MANMOHAN SARIN, J. ( 1 ) BY this common judgment, the aforementioned writ petitions seeking quashing of the allotment letters-cum-demand in respect of the housesunder the expandable housing scheme of 1996 are being decided. The petitioners in the writ petitions apart from quashing of the allotment-cum-demand letter, seek a mandamus to the respondent-DDA to charge as per the rates given in the brochure and not the increased rates as demanded in the allotment-cum-demand letter. Directions for handing over of possession is also sought with the stipulation that the charging of the cost be deferred till the houses are- fit for habitation. ( 2 ) THE above writ petitions raised common questions of law and facts, and as such can be conveniently decided together. Arguments were heard with liberty given to supplement the said arguments or adopt the same. Mr. R. K. Saini and Mr. Sumit Bansal, counsel for the respective petitioners have been heard at length. During the course of proceedings the commissioner (Housing) and Director (Housing) were summoned and directed to file affidavits with regard to provision and availability of basic amenities. ( 3 ) THE facts giving rise to the writ petitions are as under. ( 4 ) THE Delhi Development Authority announced an Expandable Housing Scheme 1996 and invited applications for allotment of 3500 expandable houses. The houses being offered were of Type-A and Type-B. The former being a one room set and type-B being a two or more rooms set. The existence of the basic structure of the house was a salient feature of the scheme. Under the scheme, allottee had the option of raising further construction on the First Floor of an equivalent area. The Delhi Development authority had also constructed certain sample houses to give an idea to the applicant allottees as to how fully constructed after additional construction would look. ( 5 ) THE applicants were required to pay registration amount to Rs. 7500/- for type-A houses and Rs. 15,000 for type-B houses. The. houses offered for allotment were in bindapur, Nasirpur, Dwarka, Rohini, Narela, kondli, Gharoli. The tentative disposal cost of the houses in the different colonies sector/vise was given in Table 1 of the brochure for type-A houses and in Table 2 of the brochure for type-B houses. Details with regard to the number of houses available in each sector, pocket and locality and the price therefor were given. The tentative disposal cost of the houses in the different colonies sector/vise was given in Table 1 of the brochure for type-A houses and in Table 2 of the brochure for type-B houses. Details with regard to the number of houses available in each sector, pocket and locality and the price therefor were given. Rates also marginally varied for houses in different sectors. The tables indicated the tentative disposal cost of houses. It may be noted that for Bindapur, the tentative cost shown for Type-A house was rs. 2,51,400/ while in Dwarka it was Rs. 3,84,100- and Rs. 4,13,500/- in Rohini. The tentative disposal costs of houses in Rohini varied from Rs. 3,47,300/- to Rs. 3,87,700/- and in Narela it varied from Rs. 3,15,600/- to rs. 4,10,900/- depending upon the sector. In Kondli and Gharoli, it varied from Rs. 1,49,600/- to Rs. 2,43,100/ -. The variation was also on account of, in some cases, a greater area. For Type-B houses, the tentative disposal cost was Rs. 5,64,000/ in Bindapur, rs. 4,76,200/- in Dwarka and Rs. 5,72,300/- to Rs. 5,74,600/- in Narela. The scheme also provided for discounts in case of 100% disposal price being paid. The mode of payment prescribed was 50% of the disposal price on allotment and within 60 days from the date of demand letter, balance 50% amount was to be recovered together with the prescribed interest in 10 six monthly equal installments over a period of five years. ( 6 ) HAVING noted the salient features of the scheme, let me briefly notice the facts of CW. Nos. 2142/99, 2143/99-and 2733/99. CW. No. 2142/99 ( 7 ) PETITIONER Raj Kumar had applied for a type-A house by deposit of registration amount of Rs. 7500/- which was duly registered at No. 067000. The tentative disposal cost for type-A flat in Phase-Ill in sector 21, Pocket IV, Phase-Ill, Rohini was rs. 3,67,300/- as per the brochure. The draw of lots took place on 21st March 1997. Petitioner Raj Kumar was duly selected in draw of lots and H. No. 213, Type-A, Pocket- iv, Sector 21, Rohini was earmarked to be allotted to him. The allotment-cum-demand letter, however, was issued only in september, 1998. The said allottment-cum- demand letter gave the disposal cost of the flat at Rs. 4,44,200/- i. e. a rise of 20. 39% of the flat as per the brochure. The allotment-cum-demand letter, however, was issued only in september, 1998. The said allottment-cum- demand letter gave the disposal cost of the flat at Rs. 4,44,200/- i. e. a rise of 20. 39% of the flat as per the brochure. The allotment letter required the petitioner to pay 50% of the disposal cost immediately out of which rs. 10,000/- was to be paid as confirmation amount by 10th October, 1998. The balance 50% of the disposal cost together with inbuilt interest was required to be paid in ten equal six monthly installments. CW. No. 2143/99 ( 8 ) PETITIONER Praveen Kumar Batta applied under the Expandable Housing Scheme, 1996 floated by the respondent by depositing a sum of Rs. 7500/-, vide application No. 053583. Draw of lot was held on 21. 3. 1997. Petitioner was allotted type-A house in Rohini being House No. 39, Type-A, Pocket 9, sector 25. It was only in September, 1998 that the demand-cum-allotment letter was received by the petitioner, demanding Rs. 4,71,378. 80 against the cost of Rs. 3,87,700/ -, mentioned in the brochure. Petitioner claimed that water and electricity supplies were not available. The houses had been constructed when the brochure was taken out and hence there was no occasion for the exorbitant increase in cost demanded. The rest of the grounds taken by both the plaintiff and defendant are common as in CW. No. 2142/99. ( 9 ) PETITIONER Rahul Saini applied under the expandable Housing Scheme, 1996, floated by the respondent, by making an initial deposit of Rs. 15,000/-vide application No. 079478. Draw of lot was held on 21. 3. 1997. Petitioner was allotted flat bearing No. 70, type-A, Pocket 25, Sector 24, Rohini, Delhi. The issuance of demand-cum-allotment Jetter was delayed and was only issued in September, 1998. As per the allotment letter, the disposal cost of the flat was shown as Rs. 4,52,600/ Petitioner was also required to deposit the confirmation amount of Rs. 15,000/- by 10. 10. 1998. Petitioner did deposit the confirmation amount. The cost of the flat was mentioned in the brochure as Rs. 3,47,300/. Petitioner claimed that a difference of Rs. 1,05,300/- was exorbitant and the respondent itself had delayed the issuance of demand-cum-allotment letter by one and a half year. Petitioner claimed that roads were yet to be built, sewerage line was to be laid, facility of water and electricity and essential amenities were not available. 3,47,300/. Petitioner claimed that a difference of Rs. 1,05,300/- was exorbitant and the respondent itself had delayed the issuance of demand-cum-allotment letter by one and a half year. Petitioner claimed that roads were yet to be built, sewerage line was to be laid, facility of water and electricity and essential amenities were not available. There was no occasion to claim the increased disposal cost, as per the demand-cum-allotment letter. The rest of the grounds taken by both the plaintiff and defendant are common as in CW. No. 2142/99. ( 10 ) THE petitioners are aggrieved by what they term as the arbitrary exorbitant, unwarranted increase in the disposal cost of flats to which they have been subjected, without any fault of theirs. The issuance of the allotment-cum-demand letter had been delayed by the ODA itself for a period of nearly 18 months after the draw of lots. The grievance of the petitioner does not end here. It is urged that the areas are undeveloped, roads were yet to be fully built, electricity and water was not available. In other words, houses were not habitable in the absence of basic amenities. Yet the DDA is seeking to raise the cost of the houses by over 20%. ( 11 ) THE petitioners, in these circumstances, had filed the writ petitions seeking the reliefs mentioned above. As an interim measure in most of the cases cancellation of the allotment was stayed. ( 12 ) THESE writ petitions raise the following issues and questions for consideration. (A) Whether the respondents could revise the price as given in brochure as tentative disposal cost to a higher amount ? (B) Whether the increase in price was justifiable and subject to judicial review ? (C) Whether DDA was estopped from demanding a higher price and interest on account of its own delay in issuance of the allotment-cum-demand letter, due to non-provision of basic amenities, such as water and electricity ? ( 13 ) LET us first consider points A and B. The case of the petitioners is that the houses already stood constructed except for the additional construction which was optional to be made by the successful applicant/allottee. The tentative disposal must have been indicated in the Brochure on the basis of the calculations made by the respondent and the cost and expenses incurred in acquisition of the land and raising of the construction. The tentative disposal must have been indicated in the Brochure on the basis of the calculations made by the respondent and the cost and expenses incurred in acquisition of the land and raising of the construction. The responsibility for development of the area and providing the infrastructure as well as the basic amenities was that of the respondent- dda. Even after the draw of lots for a period of 18 months, the allotment letters were not issued. It is the respondent s own case that the allotment-cum-demand letters were deferred due to the non-availability of basic amenities, such as water, electric supply. ( 14 ) LEARNED counsel, Mr. Sumit Bansal and mr. R. K. Saini submitted that in case deferment of the allotment-cum-demand letter was justifiable on non-availability of basic amenities for a period of 18 months. The same were not available even now. As such there was no justification for issuance of the demand-cum-allotment letter in september, 1998. Mr. Saini also submitted that in the instant scheme there was no element of uncertainty, the houses were in existence and were offered for sale on cash down or hire purchase basic. He submitted that the fixation of tentative disposal cost itself was done without any attention to detail as the cost varied in different pockets within the same area. He submitted that the brochure did not have any stipulation which provided for revision of price. There was no reasonable basis for a revision in price. The words "tentative disposal cost" were intended to take care only of certain contingencies, such as a "mistake occurring or an omission. He argued that it certainly did not give a licence to the party in breach, to take advantage of its own default. He submitted that even In September, 1997 an intimation was sent with regard to the allotment of houses. As regards the increase in cost on account of revision in land rates it was vehemently opposed on the ground that the land had already been acquired, appropriated and used for the construction of the houses, which were offered for sale. Hence, there was no justification to increase the cost on the basis of revision of land rates by the Central Government subsequently. This itself accounted for an escalation of Rs. 38,200/- approximately. ( 15 ) MR. Saini next urged that the responsibility for provision of basic amenities was that of dda. Hence, there was no justification to increase the cost on the basis of revision of land rates by the Central Government subsequently. This itself accounted for an escalation of Rs. 38,200/- approximately. ( 15 ) MR. Saini next urged that the responsibility for provision of basic amenities was that of dda. It was for DDA to have the same executed through the Delhi Vidyut Board or the Delhi Jal Board. It was idle for DDA to contend that they had done what was required to be done and it was Delhi Jal Board and Delhi Vidyut Board who had failed to fulfill their obligations. As far as petitioners are concerned, it was failure on the part of DDA. Counsel also relied on Haryana Urban development Authority and Anr. v. Ranjan dhamina and Anr reported at AIR 1997 SC 1732 . In the cited case, land rate was sought to be increased from Rs. 269. 92 per sq. mtr. to Rs. 560. 60p per sq. mtr. It was not permitted, even though price was tentative and the defendant were entitled to a higher suni, as per the decision of the authority. This case is clearly distinguishable, in as much as the allotment letter itself in Clause (9) had the following clause ;- "the above price is tentative to the extent that any enhancement in the - cost of tend awarded by the competent authority under the tend Acquisition Act shall also be payable proportionately as determined shall be paid within thirty days of its demand. " ( 16 ) IT would be seen that under the aforesaid clause, it was only enhancement in the cost of land awarded by the Land Acquisition collector, which would enable additional price being demanded. In other words though the price was tentative, increase was confined to higher land rates being awarded by the Land acquisition Collector. ( 17 ) RELIANCE was also placed on Smt. Nisha singhal v. M. P. Housing Board, Bhopal and Ore. reported at AIR 1996 MP 212 as also on P. N. Verma and Ors. v. Union of India and ors. reported at AIR 1985 Delhi 417, to urge that the Court could interfere even in costing. If there is a change in the criteria or determination of disposal costs. reported at AIR 1996 MP 212 as also on P. N. Verma and Ors. v. Union of India and ors. reported at AIR 1985 Delhi 417, to urge that the Court could interfere even in costing. If there is a change in the criteria or determination of disposal costs. In P. N. Verma v. Union of India (supra), while the Court interfered as it found the the disposal cost was fixed on a basis totally different from the one announced earlier. The legal principles as enunciated in para 46 are reproduced for the facility of reference. "46. It is not within the province of the writ court to go into the intricacies of the calculations, decide the correctness of the various inclusions or their extent or compute the figure at which the disposal cost should be fixed. At the time of the promulgation of the scheme, the DDA had committed itself that the flats would be allotted at the actual cost. That actual cost was tentatively fixed at a figure which was announced subject, however, to variations in cost factors. It is not open to the DDA to alter this basis for the determination of the disposal cost. So long as the DDA adheres to this basis in fixing the disposal cost, writ court will not interfere. It will not interfere even if there should be some mistakes or exaggerations in the calculation of the components of the figure arrived at, as that would be a matter for determination after evidence and investigation in a suit. Even if an item should be included in the cost components, about the inclusion of which as one of the cost factors there could be some doubt, the writ Court may not interfere and may leave the parties to fight out their battle in a regular suit. Even if an item should be included in the cost components, about the inclusion of which as one of the cost factors there could be some doubt, the writ Court may not interfere and may leave the parties to fight out their battle in a regular suit. But where the disposal cost is fixed on a basis totally different from that announced earlier or where the components taken into account cannot be described by any stretch of imagination as cost factors or where a component of the cost is shown to have been fixed arbitrarily and without any basis whatsoever, the Court has no option but to quash the determination of the disposal cost so fixed and direct the DDA to undertake afresh, a proper determination of the disposal cost so fixed and direct the DDA to undertake afresh a proper determination thereof in accordance with the terms of the original contract or after excluding the items unwarrantedly included therein of after redetermining the value of any component on a proper and reasoned basis. " ( 18 ) THE DDA in its counter-affidavit and additional affidavits, as per directions given from time to time, claimed that roads and storm water drains had already been laid out, dda had further deposited the. requisite amounts as demanded by the Delhi Vidyut board and Delhi Jal Board for provision of electricity and water amenities. In the affidavit dated 6. 12. 99, of Mr. V. K. Singhal, Director (Housing ). Particulars and details were given of the amounts and the dates on which estimates of costs were received from the delhi Vidyut Board and Delhi Jal Board. DDA made the deposits within a short time thereof. It was claimed that the Delhi Development authority had paid over Rs. 1 crore to the delhi Vidyut Board, who miserably failed to discharge its obligations. It was oh account of these factors that despite the draw of lots, letter of allotment was withheld for a while on accdunt of non-provisions of the basic amenities. It was also hot issued as the costing details were being worked out. Upon receipt of the costing details from the Finance department, the demand-cum-allotment letter was issued. ( 19 ) LEARNED counsel, Ms. Anusuya Salwan for dda, referred to the brochure, where the cost indicated was "tentative disposal cost". It was urged that the costs, as given in the. It was also hot issued as the costing details were being worked out. Upon receipt of the costing details from the Finance department, the demand-cum-allotment letter was issued. ( 19 ) LEARNED counsel, Ms. Anusuya Salwan for dda, referred to the brochure, where the cost indicated was "tentative disposal cost". It was urged that the costs, as given in the. brochure, were tentative and final costs, were dependent on the cost of land and various other inputs and computable on the date of issuance of letter of allotment cum demand as per the policy of the DDA. She submitted that there was no indication in the brochure that the tentative disposal cost wa s the one, which was to be finally paid. Moreover, she emphasised that this was a case where the entire funding of the scheme was done by the Delhi Development Authority and the applicants or allottees did not participate or invest anything towards the construction. This was in distinction to the Self Finance scheme (SFS) where the allottee contributes to cost of acquisition and construction. DDA was entitled with passage of time, to recover minimal cost of the deployment of its capital and funds. The cost of servicing of interest on loans taken and other factors would also have to be reckoned while considering the justification for revision. The only investment made by most of the petitioners in these cases is either Rs. 7500/- or Rs. 15000/- paid at the time of registration. The transfer of ownership of the house together with ownership of the land were the salient features of the scheme. This was a scheme under which a freehold land constructed portion of the house duly completed was being offered with an option to raise additional construction. The disposal cost indicated in the brochure was clearly spelt out as tentative. The successful applicants/allottees were required on the issuance of allotment-cum-demand letter to pay confirmation amount of Rs. 15,000/- which would indicate their acceptance of allotment made. Most of the petitioners have not even paid the confirmation amount. Besides the allottees were required to pay 50% of the disposal cost as per the demand letter, balance 50% was to be paid in ten equal six monthly installments, together with inbuilt interest. 15,000/- which would indicate their acceptance of allotment made. Most of the petitioners have not even paid the confirmation amount. Besides the allottees were required to pay 50% of the disposal cost as per the demand letter, balance 50% was to be paid in ten equal six monthly installments, together with inbuilt interest. It is claimed That DDA had paid a huge amount to Delhi Jal Board and Delhi Vidyut Board, for provision of water and electric supply respectively. In these circumstances, it was not under any obligation to sell the flats or offer the same on hire purchase basis on the tentative cost, as indicated. ( 20 ) COMING to the delay in issuance of allotment-cum-demand letter, she submitted that the issuance of delayed allotment-cum- demand fetters itself gave reprieve to the allottees as they were not required to commence payment of 50% of the disposal costs and the installments. DDA itself for good and bonafide reasons, delayed the issuance of demand letter so that the basis amenities of electricity could be provided in the colonies for which it had already expended and paid amounts to the concerned agencies. DDA had been following a policy of charging the price prevalent and applicable at the time of issuance of demand-cum-allotment letter. This was uniformly implemented. The major components which led to the increase in the costing was that the premium of land under each developing unit was to the tune of Rs. 1,41,400 in the year 1997. Due to the periodical increase in the premium of the land, as determined by the Government of India, the land rates in 1998 increased with land premium for each dwelling unit coming to Rs. 1,79,600/- i. e. , an increase of Rs. 38,200/ -. ( 21 ) SHE submitted, in this case, there was no injury or loss caused to the allottees in real and practical terms. By the delay in issuance of allotment-cum-demand letter the applicants were not then required to make payment of the 50% of the disposal cost or to commence the payment of the ten equal monthly installments. A mere 10% return on these payments which were deferred, would result in arriving at a figure which was more than what has been claimed by the DDA as the disposal cost. A mere 10% return on these payments which were deferred, would result in arriving at a figure which was more than what has been claimed by the DDA as the disposal cost. ( 22 ) HAVING noted the rival submissions on the points at issue reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in DDA v. Pushpinder Kumar Jain reported at JT 1994 (6) SC 292. The Supreme Court in the above case upheld the charging of the price prevailing at the date of allotment and repelled the contention that the price prevailing on the date of draw of lots should be charged. The Court, of course, in the cited case was concerned only with the delay between 12th october, 1999 and allotment of flat on 9th january, 2000. It held that the delay was not unreasonable. The Court further held that the draw of lots was only a mode or process to identify the allottee in a process of selection. The same i. e. identification did not confer any right on the allottee of allotment at the price prevailing on the date of draw of lots. ( 23 ) REFERENCE may also be usefully made to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in smt. Sheelawanti and Ors. v. DDA and Anr. reported at 1995 I AD (Delhi) 725. The Full bench upheld the revision in prices in terms of the brochure. Following paras of the judgment sum up the legal position :- "21. The consistent view of this Court, thus, was that escalation in prices of the flats constructed by the ODA under different schemes, including the present scheme, could not be challenged under article 226 of the Constitution, till the decision In Asnok Kumar Behl v. DDA 1993 III AD (Delhi) 577, In which the court went into the question of pricing and quashed the escalated price of the flats allotted under the scheme. It appears that the Court did so apparently for the reason that despite specific directions in that behalf the DDA had failed to place the relevant material before the Court to explain how the price fixation had been done and on what basis. Court queries in this behalf were not answered, which led to the belief that the DDA was suppressing something and had acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the writ petitioners. Court queries in this behalf were not answered, which led to the belief that the DDA was suppressing something and had acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the writ petitioners. These significant factors put the case out of the ambit of the ratio of the bareili Development Authority s case. 22. From the above. It is clear that the scope of judicial review in the cases involving costing and fixation of prices is very much limited. Apart from the observations and the findings recorded in B. D. A s case (page 126), extracted above that a public body entering in the realm of contrary acts merely in its executive capacity and thereafter the relations are no longer governed by constitutional provisions but by contract, which apply in this case as well, even otherwise, what has to be seen and examined by the Writ Court is whether the pricing of flats demanded by the dda for different categories of allottees is whimsical or arbitrary. The data placed on record by the D. D. A. , prima facie, does not warrant so. There are of course some contentious points, like formula and basis for working out the land rate, cost of development, construction and inclusion of certain expenses, which could only be decided on evidence, which we do not propose to do in writ jurisdiction. Merely because the method of valuation suggested by the petitioners would be more fairer or logical, the method or. the basis adopted by the DDA cannot be struck down as arbitrary or whimsical. 25. There is no doubt that when compared to the prices fixed for the previous years, and particularly in the year 1979, when the price of the land was fixed at Rs. 62/- per sq. meter, the impugned prices, now notified by the lieutenant Governor in December, 1990, look to be quite excessive having regard to the vast difference. Admittedly, for several years (for over a decade), the land rates had not been revised, for one reason or the other, and to some extent obviously due to lapse of the administrative machinery, same rates were taken as the component of the prices of the flats right from the year 1979 to 1990. It is obvious that if only the land rates were being revised every year with gradual increase, perhaps the escalation would have gone unnoticed. It is obvious that if only the land rates were being revised every year with gradual increase, perhaps the escalation would have gone unnoticed. For example, the land rates near Jahangir Puri were rs. 200/- per sq. yard in the year 1979 and it became Rs. 4,380/- in the year 1990 effective from the period 01 April, 1990 to 31st March, 1991. In between the years 1979 to 1991, gradual increases were not notified although it is a known fact that there has been phenomenal increase in the land prices all over Delhi during this period and particularly in the late 80s. In these circumstances, the impression caused at the first flush by the alleged sudden increase in the cost of the land cannot be considered to be a valid ground to attack the prices, now notified as arbitrary. 26. In view of the terms and conditions, (Clauses 13 and 14) in the brochure it cannot be said that pricing is one time process and the DDA having fixed in the brochure some price could not revise it or that the nature or character of the scheme is changed thereby. Obviously, it is a continuous prices. Different sectors/colonies come into being at different times with continuous spiralling escalation in prices, the costing would naturally materially vary. It is truethat housing, accommodation is a vital requirement for a proper living and a city like Delhi, where State controls the land and regulates the development activities, the instrumentalities of the state, like the DDA, has a responsibility to act fairly and reasonably while fixing the price for sale of the land, houses pr the flats belonging to it. However, it cannot be said that the DDA is obliged to sell them at a price that may result in loss to it or at a price which does not contain any profit element. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Oil and natural Gas Commission and Another v. The association of Natural Gas Consumer industries of Gujrat and Others etc. AIR 1990 SC 1851 that generation of some commercial profit to the public undertakings is not prohibited. Similar view has been expressed in Premji Bhal parmer and Others v. DDA and Others, air 1980 SC 738 . AIR 1990 SC 1851 that generation of some commercial profit to the public undertakings is not prohibited. Similar view has been expressed in Premji Bhal parmer and Others v. DDA and Others, air 1980 SC 738 . In view of it, it cannot be said that taking into account of some profit element, if any, which the DDA denies to have taken in account while fixing the price, per se, renders the price fixed as arbitrary or unreasonable. 27. Even otherwise, the Scheme itself contemplates varying rates depending upon the class to which an allottee belongs-such as economically weaker section. Low Income Group" or Middle income Group. But in each cases, the consideration payable for the flat is referred to as the "cost". In other words, even to those who belong to the economically weaker sections, the consideration payable is called the "cost" of the flat. If the basic cost (i. e. the actual expenditure incurred by the DDA) is to be the "cost" for the flats the, the same rate should have been uniformally applied -to all the classes of allottees. Admittedly, it is not so. Therefore, the word "cost" referred in the Scheme cannot be equated to the basic expenditure incurred by the DDA. The term has a wider significance and is used to convey the meaning of the term "price". 28. The Scheme uses the word cost at several places. But it is clear that it is used in the sense of a price to be fixed. 29. The new Lexicon, Webster s dictionary of the English Language (1988 Edition) gives one of the meaning of the term cost as "the price paid or to be paid for something". 30. The Scheme itself has equated the "cost" to the word "price". Clause 13 gives the "likely cost of flats", and thereafter says "the prices are indicative and do not represent the final costs". Again clause 14 says". . . . . the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure are illustrative. " ( 24 ) IT may be noticed that since then the supreme Court has allowed the appeal against the decision of the Delhi High Court in Ashok kumar Behl v. DDA s case referred to in para 21 of Sheelawanti and Anr. v. DDA and Anr. (supra) quoted above. It has also been held that in Sheelawanti and Anr. v. DDA and anr. v. DDA and Anr. (supra) quoted above. It has also been held that in Sheelawanti and Anr. v. DDA and anr. (supra), the pricing was not a one time process and the DDA having indicated the price in the process could revise it and the nature or character of the scheme is not changed by such revision. Further the DDA was not obliged to sell them at a loss or at a price, which does not contain any element of profit. The Court also noted that DDA in its scheme has been using the word cost at several places, while equating the same to price . The revision in the price on account of fixation in the land prices has also been upheld in view of the decision of DDA Vs Pushpinder kumar Jain s case (supra) as well as sheefawanti s case (supra) as noted above and the fact that in the instant case in the brochure the term used was tentative disposal cost, the argument of the petitioners that there could be no revision in the price or cost is without merit and is rejected. ( 25 ) COMING to the second question, in view of the judicial pronouncements noted above, the right of the DDA to revise price is longer res integra. In the instance case, DDA had justified the revision firstly on account of increase in land prices as determined for Nazul land by the Central Government. The DDA has a policy where the land prices prevalent at the time of issuance of demand-cum-allotment letters are to be charged. This is the uniform and consistent policy-which has been followed. It may be in several cases that the tentative. First may have included the land price at a higher rate in the scheme. However, if at a later time, on the issuance of allotment- cum-demand letter there was a downward revision in the land rates as determined on an overall acquisition basis, the applicant would be billed at the price and at the rates, prevailing at the time of allotment-cum-demand letter. Even otherwise there is no challenge to the land rates as determined. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the increase even otherwise is on account of arbitrary or extraneous factors or such factors which cannot form part of the costing. Even otherwise there is no challenge to the land rates as determined. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the increase even otherwise is on account of arbitrary or extraneous factors or such factors which cannot form part of the costing. ( 26 ) COMING now to third question, whether the DDA can charge interest on the unpaid disposal cost on the basis of allotment-cum- demand letter as issued or the same is deferred to the date till the basic amenities were provided by the DDA? ( 27 ) THERE is merit in the contention of the petitioners that when a public body like the dda announces an Expandable Housing scheme, 1996 and is offering houses for allotment on ownership basis, then it has an obligation to ensure provision of a healthy environment and good infrastructure. It is interesting to note that the brochure of DDA itself had the following quotes :- "men come together in cities in order to live, they remain together in order to live the good life. "aristotle Again: "town life nourishes and perfects all the more civilized elements in man-Shakspeare wrote nothing but doggerel lampoon before he came to London. "oscar Wilde ( 28 ) DESPITE extolling the virtues of a good city life by the reputed authors. DDA did scarce to ensure the development of the area. The additional affidavit of the Housing director-II has given the details of the payments made to the DVB and DJB. It is claimed that although the DDA has made the requisite payments, the said agencies has failed miserably to discharge their duties and the demand letters were withheld pending the provisions of water and electricity. In another additional affidavit filed by Shri d. Devedi, Director Housing-II dated 31st october, 2000. It is claimed that the electrification in Rohini was carried as under :- ( 29 ) IT is averred in the above affidavit that water supply in Sectors 20 to 25 in Rohini phase-Ill was made available on 1st October, 1997. The petitioners during the course of hearing had claimed that these facilities were not even fully available now. Concerned Chief engineer (Civil) was, therefore, asked to appear in Court to ascertain the availability of water in Phase-Ill of Rohini. The Chief Engineer explained that as of November, 2001, against requirements of two million gallons of water at present only 0. 20 to 0. Concerned Chief engineer (Civil) was, therefore, asked to appear in Court to ascertain the availability of water in Phase-Ill of Rohini. The Chief Engineer explained that as of November, 2001, against requirements of two million gallons of water at present only 0. 20 to 0. 30 million gallons are available for half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the evening. It was also stated that situation could not be retrieved by boring of tubewells on account of ground water level having gone down. Accordingly, it was stated that the only option was to augment the regular supply through municipal lines. It was stated that certain diversion of supplies was expected from Haryana. The expected demand once there is habitation would further grow. In the present scenario, restricted availability of water for few hours in a day has become the norm in the metro. Hence shortage or restricted supply is not to be equated with non-provision or absence of amenity. The availability of amenities on the dates indicated in the affidavits above is accepted as there is nothing contrary on record. ( 30 ) IN these circumstances, the Commissioner (Housing) was directed to file a fresh computation of the disposal cost plus interest which the DDA should charge in these special circumstances. The DDA has placed on record, its policy of deferment in cases of absence of provision of basic amenities. It has been stated, as per the policy, payments of monthly instalments of allottees on hire purchase was: deferred till the basic amenities were made available. As regards cases qua allotment on ownership basis, the price is split into two parts of 50% each. Rebate from interest is sought to be given by the DDA on 50% of the price till the amenities and services were made available. On the balance 50%, interest would be payable as per policy. The net position being that on 50% of the price, no interest would be charged till the provision of amenities while for remaining 50%, interest would be charged. On a consideration of the policy and the computation as filed, it is seen that the amount payable by the allottees on the basis of cost plus interest even exceeds the price at which allotment can be offered at the current cost. For instance, for Sector 22, pocket 12, Type-A, Rohini, the amount payable works out to Rs. On a consideration of the policy and the computation as filed, it is seen that the amount payable by the allottees on the basis of cost plus interest even exceeds the price at which allotment can be offered at the current cost. For instance, for Sector 22, pocket 12, Type-A, Rohini, the amount payable works out to Rs. 5,26,200/- while on current cost it works out to Rs. 5,15,000/ similarly for Sector 21, Pocket IV, Type-A, rohini, the amount payable works out to Rs. 5,16,500/- as against the current cost of Rs. 5,01,200/ -. In these circumstances, the petitioners sought time to obtain instructions on whether they would like to avail of the j offer made by DDA on availing of the benefit of allotment at current costs. Learned counsel for the petitioners indicated that the petitioners were not interested in availing of the benefit of the current cost rather they would invite a decision on merit on their challenge to the right of DDA to revise prices. ( 31 ) I am of the view that in view of the- foregoing discussions, judicial pronouncements in Sheelawanti (supra) and pushpinder Jain (supra) as also in K. Bhattacharjee v. ODA reported at 63 (1996) DLF. 467 (a decision on the Division bench), the challenge to the right of the DDA to revise the price in the instant case fails. Moreover, the increase has not been shown to be arbitrary or whimsical or based on any irrational criteria. In K. Bhattacharjee v. DDA (supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that an obligation to hand over possession of the flat arises only on payment being made consistently with the terms of the scheme and the letter of allotment. Further the allottee cannot withhold payment until the DDA delivers the possession of the flat to him. It is the other way round. He has to make the payment and then only insist on possession being delivered of the allotted flat. The Divisio n Bench further held that while taking possession the allottees would have every right to insist on the flat being habitable and fit for human residence. If the DDA fails in discharging its such obligation, two courses are open to the allottee. The Divisio n Bench further held that while taking possession the allottees would have every right to insist on the flat being habitable and fit for human residence. If the DDA fails in discharging its such obligation, two courses are open to the allottee. He may put an end to the contract and seek a refund of the amount paid by him, also hold DDA liable for breach of contract, or he may take delivery of possess on and then compel performance by the DDA of its unfulfilled obligations. In other words, it was held that the allottees could not withhold payment. ( 32 ) IN the instant case, while the houses stood constructed, the allottees have not made any payment except the registration amount and in some cases, the confirmation amount. The respondent-DDA in accordance with their uniform policy, offered the rebate of not charging interest on the 50% of the amount due till the date amenities and services were made available. Not only this, DDA also made a concession of offering in the alternative houses at current cost which was lower then the amount which works out on the disposal cost, as per the allotment-cum-demand letter with interest. The rate of interest being charged is also 12% as against 18% stipulated under the allotment-cum-demand. DDA even offered to make available its good officer for. getting the finance to the allottees/purchases through nationalised banks and for that purpose was willing to consider execution of a tripartite agreement in this regard. Counsel for the petitioners, however, did not accept the offer. ( 33 ) DDA s counsel also during the course of submissions submitted that since the petitioners were unwilling buyers and not willing to take the concession offered in terms of current costs. DDA should be permitted to withdraw the said offer. As DDA cannot absolve itself of the responsibility qua the allottees for provision of amenities, I am of the view that further time should be given to the petitioners to accept the offer made by dda. ( 34 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petitions have no merit in so as challenge -to the revision in disposal cost is concerned and the same fails. ( 34 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petitions have no merit in so as challenge -to the revision in disposal cost is concerned and the same fails. The writ petitions are disposed of with the directions that the petitioners shall pay interest on 12% Per annum on 50% of the amount from the date of allotment-cum-demand and at 100% of the amount from the date the amenities were made available. In the alternative, the petitioners could also opt. Within a period of 45 days, for payment on the basis of current cost and to avail of the said offer.