3 ) THE Interlocutory Application presented on 23. 6. 2003 came up before the chief Judge, City Civil Court on the same day as request was made for urgent hearing of the application. The note put up by the Office on the docket reads that: sri A. Tulsi Raj Gokul, Advocate for petitioner. LA. No. 1735 of 2003 in Arb. OP. No. 1303 of 2003. Under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 cpc. The note put up by the Office on the docket reads that: sri A. Tulsi Raj Gokul, Advocate for petitioner. LA. No. 1735 of 2003 in Arb. OP. No. 1303 of 2003. Under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 cpc. This petition under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of CPC filed by the petitioner requesting the court to grant mandatory injunction to direct to restore the signal services currently as disclosed in the petition. O. P. is posted to 7. 8. 2003. No caveat is pending. ( 4 ) THE Chief Judge City Civil Court thereon passed the following order: sri Srinivasa Iyengar offered to file vekalath. For counter and hearing: 24. 6. 2003. ( 5 ) THE above indicates that the main petition filed on 23. 6. 2003 as well as the interlocutory application filed under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC were posted to 7. 8. 2003. As Counsel put in appearance on 23. 6. 2003 on behalf of the appellant and opposed the petition and offered to file vakalat, the case was adjourned to the very next day for filing counter. On the next day (24. 6. 2003), the impugned order was passed which is under challenge by the appellant herein who is respondent before the Court below. ( 6 ) THE impugned order is challenged, inter alia, on the ground that it has been passed by the City Civil Court in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. A request was made for urgent hearing by the Respondent to take up for order the petition on 23. 6. 2003. The appellant s counsel took notice on the same day and sought time to file counter. The Court insisted to hear the matter the very next day. As such it was adjourned only for a day. On the next day when the case was called during call work, representation was made on behalf of the appellant to take it up in the afternoon as the counter was under preparation. Chief Judge, City Civil Court called the matter at 12. 30 p. m. and denied reasonable request of the appellant to take up the case in the afternoon. The learned judge heard the Counsel for respondent only and reserved his orders, which was pronounced immediately the Court is adjourned for the day in the same evening. Chief Judge, City Civil Court called the matter at 12. 30 p. m. and denied reasonable request of the appellant to take up the case in the afternoon. The learned judge heard the Counsel for respondent only and reserved his orders, which was pronounced immediately the Court is adjourned for the day in the same evening. According to the appellant, there was absolutely no urgency to have heard the respondent only and passed orders on the same day. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the contract had been terminated on 31. 12. 2002 whereas the petition was presented by the respondent only on 23. 6. 2003. There was no compelling circumstance or urgency to deny the appellant at least a reasonable opportunity to present its case by postponing hearing for a few hours on 24. 6. 2003. It is urged that the City Civil Court failed to take note of the fact that the agreement between the parties is not specifically enforceable inasmuch as the respondent has not fulfilled its part of the contractual obligations. A person who even fails to fulfil its obligation is disentitled to demand from the opposite party, fulfilling its part of obligation under the same contract. Respondent had consistently defaulted in fulfilling its obligation and was in arrears of payment of monthly subscriptions when contract was terminated on 31. 12. 2002. Even at the time when the respondent approached the court, he was in arrears to the tune of rs. 8,39,415/ -. There was absolute breach of the terms of agreement on the part of respondent. Contract stood terminated-by the appellant on 31. 12. 2002. Signals were not being transmitted thereafter as per the agreement. Even assuming for the sake of argument that termination on the part of the appellant was not justified, the respondent had in fact in the meanwhile acquiesced for the termination and had also made alternate arrangements with M/s hathway Cable and Datacom Pvt. Ltd. Thus the respondent had abandoned the affiliation agreement much before approaching the court and for that reason also, the respondent was not entitled to any interim injunction which aspect the learned Court below failed to notice which was apparent on the face of the record. These facts as are apparent on record have been mentioned only to show the manner in which the Court below has dealt with the matter. These facts as are apparent on record have been mentioned only to show the manner in which the Court below has dealt with the matter. ( 7 ) THE appeal was presented on 27. 6. 2003. It came up for admission before the regular Bench hearing such appeals on 2. 7. 2003. The Bench directed the matter to be posted before another Bench with the permission of the Chief Justice (since one of the Judges declined to hear the appeal ). On the same day special mention was made before the Division Bench-1 by the learned Advocate-General appearing for the appellant. Request was allowed. The appeal was taken up for consideration on the same day. The reason for taking up the matter on the same day is reflected in the ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the appellant has reiterated the same grounds as have been taken to challenge the impugned order. In addition, reference was made to the terms of the agreement that even as per the terms of the agreement, the Courts at hyderabad have no jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate upon any matter arising out of the contract entered into by the parties since the Courts in Mumbai alone have jurisdiction over any dispute where the respondent would be at liberty to take appropriate proceedings. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that it was a fit case where in a petition filed under Section 9 of the Act the Court could intervene and grant interim measure of protection pending consideration of the main petition, which the Court below has rightly done it in the facts and circumstances. He referred to sections 5, 9 and 37-A of the Act about the power of the Courts and urged that the appeal was not maintainable since the appellant had his remedy of approaching the same Court seeking vacation of the order impugned against. ( 10 ) WE have given our due consideration to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the material on record including the original record called for from the Court below. ( 11 ) BEFORE we proceed further, it would be necessary for us to refer to certain averments made in the petition filed under section 9 of the Act. ( 12 ) ). The respondent and the appellant entered into an agreement on 19. 11. ( 11 ) BEFORE we proceed further, it would be necessary for us to refer to certain averments made in the petition filed under section 9 of the Act. ( 12 ) ). The respondent and the appellant entered into an agreement on 19. 11. 2002 for distribution of package of satellite channels through IRDs (Integrated Receiver decoders) supplied by the respondent company much earlier which was installed in the control room of the respondent- company situated at Khairatabad, Hyderabad. Under the said agreement, respondent was granted the non-exclusive permission to carry and to distribute the signal services of the six channels mentioned supra. Respondent was supplied with the signal services even prior to November, 2002 and the agreement entered on 19. 11. 2002 was for extension of signal services which were already being supplied to the respondent. The validity of the agreement was for the period from 19. 11. 2002 to 18. 11. 2003. Under the agreement monthly subscription fee payable by the respondent to the appellant was fixed at Rs. 4,80,000/- per month at the rate of Rs. 40/- per subscriber and the number of subscribers was fixed at 12,000 upon physical verification. Monthly subscription fee was payable every month by 15th of the said month. Respondent further alleged that there was disconnection of signal services on 31st December, 2002 as the respondent fell in arrears for the months of October, november and December, 2002. Respondent alleged that thereafter there was exchange of letters between the respondent and there was also a request for upgradation of the activity and for payment of accumulated arrears in instalments. Notwithstanding the said request, signal services were disconnected on 31. 12. 2002 through telegraphic intimation. Thereafter respondent had been regularly negotiating with the officials of the appellant for restoration of signal services by making payments, depending upon the availability of funds. Respondent was assured for activation of the signal services by the officials of the appellant from time to time. Part payments were also acknowledged by the appellant. Respondent thus alleged that as on 31. 12. 2002 amount outstanding was to the tune of Rs. 10,44,654/- and after payments were made, the outstanding was reduced to rs. 6,64,654/- as on 7. 1. 2003 which the respondent assured to clear within a reasonable period to be fixed by the appellant s officials upon negotiations. Respondent thus alleged that as on 31. 12. 2002 amount outstanding was to the tune of Rs. 10,44,654/- and after payments were made, the outstanding was reduced to rs. 6,64,654/- as on 7. 1. 2003 which the respondent assured to clear within a reasonable period to be fixed by the appellant s officials upon negotiations. But the officials of the appellant insisted for 80% payment out of the subscription amounts to consider restoration of signal services. ( 13 ) IT was further alleged that the appellant adopted some deceptive, monopolistic, unethical attitude despite the fact that respondent was prepared to pay the balance amount. The respondent started receiving signal services from M/s Hathway cable and Data Com. Pvt. Ltd. , Respondent thereafter referred to the conversation, which took place on 20. 6. 2003 between the respondent and the officials of the appellant and alleging that the appellant declined to activate the signal services. In this background the respondent allege that the agreement between the respondent and appellant was still subsisting. The agreement was not terminated except for disconnection of signal services due to accumulation of subscription arrears for about three months. In para 17 of the petition it was further alleged that the agreement was still valid and subsisting, the appellant though had temporarily terminated or discontinued the delivery of signal services, but had not expressly terminated the agreement till date, therefore, agreement is valid and subsisting even till 18th November, 2003. It was alleged that the cause of action arose on 31. 12. 2002 being the date of disconnection of signal services and on all such dates as and when request was made by respondent and it also arose on 14. 6. 2003 when the distributor of the appellant sent altogether four invoices for higher connectivity for an amount of Rs. 36,63,440/- and on 20. 6. 2003 when the officials of the appellant declined to restore the activity. Respondent alleged that affiliation agreement was entered between the parties at Hyderabad and since office of the appellant as well as the office of the distribution and the cable network of the respondent were located within the territorial limits of the Courts at Hyderabad, therefore, the Courts at Hyderabad alone have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Respondent alleged that affiliation agreement was entered between the parties at Hyderabad and since office of the appellant as well as the office of the distribution and the cable network of the respondent were located within the territorial limits of the Courts at Hyderabad, therefore, the Courts at Hyderabad alone have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Under these circumstances, the respondent had approached the Court for interim measure of protection seeking direction against the appellant to restore signal services on receipt of arrears and to continue to do so during the pendency of disputes to be resolved by the parties through arbitration. ( 14 ) WITH these averments in the petition filed under Section 9 of the Act, the Court below proceeded to dispose of the application filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the code of Civil Procedure on merits. Impugned order also makes mention of the fact that application came up for the first time before the Court on 23. 6. 2003 when Counsel for the appellant appeared and offered to file vakalat. Request was accepted and the matter was posted to next day i. e. , 24. 6. 2003. On 24. 6. 2003 when the case was called learned Counsel for appellant appeared and sought some more time on the ground that counter is not ready. The Court rejected the prayer saying since it is urgent application and already the respondent and their Counsel have been informed to file counter and argue the case the request was rejected. Heard the arguments of the Counsel for the petitioner. ( 15 ) WHAT was stated before us and what is reflected in the file would suggest that the chief Judge, City Civil Court even declined to adjourn the matter for few hours on the same day so as to take it up in the afternoon session. He proceeded to hear arguments on behalf of the respondent and even failed to hear arguments on behalf of the appellant and posted the case for the same evening to announce the order. He proceeded to hear arguments on behalf of the respondent and even failed to hear arguments on behalf of the appellant and posted the case for the same evening to announce the order. ( 16 ) SCOPE of Section 39 of the Act has been noticed in the impugned order stating that mandatory injunctions are granted to prevent the breach of an obligation for which discretion is given to pass appropriate orders compelling performance of certain acts and a party approaching the Court for such relief is entitled for the same in a case where in spite of protest from him the opposite party continues with his unlawful acts in an unfair and high handed manner. Further observing that generally mandatory injunction is an order requiring the defendant to do some positive act for the purpose of putting an end to a wrongful state of things created by him. Considerations, which apply for mandatory injunctions, are somewhat different from considerations, which govern the grant of prohibitory injunctions. A mandatory injunction is granted in rare cases with due care and caution and in exceptional circumstances and cannot be claimed as of right. Unless there are compelling circumstances injunction in mandatory form cannot be issued. Best guidelines to be seen is whether the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and irreparable. Having narrated such principles, the Chief Judge, City Civil Court proceeded to observe in the impugned order that the respondent had invested huge amount and was suffering because of the acts of the appellant and in case signals are not received by the appellant, he will not be able to distribute the same to the subscribers and the subscribers will have to leave the respondent and opt for another cable operator. Thus, he formed an opinion it will be a wrongful loss to the respondent and wrongful gain to the other side who may be hand-in-glove with the broadcaster. He further observed that it was a fundamental right of a citizen to have the facility because air waves are public properties. There was an agreement between satellite channels and cable net workers for transmission and distribution of the signals to the public at large through cable operators, which was meant for providing entertainment after monthly subscription, is collected. Thus there was an obligation on the part of satellite channel operators and cable net workers and the public. There was an agreement between satellite channels and cable net workers for transmission and distribution of the signals to the public at large through cable operators, which was meant for providing entertainment after monthly subscription, is collected. Thus there was an obligation on the part of satellite channel operators and cable net workers and the public. In this background, the Chief Judge was of the view that there was a primafacie case since the respondent was suffering due to the acts of the appellants and the balance of convenience was also in its favour for grant of mandatory injunction and thus proceeded to pass the order finally disposing the petition filed under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 CPC permitting the respondent to pay the arrears within one week and forthwith directing the appellant to restore the activity. ( 17 ) IN the background as noticed above, it is apparent that petition was presented on 23. 6. 2003 in Court with a prayer for injunction in mandatory form. Signals were not being transmitted by the Appellant to the respondent since 31. 12. 2002. The main petition filed under Section 9 of the Act was adjourned to 7. 8. 2003. Miscellaneous application was taken up and order was passed thereon the next date. From the facts we fail to understand as to what was the urgency in the matter, which prompted the Chief Judge to take up the matter on the very next day when the learned Counsel for the appellant suo motu entered appearance on the same day and sought reasonable time to file the counter. The Presiding Officer instead of granting a reasonable time insisted that the matter will be taken up the very next day and on the next day when the case was called, request to take up the case in the afternoon to enable the appellant to file reply and to make submissions was turned down. Such a reasonable and genuine request made on behalf of the appellant was thus turned down in arbitrary and capricious manner by the Presiding Officer and in utmost haste proceeded to hear only the learned Counsel for respondent thereby depriving even the right of being heard to the appellant, who otherwise was entitled to such hearing. The order passed by the presiding Officer, thus is in utter violation of the basic principles of natural justice. The order passed by the presiding Officer, thus is in utter violation of the basic principles of natural justice. Nowhere in the petition filed under Section 9 of the Act or in the application filed under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC any circumstance was disclosed which would have prompted or enable even a reasonable man to infer that it was a case which should have been taken with utmost haste and the affected party be deprived of right to file reply or of being heard. Not only the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice but the same is liable to be set aside even on merits also. Before that, we will first deal with the objection raised by the respondent about the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the same is against an ad interim order. ( 18 ) NO doubt the impugned order was passed on an application filed under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of civil Procedure. But it is not an ex parte order in the sense that the appellant was not before the Court when order was passed. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant still has a right to raise an objection and seek vacation of the order by approaching the Court below and filing its reply. Such a submission has no force inasmuch as the application filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC has finally been disposed of by the order impugned and even a decree has also been drawn thereon. Not only the application was finally disposed of but even the relief granted to the respondent is such that it virtually has the effect of disposing of the main petition itself. The main prayer made in the application filed under Section 9 of the Act and the injunction prayed for in the application filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC are same and similar. Such an order by any stretch of imagination cannot be termed to be an ad interim order ex parte. It is an order finally disposing of an application and thereby affecting valuable rights of the appellant. The objection raised on behalf of the respondent about maintainability of the appeal thus has no force. Such an order by any stretch of imagination cannot be termed to be an ad interim order ex parte. It is an order finally disposing of an application and thereby affecting valuable rights of the appellant. The objection raised on behalf of the respondent about maintainability of the appeal thus has no force. ( 19 ) UNDER Section 9 of the Act, the court is empowered to pass an order for an interim measure of protection in respect of matters specified in clause (ii) (a) to (e) of sub-section (ii) of the said section. Under clause (e) the Court is entitled to grant such interim measure of protection as may appear to it to be just and convenient during arbitral proceedings or at any time after making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in accordance with Section 36 of the Act. No doubt the Court dealing with an application under Section 9 of the Act will be in a position to grant by way interim measure of protection even orders in mandatory form but the question is, whether the present case is one in which such an order could have been passed by way of interim measure of protection, more particularly, at a stage when the Court had not yet dealt with the application filed under Section 9 of the Act but was dealing only with an application filed under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of civil Procedure. ( 20 ) ). While dealing with an application filed under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking injunction in mandatory form as an interim measure of protection, in our view, the same principles will apply as will govern such an application filed in civil suit. The Supreme Court in Dorab Cawasji warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, (1990) 2 scc 117 , has laid down the principles where interlocutory orders in a mandatory form can be issued or an injunction in mandatory form can be granted. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status, which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing, when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. Since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, the guidelines evolved in various decisions of Courts were approved by the Supreme Court observing that generally stated these guidelines are: 1. The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than aprima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. 2. It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury, which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. 3. The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. ( 21 ) BEING essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion. Applying these principles to the instant case where signals were admittedly disrupted almost six months prior to the party coming to the Court, we are of the view that it was not a fit case for grant of an interim measure of protection for restoration of the signals service especially when the party approaching the Court had admittedly committed default in paying monthly subscriptions. ( 22 ) AN application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is required to be dealt with on the three basic principles governing grant of discretionary remedy. ( 22 ) AN application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is required to be dealt with on the three basic principles governing grant of discretionary remedy. The Courts are supposed to take into consideration, while exercising judicial discretion in granting or refusing to grant injunction that whether persons seeking injunction has made out a prima facie case which is a sine qua non; whether balance of convenience is in his favour or whether greater inconvenience would be caused to him if injunction was not granted to him than the inconvenience which the other side would be put to if the injunction was granted and whether the person seeking temporary injunction would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction was not granted. In a case where a party in terms of the clause contained in the agreement was obliged to make regular payment of subscription by 15th of current month had failed to clear the arrears of its subscription for a period of three months due to which the signals were disconnected also in terms of the agreement, it would not be a fit case where it can be said that a prima case had been made out or balance of convenience was in its favour for grant of injunction. Failure to pay monthly subscriptions by due date is a ground for termination of agreement without any notice or reminder as per Clause 16 of the agreement. Respondent was not in receipt of signals for a period of about six months. Therefore, even delay was a ground on which no prima facie case can be said to have been made out for grant of injunction. In contractual matter of breach of terms of agreement between two contracting parties, the party aggrieved has remedy of recovering damages. As such, the other basic principle of irreparable loss cannot be said to have been made out. There is no clause in the agreement entitling the party aggrieved to seek for specific performance of the agreement irrespective of the fact that it had not paid its dues. Admittedly, the respondent was in arrears. When it approached the Court such a case would not even satisfy the principle of balance of convenience. There is no clause in the agreement entitling the party aggrieved to seek for specific performance of the agreement irrespective of the fact that it had not paid its dues. Admittedly, the respondent was in arrears. When it approached the Court such a case would not even satisfy the principle of balance of convenience. The relief to be granted under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 being discretionary and equitable in nature, it is of utmost importance that the conduct of the party seeking injunction or the party seeking Court s interference be faif. In Gujarat Bottling Company Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. , (1995) 5 SCC 545 , the apex Court held: under Order 39 of the Code of Civil procedure, jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with an order of interlocutory or temporary injunction is purely equitable and, therefore, the Court on being approached, will, apart from other considerations, also look to the conduct of the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and may refuse to interfere unless his conduct was free from blame. Since the relief is wholly equitable in nature, the party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court has to show that he himself was not at fault and that he himself was not responsible for bringing about the state of things complained of and that he was not unfair or inequitable in his dealings with the party against, whom he was seeking relief. His conduct should be fair and honest. These considerations arise not only in respect of the person who seeks an order of injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings. ( 23 ) APPLYING the ratio of the above to the case in hand, it cannot be said that the respondent who has committed default in paying the monthly subscription fee had any balance of convenience in its favour for grant of injunction. Therefore, the Court below was wrong in its conclusion that the respondent had proved prima facie case for grant of injunction or that the balance of convenience is in its favour. Therefore, the Court below was wrong in its conclusion that the respondent had proved prima facie case for grant of injunction or that the balance of convenience is in its favour. It was a case where even an injunction in prohibitory form could not have been granted what to say an injunction in mandatory form, In our considered opinion, the Court below proceeded to dispose of the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure in utmost haste by flouting the basic principles of natural justice and exercised its jurisdiction with material irregularity. Further, though the Court below directed the respondent to clear the arrears of subscription fee within one month, it directed the appellant to restore the signals forthwith without even ensuring prompt payment of the current subscription fee. ( 24 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the application filed under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil procedure is liable to be dismissed. We have not proceeded to decide the question whether the Courts at Hyderabad have jurisdiction since the appellant had no opportunity to file its reply before the Court below and we would leave open it to be dealt with by the Court below in the application filed under Section 9 of the Act in accordance with law. ( 25 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the Court below is set aside. The application filed under order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil procedure before the Court below is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/- payable to the A. P. Legal Services Authority, hyderabad. The main petition filed under section 9 of the Act shall be disposed of on its own merits uninfluenced by any of the observations made hereinabove.