K. C. BHANU, J. ( 1 ) ACCUSED Nos. 1 to 6 in S. C. No. 485/2001 on the file of vi Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, secunderabad, filed this appeal, challenging the legality and validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated 22. 7. 2002, whereby A1 to A6 were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for one month under section 364 IPC, Al to A6 were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for one month under Section 364-A IPC, a3 was convicted to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- and in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for 15 days under Section 370 IPC, A3 and A4 were sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for one month each under section 302 IPC, A1, A2, A5 and A6 were sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for one month under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, A3 and a4 were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for one month under Section 201 IPC, with a direction that the sentences shall run concurrently. ( 2 ) THE gravamen of the charges against the accused was that they kidnapped a girl of seven years age by name Tanuja for ransom, killed her, and tied a boulder to her waist and threw the dead body in a reservoir. ( 3 ) THE facts that led to the filing of the present appeal are briefly stated as follows. Tanuja is daughter of P. Ws. 2 and 22 and granddaughter of P. W. 3. A1 and A6 are related to P. W. 2, mother of tanuja. A2 to A5 have acquaintance with each other. On 6. 12. 2000, as usual P. W. 3 sent Tanuja to the School in the auto of p. W. 10. Tanuja is daughter of P. Ws. 2 and 22 and granddaughter of P. W. 3. A1 and A6 are related to P. W. 2, mother of tanuja. A2 to A5 have acquaintance with each other. On 6. 12. 2000, as usual P. W. 3 sent Tanuja to the School in the auto of p. W. 10. P. W. 10 dropped Tanuja along with other school children P. Ws. 6 and 21 at the school. After the school started, P. W. 1 was taking the attendance of the students. She found that Tanuja was missing. She also found Tanuja s school bag in the class. She sent two students to search for Tanuja in the school. They could not locate Tanuja in the school. They informed the same to p. W. 1. P. W. 1 immediately informed the vice-Principal of the school about the missing of Tanuja. The Vice-Principal rang up the residence of Tanuja and informed p. W. 3-the grandmother of Tanuja that Tanuja was missing. P. W. 3 immediately rushed to the school. She and P. W. 1 went to the police station and lodged Ex. P1 F. I. R. with the police. P. W. 24 registered a case and started investigation. By about afternoon on the next day, the parents of Tanuja, who were out of station, reached Hyderabad. P. W. 2 informed the police that she was suspecting A1 and A6 in the episode. On 7. 12. 2000 at about 1. 30 p. m. , P. W. 22 received a telephone call. The caller introduced himself as Ramu. He told P. W. 22 that Tanuja was in their custody and to secure her release he should pay Rs. 10 lakhs as ransom. P. W. 22 installed a caller I. D. and when he again received calls from the caller he informed the police. On verification it was found that the calls were made from a public booth at M. G. Bus Station, Hyderabad. During the course of investigation, P. W. 25 arrested A1 and in pursuance of her confessional statement, he recovered school diary of Tanuja, the sari Al wore at the time when she took away Tanuja from the school. Al led P. W. 25 to the house of A4. A4 led the police to the reservoir, which tanuja was thrown into after being killed. The dead body was taken out from the reservoir. Al led P. W. 25 to the house of A4. A4 led the police to the reservoir, which tanuja was thrown into after being killed. The dead body was taken out from the reservoir. It was identified to be of Tanuja. Photographs of the dead body were taken. P. W. 25 prepared a rough sketch of the scene, seized incriminating articles, and held inquest over the dead body. The dead body was sent for conducting post-mortem examination. After completion of investigation, a charge-sheet was filed. Accused pleaded not guilty. The Prosecution examined 25 witnesses and exhibited 40 documents besides M. Os. l to 24. The Trial court on assessment of evidence on record convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid by the impugned judgment, aggrieved by which the accused preferred the present appeal. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for A1, a3, A4 and A6 contended that the entire case is cooked up by the Investigating officer, and the circumstances do not complete the chain so as to establish conclusively the guilt of the accused in a manner that rules out every hypothesis inconsistent with their innocence. The missing links were also liberally filled up by manipulated material and baseless surmises resulting in grave injustice to the appellants. The identity of the dead body has not been established beyond all reasonable doubt as the skin was peeled off, and no seizure report was prepared for m. Os. 4 to 10. P. W. 7 is a planted witness as he has closely been associated with the family of P. Ws. 2 and 22. None of the witnesses proves the recovery of scooter. The demand made over phone for ransom has not been proved, because the voice of none of the accused has been compared with the recorded voice. There is no evidence to show as to how the conversation made over telephone was recorded. The seizure of sari from A1 cannot link the accused with the offences. The learned counsel, therefore, submits that the order of conviction and sentence should be set aside. Learned Counsel appearing for the A2 to a5 while generally adopting the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the other accused has specifically contended that the letter allegedly written by Al to A2 does not reveal any conspiracy. There is no evidence that M. O. 19 has been used in the commission of the offence. Learned Counsel appearing for the A2 to a5 while generally adopting the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the other accused has specifically contended that the letter allegedly written by Al to A2 does not reveal any conspiracy. There is no evidence that M. O. 19 has been used in the commission of the offence. None of the witnesses speaks about the involvement of a5 in the commission of offence and so the order of conviction and sentence should be set aside. On the other hand, learned public Prosecutor contended that the circumstances may not independently establish the guilt of the accused, but if taken cumulatively would only lead to the inevitable and inescapable conclusion that it is the accused who committed the murder of the deceased. There is no reason for p. W. 7 to implicate the accused falsely. The recoveries made in this case at the instance of the accused would provide sufficient link between the accused and the crime committed. She, therefore, prays that the order of conviction and sentence should be set aside. ( 5 ) THE case rests upon circumstantial evidence. There is no direct evidence. Therefore, the observations, on the aspect of circumstantial evidence, made by me apex Court in Hanumant Govind nargundkar v. State of M. P. , AIR 1952 sc 343 , may be extracted below: "it is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. " ( 6 ) IN a recent decision in Bodhraj v. State of J and K , 2003 SCC (Crl.) 201, the apex Court has held as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 6 ) IN a recent decision in Bodhraj v. State of J and K , 2003 SCC (Crl.) 201, the apex Court has held as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . . . for a crime to be proved it is not necessary that the crime must be seen to have been committed and must, in all circumstances be proved by direct ocular evidence by examining before the Court those persons who had seen its commission. The offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The principal fact or factum probandum may be proved indirectly by means of certain inferences drawn from factum probans, that is, the evidentiary facts. To put it differently, circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together they form a chain circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed. " ( 7 ) BEARING the above principles in mind, the evidence of Prosecution witnesses has to be appreciated to ascertain whether all the circumstances, if taken together, form a complete chain so as to establish conclusively the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. ( 8 ) IT is settled law that in arriving at a conclusion about the guilt of an accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of preponderance of probabilities its intrinsic worth and the animus of the witnesses. In each case whether the proof of the case by the Prosecution or the proof of defence set up by the accused, it is the estimate of probabilities arrived at from his practical standpoint by a prudent man. The court has to be watchful and ensure that conjectures and suspicions cannot take the place of legal proof. ( 9 ) P. W. 17 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased on 12. 12. 2000. He found no injuries on the dead body. Answering the questionnaire-Ex. The court has to be watchful and ensure that conjectures and suspicions cannot take the place of legal proof. ( 9 ) P. W. 17 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased on 12. 12. 2000. He found no injuries on the dead body. Answering the questionnaire-Ex. P5, he has stated that it is possible that injuries caused by throttling on a highly decomposed body may not be visible, and that hyoid bone and cartilage need not necessarily be fractured when a child is throttled to death, because these structures are flexible in young age. Though he could not state with certainty that the death of the deceased was due to drowning, he has stated that the death of the deceased would appear to have occurred due to throttling. Ex. P4 is the post-mortem certificate issued by him. According to him, the deceased died about 5 to 7 days prior to the post-mortem examination. On the basis of the evidence of P. W. 17 and the recitals in exs. P4 and P5, it can be said that the deceased met with a homicidal death. ( 10 ) P. W. 25 conducted inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P. W. 16 under Ex. P3-inquest report. Since the inquest mediators could not give any definite opinion as to the cause of death of the deceased, their evidence on the aspect of the cause of death is not of any help. ( 11 ) SINCE it is contended on behalf of the appellants that the dead body could not be identified as that of Tanuja, we would proceed to scrutinize the evidence on record whether the dead body could be identified or not. ( 12 ) P. W. 4 is the brother of P. W. 22. He is resident of Nellore. On receiving information that Tanuja was missing, he reached the house of P. W. 22 by midnight on 6. 12. 2000. He stated that he went to kotipally reservoir. He identified the dead body. In the cross-examination he stated that he identified the dead body by hair and shape of the body. Ex. P4-post-mortem certificate shows that the hair on the dead body was easily coming out. Therefore, it may not be possible for him to identify the dead body of the deceased by her hair. He identified the dead body. In the cross-examination he stated that he identified the dead body by hair and shape of the body. Ex. P4-post-mortem certificate shows that the hair on the dead body was easily coming out. Therefore, it may not be possible for him to identify the dead body of the deceased by her hair. P. W. 5 is the cousin of P. W. 2. He too went to the reservoir and he identified the dead body as that of Tanuja. Except that a suggestion was given to this witness that he did not know anything about this case, nothing has been elicited from his cross-examination that he could not identify the dead body as that of Tanuja. At the time of inquest, police seized M. Os. 4 to 11, which are frock, ribbons, ear rings, canvas shoes, blouse etc. , found on the dead body. P. W. 3 identified these objects. She stated that since the day on which Tanuja was kidnapped was "sports Day" in the school, Tanuja was made to wear white dress on that day. She denied the suggestion that these material objects did not belong to Tanuja. Nothing has been elicited from her cross-examination to discredit her veracity in her evidence. Therefore, from the evidence on record it can be said that the dead body recovered from the reservoir was that of Tanuja. ( 13 ) IT is contended on behalf of the accused that the dead body was not subjected to DNA test to identify that it was that of Tanuja. P. W. 25 stated that since P. Ws. 4 and 5 identified the dead body as that of Tanuja, he did not subject it to DNA test. So, this contention has no force. ( 14 ) NOW the question is whether the accused persons are perpetrators of the crime or not. As already stated supra it can only be established through circumstantial evidence. But, before going to the circumstances the Prosecution relied on, it is apposite to narrate a few facts which are not in dispute. ( 15 ) P. WS. 2 and 22 are parents of tanuja. She was studying n Class by the date of her unfortunate death. A1 and A6 are wife and husband. A1 is granddaughter of maternal aunt, and A6 is son of another maternal aunt, of P. W. 2. ( 15 ) P. WS. 2 and 22 are parents of tanuja. She was studying n Class by the date of her unfortunate death. A1 and A6 are wife and husband. A1 is granddaughter of maternal aunt, and A6 is son of another maternal aunt, of P. W. 2. As usual, Tanuja left for school at 7. 30 am. When P. W. 1 was marking the attendance of the students, she found Tanuja missing. She sent two children in search of Tanuja. They searched for tanuja in the school, but could not find her. P. W. 1 immediately informed the Vice-Principal of the school. The Vice-Principal rang up the residence of Tanuja and informed P. W. 3 about the missing of tanuja from the school. P. W. 3 rushed to the school. P. Ws. 1 and 3 went to the Police station and lodged Ex. P1-report. P. W. 24 registered a case on the basis of Ex. P1. He informed the main control room and other regional control rooms and deputed staff at railway Stations and Bus Stations. P. Ws. 2 and 22 were out of Hyderabad by 6. 12. 2000 and on being informed about the missing of their daughter, they reached Hyderabad by 7. 12. 2000. They received some phone calls from 7. 12. 2000 till 10. 12. 2000. The caller demanded a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs for the release of Tanuja. In this background of the case, the circumstances which the prosecution sought to rely upon have to be scrutinized with a great deal of wariness. ( 16 ) THE motive as suggested by the prosecution is that A1 and A2 were jealous of P. W. 2 and were in need of money for their bad habits. P. W. 2 stated that A6 stayed in their house and prosecuted his education. He was in the habit of making petty thefts. On one occasion, he stole the gas cylinder and some household articles from the house of P. W. 2. He was addicted bad vices. He was in the habit of consuming liquor and chewing Gutka. A1 was in need of money. This part of the evidence could not be shattered in the cross-examination of p. W. 2. It has just been suggested to this witness that she was jealous of Al and A6 because A6 married A1. He was addicted bad vices. He was in the habit of consuming liquor and chewing Gutka. A1 was in need of money. This part of the evidence could not be shattered in the cross-examination of p. W. 2. It has just been suggested to this witness that she was jealous of Al and A6 because A6 married A1. P. W. 2 needed never be jealous of A1 and A6, because she was financially in better position and was in higher status in the society than A1 and A6 were. It was in her house that A6 did his school education. Since A1 and A6 are closely related to P. Ws. 2 and 22, the former knew about the monetary status of the latter, and since Al and A6 were in need of money, the possibility that they must have developed motive to get some money from P. Ws. 2 and 22 cannot be ruled out. However, the motive being the state of mind, it may not always be possible to know what the motive for a particular offence was. The absence or non-proof of motive does not invariably create a doubt on the prosecution case, if the evidence produced on record is otherwise considered reliable and trustworthy. Therefore, even if the motive is held to have not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, it matters little if the other evidence on record is dependable. ( 17 ) THE first circumstance the prosecution relied upon is that the deceased was last seen in the company of A1. P. W. 1 sent the deceased in the auto of P. W. 10 to the school. P. W. 10 stated that he dropped Tanuja and other children including Brinda at the school on 6. 12. 2000 by about 8. 20 a. m. Brinda was examined as p. W. 6. She was studying IV class at the relevant time. She stated that she reached the school in the auto of P. W. 10 along with tanuja. She and Tanuja kept their school bags in their respective class rooms and were playing in the school playground. At that time one "aunti" came to the school and called Tanuja. "aunti" and Tanuja had conversation for some time and later they went away from the school at about 8. 30 a. m. P. W. 21 was studying VII Class in the same school by the relevant time. At that time one "aunti" came to the school and called Tanuja. "aunti" and Tanuja had conversation for some time and later they went away from the school at about 8. 30 a. m. P. W. 21 was studying VII Class in the same school by the relevant time. He stated that when he was playing along with other students in the school playground, one "aunti" and Tanuja were roaming in the playground. P. Ws. 6 and 21 could not identify that "aunti". However, the fact remains that Tanuja was taken away from the school at about 8. 30 a. m. , on 6. 12. 2000 by one "auntie" woman. The question now is who was that "aunti"? ( 18 ) P. W. 7 is closely acquainted with the family of P. W. 2, as the father of P. W. 2, was Joint Secretary of the Union of the company in which P. W. 7 worked. He stated that on 6. 12. 2000 at about 9 am when he was going to bus stand, he saw a white ambassador car in front of the school. He also saw A1 taking Tanuja in the car and a green colour scooter stationed near the school. Being closely acquainted with the family of P. W. 2, it was not difficult for him to identify Tanuja and A1. ( 19 ) BOTH the Counsel challenged the evidence of this witness on the ground that he was planted as a chance witness, particularly because till a news item was published in newspapers about the death of tanuja, he did not inform anyone that he had seen Tanuja and A1 together. ( 20 ) THERE cannot be any controversy regarding the competency of a pedestrian being a natural witness. Trustworthiness of a chance witness is dependant upon the intrinsic quality of his evidence. Even if he may not ordinarily be present at the time and place, his evidence cannot be rejected just because he is present at the relevant time, and his presence does not necessarily mean that he was not and could not have been present at the relevant time and place. At the most, his evidence requires to be closely scrutinized in order to find out whether he was in fact present at the relevant time and place. ( 21 ) P. W. 7 is a retired employee. At the most, his evidence requires to be closely scrutinized in order to find out whether he was in fact present at the relevant time and place. ( 21 ) P. W. 7 is a retired employee. He was going to bus stand at 8. 30 a. m. It is at that time, he observed A1 taking Tanuja in the car. There is nothing elicited in his cross-examination to show that he has animus against the accused to implicate them. Except that a suggestion was given to him that he did not know anything in this case and owing to his acquaintance with the family of P. Ws. 2 and 22 he was speaking false, nothing has been elicited in his cross-examination which could weaken his testimony. Therefore, his presence at the school at the relevant time is quite natural. His evidence that he saw a1 taking Tanuja in the car could not be destroyed in his cross-examination. He appears to be a witness of truth and he spoke what he had seen. Had he wanted to perjure himself, he would as well have stated that the other accused, or at least A6, were also present there. True that he admitted in his cross-examination that he used to visit the house of F. W. 22 for every two or three days and until he saw the news published in the newspapers about the death of Tanuja he did not inform anyone that he had seen al taking Tanuja in the car, but he convincingly explained for doing so. He stated that his nephew was attacked with jaundice and he was busy in that connection and therefore he did not enquire from P. W. 22 as to why Al had taken Tanuja from school on 6. 12. 2000. On seeing the news appeared in the newspaper about the death of Tanuja, he informed P. W. 22. Though he used to visit the house of P. W. 22 for every two or three days, he did not say that he visited the house of P. W. 22 during the period between 6. 12. 2000 and 17. 12. 2000, and, therefore, naturally he did not have an occasion to inform P. W. 2 or 22. His evidence thus establishes that tanuja was taken away in the car by Al on 6. 12. 2000 at about 8. 30 am. 12. 2000 and 17. 12. 2000, and, therefore, naturally he did not have an occasion to inform P. W. 2 or 22. His evidence thus establishes that tanuja was taken away in the car by Al on 6. 12. 2000 at about 8. 30 am. P. W. 3 stated that as soon as the Vice- Principal informed her over phone that one "aunti" took away tanuja from the school and enquired with ner whether that "aunti" was her relative, she suspected that A1 was the "aunti" the vice-Principal was talking about, since tanuja used to call A1 as "aunti". Therefore, the evidence on record makes it clear that the "aunti" referred by P. Ws. 6 and 21 was nobody other than A1. ( 22 ) ANOTHER circumstance the prosecution has come up with is that the father of Al died 10 days before 6. 12. 2000 and a "10th day ceremony" was performed in her house three days prior to 6. 12. 2000 and Al tried to gain intimacy with tanuja on that occasion. This is spoken to by P. Ws. 2 and 3. P. W. 3 stated that she went to the house of Al along with Tanuja three days prior to 6. 12. 2000. Al gathered several children including Tanuja. She engaged them in a play "anthyakshari". She also encouraged them to play some other games. She gave chocolates also. This circumstance may not per se be an incriminating circumstance against A1, but it certainly gives rise to a suspicion about her motive behind distributing chocolates etc. , to Tanuja, because it was the "10th day ceremony" being performed on the death of her father which was no occasion to distribute chocolates or gathering several children and entertaining them in a play like "anthyakshari" etc. The purpose is evident. Al wanted to gain as much intimacy with Tanuja as possible, and the subsequent events show that she was successful in her attempt. ( 23 ) THE next circumstance against the accused was that they demanded ransom of Rs. 10 lakhs for the release of Tanuja. P. W. 22 stated that after he received a call from a person who introduced himself as Ramu on 7. 12. 2000, he installed M. O. 2- called I. D. machine and recorded the conversation between him and the caller as in Ex. P8. Ex. 10 lakhs for the release of Tanuja. P. W. 22 stated that after he received a call from a person who introduced himself as Ramu on 7. 12. 2000, he installed M. O. 2- called I. D. machine and recorded the conversation between him and the caller as in Ex. P8. Ex. P8 would clearly go to show that the kidnappers of Tanuja demanded rs. 10 lakhs. P. W. 4 also stated that the caller demanded ransom of Rs. 10 lakhs. P. W. 22 deposed in detail about the calls he received and the demands made in order to release tanuja. The evidence of these witnesses in this respect has not been specifically denied or disputed. But, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the accused, the voice recorded in M. O. 1 was not compared with the voice of any one of the accused. Therefore, it cannot conclusively be said that it was the voice of any one of the accused, and so the contention of learned counsel appearing for the accused that a device like M. O. 2 cannot record voice and no permission was obtained from the telephone Department to use M. O. 2 is inconsequential. We have already held that on 6. 12. 2000 at about 8. 30 a. m. Al took away Tanuja from the school. The first call received from the caller was at about 1. 30 p. m. , on 7. 12. 2000. When Al took away Tanuja on 6. 12. 2000, who would make a call on 7. 12. 2000 that Tanuja was kidnapped and ransom of Rs. 10 lakhs was to be paid for her release? It must indubitably be someone in the "group of A1" that made the call. Therefore, this circumstance can be taken as a connecting link in the chain of circumstances against the accused, the fact that the voice of the caller was not established to be of any of the accused notwithstanding. ( 24 ) P. W. 25 arrested Al on, 12. 12. 2000. She made a confessional statement. In pursuance of the statement, the school diary of Tanuja and the sari A1 was said to have been wearing at the time when she took away Tanuja from the school were recovered under Ex. P9 in the presence of p. W. 20. M. Os. 3 and 15 were the diary and the sari respectively. She made a confessional statement. In pursuance of the statement, the school diary of Tanuja and the sari A1 was said to have been wearing at the time when she took away Tanuja from the school were recovered under Ex. P9 in the presence of p. W. 20. M. Os. 3 and 15 were the diary and the sari respectively. P. W. 20 corroborated the evidence of P. W. 25 with regard to the seizure of M. Os. 3 and 15. P. W. 20 stated that the length of M. O. 3 is 6 to 7 inches and width is 1 1/2 inches. Learned Counsel for the accused has contended that a school diary would not be of the size as stated by p. W. 20 and therefore his evidence should be discarded. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept this contention. P. W. 20 appears to be not much educated, as he stated that he did not know writing or reading English which is why he must have given such measurements. But his evidence cannot be discarded ipso facto, because he stated that the colour of M. O. 3 was brown and he was not cross-examined on the aspect that M. O. 3 was not the diary seized by the police. P. W. 25 was the best person to clarify any ambiguity. He too was not cross-examined on this aspect. M. O. 3 contained brown colour cover labelled as "r. L. Tanuja, II Class". P. W. 20 was suggested to be a stock witness. He denied the suggestion. He also denied the suggestion that as he was doing business without license, due to fear of the police that he might be legally proceeded against for not having license, he obliged the police. There is no material to show that he was stock witness for the police, and nothing has been elicited in his cross-examination that he was speaking false. ( 25 ) THOUGH the recovery of M. O. 15 is not incriminating against A1 because there is no evidence on record to show that M. O. 15 was the sari she was wearing at the time of kidnapping Tanuja, certainly the recovery of M. O. 3 is. The reason is that PW. 3 stated that on reaching the school she verified the bag of Tanuja and found her school diary missing. The reason is that PW. 3 stated that on reaching the school she verified the bag of Tanuja and found her school diary missing. P. W. 7 stated that he saw Tanuja holding a book in her hand when A1 was making Tanuja sit in the car. The diary which was missing from the school bag of Tanuja was recovered from the house of Al at her instance. Therefore, she was expected to explain as to how m. O. 3 came into her possession. She denied the seizure itself. As already stated supra the evidence of P. Ws. 20 and 25 establishes the recovery of M. O. 3. Therefore, this recovery provides a further link in the chain of circumstances. ( 26 ) P. W. 25 stated that on arrest of a1, she led him to the house of A4 at nagasamudram Village. A4 made a confessional statement on 12. 12. 2000 in the presence of P. W. 16. Ex. P 21 is the admissible portion of the statement. A4 led the police and mediators to Kotipally Reservoir and pointed out the place where the dead body of Tanuja was thrown. P. W. 15 is a fisherman. He specifically stated that A4 showed the place where the dead body was thrown. He stated that on search the dead body was traced and it was taken out from the reservoir. The depth of the reservoir, according to him, was 10 ft. The fact that he traced the dead body from the reservoir from the place pointed out by A4 has not been disputed in his cross-examination. Therefore, from the evidence on record it can safely be said that the dead body of Tanuja was picked up from the place pointed out by A4. ( 27 ) LEARNED Counsel for the accused contended that according to P. W. 15 the place where the dead body was traced was 2 yards away from the water line whereas according to P. W. 25 it was 10 ft. from the main gate, and so there is a discrepancy with regard to the actual place where the dead body was traced out from. ( 28 ) P. W. 25 stated in his cross-examination that the dead body was found at a distance of 9 ft from "peddatumu". from the main gate, and so there is a discrepancy with regard to the actual place where the dead body was traced out from. ( 28 ) P. W. 25 stated in his cross-examination that the dead body was found at a distance of 9 ft from "peddatumu". When he was cross-examined again on the same point, he again stated that the dead body was found at a distance of 9 ft from crust gate of sluice canal. Ex. P32, rough sketch of the scene of occurrence, shows that the crust gate was situated opposite to the sluice canal. P. W. 15 stated that the dead body was found 2 yards away from the water line. He also stated that the place where the dead body was found was also called as "peddatumu". Thus, both the witnesses stated that the dead body was found near "peddatumu". It can be taken judicial notice of that 2 yards are equivalent to approximately 6 ft. Therefore, there is no much discrepancy in the evidence of these witnesses with regard to the place where the dead body was actually traced. P. W. 15 is an illiterate. He was not expected to give the distance so precisely that it absolutely tallied with that which was given by P. W. 25. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel in this respect is rejected. ( 29 ) P. W. 25 stated that the stone which was tied to the dead body of tanuja weighed 32. 5 Kgs. and the weight of tanuja was 20 Kgs. Learned Counsel has contended that two persons cannot throw a weight of more than 52 Kgs. to a distance of 9 ft. It is not the case of the Prosecution that only two of the six accused threw the entire 52 Kgs. Since the case entirely depends upon circumstantial evidence, there is no direct evidence that only two accused persons threw the entire weight into the reservoir. How many of the accused persons threw the weight to that distance does not matter much, when all the accused persons are alleged to have had conspiracy to commit the crime and the crime was committed in pursuance of the conspiracy. All that the prosecution has to prove is that the accused persons had criminal conspiracy to commit the crime and the crime was committed. All that the prosecution has to prove is that the accused persons had criminal conspiracy to commit the crime and the crime was committed. The role played by each of the accused need not be proved to the minutest detail in a case which depends completely on circumstantial evidence. It cannot be expected of Prosecution to establish by conclusive evidence as to how many persons threw the dead body to that distance and how they could do so. Hence, this contention also of the learned Counsel in this aspect is rejected. ( 30 ) P. W. 25 seized M. Os. 22 and 23 - granite stone and two plastic ropes respectively under Ex. P33-seizure report. On 15. 12. 2000, A6 voluntarily surrendered himself before the police and made a confessional statement, the admissible portion of which is Ex. P10. He showed the place where A2, A3 and A5 were hiding themselves. We will discuss Ex. P10 in detail later in this judgment. On his arrest, A2 made a confessional statement, admissible portion of which is at Ex. P13. In pursuance of the same, M. O. 9-gold chain was recovered from his house. At the instance of A2, police also seized the scooter and the car. In pursuance of the confessional statement of a6, M. Os. 16 and 17 were seized-two hand gloves and torch light. ( 31 ) M. O. 9 is the gold chain identified by P. W. 3 as that of the deceased. P. W. 23 acted as mediator when M. O. 9 was seized in pursuance of the confessional statement of A3. P. W. 23 also stated that A2 led them to Karankote Village and showed them m. Os. 4, 12 and 5 - frock, blouse and drawer of the deceased respectively - and M. O. 18 - a letter written by A1 to A2. When the evidence of P. W. 3 is read as a whole, it is clear that she identified M. Os. 4, 12 and 5 as that of Tanuja. A2 did not give any explanation for being in possession of these articles which belonged to Tanuja. Therefore, it is certainly an incriminating circumstance against him. ( 32 ) M. O. 18 is the letter written by A1 to A2. It is extracted below. "dear Bhasker, i wish you success in your work. I am writing this letter to you today. Therefore, it is certainly an incriminating circumstance against him. ( 32 ) M. O. 18 is the letter written by A1 to A2. It is extracted below. "dear Bhasker, i wish you success in your work. I am writing this letter to you today. On account of my faith in you and Prasad, I am asking you to do such a dangerous work because I cannot live with you. If you complete this work then i can also stay with you. I will be always with you. Whether in pain, or pleasure, I will be always with you and Prasad will also be with you. Please forgive small mistakes of prasad. Prasad is very good by heart. But, when you worry Prasad also get worried. This I have realized in last 2 or 3 days. For these 2 or 3 days, Prasad was very sad. Please do not mistake Prasad. I love you very much. I love you Bhasker. Yours truly, usha" ( 33 ) THOUGH A1 did not dispute or deny the execution of this letter by her, she stated that it was obtained by coercion by police. This assertion cannot be accepted as true, because P. W. 23, who is an independent mediator for the seizure of this letter, categorically stated that this letter was recovered in pursuance of the confessional statement of A2 from his trunk box in his house. The contents of this letter show that it was not obtained by force or coercion by police. In this letter, A1 entrusted some dangerous work to A2 after completion of which, she stated, she well like to stay with him. She also requested A2 not to mistake Prasad - her husband (A6) for small mistakes. Had the police wanted to extract such letter from Al, they would have as well fabricated it to implicate all the accused. A close reading of this letter would clearly reveal the evil design A1 hatched with A2. ( 34 ) P. W. 8 is the owner of the car. He appointed A5 as its Driver. He stated that the car was under repairs on 4. 12. 2000 and 5. 12. 2000. On 6. 12. 2000 A5 took the vehicle on hire and in the evening he paid him Rs. 300/- towards hire charges and took the vehicle again with him. He did not come back for 4 or 5 days. He stated that the car was under repairs on 4. 12. 2000 and 5. 12. 2000. On 6. 12. 2000 A5 took the vehicle on hire and in the evening he paid him Rs. 300/- towards hire charges and took the vehicle again with him. He did not come back for 4 or 5 days. Therefore, p. W. 8 enquired with P. W. 9 who is the manager of Rudrani Travels to whom P. W. 8 used to lend the car on hire, and was informed that A5 did not report there also. The vehicle was seized on 15. 12. 2000 at tandur under Ex. P17 in pursuance of the confessional statement of A5. A5 did not offer any explanation as to why he abandoned the car at Tandur. He also did not offer any explanation as to why he did not report either to P. W. 8 or P. W. 9 for about five or six days after 6. 12. 2000. It is thus clear that A5 was hand in glove with the other accused and the car was abandoned at Tandur as part of the criminal conspiracy. ( 35 ) P. W. 12 stated that A4 came to his hotel at Kotepally on a scooter and purchased "bajji and kara" worth Rs. 20/- on 6. 12. 2000 at about 12 noon from his hotel. He identified A4 being his regular customer. The evidence of this witnesses establishes that A4 was at Kotepally by about 12 noon on 6. 12. 2000 which was the day from which tanuja was missing. P. W. 13 stated that on 6. 12. 2000 at about 12. 30 p. m. A2 came to his automobile shop at Kotepally in a white ambassador car and purchased 5 liters of diesel and along A2, A1 was also present. P. W. 13 identified Al and A2 in the Court. Nothing has been elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his evidence. The evidence of this witness establishes that A2 and A1 were at Kotepally at about 12. 30 p. m. on 6. 12. 2000 which was, as already stated above, the day from which Tanuja was missing. ( 36 ) LEARNED Counsel for the accused contended since the Prosecution witnesses did not say the registration numbers of the car and the scooter, the seizure of these vehicles cannot be incriminating against the accused. It is so. 30 p. m. on 6. 12. 2000 which was, as already stated above, the day from which Tanuja was missing. ( 36 ) LEARNED Counsel for the accused contended since the Prosecution witnesses did not say the registration numbers of the car and the scooter, the seizure of these vehicles cannot be incriminating against the accused. It is so. But, the witnesses described the car by its colour. Therefore, the seizure of these vehicles may not per se be incriminating against the accused, but as already stated above it can be taken as a link in the chain of circumstances and, as already stated supra, to establish the fact that A1, A2 and A4 were at Kotepally on 6. 12. 2000 by about afternoon. ( 37 ) THE accused are alleged to have conspired together to extract ransom from the parents of Tanuja by kidnapping her. It is difficult for Prosecution to establish, in a case of circumstantial evidence, criminal conspiracy by direct evidence, because in general conspiracy is entered into in secrecy so that nobody else would know it. Therefore, it has to be gathered from the circumstances. On this aspect, the observations of the Apex Court in Ram narain Peply v. Central Bureau of investigation, 2003 AIR SCW 3119, made in paragraph 345 by the Apex Court are relevant. They are extracted below. "no doubt in the case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence. The ingredients of offence are that there should be an agreement between persons who are alleged tp conspire and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal act or for doing illegal means an act which itself may not be illegal. Therefore, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both, and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. " ( 38 ) TANUJA s parents are closely related to A1 and A6 who know their financial status. The conspiracy was to kidnap tanuja for ransom and in order not to be identified later to kill her. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. " ( 38 ) TANUJA s parents are closely related to A1 and A6 who know their financial status. The conspiracy was to kidnap tanuja for ransom and in order not to be identified later to kill her. That is why A5 was chosen so that he could drive the car and A2 was chosen being closely intimated to A1, and A3 was chosen being an ex-serviceman since A6 is also an ex-serviceman. Being the driver of the car, A5 knew that it was under repair till 5. 12. 2000. That is why 6. 12. 2000 was chosen as the date to execute their conspiracy. ( 39 ) THE recovery of M. Os. 16 and 17- gloves and torchlight-does not incriminate a6 in the offence, because there is no evidence on record to show that these items were used in the commission of the offence. But on his arrest, he led the police on 15. 12. 2000 to the place where A2, A3 and a5 were hiding themselves. P. W. 25 stated that he unsuccessfully tried to arrest these accused till A6 made confessional statement leading to their arrest. Ex. P10 is the admissible portion of the confessional statement. Police arrested A2, A3 and A5 from a room in the house of P. W. 14. The evidence of P. W. 14 is important here. It has been elicited from the cross-examination of this witness that one room in his house was let out to the Sarpanch of Tandur village and in another room he was living with his family. It has been further elicited also from his cross-examination that neither he nor any of his family members saw any visitor in the room let out by him to the Sarpanch, and the police informed him that they arrested three persons from the room. It means that despite being the landlord of the room and despite the fact that he and his family members were living in the room just beside the room in question, it was not known to him or to any of his family members that three persons were staying in the room, until the police told him that they arrested three persons. This fact undoubtedly establishes that A2, a3 and A5 were hiding themselves in a place which was within their exclusive knowledge and that place was discovered in pursuance of the confessional statement of a6. Now the question is whether the discovery of "the place" by A6, where A2, a3, and A5 were found hiding themselves, comes within the meaning of "discovery" under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. ( 40 ) THE conditions necessary for application of Section 27 of the Evidence act are: (i) the fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue, (ii) the fact must have been discovered, and discovered in consequence of some information received from the accused, (iii) person giving the information must be accused of any offence, (iv) he must be in the custody of police officer, (v) the discovery of fact in consequence of the information received from an accused in custody must be deposed to, and (vi) thereupon that portion only of the information which relates distinctly to the fact discovered can be proved. ( 41 ) IN Pulukuri Kottaya v. R. , AIR 1947 pc 67, the Apex Court has held that it is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered" as equivalent to the object produced and the "fact discovered" embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. This decision has been approved by the Apex Court in a series of decisions including Udaibhan v. S. , AIR 1976 SC 483 and HP Admn v. Om Prakash, AIR 1972 sc 975 . ( 42 ) IN the instant case, all conditions referred to in Paragraph 40 have been satisfied. In consequence of the information given by A6, the "fact discovered" is "the place" where A2, A3 and A5 were hiding themselves in the room, which was within the exclusive knowledge of A2, A3 and A5. Therefore, we are of the opinion that it must be held that "the place" is a discovery of "fact" within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. ( 43 ) WHAT is "fact" is defined under section 3 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, we are of the opinion that it must be held that "the place" is a discovery of "fact" within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. ( 43 ) WHAT is "fact" is defined under section 3 of the Evidence Act. It defines that "fact" means and includes (1) anything, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses; (2) any mental condition of which any person is conscious. Statements, feelings, opinions and states of mind are just as much "facts" as any other circumstances of which, through the medium of the senses or by our self-consciousness, we become aware, and all are equally admissible for the purpose of proving or disproving the matter to which they relate. Facts fall into two classes, those which can, and those which cannot be perceived by the senses. Of facts, which can be perceived by the senses, it is superfluous to give examples. Of facts which cannot be perceived by the senses; intention, fraud, good faith and exclusive knowledge may be given as examples. Therefore, "exclusive knowledge" is also a "fact". In the instant case, the "fact" which was discovered, in pursuance of the confessional statement of a6, is "the place" where A2, A3 and A5 were hiding themselves, which was within the "exclusive knowledge" of A6 and thus is admissible under Section 27 of the Act. Had the police not found A2, A3 and A6 in "the place" discovered by A6, "the place" would not have been a discovery. A "discovery", which becomes a "discovery" on another "discovery" which does not fall under Section 27 of the Act, is admissible in evidence. ( 44 ) EVEN assuming that it is not "discovery" within the meaning of section 27 of the Act, it can yet be certainly taken as "conduct" of A6 within the meaning of Section 8 of the Act. There is a clear distinction between the conduct of an accused, which is admissible under section 8, if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and the statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation which is hit by section 162 Cr. P. C. What is excluded by section 162 Cr. P. C. , is the statement and not the evidence relating to the conduct when confronted or questioned by the police officer. P. C. What is excluded by section 162 Cr. P. C. , is the statement and not the evidence relating to the conduct when confronted or questioned by the police officer. For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that an accused led a police officer and pointed out the place where stolen articles or weapons which might have been used in the commission of the offence were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Act, as held by the Supreme Court in Prakashchand v. S. , AIR 1979 SC 400 . Therefore, the fact that A6 discovered the place where A2, a3 and A5 were hiding themselves is admissible as conduct under Section 8 of the Act, and that fact, coupled with his relationship with the other accused and his wife with whom Tanuja was last seen alive, clearly points out his conspiracy in the crime. The entire episode went on for about six days. There is evidence on record that a1 was seen at Kotepalli. Without the knowledge of her husband-A6, she must not have been in a position to go out of station with outsiders for so many days. This also shows that A6 had complicity in the crime. As far as A5 is concerned, though he is only a Driver, as already stated above, his conduct and behaviour also show his involvement in the crime. Had he not been a party to the conspiracy along with the other accused, he would have reported back to P. W. 8 or p. W. 9 immediately after he left the passengers at the destination and would not have hid himself at Tandur. It is not his case that he was wrongfully detained by the other accused or threatened him not to leave the place. It is also apposite to note that p. W. 9 stated that A5 informed him on 6. 12. 2000 that he had hired the car for his personal work on that day. What was his personal work has not been brought on record. He did not explain anything even in his statement under Section 313 Cr. P. C. His personal work can easily be guessed. 12. 2000 that he had hired the car for his personal work on that day. What was his personal work has not been brought on record. He did not explain anything even in his statement under Section 313 Cr. P. C. His personal work can easily be guessed. ( 45 ) A2 examined D. W. I to establish that he was at Mahaboobnagar on 6. 10. 2000 and both of them went to Marikal Village in search of a marriage alliance for the daughter of A2 and returned to Mahaboobnagar in the evening. It means A2 wanted to show that he was at Mahaboobnagar on 6. 12. 2000. In the cross-examination of D. W. I he admitted that he did not have any traveling tickets to prove his assertion. He also admitted that he did not inform the police about A2 being with him on 6. 12. 2000. Therefore, the evidence of this witness has to be disbelieved, because it is very easy for anybody to lead such evidence. On the other contrary, there is evidence of P. W. 13 who emphatically stated that A2 came to his shop at Kotepally in a white ambassador car along with A1 at about 12 noon on 6. 1. 2. 2000 and purchased 5 Ltrs. Diesel. ( 46 ) M. OS. 5 to 12 were seized without panchanama. The voice recorded in M. O. 1 was not compared with the voice of any of the accused. M. O. 18 letter was not sent for comparison to ascertain whether it was in the handwriting of A1. These are all innocuous and would not affect the otherwise reliable main substratum of the Prosecution case. Incomplete investigation cannot afford a ground for acquitting the accused, when, despite such investigation, the case is proved against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. ( 47 ) LEARNED Counsel for the accused has also contended that even before A4 led the police to the place where the dead body was thrown P. W. 25 had asked P. W. 22 to come to Kotepalli reservoir, which shows that the Investigating Officer had already known that place, but in order to implicate the accused, he concocted the story of searching and tracing out the dead body. On her arrest, A1 spilled the beans. On her arrest, A1 spilled the beans. The entire confessional statement made by an accused is not admissible in evidence and only that part of the statement which falls within section 27 of the Evidence Act is admissible in evidence; and what is evidence need not be discused here. Yet, a Police Officer is at liberty to use and rely upon the entire or part of such statement for the purpose of his investigation of the case. There is no bar for him to use such statement. His experience tells him whether such statement is true or misleading and can, without much difficulty, distinguish between the two. What P. W. 25 did in this case was exactly the same. In all probability he knew that a4 would let the cat out of the bag and the dead body would be discovered. Therefore, he asked P. W. 22 to come to Kotipally reservoir. Of course, being in a shock and depressed state, P. W. 22 sent P. Ws. 4 and 5 to Kotipalli. It is a different matter altogether. Even if the dead body had not been found in the reservoir, nothing devastating would have happened by calling P. Ws. 4 and 5 to the reservoir. There is overwhelming evidence on record that on A4 pointing the exact place where cadaver of Tanuja was thrown, the dead body was traced from the reservoir on 12. 12. 2000. There is nothing on record to show that P. W. 25 is inimically disposed towards the accused so as to inculpate them in a case of this nature. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel in this respect falls to the ground. ( 48 ) LEARNED Public Prosecutor contended that the statements made by the prosecution witnesses in their evidence remain unchallenged in their cross-examination and so their evidence can be relied on. Learned Counsel for the accused relied upon a decision in Koli Trikam Jivraj v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1969 Guj. 69 , wherein it has been held as follows: ". . . . . . . . If the lawyer of the accused puts a suggestion to a prosecution witness that a particular event happened, or happened in a particular manner, then it cannot be implied that the lawyer commits himself to such an assertion. 69 , wherein it has been held as follows: ". . . . . . . . If the lawyer of the accused puts a suggestion to a prosecution witness that a particular event happened, or happened in a particular manner, then it cannot be implied that the lawyer commits himself to such an assertion. Suggestions put in cross-examination are no evidence at all and on the basis of such suggestions no inference can be drawn against the accused that he admitted the facts referred to in the suggestions. It is possible that in putting suggestions the lawyer of the accused, if he thinks fit and proper, may not put the entire case of the accused in the cross-examination of a prosecution witness. " ( 49 ) THE law laid down that suggestion is no evidence, cannot be disputed. The point here is that once a witness makes a statement in his evidence in Court and the statement is not challenged in his cross-examination, it can then be said that the statement is admitted by the party who has not challenged it. The decision cited by the learned Counsel for the accused has no application to the present context. ( 50 ) IN view of me above discussion, the circumstantial evidence to support the prosecution can be said to have been conclusive in nature with complete and unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the irresistible and unmistakable conclusion that it is the accused, and they alone, who committed the crime. The Trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record in a proper perspective rightly convicted and sentenced the accused. There are absolutely no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment. ( 51 ) IN the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence recorded by the Court below.