JUDGMENT - Smt. DESAI RANJANA, J.:---The appellant is the original defendant. The plaintiff filed a suit for injunction restraining the defendant from putting up construction adjacent to the plaintiffs property bearing No. 15-A, Zakaria Manzil, Old Boleseth Chawl, Maulana Azad Road, Madanpura, Mumbai by putting up any structure of iron grills, beams or structure in any manner on the property No. 15-B, near Old Boleseth Chawl, Maulana Azad Road, Madanpura, Mumbai. In this suit on 13-6-2001 the plaintiff took out Notice of Motion No. 2413 of 2001 for interim and ad interim injunction. The trial Court by its order of the same date observed that though the notice was attempted to be served upon the defendant, defendants wife refused to accept the same. It took on record 8 photographs filed by the plaintiff. It also noted that the plaintiff had sent telegraphic notice to the defendant. Copy of the telegraphic notice was taken on file. Considering the submissions of the plaintiffs Counsel and 8 photographs produced by the plaintiff, the trial Court passed an ad interim order of injunction. 2. It appears that on the same date, a little later, the defendant appeared in the Court. He stated that he received the telegraphic notice at or about 2.30 p.m. and as such he could not remain present. He submitted that he desired to engage a lawyer. He was therefore permitted to do so and was granted liberty to move the Court to vacate the order of injunction after giving 24 hours advance notice to the plaintiff. The defendant did not move or vacating the order of injunction till 8-8-2001. 3. The returnable date of Notice of Motion No. 2413 of 2001 was 29-6-2001. On that day, the defendant did not appear in person. The Court appointed Court Commissioner to visit the site and report to the Court the position of the suit structure. The Commissioner was directed to submit his report on 9-7-2001. The plaintiff had taken out Contempt Notice of Motion No. 2821 of 2001. A copy of the same was served on the defendant. On that day, the defendant made a statement that he had not carried out any construction. This statement came to be recorded. The Commissioner submitted his report on 29-6-2001. 4. On 23-7-2001 prayer (b) of the Contempt Notice of Motion was pressed i.e., plaintiff prayed that Court Receiver be appointed. A copy of the same was served on the defendant. On that day, the defendant made a statement that he had not carried out any construction. This statement came to be recorded. The Commissioner submitted his report on 29-6-2001. 4. On 23-7-2001 prayer (b) of the Contempt Notice of Motion was pressed i.e., plaintiff prayed that Court Receiver be appointed. The Court observed that the only contention raised by the plaintiff was that after the Commissioner visited the suit site the defendant had put up cement sheet roof and thereby violated the order passed by the Court. The Court observed that the Commissioners report states that cement roof was found at the suit structure and hence no prima facie case was made out. In the circumstances, ad interim injunction was refused. The motion was adjourned to 29-9-2001. The defendant filed his reply. 5. The plaintiff then took out second Notice of Motion being Notice of Motion No. 3402 of 2001 for appointment of Court Receiver and Commissioner. It appears that on 3-8-2001 the Court appointed the same person as Commissioner to visit the suit premises. The Commissioner visited the suit premises on 4-8-2001 and submitted the report on 4-8-2001. 6. On 8-8-2001 the defendant took out Notice of Motion No. 3366 of 2001 praying that ad interim injunction order dated 13-6-2001 be vacated. All these motions were disposed of by the trial Court by the impugned order. By the impugned order the trial Court made Contempt Notice of Motion No. 2821 of 2001 absolute in terms of prayer Clause (d). The Court came to the conclusion that the defendant had committed wilful breach and disobedience of the orders of injunction passed on 29-6-2001. The Court directed that the defendant shall remove the roof put up by him on his structure. The Court also directed him to remove constructions put up by him which are not shown in the photographs produced by the plaintiff on 29-6-2001, including the wall and the rooms put up on 1st floor/mezzanine floor left of the said structure as also the electrical fitting in the said structure within 8 weeks from the date of the order. The Court further observed that upon the failure to do so. Notice of Motion No. 2821 of 2001 is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (b) i.e., Court Receiver is appointed in respect of the suit property. The Court further observed that upon the failure to do so. Notice of Motion No. 2821 of 2001 is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (b) i.e., Court Receiver is appointed in respect of the suit property. The Court Receiver shall take possession of the said property and seal the same. The property shall remain attached for a period of one year after which and if breach and the act of disobedience of the defendant continues and the defendant does not purge his contempt by removing the entire unauthorised construction and restore the status quo as is existed on the date of the order dated 29-6-2001, the Court Receiver shall apply for sale of the said property and obtain further directions from the Court. Notice of Motion No. 2821 of 2001 is further made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (d) i.e., the defendant shall not put up any further work of construction of any nature in the said premises. The defendant was saddled with a cost of Rs. 2,000/-. In view of the aforesaid, no order was passed on Notice of Motion No. 3402 of 2001. Notice of Motion No. 3366 of 2001 taken out by the defendant for vacating the ad interim order of injunction and for dismissal of the suit was dismissed. Notice of Motion No. 2413 of 2001 was made absolute in terms was prayer (a) i.e., the defendant, his servants and agents were restrained from putting up any construction whatsoever on the said structure. It was observed that the defendant, would be entitled to file written statement after he purges his contempt. This order is under challenge before me. Being aggrieved by the impugned order in so far as it disposes of Notice of Motion Nos. 3366 of 2001, 2413 of 2001, 3402 of 2001, the defendant has preferred this appeal. Being aggrieved by the impugned order so far as it disposes of Contempt of Notice of Motion No. 2821 of 2001 the defendant has filed Writ Petition No. 5665 of 2003. 7. It may be stated here that one Suhail Abdul Bari, who claims to be the owner of part A of the suit structure had filed Chamber Summons in the S.C. Suit No. 3141 of 2001 praying that he may be added as a party to the suit. By order dated 9-8-2002, the trial Court dismissed the said Chamber Summons. 7. It may be stated here that one Suhail Abdul Bari, who claims to be the owner of part A of the suit structure had filed Chamber Summons in the S.C. Suit No. 3141 of 2001 praying that he may be added as a party to the suit. By order dated 9-8-2002, the trial Court dismissed the said Chamber Summons. Being aggrieved by that order, said Suhail Abdul Bari has filed Writ Petition No. 6901 of 2003. Rule is issued on the said writ petition on 13-1-2003 and further proceedings in Suit No. 3141 of 2001 are stayed. 8. I have heard at some length Mr. Diwan learned Counsel appearing for the appellant. Mr. Diwan assailed the impugned order on several counts. He firstly found fault with the approach adopted by the trial Court. He contended that it was necessary for the trial Court to first consider the case of the defendant with regard to the vacating of injunction order. Mr. Diwan contended that the learned Judge ought to have at least considered the defendants case simultaneously with that of the plaintiffs case. The trial Court could not have found the defendant guilty of contempt and shut him out in this manner. The defendants case as regards the illegality of ad interim order of injunction or status quo has not been considered at all. The learned Counsel contended that the contempt proceedings are in the nature of quasi criminal proceedings and they cannot be disposed of in this manner. In this connection, he relied on (Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. and another v. Sachidanand Dass and another)1, 1995 Supp. (4) S.C.C. 465, (State of Jammu Kashmir v. Mohd. Yaqoob Khan and others)2, 1992(4) S.C.C. 167 and Suo motu Contempt Petition (C) No. 426 of 2002 in I.A. No. 6 In C.A. No. 7919 of 2001, in (A.I.R. 2003 S.C.W. 2609)3. 9. Mr. Diwan then contended that on 13-6-2001 the defendant was not present when the first order was passed. He took time to engage a lawyer. The knowledge about the contents of the order of injunction dated 13-6-2001 therefore cannot be imputed to him. He stated that it is the plaintiffs case that copy of the injunction order was sent to the defendant on 20-6-2001 and the proceedings were served on him on 27-6-2001 and the contempt is said to have been committed between 13-6-2001 and 4-8-2001. He stated that it is the plaintiffs case that copy of the injunction order was sent to the defendant on 20-6-2001 and the proceedings were served on him on 27-6-2001 and the contempt is said to have been committed between 13-6-2001 and 4-8-2001. To come to the conclusion, that the defendant has committed contempt, the learned Judge has relied on the Commissioners reports dated 29-6-2001 and 4-8-2001. Mr. Diwan stated that the learned Judge has not corrected appreciated the reports. Admittedly, as per the Commissioners first report he did not go to the first floor at all. He has stated that he did not go to the first floor because there was no ladder. He has further stated that there was no electricity and he had to use a torch. In the second report dated 4-8-2001 he has stated that when he visited the suit premises on 29-6-2001 he had noticed a wall which he had not noticed on 4-8-2001. The learned Counsel contended that if the Commissioner had not visited the first floor of the suit premises on his first visit on 29-6-2001 it is inconceivable that he could have seen a wall on the first floor. Therefore it cannot be inferred from this that the wall was constructed after 29-6-2001. The learned Judge was wrong in drawing such a conclusion. The learned Counsel then submitted that there are hardly any major differences in the first report dated 29-6-2001 and the second report dated 4-8-2001. Assuming that some minor changes were seen on 4-8-2001, from that it cannot be presumed that the defendant is guilty of contempt. Mr. Diwan urged that in any event the reports make it amply clear that the adjacent structure is that of one Sohail Taban Abdul Bari and not that of the defendant and, hence, the defendant may not be held liable if any construction is found to have been put up between 13-6-2001 and 4-8-2001. He therefore submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 10. I have also heard Mr. Surve, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent at great length. He contended that the defendant had knowledge of the order of injunction and order of status quo. On 13-6-2001 in fact he appeared in the Court. He showed the telegraphic notice and therefore he cannot urge that he had no notice that the Court was going to be moved. Surve, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent at great length. He contended that the defendant had knowledge of the order of injunction and order of status quo. On 13-6-2001 in fact he appeared in the Court. He showed the telegraphic notice and therefore he cannot urge that he had no notice that the Court was going to be moved. He took time to engage a lawyer. Though he had knowledge of the order in flagrant violation of the order of the Court he has carried out construction which is evident from the two Commissioners reports and therefore the impugned order should not be disturbed. So far as the contention of the defendant that he ought to have been heard as regards his case on the validity or otherwise of the injunction and status quo order, the learned Counsel relied on (Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and another v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd.)4, 1997(4) Bom.C.R. (S.C.) 312; (Hadikson v. Hadikson)5, 1952(2) All.E.L.R. 567. Relying on these judgments he submitted that in a gross contempt of this type, a contemnor cannot be heard till he purges the contempt. 11. It is an admitted position that on 13-6-2001 the defendant appeared in the Court. He showed to the Court a telegraphic notice received by him. Therefore, the plaintiffs case that he had sent notice to him will have to be accepted. The defendant sought time from the Court to engage Advocate. It is therefore inconceivable that the defendant would not make any enquiry as to what order the Court had passed on 13-6-2001. At any rate, it must be presumed that after consulting the lawyer he must have found out what order was passed on 13-6-2001. It is significant to note that till 8-8-2001 the defendant did not adopt any proceedings to get the injunction order vacated. So far as the contention of the defendant that it was necessary for the Court to first hear him as regards the validity of injunction and status quo order, it will be useful to refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hadikson v. Hadikson, 1952(2) All.E.R. 567 CA. The Court of Appeal observed: "It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a Court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The Court of Appeal observed: "It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a Court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham L.C said in Chuck v. Cremer A party, who knows of an order whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it. It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null and valid whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the Court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the Court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed. Such being the nature of their obligation, two consequences follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the Court (and I am not now considering disobedience of orders relating to matters of procedure) is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise. The second is that no application to the Court by such a person will be entertained till he had purged himself of his contempt." 12. In Bagasarwallas case (supra), the Supreme Court examined the question whether a person who disobeys an interim injunction order made by the Civil Court can be punished under Rule 2-A of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure where it is ultimately found that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and held that non-compliance with the interim orders issued prior to the decision regarding jurisdiction would render the defendants liable to be punished under Order 39, Rule 2-A. The above quoted extract from Hadiksons case was quoted by the Supreme Court while arriving at this conclusion. 13. 13. It will be also useful to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Suo Motu Contempt Petition (C) No. 426 of 2002 In I.A. No. 6 In C.A. No. 7919 of 2001, A.I.R. 2003 S.C.W. 2609 where the Supreme Court has observed that: "It is no rule of law and certainly not a statutory rule that a contemnor cannot be heard unless the contempt is purged. It lies within the discretion of the Court to tell the contemnor charged with having committed contempt of the Court that he will not be heard and would not be allowed participation in the Court proceedings unless the contempt is purged. This is a flexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule of law. The discretion shall be guided and governed by the facts and circumstances of a given case. Where the Court may form opinion that the contemnor is persisting in his behaviour and initiation of proceedings in contempt has had no deterrent or reformatory effect on him and/or if the disobedience by the contemnor is such that so long it continues it impedes the course of justice and/or renders it impossible for the Court to enforce its orders in respect of him. The Court would be justified in withholding access to Court or participation in the proceedings from the contemnor." 14. Therefore, ultimately, whether to hear the contemnor before he purges the contempt would depend on facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion of the Court would be guided by the nature of the contempt, the conduct of the contemnor and other attendant circumstances. In a given case the Court may in its discretion allow the contemnor to make submission but where the Court comes to a conclusion that the behaviour of the contemnor is impeding the course of justice, the Court say not give him a hearing unless he purges the contempt. In my opinion in the facts of this case, the Court was right in adopting the latter approach namely, not giving the defendant hearing unless he purges the contempt. 15. The trial Court has found that if the two Commissioners reports are read minutely they indicate that major changes have been effected in the suit structure after the Commissioners first visit to the suit structure. The trial Court has quoted the differences in the said two reports. I say reproduce them. 15. The trial Court has found that if the two Commissioners reports are read minutely they indicate that major changes have been effected in the suit structure after the Commissioners first visit to the suit structure. The trial Court has quoted the differences in the said two reports. I say reproduce them. "i) Iron girders found in a heap on 29-6-2001 were absent on 4-8-2001. ii) The two wooden doors noticed on 29-6-2001 were not noticed on 4-8-2001. iii) The place where bricks and cement bags were kept lying on 29-6-2001 was vacant on 4-8-2001. iv) Iron grill was fixed to the portion which was found partly broken at the rear side about 2 ft. from the ceiling which was absent on the earlier occasion. v) Damage to a partly broken wall on the East side was seen on the date of the second commission. vi) Debris and other waste material were kept near the entrance which was not on the second occasion which was absent earlier. vii) A wall on the 1st floor was seen on the date of the second commission which was absent on the date of the first commission. The height of that wall was reported to be 6 ft. viii) A lobby of about 3 ft. was constructed on the 1st floor portion with rooms on the either sides which was noticed at the time of second commission and was absent at the time of the first commission. ix) Whereas electric wires were hanging on 29-6-2001 the electric fittings of the work was found completed with electric board fitted to the wall on the date of the second commission." Having read the two reports, I find that the trial Court has correctly noted the differences. These differences are not minor differences. It is true that the Commissioner did not go to the 1st floor and he had to use a torch. But a construction of wall is not something which the Commissioner cannot see even from the ground floor. Besides, the above mentioned differences indicate that the defendant did not keep quiet after the first order. Considerable construction activity has taken place in the suit structure between 29-6-2001 and 4-8-2001 even though an order of injunction and order of status quo were in operation and the said orders were well within the knowledge of the defendant. Besides, the above mentioned differences indicate that the defendant did not keep quiet after the first order. Considerable construction activity has taken place in the suit structure between 29-6-2001 and 4-8-2001 even though an order of injunction and order of status quo were in operation and the said orders were well within the knowledge of the defendant. He had appeared in the Court on 13-6-2001 and taken time to engage a lawyer. Admittedly, the proceedings were served on him. He cannot be therefore heard to say that he had no knowledge of the order passed by the trial Court. The photographs produced by the plaintiff on 13-6-2001 and the photographs taken by the Commissioner on 4-8-2001 and the two reports of the Commissioner support the plaintiffs case that the defendant is guilty of Contempt of Court. This is a gross contempt. Therefore, the trial Court was right in passing the impugned order. 16. So far as the case of the defendant that in any event it is Suhail Taban Abdul Bari, who is in possession of the adjacent portion A and that the defendant is in possession of portion B and therefore he cannot be held guilty of contempt of is concerned, I have no hesitation in rejecting it. The trial Court is right in observing that had Suhail Taban Abdul Bari been aggrieved by the orders of the Court, he would not have lost any time and would have rushed to the Court to vacate the injunction order. The fact that he has made no effort to move the Court immediately speaks volume. This submission of the learned Counsel for the defendant must also fail. In my opinion therefore there is no substance in Appeal from Order No. 682 of 2003 and Writ Petition No. 5665 of 2003 and they are dismissed. 17. At this stage, Mr. Diwan, the learned Counsel for the defendant states that the impugned order be stayed. Mr. Surve, the learned Counsel for the appellant vehemently opposes this. In the facts and circumstances. I stay the operation of the impugned order and the operation of this judgment for a period of eight weeks from today. 18. Appeal from order and the writ petitioner are disposed of. Parties to act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar of this Court. A.O. and W.P. dismissed. -----