JUDGMENT - MOHITE R.S., J.:---By this writ petition the petitioner who was an employee of the respondent seeks to quash and set aside the impugned order passed by the 6th Labour Court, Mumbai on 24-12-2000 by which, the Labour Court has dismissed the Application (IDA) No. 527 of 1998, in view of his decision on a preliminary issue as to whether the petitioner was a workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and on the basis of finding thereon that the petitioner was not a workman. 2. The brief relevant facts of the case are as follows : On 16-3-1973, the petitioner was first appointed by the respondent-company as a typist-cum-clerk with effect from 15-3-1973 on the terms and conditions as mentioned in the appointment order. The appointment was on probation for a period of six months and the appointment order included service conditions like grant of leave, Provident Fund, Bonus and Super annuation. 3. On 21-3-1994, the petitioner tendered a letter to the respondent-company stating therein that she has been informed that the company was shifting its activity to Bangalore and was closing its Bombay Office from 31-3-1994 and as it was not possible for the petitioner to shift to Bangalore, she requested the management to settle her account with immediate effect. On 11-7-1998, the petitioner filed an application under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which was numbered as Application (IDA) No. 527 of 1998, claiming that the company had paid Rs. 10/- lacs and above to some other workers and that she had received only Rs. 1,90,505/- after 20 years of service. She claimed a different of retrenchment compensation and interest thereon amounting to Rs. 9,91,840/-. It may be stated here that, in this application filed by the petitioner, there was no specific averment dealing with the question as to whether she was workman. The application was filed on the assumption that she was a workman. On 17-8-1999, the respondent filed its written statement. One of the contention raised in the written statement was that the petitioner was working as the Confidential Secretary of a Sr. Partner of the company and was required to assist the Sr. Partner in her day to day work. The application was filed on the assumption that she was a workman. On 17-8-1999, the respondent filed its written statement. One of the contention raised in the written statement was that the petitioner was working as the Confidential Secretary of a Sr. Partner of the company and was required to assist the Sr. Partner in her day to day work. She was independently entertaining the parties having business with the company, she was involved in important decisions that she was independently doing correspondence with the parties and various authorities and was negotiating important matters with the parties, that her service conditions were different than the workman and her last drawn salary was Rs. 9122/- per month. Hence, she was not workman within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus, she had no locus standi to file the application under section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. It appears that on the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the Labour Court framed the following issues. Issues 1. Whether the application is maintainable? 2. Whether the applicant is entitled to the claim? 3. What order? He further ordered that the Issue No. 1 be tried as preliminary issue. 5. On this preliminary issue, the parties led evidence. The petitioner examined herself. The respondents restricted themselves to cross-examining the petitioner but did not lead any evidence of their own on the question as to whether the petitioner could be said to be a workman. Ultimately on appreciation of the evidence of the petitioner, by a judgment and order dated 24-2-2002 the 6th Labour Court, Mumbai was pleased to decide the issue and held that the application was not maintainable as the applicant Mrs. Kashmira was not the workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is this order which is impugned in this writ petition. 6. Before dealing with the merits of the present petition. I find it necessary to make certain observations regarding the framing of preliminary issue in matters before the Labour Courts and the piecemeal adjudication of such matters. It is this order which is impugned in this writ petition. 6. Before dealing with the merits of the present petition. I find it necessary to make certain observations regarding the framing of preliminary issue in matters before the Labour Courts and the piecemeal adjudication of such matters. In the year 1963 the Apex Court in the case of (Management of Express Newspapers Private Limited, Madras v. The Workers and others)1, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. page 569 observed in para 12 as follows : "It is also true that even if the dispute is tried by the Industrial Tribunal, at the very commencement the Industrial Tribunal will have to examine as a preliminary issue the question as to whether the dispute referred to it is an industrial dispute or not, and the decision of this question would inevitably depend upon the view which the Industrial Tribunal may take as to whether the action taken by the appellant is a closure or a lockout. The finding which the Industrial Tribunal may record on this preliminary issue will decide whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute or not. If the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a closure, there would be an end to the proceedings before the Tribunal so far as the main dispute is concerned. If, on the other hand, the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a lockout which has been, disguised as a closure, then the Tribunal will be entitled to deal with the reference. The finding which the Tribunal may make on this preliminary issue is a finding on a jurisdictional fact and it is only when the jurisdictional fact is found against the appellant that the Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute. This position is also not in dispute." 7. It appears that the procedure suggested was laid down with a view to avoid the decision on other issues once the Labour Court came to a decision that it has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. This position is also not in dispute." 7. It appears that the procedure suggested was laid down with a view to avoid the decision on other issues once the Labour Court came to a decision that it has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. However, the said procedure led to other difficulties as it became possible for the employee to raise a jurisdictional issue in virtually every case and permitted them to challenge any decision on such preliminary issue before the higher Court and then delay the decision on merits in the main matter for a long period. Often, this resulted in injustice because the employee could not afford to contest such proceedings against the employer for want of resources. Ultimately, the Supreme Court in the case of (D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and others)2, 1983(47) F.L.R. page 477 took cognizance of the situation and observed that though there was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first, the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. The observation of the three judges of the Apex Court in the case of D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration pertaining to the question of raising of preliminary issue was in the following terms. "We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issue first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that Tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them is preliminary issues. Nor should High Court in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Nor should High Court in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workman in this fashion. Tribunals and courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down." 8. In this regard reliance can be placed on the observations made by this Court (R.M. Lodha, J.) in the case of (Rajiv Bhalchandra Gundewar v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.)3, 2000(I) C.L.R. 818 in which in para 7 this Court has observed as follows : "So far as direction given by the Industrial Court to the Labour Court that the said Court should frame all issues is concerned, the said direction cannot be faulted and is proper. The further direction given by the Industrial Court for first decide the issue of workman and if the finding on the said issue is in the negative, the Labour Court should not decide the remaining issues cannot be countenanced and needs to be modified. The further direction given by the Industrial Court for first decide the issue of workman and if the finding on the said issue is in the negative, the Labour Court should not decide the remaining issues cannot be countenanced and needs to be modified. Piecemeal decision on the issues always results in protracting the litigation and to avoid that it is always advantageous that all issues are decided together, it is true that the question whether the complainant is workman or not is a vital issue but at the same time, the other issues regarding that legality and correctness of the termination of the complainant needs to be gone into by the Labour Court also because even if it is held by the Labour Court that the complainant is not workman, the other issues raised in the complaint are required to be decided because in case the said finding is not upheld ultimately by Superior Court, the matter may not be required to be remanded for decision on other issues if the other issues are decided by the Labour Court. The decision on all issues simultaneously shall definitely curtail unnecessary delay in final disposal of the matter. The finding recorded by the Labour Court on the question whether the complainant is workman or not is not final and obviously, therefore, to obviate the necessity of remand at later stage by the Superior Court on other issues in case the Superior Court does not agree with the Labour Court on its finding on the question whether the complainant is workman or not, it would be desirable that all issues are decided simultaneously including the question whether the complainant is workman or not." 9. In this view of the matter, I strongly feel that the Labour Court erred in not deciding all the issues at one time and was in error in framing a preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the application on the basis of an objection by the respondents that the petitioner was not the workman. 10. Be that as it may, I find that on the merits in the present case, the material on record is completely unsatisfactory. In the application, the petitioner has made no pleading as to how she is workman within the meaning of section 2(s). The application is filed on the assumption that she is workman. 10. Be that as it may, I find that on the merits in the present case, the material on record is completely unsatisfactory. In the application, the petitioner has made no pleading as to how she is workman within the meaning of section 2(s). The application is filed on the assumption that she is workman. The pleadings of the company in the written statement were to the effect that the petitioner was the Confidential Secretary of the Sr. Partner and her predominant duties were to assist the Sr. Partner in her day to day work. She was independently doing correspondence with the parties and various authorities. She was also negotiating important matters with the parties. Her service conditions were different than the workers and her last drawn salary was Rs. 9,122/- per month. 11. However, the respondents lead no evidence in the matter to prove the facts mentioned in their pleadings i.e. in the written statement. No doubt, the petitioner entered the witness box. I have perused her evidence. In her evidence she denied that she was working as Confidential Secretary. However, in her cross-examination, she admitted that she had worked with the respondents as Confidential Secretary in a responsible capacity. Once again at the stage of cross-examination, she denied that she was basically a Secretary doing administrative work. In her evidence there is some reference to the nature of work that she was performing as a Clerk-cum-typist i.e. all typing and filing. In her cross-examination in some letters have been brought on record which would indicate that though the employers may not have appointed the petitioner as a Confidential Secretary yet she was working as Confidential Secretary of one Dr. Captain, Sr. Partner of the company. The exact and specific nature of the duty which she was doing when assisting Dr. Captain has not been referred to by the petitioner in her examination-in-chief, obviously because she denied being Confidential Secretary to the Sr. Partner of the company. In short, I find that the material on record consists of the sole evidence of the petitioner and some documents put to her and such evidence is completely inadequate in deciding the question in issue. The said evidence as it stands is inadequate to properly and fairly decide the question whether the petitioner is workman. 12. Partner of the company. In short, I find that the material on record consists of the sole evidence of the petitioner and some documents put to her and such evidence is completely inadequate in deciding the question in issue. The said evidence as it stands is inadequate to properly and fairly decide the question whether the petitioner is workman. 12. In the impugned judgment and order, the Labour Court was more influenced of the fact that the petitioner has not disclosed that she was working as a Confidential Secretary to the Sr. Partner one Dr. Mrs. R.M. Captain. The Labour Court has lost sight of the fact that the exact nature of duties being performed by the present petitioner were not brought on record either in the cross-examination or by the company by leading independent evidence. In this view of the matter, I intend to set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the 6th Labour Court, Mumbai on 24-2-2000. Matter will stand remanded to the 6th Labour Court, Mumbai for deciding all the issues including preliminary issue at one stage. Parties will be at liberty to lead evidence on all issues. The parties will be also at liberty to lead further evidence on Issue No. 1 which was treated to be a preliminary issue. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. There will be no order as to costs. Since application under section 33-C(2) was made in the year 1998, it is directed that the main application be decided as expeditiously as possible and in any case before the end of September, 2004. All concerned to act on the copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate/C.S. of this Court. -----