D. P. SINGH, J. Heard Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Suman Sirohi, for the respondents. 2. This writ petition is directed against an award dated 25th July, 1983 directing the reinstatement of the respondent workman with full back wages and continuity of service. 3. Brief facts necessary for decision of this writ petition are that respondent No. 3 was appointed as temporary conductor for a fixed term w. e. f. 21-2-1973 to 28-2-1973. This engagement was extended from time to time and remained valid uptil 31st of October, 1974. Always a condition remained in the said appointment letter,which is annexed alongwith the writ petition "that the services are purely temporary and can be terminated of any time without any notice and assigning only reason thereof. " On an over all assessment of his work, the temporary engagement of the workman was terminated on 4-9- 1974 after giving one months notice/pay. The workman approached the Civil Court challenging his termination in suit No. 322 of 1974. While the suit remained pending U. P. Public Services Tribunals Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as Services Tribunal Act) came into force and in view of Section 6 (2) the suit stood transferred to the Tribunal and was registered as claim No. 668 of 1976. Before the Tribunal, an objection with respect to jurisdiction was raised by the petitioner when the workman added grounds with regard to retrenchment etc. However,the said objection of the petitioner was rejected in view of a decision of this Court and also the claim of the workman was dismissed vide order dated 27th April, 1977. Aggrieved the workman filed writ petition before this Court against the order of the Tribunal but the said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 3-1-1978. It is urged that in the writ petition specific ground of violation of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act was also taken. 4. Having failed in the first innings, the workman approached the Conciliation Officer challenging the termination in spite of objections on behalf of the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer submitted a failure report and the State Government referred the dispute under Section 4-K to the labour Court which registered the same as adjudication case No. 58 of 1952. 4. Having failed in the first innings, the workman approached the Conciliation Officer challenging the termination in spite of objections on behalf of the petitioner, the Conciliation Officer submitted a failure report and the State Government referred the dispute under Section 4-K to the labour Court which registered the same as adjudication case No. 58 of 1952. After filing of the respective statement and documents and recording of evidence, the labour Court struck four issues which were to the following effect : " (1) Whether the instant case is barred on the principles of res judicata in view of the decision of the Public Services Tribunal in case No. 668 (ii)/76 and of the Honble High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 781 of 1977? (2) Whether the reference is bad in law as alleged in para 16 of the written statement of the employers? (3) Whether the reference is barred by limitation? If so, its effect? (4) To what relief, if any, is workman entitled? 5. The labour Court on issue No. 2 held that in view of Section 2-A the dispute is deemed to be an Industrial Dispute irrespective of the fact that no demand was raised or notice given to the petitioner. While deciding Issue No. 3, it found that since the workman was agitating the matter before different forum, therefore, the reference was not hit by laches. While disposing of Issue No. 4 it came to the conclusion that since it was an Industrial Disputes, therefore, only the labour Court could grant any relief as common and, general law questions were not involved. Thereafter, the labour Court went on to hold that termination of the workman amounted to retrenchment and as the conditions were not complied with, the termination was illegal. 6. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the labour Court erred in holding that in view of Section 2-A of the Act, the termination was deemed to be an Industrial Dispute, because Section 2-A was not on the statute book on the date when the termination took place, thus it would not apply to the present case. The contention is bound to be rejected. The contention is bound to be rejected. The apex Court while considering somewhat in similar situation, in the case of Ruston and Hamsby v. T. B. Kadam, 1976 (3) SCC 71 , held that if on the date of reference Section 2-A was in the statute book, it would apply even though the termination took place prior to this date. 7. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that since appointment of the workman was for fixed period and the condition having been mentioned in the appointment letter itself, termination would not amount to retrenchment. In support of this contention learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out the proviso to Section 6-N (a ). It would be useful to quote Section 6-N (a) with the proviso hereunder : "6-N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.-No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - (a) the workman has been given one months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has been expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice wages for the period of the notice : Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service. 8. A perusal of the appointment letter of the workman which is Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition shows that the appointment was only uptil 31st October, 1974. Even though his services were terminated on 4th September, 1974, at best he could continue only uptil 31st October, 1974. The proviso to the aforesaid section is implicit that no notice was necessary in case of such termination. 9. The third contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is once the workman had approached this Court through a writ petition on identical grounds as raised before the labour Court, the decision of this Court would operate res judicata and the labour Court could not again deliberate upon the same. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the workman before the claims Tribunal and also before this Court has raised questions of general or common law and also had taken grounds available under the Act to challenge his termination. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the workman before the claims Tribunal and also before this Court has raised questions of general or common law and also had taken grounds available under the Act to challenge his termination. Thus, according to him once he had chosen a forum he cannot turn round now and approach the labour Court. In my view, the contention appears to be correct. The apex Court in the case of the Primary Textiles United v. Kamlakar Shanta Rai, AIR 1975 SC 2238 , has while considering the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the labour Court held that alternative forums are available and the suitor is free to choose his remedy under the Act or the Civil Court, but he cannot have both course open for him as he has to choose one of the two. This approach is also in conformity with public policy. A perusal of the judgment of the claims Tribunal and the grounds taken by the workman before it and also before this Court in the writ petition show that apart from the rights and liabilities under the Act, the action of the workman was also based on general and common law grounds. So the attack was not confined to grounds available under the Act, therefore, the labour Court could not have re-deliberated upon on those very grounds which were considered by the service Tribunal and also by this Court. If any other view is taken, apart from being against the public policy, it would also impinge upon the hierarchy of Courts. Can a situation be countenanced where this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has decided a case on some grounds and the labour Court also decides the same cause on those very grounds differently. In my view, the labour Court could not have reopened the matter. 10. Counsel for the workman has urged that the decision of the services Tribunal and this Court will not operate as res judicata, since the jurisdiction to grant relief lay only with the labour Court and thus the decision by the Tribunal and this Court was without jurisdiction and as such it cannot bar adjudication of the cause before the labour Court. In support of her contention she had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai, AIR 1971 SC 2355 . In support of her contention she had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai, AIR 1971 SC 2355 . Keeping in view the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case, the question still persists as to whether the decision of the services Tribunal was without jurisdiction? The Services Tribunal Act contains provisions that no suit would lie in service matter in Civil Court. But once the suit itself was transferred to the Service Tribunal by operation of law, it ceases to be a suit and it was decided under the Services Tribunals Act as a claim petition. Thus in my view, the contention of the learned Counsel for the workman has no force. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned award dated 25th July, 1983 is hereby set aside. No order as to cost. Petition allowed. .