ORDER 1. LEAVE GRANTED. 2. THE APPELLANT WAS A LECTURER IN THE RESPONDENT 1 INSTITUTION. A CHARGESHEET WAS ISSUED TO THE APPELLANT. NO FORMAL ENQUIRY WAS HELD. ON 18-11- D 1998 AN ORDER WAS PASSED BY THE RESPONDENTS TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT: "THE BOARD OF MANAGEMENT OF VOCATIONAL EDUCATION SOCIETY, GULBARGA HEREWITH DISPENSE WITH THE SERVICES OF AHTASHMUDDIN, LECTURER IN BIOLOGY AT LUQMAN PRE-UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SCIENCE, WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT UNDER SECTION 99 OF THE KARNATAKA EDUCATION ACT, 1983 (1 OF 1995). SHRI AHTASHMUDDIN SHALL BE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PRESCRIBED SALARY OF 3 MONTHS WHICH HE SHALL COLLECT FROM THE UNDERSIGNED, AT ANY TIME." 3. THE APPELLANT PREFERRED AN APPEAL BEFORE THE EDUCATIONAL APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 94 OF THE KARNATAKA EDUCATION ACT, 1983 (HEREINAFTER REFERRED AS "THE ACT"). THE POINT TAKEN BY THE RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL F WAS THAT THE TRIBUNAL DID NOT HAVE THE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL BY REASON OF THE LANGUAGE IN SECTION 94(1) OF THE ACT WHICH PROVIDES: "94. APPEALS.-(1) ANY TEACHER OR OTHER EMPLOYEE OF A PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION WHO IS DISMISSED, REMOVED OR REDUCED IN RANK MAY WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF COMMUNICATION OF THE ORDER PREFER AN APPEAL TO THE TRIBUNAL." 4. ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENTS, THE APPELLANT HAD NEITHER BEEN DISMISSED NOR REMOVED NOR REDUCED IN RANK AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT PREFER AN APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 94(1) OF THE ACT. ACCORDING TO THE RESPONDENTS, ALL THAT HAD BEEN DONE BY THE ORDER WAS THE TERMINATION OF SERVICE UNDER SECTION 99 OF THE ACT. SECTION 99 ALLOWS THE SERVICES OF AN EMPLOYEE OF A PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION TO BE TERMINATED BY THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE SCHOOL "FOR REASONS OTHER THAN AS A MEASURE OF PUNISHMENT". 5. THE TRIBUNAL REJECTED THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS AND HELD THAT THE ORDER OF TERMINATION "WAS IN FACT A DISMISSAL" AND, THEREFORE, THE TRIBUNAL COULD ENTERTAIN THE APPELLANTS APPEAL. THE RESPONDENTS CHALLENGED THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL BY WAY OF A REVISIONAL APPLICATION BEFORE THE HIGH COURT. THE HIGH COURT SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL BY HOLDING THAT THE ORDER OF TERMINATION OF THE SERVICES OF THE APPELLANT DID NOT FALL WITHIN SECTION 94(1) OF THE ACT. NEVERTHELESS, THE HIGH COURT HELD THAT THE ORDER DID AMOUNT TO A PENALTY AND THEREFORE DIRECTED THE APPELLANT TO SEEK HIS REMEDY UNDER SECTION 94(5). SECTION 94(5) PROVIDES: "94. NEVERTHELESS, THE HIGH COURT HELD THAT THE ORDER DID AMOUNT TO A PENALTY AND THEREFORE DIRECTED THE APPELLANT TO SEEK HIS REMEDY UNDER SECTION 94(5). SECTION 94(5) PROVIDES: "94. (5) IN RESPECT OF AN ORDER IMPOSING A PENALTY OTHER THAN THOSE SPECIFIED IN SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 92, ON ANY TEACHER OR OTHER EMPLOYEE, AN APPEAL SHALL LIE TO THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF COMMUNICATION OF THE ORDER IMPOSING SUCH PENALTY." 6. THIS FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF TERMINATION DID IN FACT IMPOSE A PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN QUESTIONED BEFORE US BY THE RESPONDENT. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE ORDER, NAMELY, TERMINATION OF SERVICE, COUPLED WITH THE FINDING OF THE HIGH COURT THAT IT WAS IN THE NATURE OF PENALTY, IT CANNOT BUT BE HELD THAT THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT WOULD COME WITHIN SECTION 94(1) OF THE ACT AND THAT THE TRIBUNAL WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE APPEAL WAS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE IT. THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT IS ACCORDINGLY SET ASIDE AND THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL IS RESTORED. THE APPEAL IS ACCORDINGLY ALLOWED WITHOUT ANY ORDER AS TO COSTS. THE APPEAL WILL NOW BE DECIDED BY THE TRIBUNAL AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY WITHIN A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF RECEIVING A CERTIFIED COPY OF THIS ORDER.