JUDGMENT - KHARCHE S.T., J.:—Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the parties. 2.This appeal has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 6-1-2003 passed by the Additional District Judge, Wardha, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 178 of 1999 who dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment and decree dated 23-7-1999 passed by the Joint Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Wardha, in Reg. Civil Suit No. 331 of 1978, by which the appellant/defendant was directed to hand over the possession of field Survey No. 48/2 (old), No. 40 (new) admeasuring 1.34 H.R., situated at mouza Salod (Hirapur) and to pay Rs. 10,500/- along with the costs of the suit to the plaintiff. 2-A.Brief facts are as under: The plaintiff owned and possessed suit land. He entered into an agreement with the defendant for the sale of the said land for consideration of Rs. 5,000/- on 3-4-1968. It was agreed that the sale-deed would be executed on or before 15-3-1969. The defendant failed to perform his part of contract and, therefore, he instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 95 of 1970 claiming specific performance of the said contract. The defendant was put in possession of the suit property in part performance of the said contract. In that suit, i.e. Regular Civil Suit No. 331/78, the defendant who was arrayed as plaintiff set out counter-claim and prayed for a decree of possession. The said suit came to be dismissed. However, the counter-claim set out was allowed and appeal was preferred against the said decision. The claim of the original plaintiff in that suit was dismissed. However, so far as the counter-claim of the plaintiff was concerned, who was defendant in that suit, was disallowed holding that his counter-claim was not tenable and he was directed to file separate suit. Against that decision, second appeal was preferred in this Court and during pendency of the second appeal, the plaintiff filed suit for possession and mesne profits. 3.The defendant resisted the claim by filing written statement. He contended that the suit was not maintainable and that his possession over the suit field was protected by virtue of the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. He was ready and willing to perform his part of contract and, as such, he is in lawful possession. 3.The defendant resisted the claim by filing written statement. He contended that the suit was not maintainable and that his possession over the suit field was protected by virtue of the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. He was ready and willing to perform his part of contract and, as such, he is in lawful possession. He further contended that he is deemed tenant under the provisions of The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Vidarbha Region) (for short the Tenancy Act) and also contended that the suit is false and frivolous. 4.The trial Court framed as many as five issues. The trial Court on considering the evidence adduced before it decreed the suit and directed the defendant to deliver the possession. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree, he filed an appeal which also came to be dismissed and it is this judgment and decree of the Appellate Court which is under challenge in this appeal. 5.Mrs. Joshi, learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant contended that the substantial question of law which arises in this appeal is, whether the suit filed after the decision in Regular Civil Suit No. 95 of 1970 and Regular Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1970 the status of the defendant is that of a trespasser specially when admittedly the suit for specific performance of the contract and that the defendant was in lawful possession of the disputed land as deemed tenant within the meaning of section 4 of the Tenancy Act. She further contended that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court cannot be sustained in law because the defendant had taken a plea in the written statement and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the issue as to whether the defendant is a deemed tenant of the agricultural land as per the provisions of Tenancy Act. She also contended that the Courts ought to have referred this issue to tenancy authorities for determination and in absence of finding of tenancy authorities on the said issue, the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court cannot be sustained in law. 6.Mr. Bapat, learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, supports the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court. She also contended that the Courts ought to have referred this issue to tenancy authorities for determination and in absence of finding of tenancy authorities on the said issue, the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court cannot be sustained in law. 6.Mr. Bapat, learned Counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, supports the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court. He contended that the plea of deemed tenant raised by the defendant in the present suit was false and vexatious and the Appellate Court rightly negatived the contention of the defendant that the defendant has become deemed tenant of the suit land and that the possession of the defendant is nothing but trespasser. He contended that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to consider as to whether the plea raised by the defendant was false and vexatious. In support of his submissions, he relied on the Division Bench decision of this Court in (Pulmati Shymlal Mishra v. Ramkrishna Gangaprasad Bajpai)1, 1981 Mh.L.J. 321. 7.I have carefully considered the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the parties. The Appellate Court has observed in para 7 of the judgment that the document (Ex. 75) Isar Chithi had fixed the time to have the execution of sale-deed on or before 15-3-1969 but as the present defendant failed to execute the sale-deed he had filed a suit and in the previous litigation it was held that the present defendant is not entitled for specific performance of the contract. The plaintiff has categorically stated that as he is going to execute the sale-deed in favour of the present defendant so as to have smooth execution of the sale-deed but as the present defendant fails to have the execution of the sale-deed, he is liable to hand over the possession to the present plaintiff, but in vain. Considering the judgments in Regular Civil Suit No. 95 of 1970 and Regular Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1974 the possession of the defendant in the suit field is nothing but that of a trespasser. The Appellate Court further observed that the plea of the defendant that he be treated as deemed tenant of the property is not tenable. However, it is pertinent to note that in the previous litigation he never raised such plea. The Appellate Court further observed that the plea of the defendant that he be treated as deemed tenant of the property is not tenable. However, it is pertinent to note that in the previous litigation he never raised such plea. The Appellate Court found that as the plea of the defendant that he is deemed tenant of the property is not tenable, his status on the land is nothing but that of a trespasser. 8.This Court in Pulmatis case, cited supra, held that the Civil Court under section 85-A of the Tenancy Act is not under any obligation to frame and remit an issue of tenancy mechanically merely on the same being raised in the written statement, without judicial satisfaction of its necessity and justification. Cases can be conceived when tenancy plea may appear to be patently frivolous, fraudulent and part of the dilatory strategy, and may not by itself attract sections 85 and 85-A of the Tenancy Act. These observations of this Court are applicable to the present litigation because the issue which is sought to be raised by the defendant regarding tenancy, appears to be frivolous, without any foundation and, as such, there was no need to refer the said issue to the tenancy Court for determination. There is no error or illegality in the impugned judgment. 9.Having regard to the facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal and the same stands dismissed. Interim stay granted earlier stands vacated. Rule discharged. -----